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ABSTRACT
The inverse relationship between farm size and productivity is 
widely accepted as a "stylised fact" of agriculture in developing 
countries, a generalised phenomenon observed in widely differing 
agro-climatic conditions and agrarian structures. This thesis 
uses primary fieldwork data to examine the factors which give 
rise to such a relationship, and the impact of economic and 
technological change on the inverse relationship in the context 
of Egyptian agriculture.
The significance of the inverse relationship as a crucial 
developmental issue cannot be overemphasised. The inverse 
relationship constitutes a major component of the economic 
rationale for redistributive land reform, and has obvious 
importance for policy issues concerning land reorganization.
Part one critically discusses the inverse relationship debate, 
with particular emphasis on India, as an essential preliminary 
analysis to the examination of the Egyptian situation. The Indian 
literature on the inverse relationship is by far the most 
extensive, and it is within this debate that most of the 
analytical approaches to the inverse relationship have 
originated.
The second, core part of the thesis uses fieldwork data from 
rural Egypt (an extensive 18-village survey conducted by the ILO 
in 197 6 and the author's own intensive 2-village survey conducted 
in 1990) to support a new political economy approach to 
understanding the factors behind the inverse relationship and to 
examine how the inverse relationship breaks down in the dynamic 
context.
We show that in the static context, the inverse relationship 
arises from the economic compulsions to which poor peasants are 
subject within a relatively backward agriculture. Redistribution 
of land on the basis of the inverse relationship argument 
therefore, will only deepen and perpetuate these conditions.
Furthermore, in the dynamic context of technological change, the 
inverse relationship will disappear. The inverse relationship 
argument for redistributive land reform no longer has any 
rationale in the context of changing production conditions.
Ill
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1INTRODUCTION 
The present study: nature and rationale
The inverse relationship between farm size and farm productivity 
is widely accepted as a “stylised fact" of agriculture in 
developing countries, a generalised phenomenon observed in many 
countries characterised by widely differing agro-climatic 
conditions, agrarian structures and cropping patterns. This 
thesis uses primary fieldwork data to examine both the factors 
which give rise to such a relationship, and the impact of 
economic and technological change on the inverse relationship in 
the context of Egyptian agriculture.
The significance of the inverse relationship as a crucial 
developmental issue cannot be overemphasised. It is important not 
only in terms of the debate surrounding economies/diseconomies 
of scale, but because land ownership in backward agriculture is 
practically synonymous with control of labour, wealth, and social 
and political power. The inverse relationship constitutes a major 
component of the economic rationale for redistributive land 
reform, and has obvious importance for policy issues such as 
cooperative and other forms of land reorganization, involving 
discussion of factors such as market imperfections and the 
institutional framework of traditional agriculture.
This thesis is in two parts. Part one, comprising the first six 
chapters, critically discusses the inverse relationship debate,
2with particular emphasis on India. The Indian literature on the 
inverse relationship is by far the most extensive, and it is 
within this debate that most of the analytical approaches to the 
inverse relationship have originated, even if only embryonically. 
These chapters are more than simply a review of the literature. 
Both the treatment of the Indian literature in Chapters I to V, 
and that of Berry and Cline (which surveys a wider range of 
empirical material) in Chapter VI are intended as contributions 
in their own right and as an essential preliminary analysis to 
the examination of the Egyptian situation.
The second, core part of the thesis uses fieldwork data from 
rural Egypt (both an extensive 18-village survey conducted by the 
ILO in 197 6 and the author's own intensive 2-village survey 
conducted in 1990) to support a new political economy approach 
to understanding the factors behind the inverse relationship and 
to examine how the inverse relationship breaks down in the 
dynamic context.
Chapter I discusses the nature and extent of the evidence for an 
inverse relationship in the agrarian sector of developing 
countries, and the suggested policy implications of such a 
relationship. We are not attempting here a comprehensive 
treatment of the range of evidence; rather a statement which 
captures the widespread existence of such a relationship, in 
order to set the context for the core part of the thesis, 
relating to Egypt. We concentrate here on the Indian debate as 
it has been the by far the most intensive and prolonged.
2We demonstrate that the suggested policy implications are heavily 
dependent on a number of unconvincing assumptions. They are also 
dependent on a particular theoretical perspective on the inverse 
relationship. Nevertheless, these implications of the inverse 
relationship, accepted at face value and without critical 
examination of its nature or causal factors, are subject to 
severe qualifications. Any positive impact may be severely 
constrained by efficiency considerations relating to minimum 
feasible farm size, input availability, dynamic general 
equilibrium effects on saving, investment and employment, and the 
nature of technical and social change in agriculture. After 
examining the causal explanations for the inverse relationship 
and placing it in the context of agrarian transition in later 
chapters, however, we shall see that the inverse relationship 
rationale for redistributive land reform disappears.
Chapter II clarifies the issues involved with a detailed 
examination of the major conceptual, statistical and 
methodological problems associated with the inverse relationship 
debate. Neither the existence of the inverse relationship, nor 
its implications, have gone unchallenged. Indeed, Amartya Sen, 
who is regarded as the prime mover of the debate, was one of the 
first to admit that the inverse relationship was by no means a 
well established fact and had not been proven beyond the 
legitimate doubts of exacting statisticians.
The necessity for care in interpreting the inverse relationship 
findings is imposed by a number of important conceptual,
4statistical and methodological problems associated with the data. 
Classification by farm-size implies that the characteristics of 
a farm depend predominantly on its belonging to a certain size- 
group. Size of farm however is a very general variable and to 
treat it as the only significant parameter would be a mistake. 
Other significant problems include the level of aggregation of 
the data, and the use of OLS regression techniques on grouped 
data.
Despite these problems, the inverse relationship has been 
confirmed in Indian agriculture at the time during which the 
studies cited in this chapter were conducted, and its statistical 
validity has been adequately established by an analysis of the 
disaggregated data. It is not necessarily, however, a phenomenon 
that will persist indefinitely. Clearly the inverse relationship 
is a phenomenon that needs to be explained, and not explained 
away by "exacting statisticians".
A number of conjoint relationships are revealed by the various 
studies mentioned, involving other factors of production besides 
land. These relationships tend to be clustered, suggesting some 
a priori explanations for the inverse relationship along factor- 
intensity lines. This sets the context for a critical examination 
of the major theoretical explanations of the inverse relationship 
in the following four chapters.
Chapter III turns to the theoretical debate with a critique of 
those explanations of the inverse relationship which attempt to
5.
explain the inverse relationship in terms of qualitative factor 
differences between farm-size categories. It is postulated that 
small farm-size categories, however they may be defined, utilize 
qualitatively superior factors of production, either in terms of 
physical resources such as soil quality and irrigation, or in 
terms of management, labour, and production technique. The main 
thrust of such an approach has been to explain why such factors 
are concentrated on small farms.
We demonstrate in this chapter that the explanations of the 
inverse relationship based on qualitative factor differences are 
severely flawed. The various approaches are both theoretically 
inadequate and their assumptions remain unsupported by the 
empirical evidence. The essentially untestable hypotheses 
relating to superior management on small farms rest on an 
uncritical acceptance of the inverse relationship data, relying 
on a residual hypothesis tested by weak and unreliable proxy 
variables without consideration of other factors which a more 
critical analysis of the data suggests are important.
The alternative hypothesis concerning differentials in land or 
soil quality between farm sizes rests on conceptual confusion 
over the meaning of fertility and on the distinction that must 
be made between the macro and micro levels of aggregation. At 
best, indirect and imprecise data have been used to support a 
priori reasoning which neglects factors which would tend to 
undermine the hypothesis.
6.
Chapter IV continues the theoretical critique with an examination 
of those explanations based on differential factor input 
intensities between farm size categories, comprising a range of 
variant cheap labour theories. This approach postulates that 
small farms apply production inputs, especially land and labour, 
more intensively in cultivation. The debate has centred around 
Amartya Sen's model which postulates different behavioural 
strategies as between farm-size categories. A more explicitly 
neoclassical variant of this approach will also be discussed.
Clearly, the empirical evidence does on the whole provide support 
for an explanation of the inverse relationship based on factor 
intensities, and in particular, a labour-based explanation. The 
clustering of empirical relationships around cropping intensities 
and labour input intensities (the latter subsuming capital and 
irrigation factors) in association with the inverse relationship 
finding certainly justifies the focus on patterns of labour use.
However, the models presented in this chapter which attempt to 
explain how the inverse relationship is generated via labour 
utilisation are theoretically flawed while crucial elements in 
their underlying assumptions are also subject to empirical 
refutation. The critical problems arise from the production 
function methodology employed. Conceptually, these approaches 
depend on a spurious calculus involving the marginal product of 
labour and the wage rate. As we will see, the former is an 
operationally useless concept in agricultural production, while 
the latter is only one and probably not the most important
1variable taken into account in determining labour use. The 
question must encompass a more complex set of market and non- 
market relations than the suggested behavioural assumptions 
incorporated in the models allow.
These essentially static choice-theoretic frameworks have proven 
to be seriously defective. This would suggest that the framework 
of analysis is inappropriate. There is clearly a need to go 
beyond farm size as the relevant stratifying variable to examine 
the underlying relations and forces of production.
Chapter V turns to an examination of the inverse relationship in 
the context of agrarian transition, and attempts to transcend the 
limitations of the debate. We present a new approach to 
explaining the existence of an inverse relationship within a 
political economy perspective, and show how in the dynamic 
context, the inverse relationship breaks down.
We propose an alternative class-based approach to understanding 
the inverse relationship. This class-based approach proceeds from 
the proposition that the peasant farm is embedded in the socio­
economic context of an emerging capitalist agriculture in which 
however, non-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation are still 
prevalent. Where capitalist farming is emerging out of a semi- 
feudal agriculture, the coexistence of both the modes shapes the 
labour market, while the characteristics of the labour market 
itself influence the form and process of transition.
8The class-based approach attempts to locate farm size within a 
class matrix. The fundamental determinants of factor-use 
intensities are the nexus of property rights and tenurial 
conditions that shape market characteristics, resource 
endowments, and the nature and extent of market participation by 
different peasant strata. Within the process of peasant 
differentiation, poor peasants end up with smaller and smaller 
below-subsistence plots of land, and are forced to intensify 
cropping intensity and labour input in order to achieve 
subsistence levels of income. This stratum of poor peasants may 
also be characterised by compulsive market involvement or "forced 
commerce". Exploitative relations of production and exchange, 
with landlords, merchants and moneylenders extracting surplus via 
high rents, usury and price wedges, either singly or conjointly, 
compel poor peasants to achieve higher than average yields, 
market a high proportion of high-value cash crops, and sell 
labour off-farm in order to pay off cash and debt obligations as 
well as reach subsistence income.
In those areas where we find an inverse relationship, it is the 
case that all farm sizes have access to a more or less similar 
technology. Large and small farms use the same set of production 
inputs, and the small farms achieve higher output per acre via 
higher cropping intensity and higher application of labour effort 
per acre. With the introduction of a new technology which favours 
large farms due to its associated economies of scale, the so- 
called advantage which the small farms have with respect to 
labour input intensity, may be matched or more than matched by
9.
the new advantages which large farms have with respect to 
technology. In this situation, we might expect the inverse 
relationship to break down and eventually disappear, and with it 
part of the case for redistributive land reform.
Chapter VI rounds off the first part of the thesis with a 
critique of what is regarded by many authors as the definitive 
theoretical and empirical study of the inverse relationship: that 
of Berry and Cline. This chapter too, is not presented merely in 
terms of a review of the literature. The rigorous statistical 
treatment of the Berry and Cline data, which has been so 
influential, is offered as a contribution to the debate in its 
own right.
We devote a chapter to this study for three reasons. The first 
is because it allows a more general treatment of the inverse 
relationship result than we have attempted so far. Secondly, it 
displays serious methodological shortcomings which need to be 
addressed. And finally, such a chapter constitutes a useful 
bridge into the second part of the thesis, which relates to a 
country other than India: Egypt.
The main policy conclusion presented by Berry and Cline, of an 
equalising distribution of land towards the small farm sector, 
is both crude and simplistic, and requires a number of 
unrealistic assumptions to hold. They are further rendered 
baseless by inadequate theoretical and empirical support. The 
aggregate nature of most of the empirical evidence leads to an
10
inevitable confusion between the macro and micro level inverse 
relationships which are of entirely different import. This 
applies particularly to the cross-country data, but also to most 
of the individual country case studies. Certainly, such data is 
an inadequate basis for testing the hypotheses concerning market 
imperfections.
The theoretical framework chosen by the authors, that of 
differential factor prices and imperfect markets, is both 
logically flawed and not supported by the evidence. Further, 
where it does have some validity, however inadequate, it actually 
undermines its own purpose. The so-called market imperfections 
adduced would seem more appropriate to explaining why the inverse 
relationship might be expected to disappear in the long-run 
rather than explaining the existence of an inverse relationship.
Chapter VII turns to the core part of the thesis with a critical 
survey of the inverse relationship debate in the Egyptian 
context. We examine the nature and range of evidence for an 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in the 
Egyptian countryside. In contrast with the extensive Indian 
literature on the inverse relationship is the rather meagre 
resonance that the debate has had in Egypt. This relative 
paucity, however, has not prevented calls by several writers for 
redistributive land reform in the Egyptian countryside. The 
Egyptian evidence ranges from simple assertion, by invoking the 
authority of Berry and Cline, to full-scale field studies.
11
The studies examined in this chapter present apparently strong, 
but contradictory evidence on the relationship between farm size 
and productivity, with some contributors supporting the existence 
of an inverse relationship while others vehemently deny its 
existence. However, all the participants in the Egyptian debate 
reveal crucial conceptual and methodological flaws in their 
analyses, echoing many of the errors and misconceptions we have 
examined in the previous six chapters. It is important to 
consider these in some detail since they are flaws which recur 
wherever the inverse relationship has been examined and 
discussed. We draw heavily on the critical analysis of the debate 
surrounding the inverse relationship which we have discussed 
thoroughly in the previous six chapters.
Nevertheless, these inconclusive and partial results do suggest 
that the inverse relationship may be an important phenomenon in 
rural Egypt, although not in the way conceived of by the authors 
looked at in this chapter.
Chapter VIII identifies the central features of the political 
economy of the Egyptian countryside, as a necessary prelude to 
discussion of the fieldwork data. We consider some of the central 
features of the political economy of the Egyptian countryside, 
which have been identified by other researchers and which are 
central to our own analysis. In other words, we here survey the 
evidence with respect to the mechanisms and institutions which 
have been central to rich peasant dominance in contemporary 
Egypt. This is an important prelude to the treatment of the ILO
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data and the author's study villages in the following chapters. 
As we shall see, the influences identified in this chapter were 
crucial in the study villages, both with respect to the causal 
factors behind the inverse relationship and to its disappearance.
We shall see that despite significant land reform measures, 
important elements of semi-feudal agriculture remain strong: 
sharecropping tenancy, personalised oral contracts, and an 
indebted poor peasantry. Access to land and resources lies 
through the patronage of the rich peasants and those landlords 
who managed to evade land reform legislation. This is the 
environment, the matrix of exploitative relationships, in which 
the inverse relationship flourishes.
Our hypothesis is that in the early stages of transition, 
institutional biases act strongly in favour of the larger 
farmers. Several studies show that the main beneficiaries of the 
land reform legislation, and subsequently, the cooperative and 
rural credit system in Egypt were the rich farmers. The control 
of the latter by the rich peasantry, those owning over ten 
feddans of land, ensured their dominance with respect to the 
diffusion of the new technology. While at an earlier stage, 
intrinsic advantages of scale are not unimportant, these become 
increasingly significant over time, enabling the large farmers 
to maintain relatively high investment and growth rates . In this 
two stage process, the first impact of agrarian transition is the 
weakening and disappearance of the inverse relationship. Later,
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when scale advantages operate for a substantial length of time 
the relation turns significantly positive.
Chapter IX employs an extensive ILO data set covering 18 villages 
in 6 regions of Egypt to show a more complex and heterogeneous 
pattern of the relationship between farm size and productivity. 
We subject the data used by Radwan and Lee in their 198 6 study 
to much closer examination, in order to discover the nature and 
extent of the inverse relationship in the Egyptian countryside, 
and its relationship to technological change. This will provide 
a stronger empirical support for our hypotheses. Then, in the 
following chapter, we can explore, at the more disaggregated 
level of individual villages, just why such an inverse 
relationship exists, where it exists, and how it is changing.
Analysis of the data at a more disaggregated level produces 
results at variance with widely held views on the size- 
productivity relation. We find in the Egyptian rural sector 
striking parallels with the process of agrarian transition in 
India, with regard to the technological factors. The 
heterogeneous pattern of technological change in Egyptian 
agriculture is mirrored by the pattern of occurrence of an 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. Where 
technical change in agriculture is at a relatively undeveloped 
stage, we appear to have evidence of a significant inverse 
relationship. In those regions where technical change is 
relatively more advanced, the inverse relationship is absent. We 
can advance the hypothesis, on the basis of the evidence in
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previous chapters, that technical change in these latter regions 
has led to the breakdown of a previously existent inverse 
relationship.
Finally in Chapter X, intensive village fieldwork data from 1990, 
collected by the author, is used to provide support for the 
political economy approach to explaining the inverse relationship 
and its breakdown in the Egyptian context. In order to test the 
various hypotheses associated with the inverse relationship, two 
village surveys were carried out in the summer of 1990. On the 
basis of the results from the ILO data, a village (Higaza al- 
Qibli) was chosen from Qena governorate which was expected to 
show a positive relationship between farm size and productivity. 
A second village (Shubak al-Sharqi) was chosen from Giza 
governorate which was expected to shed light on the inverse 
relationship.
Land reform in Shubak has created a situation in which relatively 
little social differentiation and elite land accumulation has 
occurred. Thus, land reform has actually had the effect of 
slowing down capital accumulation, inhibiting saving and 
investment. Shubak is characterised by small scattered land 
possessions prohibiting the application of modern technology and 
leading to the fragile formation of capitalism. Land 
fragmentation has weakened the ability of large farmers to adopt 
new agricultural methods, slowing down the intensification of 
capital utilization. Significant elements of semi-feudal 
agriculture remain to provide the compulsions driving poor
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farmers to intensify land and labour use, thus generating an 
inverse relationship.
The village is dominated by middle and rich peasant farms which 
have not developed into capitalist farmers. These farms are not 
fully commercialised and operate with essentially the same 
techniques of production as the poor farmers with less than three 
feddans of land. Clearly, the evidence from Shubak shows us that 
the larger farmers are not qualitatively different from smaller 
farmers, but only quantitatively differentiated.
In contradistinction, Higaza clearly falls into a capitalist path 
category. This village has a relatively greater concentration of 
land, a larger area and population, and higher levels of new 
technology use, particularly mechanization. The cooperative 
system was dominated by the rich peasants allowing the large 
farms to accumulate land and other means of production such as 
machinery. Thus, Higaza has exhibited a different outcome with 
increased social differentiation and the potential disappearance 
of the small farmer rather than his survival.
Higaza has also benefited from development efforts in the form 
of loans for machinery and other modern inputs because of its 
integration into an industrialised agriculture dominated by sugar 
capital. The mode of production has changed because capital has 
penetrated the village and changed the system of production 
instead of being merely externally imposed via market relations. 
The middle and rich peasant family farms have given way to
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capitalist enterprises organized by the family, but based on wage 
labour and capitalist accumulation, manifested in the intensive 
use of machine inputs.
The 'traverse' from Giza to Qena, representing a development of 
the forces of production both determines and is determined by the 
development of the relations of production. In particular, rich 
peasants, either as proto- or fully-developed capitalist farmers 
monopolise productive resources and dominate access to the new 
technology through their control of the cooperative and rural 
credit systems. The utilization of this new technology 
accelerates rich peasant accumulation and deepens the process of 
social differentiation. The productivity advantages thus gained 
lead to a reversal in the size-productivity relationship 
characteristic of a relatively backward agriculture.
In conclusion, we show through both theoretical critique and 
empirical analysis, that in the static context, the inverse 
relationship is not the product of superior efficiency on the 
part of small farms nor is it due to better quality land on the 
small farms, but arises from the desperate struggle of poor 
peasants for survival on below-subsistence plots of land in a 
relatively backward agriculture, and the matrix of exploitative 
relations within which they operate. Redistribution of land on 
the basis of the inverse relation argument therefore, far from 
alleviating poverty and creating employment opportunities, will 
only deepen and perpetuate extreme levels of exploitation and 
poverty. Furthermore, in the dynamic context of the development
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of the forces of production, in the shape of Green Revolution 
technology, the inverse relationship is likely to disappear. The 
inverse relationship argument for redistributive land reform no 
longer has any rationale in the context of changing production 
conditions.
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CHAPTER I 
The range of evidence for an inverse relationship and its 
apparent policy implications. 
Introduction
The empirical evidence for the existence of an inverse 
relationship between farm size and farm productivity1 is both 
historically and geographically widespread, ranging from pre­
revolutionary Russia and China to contemporary poor countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. Indeed, the inverse relationship 
is widely regarded as a "stylised fact" of traditional 
agriculture [Bardhan, 1973: 1370], a generalised phenomenon 
observed in many developing countries characterised by widely 
different agro-climatic conditions, agrarian structures and 
cropping patterns [Cornia, 1985: 514-5; Ghose, 1979: 27] . Section
1.1 presents a brief survey of the range of empirical evidence 
for such an inverse relationship. Clearly, we are not attempting 
a comprehensive treatment of the range of evidence; rather a 
statement which captures the widespread existence of such a 
relationship, in order to set the context for the core part of 
the thesis, relating to Egypt.
The significance of the inverse relationship as a crucial 
developmental issue cannot be overemphasised. It is important not
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only in terms of the debate surrounding economies/diseconomies 
of scale, but because land ownership in backward agriculture is 
practically synonymous with control of labour, wealth, and social 
and political power [Bachman & Christensen, 1967: 263] . Such a 
relationship has obvious importance for policy issues such as 
land ceilings and redistribution, as well as cooperative and 
other forms of land reorganization, involving discussion of 
factors such as market imperfections and the institutional 
framework of traditional agriculture [Bardhan, 1973: 1371]. We 
will consider some apparent policy implications in section 1.2. 
Section 1.3 engages critically with the assumptions behind such 
policy implications, and attempts to qualify their validity.
1.1 The range of evidence, with an emphasis on India
The modern debate surrounding the inverse relationship begins 
with the Indian Farm Management Studies (FMS) of the mid-1950s. 
This comprises a large theoretical and empirical literature which 
came into being due to the existence of a large body of data in 
the Farm Management Studies of the 1950s.2 However, there are a 
number of important precursors of the Indian evidence and a range 
of other notable references from other countries. An inverse 
relationship can clearly be seen in data for both pre­
revolutionary Russia and China. Roy [1979: 1] notes that the 
relative productive superiority of large farms versus small farms 
lay at the core of the controversy between Lenin and the 
Narodniki (the latter position later supported by Chayanov and
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the Organization of Production School). This is the case in as 
much as the identification of large farms as capitalist and 
smallholdings as peasant family farms is made. Interestingly, 
however, while the zemstvo data do support the existence of an 
inverse relation, neither Lenin nor Chayanov mention its 
existence in Russia.3
While the earlier Russian debate on the relative efficiency of 
small farms and large farms stressed the historical perspective 
in the transition to capitalist agriculture, the more recent
debate emphasises microeconomic analysis. Bauer, in his 1948
study of the rubber industry in Malaya, the Netherlands East 
Indies and Sarawak makes the following observation: "In the
choice of planting density the rational course is not the same
for estates and for smallholdings. The latter incur no cash wage 
costs, being operated by the owner and his family, occasionally 
assisted by outside labour paid on a share basis. The 
smallholders attempt to maximise the gross yield per surface 
unit. On their densely planted holdings the trees are of smaller 
girth and the yield per tree lower than on the estates, but the 
yield per surface unit is higher. In Malaya and NEI normal, 
unrestricted yields on smallholdings are about 475-500 lb. per 
mature acre, against some 400 lb. on seedling estates" [1946: 
131] .4 This is corroborated by Bevan in his 1962 study of rubber 
smallholdings in the coastal area of Selangar, Malaya, who finds 
slightly larger yields per acre on the smaller farms [Bachman & 
Christensen, 1967: 247} .5
21
Cornia's study of fifteen developing countries found that output 
per acre systematically declines with increasing farm size in all 
countries except Bangladesh and Peru [1985: 517-523]6. We cite 
Cornia's evidence in full in Table 1 in Appendix A in order to 
show the precise basis for the statement. Evidence exists also 
for the following countries: Poland7, Iran8, Indonesia9,
Pakistan10, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala11, Korea12, Sri 
Lanka13, Thailand14, Mexico15, Brazil16, Kenya17, Philippines, 
Colombia, Malaysia, Egypt, and others18. In Chapter VI, we 
critically examine what is regarded by some writers as the major 
empirical contribution to the debate over the inverse relation, 
that of Berry and Cline [1979] , in the light of the observations 
and discussion in Chapters I to V.
Central to the modern Indian debate on farm size and productivity 
is the 17-volume Farm Management Studies (FMS) data collected by 
the Directorate of Economics and Statistics and the Research 
Programmes Committee over three years: 1954-5, 1955-6 and 1956-7. 
The FMS data covered 2,962 farms in six typical regions of India: 
Punjab, West Bengal, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Madras and Madhya 
Pradesh.19 The studies adopted a multi-stage stratified random 
sampling procedure with villages as the primary unit and 
operational holding as the ultimate unit. Within each state, two 
contiguous districts were selected to represent typical soil-crop 
complexes and major cropping patterns. Each district was divided 
into two fairly homogeneous zones and 16 villages were selected 
at random with a probability proportional to respective 
populations engaged in cultivation (in each district, 10 villages
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were studied under the intensive cost-accounting method and ten 
by the sample survey method, with four of these studied by both 
alternative methods: thus, 16 villages per district).20
Selection of operational holdings was carried out by size ranking 
within each village, and holdings were selected with equal 
probability from one of five equal size groups. Altogether, 1,096 
farms (37% of holdings) were studied by the cost-accounting 
method. Information was collected concerning village area, 
population, livestock, soil type, climatic conditions, land 
utilization, demographic characteristics, operating costs, 
maintenance of livestock, purchase/sale of output, and yields, 
with all variables measured in annual flows and values measured 
in 1954-5 rupees.21
The Indian debate proper begins with Sen's seminal 1962 article 
in the Economic Weekly [Sen, 1962]. There he notes the following 
observations: "I: When family labour employed in agriculture is 
given an 'imputed value' in terms of the ruling wage rate, much 
of Indian agriculture seems unremunerative...II: By and large, 
the 'profitability' of agriculture increases with the size of 
holding, 'profitability' being measured by the surplus (or 
deficit) of output over costs including the imputed value of 
labour...Ill: By and large, productivity per acre decreases with 
the size of holding." Sen further notes that this latter trend 
holds in most areas for value-added too. We cite the statistical 
basis for Sen's argument in Table 2, Appendix A.
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In the Indian context, precursors to Sen include Charan Singh,22 
Raj Krishna23 and E.J. Long24. Long concludes that the data 
"clearly calls into question the supposition in much land reform 
discussion that large farms are more 'efficient' than small 
farms" [1961: 118], Bachman and Christensen take this further, 
citing Mann who finds generally higher output per acre on small 
family farms than on the large cooperative farms in Punjab [1967: 
245] ,25
Khusro [1964] and Bharadwaj [1974a] carry out more detailed 
studies using OLS regression techniques on the grouped FMS data. 
Table 3 in Appendix A [from Bharadwaj, 1974a: 92] lists the OLS 
regression coefficients for yields per acre on farm size for the 
entire data set.26 While all regression coefficients are 
negative, not all are statistically significant. Khusro [1964: 
59] finds no exception to an inverse relation in all seven 
states.27 Khusro concludes: "It is this consistently recurring
phenomenon of declining slopes in all seven States without 
exception that lends itself to the generalization that in Indian 
farming of the 1950s gross output per acre declines with an 
increase in farm size" [1964: 54]. Khusro then averages these 
results for all India: "the sceptical reader who refuses to
accept this average as valid for the country or for the States 
in question can think of it as an average for the farms studied 
in the FMS survey" [1964: 60, fn. 6].28 The constant generation 
and analysis of data since then continues to confirm the finding 
of an inverse relationship.29
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Let us conclude this section with a statement that encapsulates 
the pervasiveness of the inverse relationship phenomenon by one 
of the principal contributors to the debate: " A striking
feature of the agricultural systems of virtually all poor 
countries is that yields per acre rise as average farm size 
declines. That is, the smaller the farm, the greater the average 
productivity of land. Conversely, the larger the farm, the 
greater the average productivity of labour. Since land is usually 
the factor in most acute shortage, the farms with the highest 
yields per acre are normally the most efficient. Even in 
countries where the average farm is very small, such as in India, 
it has been demonstrated that those farms which are smaller than 
average are economically the most efficient" [Griffin, 1974: 
228] .30
1.2 Some apparent policy implications
The apparent implications of such a relationship constitute a 
major component of the economic rationale for redistributive land 
reform and a small farm bias in agricultural development 
strategy.
The inverse relationship between farm size and productivity has 
fundamental significance for economic policy, particularly the 
choice between small peasant family farms, large capitalist 
farms, and large cooperatives [Chattopadhyay & Rudra, 1976: 
A115] . An apparent implication is that a land reform which
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results in smaller units of management in agriculture would both 
reduce inequality and increase total output [Griffin, 1974: 228] . 
Cornia [1985: 532] writes: "Because of the demonstrated
superiority of small vis-a-vis large farming, land redistribution 
would have, if thoroughly implemented, immediate beneficial 
effects in terms of output growth, enhanced income distribution 
and, as a result, of alleviation of rural poverty. It would also 
bring about a resource use more in line with the factor endowment 
of developing countries by increasing labour absorption...while 
forestalling premature labour-displacing mechanization."
In Paglin's view, citing the Japanese experience, large farms 
constitute a source of unexploited land resources that could be 
used to expand output and provide additional employment [1965: 
829] . While Ghose [1979: 39] claims that the inverse relation 
demonstrates the static superiority of small-scale over large- 
scale production, Griffin takes the argument further: "It is also 
possible to argue... that in certain circumstances an agrarian 
reform would lead to an acceleration in the rate of growth of 
output, i.e. to cumulative gains" [1974: 228].
In India, the alleged relationship apparently strengthened the 
case of those arguing in favour of the small farm, as against 
those advocating the relaxation of ceiling laws. In particular, 
a section of opinion which, at one time backed the idea of 
cooperatives for overcoming diseconomies of scale of small farms, 
found it easier to accept the failure of the cooperative movement 
in the light of the observed finding that small farms were not
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so inefficient [Rudra, 1968a: 1041]. Chattopadhyay and Rudra
[1976: A115] write: "Many erstwhile supporters of the cooperative 
movement have now turned into supporters of peasant farming, 
drawing consolation from the thought that large-scale farming is 
not after all necessary for dynamism in agriculture."
Dorner [1974: 119] stresses the productive and labour-absorptive 
capacity inherent in a small-farm system in providing more 
employment, a more equitable distribution of income (at least in 
the early stages of development) , and a more relevant demand 
structure for the growing manufacturing sector. Lipton agrees 
that secondary demand for labour-intensive non-farm commodities, 
and therefore rural non-farm growth,31 is relatively greater 
where land is more equally distributed. He also claims that land 
redistribution also redistributes the supply of and demand for 
credit and labour [1993b: 649].
For Lipton, the validity of the "really rather pervasive" [1993b: 
650] inverse relationship at market prices "does make the static 
case for redistributive land reform" [1993b: 645] .32 Lipton
[1993b: 642-3] argues that land redistribution to the poor can 
accelerate and equalize the long-run institutional outcomes of 
factor and product markets, technologies and power structures, 
but to achieve its aims, land reform requires institutions that 
render those aims incentive compatible. Reforms also need to be 
power compatible (allowing small farmers to mobilize politically 
around labour-intensive small-sale agriculture.
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Lipton [1993b: 653] mentions three ways of asset enhancement for 
the poor: classical land reform via ceilings and confiscation; 
"new wave" decentralised market shifts of land to small farmers 
to be achieved more by market or tax incentives rather than 
through ceilings legislation and confiscation {the latter to be 
done by NGOs or local government rather than the central state; 
and regional rural development to steer resources to the poor. 
The primary motivation is to reduce poverty by land transfers to 
the poor that shift rural income, or power, toward poorer (not 
necessarily the poorest) rural groups, thereby reducing 
inequality: "A change is a land reform if and only if it enriches 
or empowers the rural poor by transferring substantial land 
rights to them" [1993b: 644] .
Lipton [1974: 304] regards small farms as "superior" because they 
select both higher labour intensity and produce higher output per 
acre and output per unit of capital, thereby economising on what 
poor countries are short of (land and capital), absorbing idle 
resources (labour), and producing more of what is needed (food). 
Dorner [1974: 119] adds that under conditions of abundant rural 
labour and continuous population growth, productivity per unit 
of land will be the most relevant measure for policy purposes for 
the next several decades.
In view of these factor endowments, agriculture and the rural 
sector appear to offer the potential for generating livelihoods 
while increasing social returns to scarce capital resources, 
provided more labour-intensive policies and growth paths are
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followed [Lipton and Lipton, 1993: 1523]. In the South African 
context, Lipton writes that the prospects for more labour- 
intensive, small-scale farming are critically dependent on 
whether South Africa successfully reorients its research capacity 
toward resolving the technical problems involved in such farming: 
"Experience elsewhere suggests that it is important, early in a 
transition, to design a smallholder-responsive research and 
technology strategy, to ensure its stable domestic financing" 
[1993: 1535j. The technology available to black smallholders
needs to be transformed by research and geared to the creation 
of productive work rather than to labour-replacing mechanization 
[1993: 1523] .33
The further claim is made that small-scale farming can be modern, 
scientific and profitable [Lipton & Lipton, 1993: 1524], and that 
land-saving technologies can usually be applied equally well and 
efficiently on small farms [Dorner, 1974: 119] . Thus, labour-
intensity in modern agriculture does not mean drudgery and 
backward technology: rather it means providing extra physical and 
human capital to increase productivity (tubewells, HYVs etc.) 
[Lipton & Lipton, 1993: 1524-5]. New farmers must be supplied
with support services and infrastructure and should be drawn from 
those with farming skills [Lipton & Lipton, 1993: 1527] . However, 
while special aid to small farmers (credit, input subsidies etc.) 
to shift resources to underemployed family labour is necessary, 
unless land is redistributed then land/capital ratios fall and 
hence capital efficiency [Lipton, 1974: 279-80].
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Berry and Cline [1979] argue that the finding of systematically 
higher land productivity and comparable levels of total factor 
productivity on small farms as opposed to large farms suggests 
"that the expansion of the small-farm subsector of agriculture 
may be a more effective way of increasing both employment and 
output than pro-large-farm strategies and thus warrants serious 
consideration in almost all developing countries" [1979: 4], In 
LDCs, small farms are likely to have higher total factor 
productivity, and so are the optimal size for output 
maximization, as well as for labour absorption and income 
distribution [1979: 16] .
Given that small farms generate higher land productivity and 
total social factor productivity (the authors do admit an 
extremely important caveat to this statement: "except in the very 
smallest farms in some countries" [1979: 128]), the authors
propose the redistribution of land to the small farmers who apply 
labour more intensively, and the improvement of small farm access 
to credit and new technology. Both strategies will improve equity 
and increase output levels [1979: 128],
With such land redistribution, the authors claim that: "The
optimal postreform farm size, in the absence of technical returns 
to scale, will be merely the total agricultural area divided by 
the total number of families in the agricultural labour force 
(after adjusting for land quality). That is, since total factor 
productivity falls as farm size rises in the relevant range, the 
most productive agrarian structure will be that composed of the
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smallest farms possible, consistent with full allocation of the 
available land and labour force, i.e., total area divided by the 
total number of farm families" [1979: 18] . They add in a
footnote: "An equal distribution of available land among the
entire rural labour force on a family farm basis will generally 
result in parcels significantly larger than the smallest 
prereform farms" [1979: 226, fn. 23]. Berry and Cline then
reason: "If the equal distribution of all available land among
all families implies a labour/land ratio equal to that of the 
same sized farms in the existing agrarian structure, the land 
productivity of these latter farms can provide a rough prediction 
of average land productivity after redistribution. . . " [1979: 18] .
Estimates of output gains after land redistribution follow a two- 
step procedure: first, the average farm size is computed by 
dividing the available land by the number of families in the 
rural labour force;34 secondly, a statistical estimate of output 
per acre for that farm size is applied to the former result. 
Chapter five presents [1979: 132-3, table 5-1] estimates of the 
potential gains from such equalizing land redistribution.
Potential output increases range from 10% for Pakistan to 7 9.5%
for north-eastern Brazil, including 19% for India, 23% for the 
Philippines, 25% for Brazil as a whole, and 28% for Colombia and 
the Muda river area of Malaysia.
1.3 Some qualifications of the policy implications
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The only caveats to the above procedure for calculating output 
gains given any prominence in Berry and Cline are those arising 
from price changes following shifts in output mix, and changes 
in labour input intensities [1979: 18-9]. However, the set of 
assumptions required for this astonishingly simplistic 
calculation to hold are both numerous and highly unlikely to 
occur in reality.
The first and most obvious problem with this procedure is that 
the estimates are not constrained by product mix or land quality. 
In other words, the total land available which is defined as all 
land currently being used for agricultural purposes including 
pasture and woodland, can be converted to arable cultivation. 
Indeed, even marginal and waste land or land unsuitable for 
arable purposes can be so converted. Clearly, such a computation 
is inadmissible; the latter category of land would have to be 
excluded from the calculation, and the remainder would have to 
be disaggregated by type or use, between arable and pasture for 
example. Very different figures are likely to result. Indeed, 
where such product disaggregation has been carried out, as in 
Cline [1970] for Brazil, the potential output gains from land 
redistribution have been disappointing. In seven out of twelve 
regional crop sectors, production changes were either negative 
or insignificant [1970: 146-8] .
An equalizing distribution might well lead to an modal farm size
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significantly greater than the smallest currently existing farm 
size. However, an important consideration here is the question 
of minimum feasible size of farm. None of the foregoing
calculations take into account the possibility of there being a 
minimum efficient scale or of there being a floor determined by 
subsistence income. In terms of the inverse relationship 
evidence, the optimal size of farm would be around one acre [Sen, 
1962] . But when other criteria are considered, relating to 
viability, we find that the level of the floor rises
considerably. One criterion might be that of minimum income. That 
is, the farm should be able to provide an adequate level of 
income for a peasant family - a subsistence income. This may turn 
out to be significantly larger than the optimal size based on the 
inverse relationship phenomenon (output maximization). Other 
criteria might involve employment absorption: that is, the farm 
should be able to gainfully employ the working members of the 
average rural family; or technology absorption: that is, the
minimum farm size should be such as to make efficient use of 
draught animals or machines. Consideration of these criteria may 
significantly raise the minimum feasible size of holding.
In a famous exercise, Khusro [1973] estimates the average size 
of the minimum feasible holding in India, in terms of minimum 
income unit, or the "size of farm below which its output is too 
small to maintain the family at whatever is considered to be a 
reasonable standard of living" [1973: 38], at about fifteen acres 
[1973: 67] . Likewise, the minimum work unit, or the size of farm
below which family manpower cannot be fully employed, is
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estimated at 7.5 acres, the dividing line between adequate and 
inadequate family labour absorption [1973: 60]. Finally, the
minimum plough unit, or size of farm below which the farm becomes 
too small to absorb effectively the services of a pair of 
bullocks, is estimated conservatively at an average for all-India 
of 7.5 acres [1973: 52].
Note here, we have a clear conflict between the various criteria, 
in particular that based on the inverse relationship, on the one 
hand, and those based on subsistence requirements or resource use 
on the other. Thus, the concept of viability sets a limit to 
redistributive land reform.35
To draw on the inverse relationship to justify redistributive 
land reform, the general equilibrium effects also need to be 
considered: landless labourers have normally been excluded from 
access to redistributed land, and if land reform is implemented 
at the expense of large farms, then the landless may be worse off 
due to a fall in employment opportunities. Lipton admits that 
land reform must allow for the effects on the growing majority 
of the poor who depend, not on farming, but on farm labour and 
rural non-farm activity [1993b: 643] . These kinds of
considerations lead Lipton to accept some differential in size 
as justified, and he suggests a 5:1 ceiling to livelihood size 
ratio [1974: 285].
Even if the inverse relationship is empirically valid because 
small farms use more inputs per acre,36 land redistribution
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without ensuring the availability of extra inputs may not produce 
the expected results [Bardhan, 1973: 1371). Estimates of output 
gains after redistribution of land assume that the required 
inputs exist and that no losses occur due to the process of 
redistribution. The process of land redistribution itself may 
involve extra costs in terms of cadastral survey, boundary 
marking and the provision of access to plots, as well as the 
potential for the disruptive effects of land reform to reduce 
output.
Such estimates do not take into account the extra investment 
costs of providing irrigation to unirrigated land, or of 
providing extra inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides etc.). 
Smallholder farming is not a cheap option. It requires investment 
in both production and infrastructure [Lipton & Lipton, 1993:
1525]. Lipton remarks that in the African context, irrigation 
is the key component of a smallholder-oriented policy, but 
irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa has typically involved 
construction costs 5-10 times higher per hectare irrigated than 
in Asia. Fertilizer use in SSA is low partly because it is seldom 
economic without irrigation, or with crop mixes heavily geared 
towards tubers, roots and coarse grains [1993: 1535-6].
The estimates further assume that the current input-output 
characteristics on existing farms of the "optimal" size would 
also characterise farms of that size after land reform. This 
question is not only related to the availability and distribution 
of production inputs, but also to the whole area of motivation
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governing labour effort. If incomes were to rise on the small 
farms, this may relax the subsistence income or debt obligations 
constraint and allow small farmers to relax labour effort with 
a lower application of labour per acre, and hence lower output 
per acre.37 In such circumstances, while on-farm family 
consumption might increase, the supply of marketed surplus may 
well fall with serious consequences for economic activity outside 
agriculture.
One area dismissed rather cursorily by Berry and Cline is the 
question of the possible dynamic losses of redistributive land 
reform affecting negatively the rate of saving and capital 
accumulation, and the adoption of new technology. Yet the 
supposed static productivity advantages of small farms may seem 
inconsequential if a small-farm system cannot generate sufficient 
investments and the necessary increases in agricultural output. 
The authors however doubt the existence of any possible dynamic 
losses arising from land distribution because 1) there appears 
to be no evidence for higher agricultural growth rates in 
countries with higher than average farm size, and 2) there is 
evidence in Green Revolution areas that small farmers adopt the 
new technology rapidly [1979: 134-5].
The first point is quite irrelevant. Average farm size provides 
no indication of the distribution of farm size or the weight of 
large farms in that distribution. What needs to be compared is 
the relative output growth rates of a group of large capitalist 
farms with a group of small peasant farms in one country. Berry
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and Cline cite evidence of simulation experiments with rural 
savings data for Brazil and India by Cline and Bhalla38 which 
indicate that income redistribution would have only a limited 
impact on rural savings rates and total savings [1979: 28] .
However, as Sen [1964] and Bharadwaj [1974a] have shown, the vast 
bulk of small farms in India are highly indebted deficit farms. 
It is therefore most likely that any post-reform average or 
marginal rate of rural saving would be very low. Indeed, as we 
shall see below, Bhalla disposes of this annoying problem of 
deficit farms by excluding them from his analysis (this reduces 
his NCAER sample by over 50%).
The second assertion is also highly dubious. The authors assert 
that small farmers adopt the Green Revolution technology very 
soon after the large farmers, thus re-establishing an inverse 
relationship in the form of an S-curve [1979: 28] . They claim 
that the association of mechanization with the adoption of new 
technology is erroneous, simply just another manifestation of 
factor market imperfections, and that the existence of the latter 
imply the need to channel new inputs towards the small farms 
[1979: 27-8] .
Lipton [1993b: 645] claims that evidence since the mid-1970s
increasingly suggests that the dynamics of the Green Revolution 
do not undermine the inverse relationship: smallness of farms, 
with or without reform, does not significantly impede adoption 
of, or success with, improved cereal varieties or related inputs 
[Lipton & Longhurst, 1989]. Even after the Green Revolution
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process, "a big majority of empirical work in developing 
countries supports the unadjusted IR, or UIR: a 'meaningful'
inverse relationship of gross annual output-per-hectare at market 
prices to farm size in hectares" [Lipton, 1993b: 645] .39 Later, 
as smaller-scale farmers adopt the new technology, the advantage 
of labour-intensity, as manifested in the inverse relationship, 
reasserts itself, and their yields per hectare once again outpace 
those of the larger farmers [Lipton & Lipton, 1993: 1526].
However, the empirical evidence would appear not to substantiate 
this assertion. Patnaik [1937: 120-5] has demonstrated that
although some farms in all size groups have adopted the new 
technology, those small farms are in fact, in terms of scale and 
hired labour use, rich farms,40 It is the rich farms who both 
adopt the new technology thus reaping the initial benefits and 
who maintain that advantage. The evidence in chapter V shows 
clearly that the inverse relation has broken down in those Green 
Revolution areas as large farmers adopt both the new technology 
and mechanize. Indeed, Berry and Cline do admit that large farms 
are able to capture economies of scale with the introduction of 
mechanized technology [1979: 138] .
Even if small farmers are more productive than large, small farm 
systems or regions need not be. Efficient and persistent large 
farms are not illusions either [Lipton, 1993b: 648] . The
persistence of efficient large farms shows that they too are 
endogenous, incentive-compatible institutions which fulfil 
economic functions with economies of scale or which fulfil
38
political economy functions [Lipton, 1993b: 643] . Thus, even
those convinced by the inverse relationship are not necessarily 
against land pooling in cooperatives, or for land redistribution, 
because of the associated finding that large farms show larger 
profits, thus generating higher savings, investment and 
innovation in the long run [Bardhan, 1973: 1371]. Sen and Rudra 
[1980: 394], while rejecting the inverse relationship as a basis 
for small-scale peasant farming, also reject the development of 
capitalist farming which would further impoverish the poor 
peasant, and support expansion of the cooperative system: the 
superior ability of large cooperative farms to marshall labour 
and non-labour resources may be important, allowing large farms 
to produce more output per acre than small farms.
Finally, there are important political constraints to 
redistributive land reform. A rural power structure dominated by 
landlords or rich peasants may simply undermine land reform 
legislation through evasion and avoidance. However, Lipton's view 
that "avoidance can sometimes help reform [as] threats of 
ceilings can induce substantial sales to poorer farmers" [1993b: 
645] or that such a process can be implemented "if the rich 
farmers see their interests in such a process and/or are too weak 
to stop it" [1993b: 653] would, faced with the evidence, appear 
to be wishful thinking of Daedalus-like proportions.41
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Summary and conclusions
This chapter has critically surveyed the range and nature of the 
evidence for an inverse relationship between farm size and land 
productivity. We have seen in this chapter that the evidence for 
an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity 
is both geographically widespread and historically pervasive. 
Empirical support for the finding has been heavily documented for 
the contemporary developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, as well as for earlier periods in Europe, Japan, and 
North America. This weight of evidence, however, has not gone 
unchallenged, and in Chapter II, we go on to examine the major 
conceptual, methodological and statistical problems which have 
been raised in the inverse relationship literature.
The contemorary significance of the inverse relation as a crucial 
developmental issue cannot be overemphasised. Such a relationship 
has obvious importance for policy issues. The apparent 
implications of such a relationship constitute a major component 
of the economic rationale for redistributive land reform and a 
small farm bias in agricultural development strategy. This it is 
claimed will have a positive impact on output, income, employment 
absorption, and poverty alleviation.
The suggested policy implications are however heavily dependent 
on a number of unconvincing assumptions. They are also dependent 
on a particular theoretical perspective on the inverse 
relationship which will be examined in Chapter IV. Nevertheless,
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Section 1,3 has shown that these implications of the inverse 
relationship, accepted at face value without critical examination 
of its nature or causal factors, are subject to severe 
qualifications. Any positive impact may be severely constrained 
by efficiency considerations relating to minimum feasible farm 
size, input availability, dynamic general equilibrium effects on 
saving, investment and employment, and the nature of technical 
and social change in agriculture. Further, the next five chapters 
attempt to show that, after examining the causal explanations for 
the inverse relationship and placing it in the context of 
agrarian transition, the inverse relationship rationale for 
redistributive land reform disappears.
Notes to Chapter I
1. This relationship is hereinafter referred to throughout this 
study simply as the inverse relation or inverse relationship. 
Other inverse relationships between key economic variables 
associated with the current debate are specified in full. While 
the inverse relation has been introduced as one between farm size 
and farm productivity, the latter component usually refers to 
land productivity. Given the overwhelming importance of land as 
the major factor input in the agriculture of poor countries 
however, this may be justified.
2. The Indian debate on the inverse relation has been by far the 
most extensive. It began in the pages of the Economic Weekly 
(later Economic and Political Weekly) with Sen's 1962 article. 
It continued over the years with Mazumdar 1963, Sen 1964, 
Agarwala 19 64, Khusro 1964, Mazumdar 1965, Paglin 1965, A. P. Rao 
1967, C.H.H. Rao 1967 and 1968, Rudra 1968a and 1968b, C.H.H. Rao 
1972, Bhattacharya and Saini 1972, Patnaik 1972, Rudra 1973, 
Bharadwaj 1974a, Chandra 1974, Chattopadhyay and Rudra 197 6 and 
1977, Chadha 1978, Sen and Rudra 1980, Barbier 1984. Other major 
contributions are Sen 19 66, C.H.H. Rao 19 66, Bhagwati and 
Chakravarty 1969, Saini 1972, Bharadwaj 1974b, Bhalla 197 9, Saini 
1979, Roy 1981, Carter 1984, Patnaik 1987, Bhalla 1988, Bhalla 
and Roy 1988, See Ellis 1988 for a useful survey.
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3. Chayanov cites evidence for an inverse relation for 
Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, but ignores the Russian zemstvo 
data. Byres in an unpublished manuscript suggests that for 
Chayanov to admit any widespread existence of an inverse 
relationship in Russia would be to undermine his premise that 90% 
of Russian farms were pure family labour farms, given his 
assertion that large farms are capitalist. Byres also suggests 
that Lenin, on the other hand, who asserts the global superiority 
of capitalist farms, ignores the possibility of an inverse 
relationship in Russia as this would tend to undermine his thesis 
that capitalist agrarian transition was nearing completion. These 
propositions will be argued in detail in a forthcoming book.
For the Russian debate on the relative superiority of large and 
small farms, see V.I. Lenin: New economic developments in peasant 
life (on V.Y. Postnikov's 'Peasant farming in South Russia') pp. 
13-73, volume I, Collected Works; The development of capitalism 
in Russia, chapters I-IV, volume III, Collected Works; Capitalism 
in agriculture (reply to Bulgakov), pp. 109-59, volume IV, 
Collected Works; The agrarian question and the critics of Marx, 
pp. 107-222, volume V, Collected Works; and for the USA, New data 
on the laws governing the development of capitalism in 
agriculture, pp. 17-102, volume XXII, Collected Works; and A.V. 
Chayanov: The Theojry of Peasant Economy, edited by D. Thorner, 
B. Kerblay and R.E.F. Smith, Homewood, Illinois (Irwin, 1966). 
See also K. Kautsky: The Agrarian Question, volume I, translated 
by P. Burgess, London (Zwan Publications, 1988).
The Russian zemstvo data can be seen in U. Patnaik: Neo-populism 
and Marxism: The Chayanovian view of the agrarian question and 
its fundamental fallacy, Journal of Peasant Studies, vol.6 no.4 
(July 1979) table I, p.382. This data was calculated by M. 
Harrison in 'A.V. Chayanov and the study of the Russian 
peasantry' (mimeo, Cambridge 1972) from Byudzhety Kresty'an 
Starobel'skogo Uezda by Chayanov, Kharkov 1915. This shows the 
value of output (in Roubles) per desyatina (1 des . = 2.7 acres) 
decreasing from 1166.0 on 0-0.009 des. farms to 46.2 on farms 
over 15.01 des. for a sample of 101 peasant farms in Starobels'ky 
Uyezd, 1910. See also M. Harrison in Journal of Peasant Studies, 
January 1977, table 4. p.141 citing figures by G.A. Kushchenko, 
published in 1916.
For China, see J. Lossing Buck, Chinese Farm Economy, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930, and Land Utilization in China, 
1937. In his first book [p. 134] Buck admits that there is 
something of an inverse relationship in North China, which he 
attributes to better soil quality. In the second book, he simply 
asserts [p.273] that there is no inverse relationship in China. 
In fact, inspection of the disaggregated data in Land 
Utilization. Statistics (the statistical volume accompanying the 
second book) shows clear evidence of an inverse relationship. See 
Byres, unpublished manuscript.
4. Bauer's compact statement, with its focus on rational choice 
and yield maximization by family labour incurring no cash wage 
costs, may suggest that Sen [1962] has derived more inspiration
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from Bauer than he acknowledges.
5. However, Bevan also finds higher incomes on the large farms, 
with labour used more effectively: the number of trees tapped per 
hour increases from 56 on the small farms to 108 on the large 
farms.
6. Cornia uses FAO Farm Management and Production Economics 
Service data for 1973-79 which covers 3,167 farms in 18 
countries. Note however that all farms with less than $10 capital 
or less than 0.1 ha of land or with labour input less than 10 
man-days have been deleted. Further, three countries were dropped 
due to incomplete or insufficient data. Very small and very large 
farms have been excluded. He makes the curious and wrong 
proposition that: "The variability of the sample is thus smaller 
than that of the universe; the conclusions about farm size, 
resource use and land productivity drawn on the basis of the 
sample are therefore likely to hold true a fortiori for the 
universe" [1985: 517] . The 15 countries covered comprise: 
Barbados, Mexico, Peru, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Syria, Sudan, Bangladesh, Burma, India, Nepal, Korea, and 
Thailand. See Taslim, [1989], for evidence of the inverse 
relationship in Bangladesh.
7. Pohorille [1964] finds evidence for the inverse relation in 
pre-war Poland: "Labour productivity is unquestionably higher on 
the landed estates than on the peasant farms. The yield per acre, 
however, is higher in the latter owing to the use of more labour, 
especially in stock-breeding". Cited in [Sen, 1966: 442] from 
Pohorille, Development and Rural Overpopulation: Lessons from 
Polish EKperience, in ILO, Problems of Employment in Economic 
Development, Geneva, 19 64.
8. The 1960 Census for Iran shows crop yields higher on the small 
farms, although there is no monotonic decrease [Bachman & 
Christensen, 1967: 246-7] .
9. Penny and Zulkifli find value added per acre (after deducting 
capital expenses) higher on the small farms than on the large 
states [cited in Bachman & Christensen, 1967: 245] . See D.H. 
Penny & M. Zulkifli Estates and small -holdings: an economic 
comparison, Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 45, pp. 1017-21, 
December, 1963, Griffin [1974: 44] also cites a survey of 58 
owner-operated sawah (flood irrigated) farms in Subang district 
of west Java, where the wet season padi yield index declines from 
100 on the smallest size class to 78 on the largest [source: 
Agrroeconomic survey, Analis usaha tani padi sawah dan tatniaga 
beras ditiga kabupaten di Djawa barat, 1971] .
10. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1969-7 0 and 
follow-up survey in 1974 of Phulpur and Thakurgaon thanas in the 
districts of Mymensingh and Dinajpur [cited in Hossain, 1977: 
297] .
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11. Comite Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola, Monografias 
Sobre Algunos Aspectos de la Tenencia de la Tierra y el 
Desarrollo Rural en America Latina, Organizacion de los estados 
Americanos, Washington, 197 0, p. 34. See [Beriry & Cline, 1979: 
203] .
12. Bank of Korea, Research Department, Economic Statistics Year 
Book 1960, p.278 [cited in Berry & Cline, 1979: 203].
13. Cited in [Griffin, 1974: 39}. Table 2.9 shows paddy yields 
in Sri Lanka fall from 3 6.4 bushels per acre on farms less than 
20 perches {1 acre = 40 perches) and 37.3 on farms of 21-40 
perches to 33 bushels on farms of 161-320 perches and 33.7 on 
farms over 320 perches [source: 3f000 farm survey (1966-7) 
conducted by Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey on Cost of Production 
of Paddy, 1969] .
14. See [Griffin, 1974: 42] . A graph shows rice yields in central 
Thailand declining from 3 06 kg/rai {1 acre = 2.5 rais) on farms 
of 2-6 rais to 194 kg/rai on farms greater than 140 rais [source: 
G.A. Marzouk, Economic Development and Policies: Case Study of 
Thailand, Rotterdam University Press, 1972] . Note that on page 
41, Griffin states that since HYVs are short-stemmed plants and 
this area is subject to annual flooding, the green revolution has 
made no impact in this region - a fact that is of major 
significance as we shall see.
15. See [Griffin, 1974: 97] . Table 4.2 shows relative average 
land productivity in 1960 on small private farms (minifundia) 
less than 5 ha at 2.6, while that on the large private farms over 
5 ha was only 0.88 [source: S. Eckstein, El marco macroeconomica 
del problema agrario mexicana, CIDA, January 1969] .
16. See W.R. Cline Economic Consequences of a Land Reform in 
Brazil (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1970).
17. Studies of resettlement schemes in Kenya demonstrate that 
smallholders, working more intensively with family labour make 
more profitable use of land previously cultivated by large farms 
[H.W. von Haugwitz Some experience with smallholder settlement 
in Kenya, Afrika-Studien. no. 72, Munich: Weltforum Verlag for 
ILO-Institut fur Wirtschaftforschung 1972]. The increase in 
productiivity ranges between 15-90% [cited in Deininger & 
Binswanger, Are large farms more efficient then small ones? 
Government intervention, large scale agriculture, and 
resettlement in Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, World Bank 
Policy Working Paper, Washington DC, forthcoming]. See also D. 
Hunt, The impending crisis in Kenya: the case for land reform, 
Aldershot UK: Gower Press, 1984.
18. These latter case studies are all included in the survey by 
Berry & Cline [1979] . In Chapter VI we discuss the evidence for 
each country in detail. See also Barraclough & Domike, Agrarian 
structure in seven Latin American countries, in Land Economics, 
vol. XLII, no. 4, November 1966, for evidence for Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru. Dorner
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[1972] also cites evidence for India, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
Japan, Guatemala, Taiwan, Philippines, Chile, Denmark and Hungary 
[Dorner, 1972: 119-25].
19. Coverage of Madhya Pradesh began in 1956-7. The Indian Farm 
Management Studies proceed beyond the 1950s. See Farm Management 
in India; A study based on recent investigations, published by 
the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development 
and Co-operation, Government of India (New Delhi: April 1966).
20. The cost-accounting method entailed intensive daily recording 
of data during the enquiry period (2-3 months), while the sample 
survey method entailed periodic visits throughout the enquiry 
period. The former method provided the more accurate information 
used by Bharadwaj [1974a] and Khusro [1964] . Khusro adds a 
seventh state, Andhra Pradesh, for the years 1956-7, 1957-8, and 
1958-9 .
21. Sahota [1968] notes that as data were available on a per acre 
basis only, production function estimates are constrained to 
constant returns: q/n=b(1/n)^al.(k/n)^a2 => q=b.l^al.k^a2.n^(1- 
al-a2) .
22. See Byres [1988: 176-78]: Charan Singh pre-dates both Sen and 
the FMS data. In his 1947 book, Abolition of the Zamindari: Two 
Alternatives, Singh cites evidence on the existence of an inverse 
relationship from Swiss agriculture (this is the Laur data 
noticed by Chayanov) and from Denmark. Later, in 1959 and 1964, 
Singh again uses the inverse relationship in his argument against 
cooperative agriculture, citing evidence from England, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA. Bachman and Christensen 
note that "large agricultural properties inevitably become a 
focal point of attack by the economic and social groups 
attempting to displace the old elite" [1967: 263] .
23. R. Krishna, Land reform and development in southern Asia, in 
W. Froelich (ed.), Land Tenure, Industrialization and Social 
Stability, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1961. He 
writes: "Under present conditions, the ratio of output to total 
input shows no consistent relation to the size of farm. In 
respect to the ratio of output to paid input, the small farm 
turns out to be more productive than the large farm, and in 
respect to output per acre, the small farms appear to be even 
more productive" [pp. 243-4].
24. Long who acquired data from the Farm Management Centre 
Reports provides the following composite tabulation (he notes 
that the state data is not entirely comparable, hence the rather 
wide size classes) [Long, 1961: 117]:
AVERAGE GROSS OUTPUT PER ACRE BY SIZE OF FARM (rupees per acre)
0-4.9 acres 
5-9.9 
10-19 .9
240 Rs
213
171
45
over 2 0 103
Long points out that the above data have the defect that some of 
the inverse relationship finding is caused by "the fact that the 
areas of lower productivity per acre tend to be characterised by 
larger farm units" [1961: 117] . The data are recombined by state 
(which are regarded as relatively homogeneous) to obtain the 
following table [1961: 118]:
MP WB UP Pun Or AP Bom Mad ave
smallest size group 87 239 292 201 161 433 117 209 219
2nd smallest group 88 217 267 186 141 352 82 171 188
2nd largest group 84 229 227 173 150 369 51 75 170
largest size group 93 169 232 143 126 380 53 75 159
Long [1961: 118] also provides evidence for 225 farms in 3 
villages in Bihar (supplied by P. Ray, Principal, HD Jain 
College, Arrah, Bihar, LSE thesis):
[1961: 119, table II] :
GROSS OUTPUT PER ACRE 1955-56
village A villB villC average
n=92 n=100 n=33 n=22 5
0-4.9 206 384 315 302
5-9.9 193 337 306 279
10-14.9 178 329 308 272
> 15 173 331 278 261
Long also provides evidence for the USA. He finds gross value 
productivity per acre (above variable costs) inversely related 
to farm size in Wisconsin in 1950. See E.J. Long & K.H, Parsons 
"How Family Labor Affects Wisconsin Farming", Wisconsin Research 
Bulletin, no. 167, May 1950, and also E.J. Long, "Return to Scale 
in Family Farming: Is the Case Over-stated?, Journal of Political 
Economy, December 1949. Long also mentions a 1911 study of 
Tompkins County, New York state, [by G.F. Warren & K.C. 
Livermore, An Agricultural Survey, Township of Ithaca, Tompkin 
County, New York, Cornell Memoirs, no.295, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1911] which shows an inverse relationship 
between value productivity per acre and farm size.
25. See H.S. Mann, Cooperative farming and family farming in the 
Punjab: a comparative study, PhD dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 1962. Mann further claims that in those cases where 
large cooperatives were more productive than small family farms, 
this was due to superior irrigation facilities.
26. We cite the Bharadwaj data in full in Appendix A as they 
usefully summarise the findings from the entire Indian FMS data 
set in the form of OLS regression equations. Bharadwaj fits a 
log-linear regression for each district for all three years: log 
Y = log a + b log X where Y - yield per net acre (yield is gross 
value of output) and X = average size of operational holding for
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the relevant size group. The use of grouped and averaged data is 
further discussed in Chapter II.
27. While the regression coefficients are all negative, only 
three regressions (out of 21} are statistically significant: 
Bombay, Madras, and Punjab. See Table IB in [Khusro, 1964: 55-7] 
for the full regression results.
28. Just how meaningless and misleading such averages are is 
discussed in Chapter II.
29. See note 2 above which includes the major contributions to 
this extensive empirical support for an inverse relationship in 
the Indian context.
30. Citing Lau & Yotopoulos [1971] and Paglin [1965].
31. Lipton [1993b: 645] citing Vyas [1979].
32. Lipton [1993b: 651] claims that price distortions favouring 
large farms mean that the inverse relation is strong at shadow 
prices, but suppressed at market prices, and even at effective 
prices including transactions costs. Correcting such distortions 
therefore helps to get land into smaller holdings. See also de 
Janvry & Sadoulet [1989] and Binswanger & Elgin [1988].
33. Binswanger and Deininger [1993: 1465] proceed beyond this to 
say that land reform involving mechanized commercial farming 
systems requires that such farms be subdivided and resettled, 
because the efficiency of family farms is associated with the use 
of family labour, and too few families reside on highly 
mechanized farms to work these farms efficiently, if land is 
redistributed exclusively to the residential labour force.
34. In determining the number of family parcels it is assumed 
that each family has 2.5 workers [Berry & Cline, 1979: 130] . Land 
available is defined as total farm area in the 1960 FAO World 
Census of Agriculture.
35. In Javanese conditions, for example, equal redistribution of 
land would leave no livelihood holdings at all, and the output 
effects of bringing 1/4 acre farms up to 1/2 acre were found to 
be disappointing [Lipton, 1974: 283]. And in the Egyptian case, 
three acres is considered as being the minimum feasible size of 
farm on the income criterion, according to informal interviews 
with farmers during fieldwork in 1990.
36. A crucial distinction needs to be made here between purchased 
and on-farm-supplied inputs. See later in chapters II and IV for 
the importance of this distinction.
37. See Dharm Narain, Distribution of the Marketed Surplus of 
Agricultural Produce by Size-Level of Holding in India, 1950-51, 
Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1961.
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38. W.R. Cline, Interrelationships between agricultural strategy 
and rural income distribution, Food Research Institute Studies, 
vol. 12, no, 2, 1973, and S. Bhalla, An analysis of savings in 
rural India, mimeo, Washington DC, 1975, using NCAER data.
39. Lipton refers to supporting studies reviewed in Lipton [1993] 
and Binswanger et al, [1993] . The unadjusted inverse relationship 
remains meaningful, though weakened, if land measured in 
efficiency hectares is used, allowing for the fact that small 
farms operate higher quality land: "Economic logic-but little
evidence-suggests that the UIR is strengthened if (a) size is 
measured in hectares per household member or worker {reflecting 
the IR' s basis in access to family labour-per-hectare at low 
transactions costs); (b) only farms with similar nonland, non-
unskilled-labour inputs per hectare are compared, or else their 
costs are deducted from value of gross output; (c) gross output 
(and inputs) are measured at shadow prices, especially if 
socially weighted" [Lipton, 1993b: 645].
He goes on to write that a properly adjusted inverse relationship 
(AIR) would measure per hectare gross output minus costs other 
than land and unskilled labour, all at shadow prices, as a 
function of efficiency hectares per person. This AIR would, in 
most cases, show that if farmland were more equally distributed 
in terms of efficiency hectares per person it would produce more 
annual output, net of appropriate costs. It is presumably 
efficiency hectares per person, not land per household that a 
poverty reducing reform seeks to get to poor people. Moreover, 
it is appropriately shadow-priced and netted output, not gross 
output at market prices, from land that is maximized by an 
optimal distribution of operated land: "Therefore the AIR makes 
an even stronger case than does the UIR for getting owned (and 
therefore operated) land from largeholdings to private 
smallholders" [Lipton, 1993b: 645].
40. We return to this question of farm size versus farm scale in 
the next chapter where we discuss conceptual problems relating 
to the inverse relationship debate, and in Chapter V where we 
move on to a political economy approach to the inverse 
relationship in the dynamic context.
41. See T.J. Byres, Of Neo-Populist Pipe Dreams: Daedulus in the 
Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias, Journal of Peasant 
Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, January, 1979.
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CHAPTER II 
Conceptual, statistical, and methodological problems
Introduction
Neither the existence of the inverse relationship, nor its 
implications, have gone unchallenged. Indeed, Sen was one of the 
first to admit that the inverse relation was by no means a well 
established fact and had not been proven "beyond the legitimate 
doubts of exacting statisticians due to the fact that average 
data can be misleading" [1964a: 323].
Barraclough [1967: 266) , after noting that the CIDA studies in 
Latin America corroborate the finding of an inverse relationship, 
warns: "great care must be taken in interpreting these data. When 
comparisons are made for relatively homogeneous areas limited to 
the same types of farming and tenure conditions these inter-farm 
differences often diminish and in some cases even disappear."1
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the necessity for care 
in interpreting the inverse relationship findings, imposed by a 
number of important conceptual, statistical and methodological 
problems associated with the data. In section 2.1, we highlight 
a crucial conceptual distinction introduced into the debate by
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Utsa Patnaik, between different measures of farm size based on 
acreage and economic scale. Patnaik argues that use of the latter 
measure, if valid, would undermine the inverse relationship 
findings,
Sections 2.2 to 2.4 cover the methodological doubts raised by the 
contributions of a number of "exacting statisticians". In section 
2.2, we examine the crucial distinction that needs to be made 
between aggregated and disaggregated levels of analysis. The 
nature and causal direction of the inverse relationship evidence 
is very different at these two levels of analysis. Consideration 
of this distinction will allow us to specify correctly the nature 
of the problem. Section 2.3 introduces the methodological 
critique by Ashok Rudra who argued that the inverse relationship 
was merely a statistical illusion generated by the use of too 
highly aggregated and group averaged data. He also criticises the 
use of OLS regression techniques, rather than rank correlation 
analysis, in estimating the strength of the inverse relationship. 
These matters are resolved and the inverse relationship finding 
vindicated in section 2.4, where the relation is confirmed, to 
Rudra's satisfaction, as a valid empirical phenomenon in India, 
but not in the way conceived of in the earlier studies.
Finally, section 2.5 examines a number of conjoint relationships 
revealed by the various studies mentioned, involving other 
factors of production besides land. These relationships tend to 
be clustered, suggesting some a priori explanations for the 
inverse relaitonship along factor-intensity lines. This sets the
BJBL.
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context for a critical examination of the major theoretical 
explanations of the inverse relationship in the following four 
chapters.
2.1 Utsa Patnaik and Scale Grouping Rather than Size Grouping2
A notable conceptual problem with respect to the inverse 
relationship has been introduced into the debate by Utsa Patnaik 
[1972: 1613-24] . She argues forcefully that, if instead of taking 
acreage as the measure of farm size (size grouping) we take 
either annual value of gross output per farm or the value of 
tangible capital stock (scale grouping), we then get (may get), 
in certain circumstances, "diametrically opposite results".3 
Note the conditionality flagged in this statement by the 
inclusion of the phrase "in certain circumstances" and the use 
of "may" in parentheses.
On the second measure of size (the scale grouping) output per 
acre rises (may rise) sharply with increasing scale of 
production. It may be the case, she says that "an intensive 
application of capital on the smaller holding results in its 
being larger [than a holding of higher acreage] on every economic 
index except acreage" [1972: 1614].
The reason for this is, she argues, that holdings of "varying 
levels of intensity, i.e. with varying production techniques and
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even varying organisation1 [1972: 1617] are lumped together
within the same size category. So it is, then, she argues, that 
the size grouping approach blurs (may blur) certain distinctions: 
between intensively and extensively cultivated holdings; and 
between different categories within the peasantry, so obscuring 
the extent of differentiation [1972: 1615]. It is possible to 
identify, say, a rich peasant with 80 acres and a rich peasant 
with just 8 acres [1972: 1614].
If all of this is so, then the outcome is as follows, with the 
inverse relationship emerging on the size grouping, and certain 
crucial aspects concealed, which are clear on the scale grouping: 
"When grouped by size, a small number of high-productivity 
holdings of small size, lumped with similar sized but low 
productivity extensively run holdings (which constitute the 
majority), raises the average yield for the small size group as 
a whole; while the large extensive farms, lumped with similar 
sized but much more intensive high-productivity capitalist farms, 
lower the average yield for the large-size group as a whole...Not 
only with respect to yield, but also as regards all inputs, 
capital intensity and labour productivity, we find the same 
striking differences in the results of grouping by size and by 
scale respectively" [1972: 1620].
Patnaik is making a very important point. It is, indeed, the case 
that "when we are studying a process of agricultural change...it 
becomes especially important to analyse the available data 
according to scale of production" [1972: 1621]. Two holdings of
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the same size may well differ in their class status. A holding 
may be smaller in size but larger as an economic unit [1972: 
1614] . But note how she formulates the argument: "What we are
saying is that in the past, the set of rich peasants and the set 
of farms above 2 0 acres in UP probably had a very large number 
of common elements: while at present owing to the changes taking 
place in use of techniques and intensification of production the 
intersection of the two sets is getting smaller. Therefore the 
identification of the properties of one set with those of the 
other is now less justifiable and may be downright misleading" 
[1972: 1624] .
Observe the difference stressed between the past (a static 
situation) and the present (a dynamic one): in the Indian case, 
between the pre-"new technology" situation and the period when 
that "new technology" had begun to spread and have an impact. 
That differentiation has a certain plausibility.
The validity of her argument surely relates to circumstances of 
change. One might argue, even on her logic, that in the 
relatively static situation of the 1950s, when the inverse 
relationship was first established in the FMS studies size was 
a useful measure, encompassing "sets with a very large number of 
common elements"; while in the 1970s (when she was writing and 
when the "new technology" was beginning to spread) her logic 
began to take on significance. She stresses: "If techniques were 
absolutely uniform for all holdings then of course no problem of 
distinguishing between size and scale would arise. However
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techniques are far from uniform...The possibility of adopting 
new, usually much more capital intensive techniques exists [by 
the 1970s] for the farms with an investible surplus" [1972: 
1615] .
This is the crucial point. We would wish to argue that techniques 
were tending to uniformity in the 1950s (certainly, they tended 
to uniformity to a far greater extent then than in the 1970s); 
and so size is then a useful stratifying variable: an acceptable 
index of economic status (class position). And where techniques 
of production have been only partially transformed, farm size may 
still be the relevant stratifying variable. Great care must be 
taken by the researcher to avoid grouping farms with different 
systems of production together. Methods used later in the 
analysis of the fieldwork data, in the Egyptian context (Chapter 
X) , include computation of rank correlation coefficients between 
the set of farm sizes and the set of farm scales of production, 
and the computation of diagnostic statistics to identify outliers 
in the data set. The exclusion or separate treatment of these 
cases of course require theoretical and empirical support.
One further issue of crucial significance that needs to be 
flagged at this point, as it relates closely to the question of 
agrarian change, is the actual breakdown and disappearance of the 
inverse relationship in the context of the "new technology". This 
widely documented phenomenon [see Chadha, 1978; Roy, 1979; Khan, 
1979; Dyer, 1990] will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. 
Suffice it to state here that abundant evidence from India and
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Pakistan shows that following the introduction of the Green 
Revolution technology, the inverse relationship has disappeared, 
markedly so in those areas where the new technology has 
penetrated most deeply.
This, of course, is a very different phenomenon from that 
described by Patnaik. The latter approach generates a statistical 
breakdown of the inverse relationship by switching from an area 
definition of farm size to a scale measure (warranted by the 
possibility that a sub-group of holdings of small size have 
secured important productivity advantages through intensive 
application of capital, thus increasing their economic scale). 
The former approach, however, posits that it is the larger farms, 
due to their greater surpluses and access to and control over 
capital, which capture the productivity gains from the new 
technology, thereby structurally reversing the direction of the 
size-productivity relationship, despite the continued intensive 
application of family labour on the small farms.
2.2 Aggregated and disaggregated levels of analysis: a 'natural' 
inverse relationship at the macro level
The statement by Barraclough in the introduction above, raises 
the crucial distinction that needs to be made between aggregated 
and disaggregated levels of analysis. At highly aggregated levels 
of analysis, whether at the cross-country [see Cornia, 1985] , 
national or regional level, a relatively high degree of land
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heterogeneity is to be expected. Those areas with better than 
average soil quality, in particular, water availability, and 
hence higher than average natural land productivity, are 
historically likely to have attracted greater population 
settlement. Higher population density will, given limited land 
resources, lead to small average farm size over long time 
periods. Contrariwise for areas of relatively poor agricultural 
land where population settlement is likely to be less dense and 
average farm size larger. Hence, at this "macro" level, an 
inverse correlation between land productivity (as measured by 
output per acre) and farm size is to be expected.
Note that this type of natural inverse relationship at the 
"macro" level is fundamentally different from the inverse 
relation at the centre of this study. At the aggregate level, the 
direction of causality runs from land productivity (itself caused 
by better soil quality) to small average farm size. However, at 
the micro level (village level for example) the causality is 
postulated to run in the opposite direction: specific factors
associated with smaller than average farm size are producing 
higher than average farm productivity.4 Roy [1979: 5, tables
1.1-2] notes data from Kalra for Indian states which shows the 
"macro" relation. Moving from the macro to micro scale, the 
direction of causation is reversed: "while exogenous factors are 
assumed to cause the inverse relation at the macro level, 
endogenous factors are assumed to cause the same inverse relation 
at the micro level." So the inverse relationship at the "macro" 
level is caused by diversity in natural conditions.
56
There are two further dimensions to the problem of aggregation. 
There is the related problem of aggregation over villages leading 
to a spurious inverse relationship. Even if no inverse 
relationship existed within villages, but there were different 
soil fertilities between villages, and high fertility villages 
had smaller average farm size, then an inverse relation would be 
shown by data aggregated over the villages. Alternatively, if 
fertility (average land productivity) was the same over villages, 
and the inverse relationship holds in each village, but villages 
have different size-ranges, then such a relationship could be 
eliminated [Chattopadhyay & Rudra, 1976: A110]. Rudra [1968b]
implies that the inverse relationship does not exist within any 
particular village, but arises as a spurious relationship when 
data for different villages are aggregated5.
Furthermore, there is the problem of grouped averages. Most of 
the analysis of the FMS data was carried out using size class 
averages for the principal variables, farm size and output per 
acre. Grouped data may generate an aggregation bias when the in­
group variance is in fact greater than the between-group 
variance. Thus, farm level data which show no overall 
relationship between farm size and output per acre, may when 
grouped into size classes show a spurious inverse relation. 
Barbier [1974] shows that the overall relation is very sensitive 
to size-class boundaries.
2.3 Rudra on aggregation and functional form
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Rudra [1968a: 1041] suspects the process of aggregation is
responsible for what he calls the "spurious correlation" of the 
FMS data. He writes: "the farm management data do not permit of 
the generalised conclusions that have been drawn, the inferences 
having been made without adequate examination of the tables 
themselves" [1968b: A-33]. Nevertheless Rudra still uses grouped 
data to reject the prima facie arguments of the FMS data and Sen 
[Chattopadhyay & Rudra, 1976: A-110].
Rudra [1968a] uses data for 20 villages (1,198 farms) including 
6 used by Rao6, in Punjab, Haryana and western UP, all surveyed 
by the Agro-Economic Research Centre at Delhi University. He 
carried out F tests for one-way analysis of variance.7 Only two 
villages had significant F statistics (at the 5% level): 
Bahantuas Bandhu and Matiana. Bahantuas showed increasing yield 
per acre with farm size up to 2 0 acres while no systematic 
pattern was revealed in Matiana [Rudra, 1968a: 1043]. Rudra
concludes: "neither case substantiates the hypothesis of yield
per acre decreasing as farm size increases" [1968a: 1044].8
In the same study, Rudra criticizes the use of simple linear 
regressions and log-linear regressions in the foregoing studies 
which imply certain assumptions about the nature of the 
relationship being tested [1968a: 1041] . None of the studies on 
the inverse relationship gives any justification for assuming a 
linear relation, whether log-transformed or not. This criticism
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also has some significance for the reliability of t tests [-Roy, 
1979: 27] . The validity of t tests are dependent on the validity 
of the underlying regression relations. Rudra writes [1968a: 
1043] : "There may be many reasons to expect some sort of
association (between yield per acre and farm size) , but none 
whatsoever for any linear relation." Scatter plots reveal the 
absence of any systematic relationship between the two variables. 
Rudra regards rank correlation tests as superior as they assume 
no specific functional relation between output per acre and farm 
size [Chattopadhyay & Rudra, 1976: A-107].9
In a later study, Rudra presents data on rank correlation 
coefficients between farm size and yield per hectare for 
individual crops [1968b: A-35/ table 1] : producing 4
statistically significant negative coefficients (3 at the 5% 
level and 1 at 7%) and 1 positive out of 20 crop correlations in 
12 districts. Note, however, that there is a clear distinction 
to be drawn between physical yields of individual crops and total 
crop production in value terms (this reflects the importance of 
cropping intensity and crop pattern). Unlike the inverse 
relationship in value terms, little evidence has been produced 
for an inverse relationship in terms of the physical yields of 
individual crops.
Output per acre is a crude measure of productivity to only one 
input. An alternative measure of efficiency is cost per unit of 
output, but difficulties arise from the fact that much output is 
retained for self-consumption and many of the inputs are own-
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produced. This means imputing costs and these depend on rather 
hazy opportunity costs . Rao and other writers have used net farm 
income per acre {defined as gross income minus the value of 
seeds, manures, fertilizers, irrigation charges, bullock feed and 
depreciation on fixed capital) [1963: 2042-3]. Khusro [1964: 52- 
3] claims that farmers are interested in minimising paid-out 
costs, not "retained" costs, but this raises a difficulty if 
paid-out cost ratios differ with farm size. If large farms have 
higher paid-out cost/output ratios than small farms, then this 
introduces a bias against large farm productivity.
Rank correlation coefficients for yield per hectare for 
individual crops against farm size,10 appear to provide no 
evidence for an inverse relationship: the coefficients are mostly 
insignificant, and those that are significant are positive 
[Chattopadhyay & Rudra, 1976: A105-7, table 1] . The sign and
significance vary with the type of crop. Chattopadhyay and Rudra 
"have no hesitation in drawing the conclusion that output per 
hectare decreasing with farm size certainly does not hold true 
for individual crops" [1976: A110].
Rudra also presents rank correlation coefficients between farm 
size and indicators of farm business as a whole for 17 districts. 
Here Rudra uses net yields and output in value terms and finds 
an inverse relation in 15 of the cases, 9 of them significant 
[Rudra, 1968b: A-37, table IT] . Among the non-significant
coefficients there is still a preponderance of negative 
coefficients (not a random distribution of negative and positive
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as would be expected): this possibly results according to Rudra 
from the often marked declining tendency over the range of 
smaller farm sizes (but not over the large farms) [1968b: A-38] . 
Important as this is, it is no basis for generalising over the 
whole country. Rudra challenges the universal validity of the 
inverse relationship, but does not reject that validity in all 
circumstances: in some places, at certain times, and for certain 
size ranges the inverse relationship holds [Chattopadhyay & 
Rudra, 1976: A-104].
The preponderance of negative correlation coefficients only means 
that the negative relation must be significant for some of the 
cases in the polled data, but certainly not significant in all 
cases. A significant inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity does not necessarily mean it holds over the whole 
range of values of the independent variable: thus, it is
important to check the data visually. Rudra notes that the 
inverse relationship over the entire range may be true for 
Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, but 
in most cases it is expected to hold over the range of small 
farms only [Chattopadhyay & Rudra, 1976: A109],
2.4 The inverse relation vindicated
While Rudra is correct to assert the need to disaggregate the 
data, the divergence between his results and those of the FMS 
would persist even with disaggregation. Rudra's concept of yield
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per acre is biased toward eliminating the inverse relationship. 
Yields have been calculated as gross value of output per gross 
cultivated area [Rudra, 1968a: 1041]. Gross cultivated area or 
gross cropped area includes farm size plus those parts of the 
operated area multi-cropped.11
However, factors such as double (or multiple) cropping and the 
percentage of land cultivated reflect the economics of farming. 
They are not exogenous factors affecting the economics of 
farming. A farmer who cultivates land more intensively via double 
cropping and raising the percentage of land cultivated may be 
argued to be using land more efficiently [i?ao, 1968: 1413] .
Rudra's procedure however, obscures cropping intensity 
differentials between farm size groups which may be of critical 
significance. Moreover, it is important to establish why land is 
cultivated more intensively. Rudra's procedure corrects for the 
efficiency of land use by using gross cropped area.12
Hanumantha Rao notes that if an inverse relationship exists 
between cropping intensity (the ratio of gross cropped area to 
net cropped area or farm size) and farm size, then Rudra's 
results are not surprising. If however such a relation does not 
exist for Rudra's villages then possibly no inverse relation 
exists. "The relevant question in this case is...whether these 
five [sic] villages are to be regarded as more typical of Indian 
farming than those studied by the FMS in different parts of the 
country" [Rao, 1968: 1413-4] .13
62
Nevertheless, much of Rudra's criticism of the earlier FMS 
studies has a great deal of validity. However, other writers 
sought to answer the criticisms by using disaggregated data for 
individual farm households at the village level.
Saini [1971] analyzes disaggregated FMS data for 25 data sets in 
9 States.14 His data [1971: A-79, table 1] show 22 out of 25 
coefficients less than unity, and 18 significantly less than 
unity at the 5% level {see Table 4, Appendix A) . Three cases show 
coefficients greater than unity, but not statistically 
significant. Saini concludes: "Thus, by and large, the inverse
relationship between farm size and productivity is a confirmed 
phenomenon in Indian agriculture and its statistical validity is 
adequately established by an analysis of the disaggregated data" 
[1971: A81-2] . Note however that this study still pools data over 
several villages, a defect he was to rectify in the following 
study.15
In this later study, Bhattacharya and Saini [1972: A63] examine 
disaggregated FMS data for individual farms, separately for each 
sample village. The data relate to Punjab (Ferozepur) 1955-6, 
1956-7, 1967-8 and 1968-9 and to Uttar Pradesh (Muzaffarnagar) 
for the same years plus 1966-7. Scatter diagrams did not reveal 
any significant non-linearities, but nevertheless Kendall rank 
correlation coefficients were computed [1972: A63] . Table 5 in 
Appendix A [from 1972: A65-66] shows the regression results and 
rank correlation coefficients.16
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Muzaffarnagar showed a significant inverse relationship for all 
years in that such a correlation is observed within most of the 
sample villages and does not arise from aggregation over 
villages. An inverse relation was unclear for the Ferozepur 
region. There is little evidence of a time trend. The writers 
claim that this indicates that the Green Revolution has not 
affected the inverse relationship in either region, but 
regressions using gross cropped area do show a shift from 
negative to positive correlation over time in Muzaffarnagar and 
from zero to positive in Ferozepur [1972: A71] .17
The general conclusion after the spilling of much ink is that the 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity has been 
confirmed as a valid empirical phenomenon in India, but not in 
the way conceived of in the earlier studies. Rudra and Sen in a 
joint paper [1980: 393] conclude: "While...the inverse relation 
is more frequently confirmed than rejected, it would be a mistake 
to take it to be an empirical generalisation for Indian 
agriculture as a whole." The inverse relationship findings in the 
Indian FMS, then, are not entirely conclusive. Moreover, some 
exceptions and complications are introduced by considering other 
factors besides land [Sen, 1964b: 441]. But those findings do 
suggest a persistent phenomenon that needs to be explained.
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2.5 Conjoint relationships: clustered factors and some a priori 
explanations
A wide range of relationships between farm size and other 
important factors are revealed by the various studies mentioned 
above that may throw some light on the theoretical understanding 
of this phenomenon presented in chapters III to VI. We note, 
however, an absence in these early findings concerning, for 
example, the relationship between tenancy and size, or rent 
burden and size, or interest burden and size etc.: i.e. on
property relations.
The major findings of the FMS studies and the wider debate which 
followed can be summarised as follows:18
1) An inverse relationship between output per net cropped acre 
for the total value of crop production and farm size exists for 
most regions of India, and for a wide range of other countries
2) That inverse relationship appears to be weakened when gross 
cropped area is used as the land measure in the productivity 
calculation,
3) No inverse relationship is evident between the physical yield 
per acre of individual crops and farm size. Indeed, in most 
cases, physical yields of individual crops appear to be constant 
or even increasing across farm size.
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4) There is a strong inverse relationship between cropping 
intensity and farm size, where the cropping intensity index 
represents the ratio of gross cropped area to net cropped area.
5) A further inverse relationship is evident between units of 
labour input per acre and farm size. As farm size increases, less 
human labour input is applied per acre.
6) A related phenomenon is the declining ratio of family labour 
to total labour as farm size increases. The ratio of hired labour 
input to total labour increases with farm size.
7) Along with increasing labour input intensity on the smaller 
farms, is a higher intensity of application of capital inputs 
(including animal labour power, seeds, fertilizers, and farm 
buildings).
8) This latter association does not apply to purchased 
intermediate inputs which tend to increase proportionately or 
more than proportionately with farm size.
9) An inverse relationship has also been noticed between the 
percentage of cultivated area irrigated and farm size.
Below, we discuss each relationship individually, but it is 
already fairly obvious that these findings are closely 
interdependent. All the studies mentioned above in Chapter I and 
in this chapter find these relationships clustered, suggesting
a priori explanations for the inverse relationship.
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Paglin [1965: 818] suggests that differences in labour and
material inputs per acre explain a large proportion of the 
variance in productivity between farm size. On small farms, land- 
saving techniques imply capital and labour substitution for land. 
Small farms use more bullock labour, fertiliser and irrigation 
inputs per acre as well as more family labour - all related to 
higher cropping intensity [1965: 821] . Rao [1968: 1413] points 
out that previous studies at the village level confirm that the 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in the 
FMS data arises from a corresponding inverse relation between 
size and cropping intensity, input intensity and the percentage 
of farm area irrigated.
Rudra's study of 20 villages revealed an inverse relationship 
between cropping intensity and farm size in 11 out of 16 cases 
(9 at the 1% level). Eleven villages {5 significant at the 1% 
level) show negative coefficients with regard to the relation 
between percentage area irrigated and farm size (but with one 
significant positive result in Allepey, Kerala) [1968b: A37-8]. 
Investment per hectare shows a declining tendency in 9 out of 12 
cases, and there were 13 significantly negative coefficients out 
of 17 for total input per hectare. The later study by 
Chattopadhyay and Rudra [1976: A-lll] showed cropping intensity 
and labour input intensity varying inversely with farm size in 
all states and over all size classes (except Madhya Pradesh and 
Assam). The incidence of irrigation varied inversely with size
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in many states.19 Total input per hectare (material costs and 
labour using imputed costs) varied inversely with farm size in 
all states, but application of material inputs alone per hectare 
shows a decreasing tendency only in some cases.
Ghose suggests that higher output per acre is attained on small 
farms due to higher labour intensity and the intensive 
application of other inputs. The variation in output per acre 
correlates significantly with the variation in the application 
of manures and fertilizers and irrigation levels. These results 
held for all farms and for all types of farms (tenanted and 
owner-operated, as well as family labour-based and wage labour- 
based) taken separately [1979: 38-40].
All 15 cases in Cornia's cross-country study [1985: 524-5, table
3] show a significant inverse relation between productivity and 
farm size, and 9 out of 15 show an associated inverse relation 
between cropping intensity and size. Both labour and capital 
inputs per unit land area show a significant inverse relation 
with size. Sanyal's study of the NSS 16th round data in India 
[1969: 1345-6] finds cropping intensity falling sharply as size 
increases, The number of attached farm workers and percentage 
area irrigated both decline with size.
As was mentioned above, there is a clear distinction to be drawn 
between the physical yields of individual crops and total crop 
production in value terms. While evidence for the inverse 
relationship in terms of the total value of crop production is
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strong, most of the data sets show clearly that there is no 
systematic relationship between farm size and the physical yields 
of individual crops. Indeed, where a relationship does appear, 
this tends to reveal a pattern of increasing physical crop yields 
with farm size. This dual finding can only be resolved when the 
importance of cropping intensity and crop mix patterns is fully 
recognised.
Small farms increase output per acre through the adoption of 
multiple cropping techniques and crop diversification towards 
high value products. Hossain regards the former as the most 
significant factor behind land productivity given the relative 
homogeneity in crop mix between farms [1977: 315] . However, there 
are some problems with cropping intensity alone as an index of 
land utilization: neither the values of individual crops nor the 
duration of production cycles enter into the calculation of 
cropping intensity (simply the ratio of gross cropped area to net 
cropped area or farm size) . A crop with a relatively long 
production cycle would have a low index of cropping intensity, 
but may have high land use. Similarly, a high value crop (such 
as sugarcane) may have low cropping intensity given a twelve 
month production cycle [Roy, 1979: 37].
Higher land use and cropping intensities imply a more intensive 
application of other inputs, particularly labour. Bharadwaj 
[1974a: 19] notes on the basis of FMS data that while family size 
varies positively with size of holding, the number of earners per 
acre declines with increasing size. Regressing total labour days
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per acre on average size of holding for total crop production, 
there was a significant inverse relation. Therefore, the higher 
cropping intensity and choice of labour intensive crops are 
associated very strongly with greater labour use per acre on 
small farms in terms of total crop production.
While physical yields show no systematic variation across farm 
size, the small farms show higher labour intensity even for 
individual crops. Chattopadhyay and Rudra note a preponderance 
of significant negative signs among the relevant coefficients 
[1976: A105-7] : "Smaller farms in almost all areas seem to devote 
a greater amount of labour per hectare of land not only for 
cultivating more crops on the same land, but even for looking 
after a single crop. However, this greater amount of labour does 
not result in higher production. Presumably, the larger farms 
while devoting less labour, apply capital and other inputs at a 
higher rate so as to obtain the same amount of production or more 
than the smaller farms" [1976: Alll]. Data from the Japan Farm 
Household survey in 19 60 show that while individual crop yields 
are higher on the large farms, cropping intensity is higher on 
the small farms and the latter use much more labour per cho 
[Bachman & Christensen, 1967: 247] .
Ghose [1979: 34, table 3] finds that labour input intensity {for 
both net and gross cropped area) varies inversely with size for 
all farms taken together and for types of farms. This holds even 
when output per acre varies directly with size. The inverse 
relationship between farm size and labour input per acre thus
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exists independently of production relations. Paglin, however, 
notes that even though labour intensity varies over farm size, 
total labour input as a proportion of total costs is relatively 
constant over size [1965: 821].
A related finding found by Sen [1962: 245] in nearly all areas 
covered by the FMS, was that the proportion of family labour to 
hired labour falls with the size of farms. The Uttar Pradesh 
study for 1954-5 (p.37) comments: "the contribution of family
labour to the total farm labour is the highest in the lower size 
groups" [Sen, 1962: 55, table 4.10]. This table also shows that 
the proportion of family labour falls monotonically with increase 
in size.20 While small farms have higher family labour per acre, 
this is not so for wage labour. However, total family labour 
applied per acre increases as size falls, so despite falling wage 
labour, total labour per acre rises [Sen, 1962: 245, fn. 2] .
Cornia [1985: 518] concludes that the higher proportion of hired 
labour on the large farms confirms "the hypothesis that, on 
average, large farms adopt a capitalistic mode of production 
based on wage-labour, while small farms tend to make a larger use 
of on-farm family labour."21 However, Paglin [1965: 824] notes 
that small farms themselves use significant amounts of hired 
labour although less than the large size classes. Ghose [1979: 
3 0] confirms this for Hooghly: the proportion of wage labour- 
based farms increases with size, but even small size-classes 
contain a significant proportion of wage labour farms. Ferozepur 
shows a clearer pattern, but still there are large peasant farms.
71
Taslim's study of 3 00 rural households in Bangladesh [1989: 57] 
produces strong evidence to support the general finding that the 
smaller the farm size, the greater the number of family workers 
per unit of land. He also finds that the greater the number of 
family labourers per unit of land, the greater the ratio of 
family labour to total labour input on the farm. He does notice 
some difference between small and large farms though: the
correlation between family labour and hired labour is negative 
on the small farms, but positive on the large farms. Also the 
correlation between family labour inputs per acre and total 
labour inputs per acre is negative on the small farms, and 
positive on the large farms (but not significant) [1989: 64],22 
This would suggest that family labour and hired labour are 
substitutes on the small farms, but complementary on the large 
farm sizes. The ability of large farms to employ wage labour is 
constrained by the availability of family labour, essential for 
supervision.
The significantly higher labour intensity of production on small 
farms appears to entail more intensive use of other inputs. The 
FMS Studies note a persistent tendency to raise the quantum of 
inputs per acre, especially in the smaller holdings and irrigated 
holdings so that output per acre increases, but no explanation 
is given as to why input per acre falls as size increases (the 
Uttar Pradesh study mentions indivisibility of bullocks, but this 
doesn't explain the increased use of other inputs) [Sen, 1962: 
245] . The increased application of other inputs per acre may 
partly reflect the complementarity between labour and other
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inputs. This may also explain the greater investment per acre on 
smaller farms with such investment undertaken by direct 
application of family labour. In Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, 
and Punjab, small farms also work with more material inputs per 
labour unit than the large farms [Paglin, 1965: 821] . Cornia
[1985: 524] notes that capital per hectare declines as farm size 
increases and capital per worker is higher on the large farms for 
9 out of 15 countries. Note however that there is no correction 
made for uncultivated land in any of the cases.
The cost of bullocks and implements as a proportion of the value 
of gross output are found to decline with the increase in farm 
size in all the regions studied [i?ao, 1965] . This appears to be 
the result of indivisibilities (especially farm buildings and 
animals). Within Indian agriculture, bullock power is important 
not only in crop production, but also for transport, social 
status, and economic security. Regressing total bullock-labour 
days per acre on average size of holding, Bharadwaj [1974: 109, 
table FI] found a significantly negative relation for total crop 
production. Thus for total crop production, bullock labour and 
human labour appear to be complementary. The FMS data for Punjab 
shows bullock cost increases with size due to the fact that small 
farmers maintain lower quality animals [Rao, 1963: 2042] .
Sanyal [1969: 1346, table 3] finds that the proportion of
cultivated area under chemical fertilizers increases up to 2.5 
acres but falls thereafter. There is, however, evidence to the 
contrary: showing that the application of purchased inputs per
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acre rises as size of farm increases.23 Rao [1968b: 93] observes 
that "even though the application of labour may be higher among 
smaller farms, they may lag behind the larger ones in regard to 
the application of technologically new inputs such as 
fertilizers, improved seeds and insecticides etc. owing to their 
low investible surplus". Bharadwaj [1974a: 38] notes that other 
inputs reveal no systematic relation with size. The seed rate per 
acre tends to vary more with sowing methods, climatic factors, 
and levels of irrigation than with size. Manures and fertilizers 
account for only a small part of expenditure and are not much 
used on the smaller size-holdings in any case.
Finally, is the perhaps surprising finding that small farm sizes 
have a higher proportion of cultivated area irrigated. Irrigation 
increases productivity per acre by permitting more intensive 
application of other inputs. The FMS studies show that irrigated 
holdings do have higher use of human and bullock labour, and 
total inputs, than unirrigated holdings. Hanumantha Rao [1966: 
3-4] finds that correcting for irrigation by including the 
proportion of area irrigated as a regressor, results in a less 
marked inverse relationship between size and productivity. A,P. 
Rao [1967: 1990], controlling for current fallow and irrigation 
ratios, finds that expenditure on seed, fertilizer and manure per 
acre and cropping intensity remained constant over all farm sizes 
on both net and gross cropped area measures. We shall examine 
this finding more closely in the next chapter.
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Summary and conclusions
Neither the statistical evidence for the inverse relationship, 
nor its apparent policy implications, have been generally 
accepted. This chapter has examined the principal conceptual and 
methodological problems associated with the data. Classification 
by farm-size implies that the characteristics of a farm depend 
predominantly on its belonging to a certain size-group. Size of 
farm however is a very general variable and to treat it as the 
only significant parameter would be a mistake.
Despite these problems, the inverse relationship has been 
confirmed in Indian agriculture at the time during which these 
studies were conducted, and its statistical validity is 
adequately established by an analysis of the disaggregated data. 
It is not necessarily, however, a phenomenon that will persist 
indefinitely. Clearly the inverse relationship is a phenomenon 
that needs to be explained, and not explained away by "exacting 
statisticians". These latter however did perform the useful 
function of questioning the FMS data critically. It would be a 
mistake to regard the inverse relationship as an empirical 
generalisation for Indian agriculture as a whole, however.
A wide range of relationships between farm size and other 
important factors are revealed in section 2,5 that may throw some 
light on the theoretical understanding of this phenomenon. This 
range of clustered relationships suggests a possible labour-based 
explanation for the inverse relationship which will be discussed
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in Chapter IV.
Further limitations of the FMS data include an over-emphasis on 
technical relations, input-output data, and only cursory 
information on tenancy and variation of tenurial terms and 
conditions across farms. The concentration on size of holding and 
technical relations on individual farms neglects information on 
property relations and underplays other aspects such as tenurial 
status, farm investment size, scale of output, rent burden, and 
non-price factors. An important point raised is whether 
productivity differentials will persist over time making small 
farms historically viable or whether they are based on a specific 
conjuncture of factors and are subject to change. The FMS years 
of reference are prior to the Green Revolution. Thus possibly 
production conditions have changed, both in technological and 
property aspects in certain regions.
This would suggest that the framework of analysis is 
inappropriate - a return to the examination of the inverse 
relationship in the context of agrarian transition would perhaps 
be more profitable. We must go deeper than the size of holding 
categories to the underlying social relations of production. The 
next two chapters examine the main theoretical approaches to the 
inverse relationship and in Chapter V, we attempt to transcend 
the limitations of the debate.
Notes to Chapter II
1. Citing H. Morales Jara, Productive dad presente y potencial en 
96 predios de la provincia de 0'Higgins y su relacion con el 
tamano de las propriedades (tesis de Ing. Agron., Universidad de 
Chile, 1964; J.O. Bray, La intensidad del uso de la tierra en 
relacion con el tamano de los predios en el Valle central de 
Chile (Santiago, Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1960); A. 
Corvalan Morales & R. Parra Herrera, Introduccion a la 
determinacion de areas agricolas homogeneas en Chile: Aconcagua- 
Chile, (tesis de Ing. Agron., Universidad de Chile 1963).
2. The argument in this section has been developed by T.J. Byres 
in an unpublished manuscript.
3. In adopting such an approach, Patnaik is following Lenin's 
treatment in New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of 
Capitalism in Agriculture, which relates to the USA and the 
apparent inverse relationship found there in the US Census data 
on agriculture of 1910-11. See Volume 22 of Collected Works 
(Moscow, 1964), pp. 58-71. One needs to take a position on 
whether or not Lenin was correct with respect to US agriculture 
at that time. He probably was. He, of course, himself used size, 
quite happily, as a stratifying variable in Development of 
Capitalism in Russia. But while Lenin may well have been correct 
with respect to the US in 1910-11, the same may not have been 
true of India in the mid-1950s; although it may have begun to 
have validity in parts of India by the 1970s.
It is interesting that Patnaik's reasons for so questioning the 
inverse relationship - i.e. in relation to arguments about 
cooperative agriculture etc. - seem to be similar to Rudra's 
(whom she quotes with apparent favour [1972: 1615). But her
approach is, of course very different to his. She also wishes to 
oppose the populist arguments about small farms being more 
efficient etc. [1972: 1613}.
4. Note however that Roy [1979] does attempt to show that the 
direction of causality at the "macro" level is indeed operative 
at the micro level. We will discuss this land-based approach to 
understanding the inverse relationship in chapter II.
5. Bhattacharya and Saini [1972: A-72] note that intercept terms 
vary significantly between villages due to soil fertility and 
other factors. Indeed, the variation in intercepts explains a 
higher proportion of variation in productivity than net or gross 
cropped area.
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6. Rao [1967: 1990] uses data for 6 villages {249 farms)
Matiana, Bhatian and Sochania in Punjab; and Zahidpur, Patti 
Beharipur and Gatti in Uttar Pradesh, collected by the 
Agricultural Economics Research Centre, University of Delhi. He 
finds that wherever there is no significant variation in 
irrigation ratios across farm size, output per acre is constant: 
the FMS findings therefore may be attributable to the irrigation 
factor. He suggests that if the percentage of current fallow 
increases with farm size then this would help to explain the FMS 
finding of declining output per acre with farm size. He also 
makes point that he uses individual farm-level data and not group 
averages.
7 . This tests the ratio of between-group variance to within-group 
variance.
8. Rudra does admit that the use of modal price in each village 
to calculate value of output (rather than individually received 
price) may have ironed out some real differences in productivity 
to the extent that price differences received by different 
farmers might reflect quality variations in output [1968a: 1041].
9. The hypothesis to be tested is not that f (x) has any 
particular functional form with a negative coefficient, but that 
given (xl, yl) and (x2, y2), both xl > x2 and yl < y2 hold. Thus 
the suitability of rank correlation tests [Rudra, 1968b: A-37].
10. Note that this is yield per gross cropped hectare. If short 
season crops have a naturally lower productivity, then this too 
may imply a bias against finding an inverse relation.
11. "The reason we have not taken farm size as the divisor is 
that we would like to treat the extent of double cropping, 
proportion of uncultivated land to cultivated land, etc, as 
distinct factors affecting the economics of farming and not 
subsume all of them in the factor 'size of farm'" [Rudra, 1968a: 
1041] . This procedure however, obscures cropping intensity 
differentials between farm size groups which may be of critical 
significance.
In fact, inspection of the FMS tables themselves (in Farm 
Management in India. A Study Based on Recent Investigations, 
Appendix III), reveals that where the gross cropped measure is 
used, the inverse relationship disappears.
12. This can be seen from the table below in which two farms of 
the same size have the same output per gross cropped area, even 
though farm A has higher output per net cropped area [Rao, 1968: 
1413]:
A B
1) size of holding (acres)
2) output per farm (Rs)
3) output per acre (2/1)
4) % of holding cultivated
5) % cultivated land double
10
750
75
100
50
10
500
50
80
25
78
cropped
6) gross cropped area (acres) 15 10
7) output per gross cropped area 50 50
13. Rudra [1968b: A-3S] answers Rao, but not convincingly. While 
the FMS studies use both net cropped area and gross cropped area, 
they are used in different contexts (see note on physical yields 
of individual crops and total value yields below). Rudra also 
points out that while higher cropping intensity on small farms 
is one of the factors leading to higher yields (hence the 
importance of using net cropped area in yield measurements), 
there are other reasons for the inverse relation mentioned by the 
FMS studies: such as higher labour input intensity and higher
fertility. Therefore using gross cropped area should not 
"correct" entirely for efficiency of land use. However, labour 
input and cropping intensity are highly correlated (see section
1.4 below), and the differential fertility hypothesis is 
insignificant at the "micro" level.
14. Saini in an earlier study uses disaggregated FMS data for 
Uttar Pradesh (Meerut and Muzaffarnagar districts) and Punjab 
(Amritsar and Ferozepur districts) for the years 1955-56 and 
1956-57 [this paper is a shorter version of [Saini, 1969a], All 
land coefficients were significantly below unity indicating a 
strong inverse relationship [Saini, 1969b: A-120] .
15. Other disaggregated studies have been carried out by Bardhan 
[1973] and Ghose [1979] . Bardhan uses disaggregated FMS data for 
915 farms from 7 districts in Punjab (2 samples: 1955-6 and 1967-
8) , Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar 
Pradesh. Table 1 shows 7 out of 8 estimates of elasticities of 
crop output per acre with respect to net sown area have negative 
coefficients (but only three are significant) [1973: 1373].
Ghose uses FMS data: 85 farms from 1955-6, 94 farms from 1956-7, 
149 farms from 1971-2, and 148 farms from 1972-3 in Hooghly 
district, West Bengal; and 100 farms from 1955-6, 100 farms from 
1956-7, and 150 farms from 1968-9 in Ferozepur, Punjab. Table 2 
[1979: 32] shows with all farms considered together, an inverse 
relationship in 5 out of 7 cases (significant in 3) using net 
cropped area (1 case significantly positive). Using gross cropped 
area, the inverse relation was much weaker indicating higher 
cropping intensity on the smaller farms.
16. There is a problem in that the per village sample size is 
small (about 10) so that t tests lack power [1972: A-63] . 
However, table 3 [1972: A-69] shows that chi-squared values from 
combined village tests are significant. For each t value, the 
probability p of Students t with n-2 df falling below the 
computed value was calculated. The lower tail probability was 
used with a one-tailed alternative hypothesis, i.e. that the true 
correlation was negative. Chi-square = -SUM In pi where pi is the 
probability for the ith village (df = twice the number of sample 
villages). The hypothesis of zero correlation is rejected if chi- 
squared is significant. A similar procedure was carried out for 
the rank coefficients.
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17. See Chapter III for further examination of this phenomenon.
18. See tables in Bharadwaj [1974a: 91-125, Appendices B-H] . 
Given their conciseness, the tables relating to the principal 
findings listed in the text are reproduced in Tables 6 to 12 in 
Appendix A.
19. But not in Kerala which showed a significant positive 
relation. Interestingly, in Uttar Pradesh, this relation was 
inverse and highly significant in the mid-1950s, but had become 
positive by the mid-1960s.
20. There was one exception in the Cost Accounting sample, but 
none in the Survey sample.
21. Note that to identify large farmers as 'capitalist' simply 
because they employ wage labour is quite unacceptable. This 
important point is elaborated upon in Chapter V when we discuss 
a possible class-based explanation of the inverse relationship.
22. The large farms are defined as greater than 6.5 acres in 
Mymensingh, 3.5 acres in Comilla, and 10 acres in Rajashahi; the 
small farms are less than 5 acres, 3.5 acres, and 7.5 acres 
respectively.
23 . See Goverment of India, Studies in the Economics of Farm 
Management in Uttar Pradesh, Combined Report for 1954-55 to 1956- 
57, (Delhi, 1963), p. 104, table 5.15.
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CHAPTER III
Explanations of the inverse relationship based on qualitative 
factor differences 
Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have surveyed the nature and extent 
of the empirical evidence supporting the existence of an inverse 
relationship between farm size and land productivity. In 
addition, we saw that the empirical data points to a number of 
clustered relationships involving factors of production, 
summarised in Chapter II, section 2.5. That evidence has spawned 
a vast theoretical literature which has attempted to explain how 
the inverse relationship arises.
One theoretical approach has already been examined in the 
previous chapter: that which purports to explain away the inverse 
relationship as a purely statistical artefact. This takes a 
variety of forms, some more plausible than others. However, the 
methodological flaws associated with that approach, broadly, and 
the weight of evidence produced at a suitably disaggregated 
level, would appear to confirm the existence of an inverse 
relationship as a real phenomenon that requires substantive 
explanation.
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Rather than discuss the theoretical debate chronologically (see 
Rudra and Sen [1980] for a summary), it is both convenient and 
logical to examine the principal theoretical approaches to the 
inverse relationship under three broad conceptual headings:
1) the first approach, to be examined in this chapter, attempts 
to explain the inverse relationship in terms of qualitative 
factor differences between farm-size categories. It is postulated 
that small farm-size categories, however they may be defined, 
utilize qualitatively superior factors of production, either in 
terms of physical resources such as soil quality and irrigation, 
or in terms of management, labour, and production technique. The 
main thrust of such an approach has been to explain why such 
factors are concentrated on small farms.
2) the second, and more substantial approach, to be discussed in 
Chapter IV, attempts to explain the inverse relationship in terms 
of differential factor use intensities between farm-size 
categories. This approach postulates that small farms apply 
production inputs, especially land and labour, more intensively 
in cultivation. The debate has centred around Amartya Sen's model 
which postulates different behavioural strategies as between 
farm-size categories. A more explicitly neoclassical variant of 
this approach will also be discussed.
3) the third is a class-based political economy explanation of 
the inverse relationship. Here, an attempt is made to identify 
farm size with class location, and to show how the inverse
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relationship arises from the interaction of classes. This is 
discussed in Chapter V.
Note here that the more usual categorisation of theoretical 
approaches in agrarian political economy, comprising 
neoclassical, Chayanovian, and Marxist paradigms, runs across the 
sets of explanations based on qualitative and quantitative factor 
differences. In this chapter and the next two, we intend to show 
that the first two approaches, both essentially static in nature, 
are either inadequate or fundamentally flawed as explanations for 
the inverse relationship. The third approach will be more fully 
examined in Chapter V when we move from the static context to the 
dynamic context of agrarian transition.
In this chapter, we examine the principal contributions to the 
first approach based on qualitative factor differences. In 
section 3.1, we discuss an influential set of explanations of the 
inverse relationship based on the proposition that small farms 
are characterised by better quality management, labour input, and 
technique than on the large farms. Section 3.2 critically 
evaluates those explanations based on differential soil fertility 
between farm sizes, while section 3,3 examines in greater detail 
a major contribution by Prannoy Roy to that approach. Related to 
that question are hypotheses concerning better irrigation on 
small farms, discussed in section 3,4.
3.1 Management, labour and technique hypotheses
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This section examines critically three separate, but as we shall 
see, inter-related explanations of the inverse relationship based 
on the proposition that small farms are characterised by better 
quality management, labour input, and technique than on the large 
farms.
Given the essentially untestable nature of the concepts of 
management and labour quality, the researcher is forced to 
utilize various proxies, and hence this approach tends to be 
residual in nature. Some form of 1 diseconomies of large scale" 
peculiar to agricultural production are normally invoked as 
giving rise to an inverse relationship. Khusro [1964: 63, fn. 11] 
writes: "with an expansion of farm-size and of all other inputs, 
might it not be that per acre returns decline owing to a fixity 
of entrepreneurship (the usual argument for diminishing returns 
to scale)? Entrepreneurship in underdeveloped farming being what 
it is, the point where it cannot cope with the expansion of other 
inputs ought to arrive at a smaller farm-size than in developed 
farming."
This view is supported by Hanumantha Rao [1966: 10-11]: "If one 
agrees with Sen...that the availability of capital cannot be a 
bottleneck for larger farms, then the productivity behaviour can 
be explained only in terms of the management factor and the 
income-leisure preferences among the larger farms." Among the 
large farm groups, management may be insufficient to meet the
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increased needs of supervision and inefficient owing to 
dissociation of ownership from management and management from 
work [Kao, 1963: 2402].1
This argument appears to have two distinct components: the first 
is a proposition concerning the increase in complexity of 
organisation that comes with size, and which appears to have 
inefficiencies inherent in it, compared with the small farm 
situation; the second is a proposition relating to supervision 
problems and incentives which seem to become problematic as size 
increases.
Ellman states the first strand in the managerial diseconomies of 
scale argument as follows: "the efficient large scale
organisation of labour requires efficient planning, 
administration, and book-keeping work which is unnecessary under 
peasant farming where each peasant organises his own work for 
himself" [1989: 100] . This argument is frequently made with
respect to agriculture, both large scale capitalist farms as well 
as to collective farms. It is not an argument that one encounters 
with respect to industrial production. In principle, however, it 
applies just as much to a comparison between small-scale 
traditional artisanal units and large-scale modern units which 
spread management overheads. Yet it is not made in this context.
Clearly, complexity of organisation does increase with size, but 
why this should necessarily generate insuperable inefficiencies 
is not so clear. On the contrary, one might argue that the scope
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provided for division of labour and specialization leads to the 
possibility of increased efficiency. If the logic of the argument 
applies to agriculture but not to industry, then identifiable 
differences must exist between the two, in relation to 
organisation and the internal problems of planning, 
administration and accounting. It is sometimes implied that such 
differences do exist in agriculture's spatial dispersion and the 
sequential nature of work over the course of the agricultural 
cycle. But why spatial dispersion is assumed to be a significant 
factor in agricultural production, and not in modern industrial 
production is unclear: after all, many modern plants cover vast 
areas and involve extremely complex management problems. Thus it 
is not at all self-evident that, simply in terms of organisation, 
large farms are inefficient. To that extent, the argument, in 
terms of organisation, is problematic.
Let us suppose however that the argument does have some validity. 
Its force then may hinge, to a certain extent, upon whether or 
not technical economies of scale exist. If there are indeed 
demonstrable potential economies of scale then these may 
compensate for possible managerial diseconomies. The greater the 
potential technical economies, the greater the compensation. That 
is, even if managerial diseconomies of scale could be shown to 
exist {in the sense that management becomes more difficult and 
more complex as size increases) that might not matter if 
technical economies of scale are possible. This implies a 
possible trade-off between technical economies of scale and 
managerial diseconomies of scale.
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Thus, the argument simply in organisational terms is not wholly 
convincing, but the second part of the argument concerning 
incentives does seem, at first sight, to have considerable force. 
This part of the argument suggests that any economies of scale 
arising from indivisibilities will be offset by the agency costs 
of managing wage labour and enforcing effort on the part of the 
hired workforce. Supervision costs and incentive contracts, it 
is posited, will have profound implications for the optimal size 
of farm.
Mellor states the argument as follows: "because of the biological 
nature of the agricultural production process, operations are 
spread out in time and space" (the sequential nature of the work 
over the course of the agricultural cycle and the spatial 
dispersion of work on a large farm with many workers). "Hence, 
a big operational unit that relies on a large work force, whether 
hired labourers or members of a group farm, encounters difficult 
problems of supervision in seeking to avoid shirking. Owing to 
the high degree of variability that characterises farming 
activities, there are numerous 'on-the-spot supervisory 
decisions' to be made" [Mellor & Johnston, 1984: 558].
Mellor [1966: 368] argues that the problems associated with a 
large labour force argue for small farm units where incentives 
rather than supervision "provoke careful, timely and knowledgable 
use of labour". This echoes an earlier argument by Joan Robinson 
[1964: 1] who writes: "For the deployment of labour, a rather
small scale is required. Workers are spread out over space so
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that discipline is hard to enforce; an incentive wage system is 
not easy to arrange or administer; there has to be a great 
diffusion of managerial responsibility; every field is different, 
every day is different and quick decisions have to be taken. For 
getting work out of the workers a peasant farm is hard to beat. 
Discipline and responsibility are imposed by the pressing 
incentive to secure the family livelihood. 1
The final product of labour appears with a considerable time lag 
after labour effort has been expended: with a large labour force, 
therefore, it is difficult to identify and reward the 
contribution of each worker, and it is difficult to assess the 
quantity or quality of labour effort until the final product 
appears. Hence the need for direct supervision. The spatial 
dispersion of work exacerbates such supervision problems. Thus, 
the farm economy is characterised by peculiar difficulties in 
supervising farm work, generally leading to powerful managerial 
diseconomies of scale as the number of workers in a production 
unit expands [Nolan, 1988: 41-2] .
Rao also mentions a large farm low aspiration model in which 
small farmers work their land intensively to earn income, but 
large farmers are indifferent, being accustomed to traditional 
consumption patterns and a greater preference for leisure and 
non-economic pursuits [1966: 11] .
The obverse of the above approach is that small farms have a 
productivity advantage which relates to the quality of labour.
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This is a hypothesis in terms of qualitative factor difference 
which relates to incentive structures. It is a classic populist 
assumption suggested quite often in the literature, but is seldom 
stated with great clarity. More often, it is implied. 
Unfortunately, no evidence is presented in support of the 
proposition; or against which one might test the hypothesis.
Thus, for example, Khusro suggests that a unit of family labour 
is worth more, qualitatively, than a unit of wage labour. He 
says: "Now, if it is true, as it probably is, that in agriculture 
a unit of family labour does more or better work than a unit of 
hired labour, the product will be larger for the former even if 
the quantities of labour applied were the same in both cases. In 
that case, a mere increase in the proportion of hired to family 
labour, as farm-size expands, gives a smaller per acre product 
[1964: 63].
A more recent contributor argues: "people will produce more as
small family groups, working for themselves and receiving the 
whole product of their labour, than as employees in larger 
units...This points to the frequent superiority of the smaller, 
self-managed family unit, as expressed in the 'inverse 
relationship' : namely, the generally higher productivity of land, 
and to a lesser extent all factors taken together, farmed in 
smaller holdings" [Lipton, 1993a: 1524].
Because family members are residual claimants to profits, they 
therefore have higher incentives to provide effort than hired
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labour. They share the burden of risk and have no search or 
recruitment costs in the labour market: thus, the claimed
superiority of family over large wage labour-based operations 
[Binswanger & Deiningerf 1993: 1452]. Due to the advantages of 
peer monitoring, agents such as family farmers benefit more from 
supervising each other in small groups than from external 
supervision by costly foremen. Small farms reduce unit labour- 
related transaction costs (search, screening, supervision, 
shirking) by providing nearby, informed, rapid and flexible 
family overview of labour, and by building on intrafamily 
altruism and on the extended fungibility of family members 
between the household and the family farm [Llpton, 1993b: 648].
It is further argued that individual peasant farmers have better 
knowledge of local natural conditions than managers of large 
farms, and that potential losses from imperfect information are 
minimised by the ability of the small farmer to adjust to micro 
variations in the natural environment [Binswanger & Deininger, 
1993: 1452]. This is accentuated by weather variability which 
requires rapid and flexible response by the farmer.
In the Indian context, Rao [1966: 11] suggests that capital and 
labour input intensities are dependent on these management and 
labour factors. Farm operations require close personal 
supervision, and the scope for such a division of functions and 
their delegation remains limited. It is further postulated that 
managerial and supervisory bottlenecks will arise at small farm 
sizes, with large farms avoiding control-intensive cropping
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patterns: crops requiring careful handling or high levels of
labour application. This stage will be reached earlier under 
labour-intensive techniques of production. Such managerial 
bottlenecks will effect a productivity decline via the decline 
in labour and capital inputs per acre.
This brings us to another explanation that falls within the 
rubric of this section and which relates to the notion of a 
superior technique being used on the smaller farms. Sen [1964a: 
323] writes: "Because of personal participation and supervision
that a small business allows, a small holding may permit the use 
of some techniques - efficient ones - that cannot be used in 
larger holdings. Some techniques require not only inputs in the 
usual sense but also loving care, and Adam Smith had directed our 
attention to the 'affection' that small property inspires."
Efficient production based on labour-using, capital-saving 
technologies (which are held to be economically and socially 
desirable) therefore depends on decentralised decision-making and 
the incentive which owner-cultivators or tenants have to exercise 
judgement and initiative because of their direct interest in the 
outcome [Mellor & Johnston, 1984: 558-9] .
Much of the foregoing arguments, if they have any validity at 
all, would appear to have more relevance for vast landed estates 
or extensive ranch-type farming involving thousands of acres. 
They will have much less relevance for the types of large farms 
we are considering, in the range from 10 to 50 or even 100 acres.
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Supervision costs, under such conditions, would seem to be 
greatly exaggerated. The use of attached labour in a supervisory 
role, or even better, the use of family labour, in setting work 
tasks and ensuring execution is sufficient to ensure that the 
requisite labour effort has been expended on the part of the 
workforce. The threat of losing access to wage labour 
opportunities will provide the incentive for the worker to supply 
the quantity and quality of labour effort demanded. The often 
highly personalised relationship between employer and labourer, 
sometimes involving access to credit and land, help to provide 
"nearby, informed, rapid and flexible" supervision of labour [see 
Bhaduri 1973].
On the small farm side of the equation, the idealised notion of 
"family altruism" and "fungibity of family members" ignores the 
unequal distribution of income within the farm household and 
intra-household exploitation. Further, the idea that small 
farmers have better information on the local environment is a 
dubious proposition, and is probably outweighed by the superior 
knowledge of large farmers concerning the use of modern 
technology.
The really critical problem, however, for these approaches is 
that if small farms were indeed characterised by superior 
management or labour quality, these should have been reflected 
in a productivity advantage with regard to individual crops. 
However, as Bharadwaj (see Table 6, Appendix A) has shown in her 
study of the FMS data no systematic or significant relation
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between farm-size and the physical yields of individual crops 
exists (in fact, irrigated wheat-gram and cotton in Punjab showed 
a positive relation). That they do not would seem to undermine 
further the hypothesis that the inverse relation arises from 
superior rural entrepreneurship of the small farmer.2
This approach is further undermined by the fact that the inverse 
relationship phenomenon is not limited to a simple comparison 
between small family labour farms and large hired labour farms. 
All the evidence shows that the inverse relationship runs across 
small family farms themselves. How the adherents of the above 
approaches might explain this has been left unwritten. Indeed, 
they seem not to have even recognised the problem.
Finally on the superior technique approach. Technique relates to 
the use of a particular production input such as labour or land. 
While we have seen that any superior technique that might exist 
does not seem to be manifested in higher physical yields of 
individual crops, it might be argued that the higher cropping 
intensity on small farms (see chapter II, section 2.5) is 
evidence of superior technique. However, what this really boils 
down to is a question of the intensification of effort rather 
than any qualitatively different technique. As such, discussion 
of this matter belongs in the following chapter.
Rao emphasises that the supposed managerial or supervisory 
disincentives are especially acute under labour-intensive 
techniques of production [1966: 11] . Indeed, much of the
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literature on diseconomies of scale comes from regions where 
agricultural mechanization is incomplete and technical change has 
been slow [Binswanger & Deininger, 1993: 1452] . With traditional 
unmechanized technology, it is claimed that large landholders' 
supervisory capacity soon becomes binding [Binswanger & 
Deininger, 1993: 1468, fn. 2],
However, in the dynamic context of changing forces of production, 
with the introduction of more capital-intensive techniques, these 
constraints would be progressively attenuated. Indeed, the FMS 
evidence clearly shows that modern technology is concentrated on 
the large farms [Bharadwaj, 1974b: A-14] . This a topic which will 
be further explored in Chapter V.
3.2 Land fertility hypothesis
A second qualitative approach centres on the proposition that 
small farms are located on land of superior productive potential. 
Land enters both sides of the farm size-productivity relation, 
and is the crucial input in backward agriculture, often the 
limitational factor. While it is relatively free from annual 
fluctuation and change in composition, it needs to be 
standardised in terms of soil quality, a process which can tend 
to be arbitrary. Consideration of this factor leads us to the 
fertility-based explanation of the inverse relation.
94
Bharadwaj [1974b: A-15] notes that there is some evidence in the 
FMS Bombay Report for intrinsic soil differences between farm 
sizes: small farms appear to have a higher proportion of medium 
and deep soils, and the uncultivated area is higher on the larger 
farms, but this should be interpreted cautiously as uncultivated 
land includes current fallow3 as well as uncultivable bunds and 
irrigation canals. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish between 
qualitative land differences and those arising from the 
application of fertility-augmenting inputs. Furthermore, superior 
soil quality may not be picked up by individual crop regressions 
because to some extent crop choice is dictated by soil type, and 
quality differences will be reflected predominantly in crop 
patterns [Bharadwaj, 1974b: A14-15].
Sen perceives some truth in the fertility based approach. Over 
time, a correlation between land fertility and size of holdings 
will be established via population expansion on more fertile 
land. Faster population growth on more fertile land (due to 
higher growth of income opportunities) leads to greater 
subdivision of the land. This is easy to see in interregional 
variation where population expands faster due to natural increase 
and immigration, but also within regions, claims Sen, where the 
ability of a farm household to withstand famine or crop disease 
is greater with more fertile land. Kalra writes: "The average
size of holding is generally small in areas where the yielding 
capacity of land is more by way of assured rainfall, irrigation 
facilities, better quality of soil, etc., and the density of 
population is high".4 Note that this approach ignores the
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crucial distinction that must be made between the inverse 
relation at the macro level, and that at the micro level (see 
Chapter II, section 2.2).
Sen's argument regarding fertility differentials relies upon a 
rather dubious Malthusian link between income and family size and 
between level of income and fragmentation, and ignores 
alternative employment opportunities off-farm. An alternative 
hypothesis proposed by Bhagwati and Chakravarty [1969] suggests 
that large farms build up holdings by land purchase and 
foreclosure on loans leading to a high degree of fragmentation, 
and consequently low productivity. Bardhan [1973: 1385] adds that 
distress sales by poor farmers result in the latter parting with 
unirrigated land first.
Of course, neither version of the fertility hypothesis (Sen or 
Bhagwati and Chakravarty) holds the promise of economic 
betterment for the small farmer nor reflects any inherently 
progressive characteristics of the latter. However, while the 
fertility hypothesis based on partible inheritance or small farm 
distress sales may appear plausible, it is weakened by the fact 
that small farmers may sell land to other small farmers. 
Likewise, land reform laws may simply lead to the large farmers 
divesting their worst quality land. Bharadwaj also points out 
that according to the FMS database, whereas large holdings do 
tend to be composed of a greater number of fragments, the 
intensity of fragmentation (number of fragments per acre) is 
higher on the small farms (see Table 8, Appendix A).
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Khusro points out that the FMS survey deals with crude acreage 
figures with no correction for fertility.5 He [1964: 64] claims 
to show, based on the behaviour of land revenue, that as farm 
size increases the proportion of bad or indifferent land 
increases and that this accounts for the decline in land 
productivity. The land revenue index is used as an indicator of 
relative soil fertility and land conditions. The data provided 
by Khusro6 appears to show declining land revenue per acre as 
farm size increases. Thus, land in successive size-groups of the 
FMS data is not uniform, but declines in quality and needs to be 
standardised.
Khusro's standardised figures7 show that gross output per 
corrected acre increases in four cases and declines in three with 
only one regression result statistically significant. He writes: 
"Thus it cannot be asserted that O/Ac [output per acre] either 
decreases or increases with Ac [acreage] and the hypothesis of 
constant gross output per corrected acre as size changes appears 
to be as good as any. . .We thus reach what is perhaps an important 
conclusion: in Indian farming of the 1950s gross output and farm 
business income per corrected acre had no general tendency either 
to increase or decrease, while net profit per acre increased with 
farm-size" [1964: 72].8
However, Sen expresses some reservation about empirically testing 
the validity of the fertility variation hypothesis inasmuch as 
Khusro uses land revenue data as an indicator of fertility. Land 
revenue may be based on other considerations. Roy [1979: 10, fn.
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2] cites the 1940 Land Revenue Commission: "The absence of any
systematic assessment in Bengal has led to a rate of rent, the 
incidence of which varies considerably from district to district 
and from holding to holding and has little relation to the 
productivity of land."9 Indeed, the land revenue figures may 
reflect neither natural soil fertility nor man-made improvements, 
but simply output per acre itself. In other words, land revenue 
figures may simply reflect that which we are trying to explain.
Bandhuhas Sen [1967: 77-78]10 notes that Khusro's results on
fertility are biased by the fact that farms are still grouped by 
acreage rather than by land revenue and that the corrections for 
land quality (using land revenue data) have been made on grouped 
data rather than ungrouped for individual farms. When individual 
farms are regrouped by land revenue assessment, a significant 
inverse relationship is still in evidence. He further finds that 
while farms are not homogeneous with respect to soil quality and 
that the latter does affect output, when acreage and output are 
adjusted by a soil fertility index to take account of inter-farm 
differences in soil quality, there is still a significant inverse 
relationship between farm size and output per unit size. Mellor 
and Moorti in a field study in Uttar Pradesh, found that farm to 
farm differences in soil were evenly distributed as between farm 
groups and so did not bias the results.11
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3.3 Prannoy Poy on soil quality explanations
Having succinctly and clearly demonstrated the crucial difference 
between the macro level inverse relationship and the micro level 
relation, Roy [1979: 4] attempts to prove the thesis that at all 
levels of disaggregation, the inverse relationship arises along 
macro lines i.e. the main line of causation runs from soil 
fertility and therefore productivity to farm size. Thus, it needs 
to be shown that: 1) land is heterogeneous with respect to soil 
quality within the village; and 2) better quality land is 
parcelled into smaller operational units even at the village 
level.
Roy's chain of reasoning runs as follows: in the Indian context 
(as in tropical agriculture in general), the principal 
determinant of land productivity is soil moisture content rather 
than soil quality as a whole. Whereas soil quality variations 
tend to occur quite naturally at the macro level, soil quality 
and texture become more homogeneous at the more disaggregated 
level. This is not true of water availability however. The factor 
that causes most variation in soil water content at the micro 
level is topography.12 Roy therefore needs to show that small 
farms are situated on land with higher soil water content, and 
hence on land of suitable topography. However, due to "paucity 
of information", Roy is forced to use "indirect forms of data" 
of an "illustrative and ... indicative nature only" [1979: 
^S],13 Roy's conclusion is that it is not labour intensity that
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determines the inverse relation, but the fact that small farms 
are situated on better land (with higher water availability).
Roy [1979: 6, figure 1.1] shows how land values decline with size 
in seven of the FMS states, particularly in the smaller size 
groups.14 The per acre value of land reflects some capitalized 
service value (the net present value of land is the flow of net 
output discounted by the prevailing interest rate) and, 
therefore, rent will be proportional to yields. Thus, despite his 
earlier criticism, land value is taken as a rough surrogate for 
the intrinsic quality of land. Roy [1979: 44] further mentions 
references in the FMS studies to large farms located on poor 
land: "a comparatively larger percentage of area held on the
bigger holdings comprise barani land of inferior quality and 
consequently of lower value" [Punjab Report, FMS, 1954-5: 47] . 
Roy also cites [1979: 47] Dantwala15 who uses data from the RBI 
Rural Credit Follow-up Surveys: "Incidentally, it may also be
noticed that the quality of land of the big cultivators is 
generally inferior to that of the small cultivators. If the value 
per acre of the land cultivated by the big and the small 
cultivators is an indication of the quality of the land, in 7 out 
of 12 districts it was larger for the lands of the small 
cultivators. In three other districts, though it was smaller, the 
difference was insignificant". Thus, claims Roy, the direction 
of causation of the inverse relationship is the same at all 
levels so far.
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If the above is true, of course, then there will be no point in 
redistributing such land to small farmers. However, land price 
may be a downward-biased indicator of land quality on large farms 
due to land market imperfections [Beriry & Cline, 1979: 13] , The 
flow of net output is neither invariant with the type of 
production system (capitalist farmers discount profits, while 
landlords discount rents) nor is rent independent of tenurial 
status.16 Furthermore, the pattern of land values is not static: 
changes due to irrigation and changing crop mixes may reverse the 
prevailing pattern over time.
Roy then turns to Wellisz et al.17 who find in their study of 
Andhra Pradesh a positive correlation between farm size and 
average soil quality as measured by a soil-type index, but a 
strong negative relation between farm size and soil moisture 
content (in the month of October)18. They conclude that 
interdistrict yield differences are strongly correlated with soil 
moisture content which has a direct impact on output per acre. 
Note however, that these results are based on interdistrict 
regressions using grouped data, which as we have seen may simply 
reflect an element of aggregation bias or the macro level inverse 
relation. Wellisz et al. also admit that their results are marred 
by multicollinearity: "The moisture indices could not be included 
in the logarithmic regressions because of the frequent occurrence 
of zero values. It is impossible therefore to compare logarithmic 
regressions with the size coefficients with logarithmic 
regressions with the moisture coefficients1 [Wellisz et al., 
1970: 674, fn. 50] . Furthermore, the conclusions of Wellisz et
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al. represent scant evidence for an inverse relationship: while 
admitting caution (because of under-reporting by small farmers) 
they find increasing returns to scale [1970: 673, table 8]
"casting a serious doubt on the decreasing returns to scale 
argument" [1970: 675] .
Roy also admits that he will have to use similar indirect 
methods, using FMS data for West Bengal 1954-5, to demonstrate 
a connection between topography (as a proxy for soil moisture 
content) and cropping pattern [1979: 71, table 2.5 and 73, table 
2.6], and between these and the inverse relationship (see Table
14, Appendix A). Again this exercise represents a weak link in 
Roy's chain of reasoning. He writes: "these correlations are of 
course necessarily vague due to imprecise data." [1979: 72] Note 
that the crops in the tables refer to a broad range of varieties 
with different soil and water requirements, thus increasing the 
imprecision of the results and the vagueness of the conclusion. 
Note too that Roy abstracts from any differences in physical 
yields of individual crops and cropping intensities to focus on 
the overall crop distribution pattern. While the data in Table
15, Appendix A [from 1979: 76, table 2.8] shows a strong inverse 
relationship between plot size and output per acre, when potatoes 
and pulses (and their areas) are removed the inverse relationship 
disappears.19 Small farms have a higher proportion of irrigated 
high land under potatoes, and large farms grow more pulses on 
unirrigated high land [1979: 78] .20
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In chapter three, Roy goes on to demonstrate that the 
distribution of this major asset is determined by 1) the pattern 
of tenancy and 2) the legal superstructure via partible
inheritance. We deal with each in turn below.
For tenanted land, plot size is seen as a control variable: the 
smaller the plot, the greater the tendency for the marginal 
product of labour to approach zero. Thus, in order to maximise 
output per acre, and to circumvent labour supervision problems, 
the landlord rents out land in small plots.21 Roy suggests
[1979: 91] that where soil quality is good, plots will be small 
and conversely for poor quality land and thus, the size of
tenants' holdings will vary inversely with land quality, thereby 
generating an inverse relationship. The tendency for landlords 
to hire out land in small plots may be reinforced by the need to 
create dependency.22 With land improvement, landlords will
parcel out even smaller plots. Thus, intertemporal changes in 
farm size would appear to reinforce the cross-sectional pattern 
of the inverse relationship. NSS data {rounds 8 and 17) show the 
average size of tenant holdings falling from 4.57 to 2.95 acres 
between 1954 and 1962. Roy suggests this is due to land 
improvements, but note that this took place over the period of 
redistributive land reform prior to the Green Revolution [1979: 
101 ] .
While plot size can indeed be a crucial control variable within 
tenancy agreements,23 the hypothesis that land quality enters 
into account in the foregoing fashion is seriously impaired by
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the lack of robust data: evidence on tenancy is notoriously
unreliable and tends to be at a highly aggregated level. 
Furthermore, data on soil quality is practically non-existent at 
the required level of detail. Roy [1979: 98, table 3.1] shows a 
clear correlation between rainfall in inches and the percentage 
of area leased under five acres.24 However, not only is rainfall 
a poor indicator of soil quality, but this correlation surely 
only reflects the macro-level inverse relationship {where fertile 
land with good water availability has smaller farm size because 
of higher population density).
Roy also cites [1979: 99] the FMS studies [Bombay Report, FMS, 
1955-6: 39] : "the values of land per acre taken on lease by
smaller cultivators were more than the values per acre of such 
land with the bigger holders". However, grouped data is only 
available for two districts, and only for tenants up to 25 acres 
is such an inverse relation shown [1979: 100, table 3.2] .
Furthermore, large farms over 25 acres have just as high land 
values per acre as the smaller size groups. Indeed, if the 
smallest size group (0-5 acres) is excluded, this inverse 
relationship between size and land value disappears.
Roy then turns to the situation on owner-occupied land [1979: 
107] here, superstructural factors like the legal system generate 
an inverse relationship through Hindu laws of inheritance. This 
had evolved from the pre-capitalist system of peasant 
proprietorship under which land subdivision and fragmentation was 
encouraged by the role of inheritable equivalence. Under this
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system, where land is heterogeneous, the bequeathment of equal 
shares does not correspond to each share being of equal acreage. 
This leads to the parcelling out of plots in sizes that are 
inversely proportional to their quality. Fragments are traded off 
against each other in terms of their quality. Roy [1979: 121] 
also notes that to a certain extent land reform programmes also 
take land quality into account when redistributing land.
However plausible the above hypotheses may seem, they 
nevertheless fail to establish an a priori foundation for 
explaining the distribution of land. They do not take into 
account the possibility that inheritance patterns may mean that 
heirs receive plots of all land qualities [S'en, 1981: 204].
Neither do they take into account the power relationships between 
the members of a particular family (between different parts of 
a family clan, or between genders for example). Neither is this 
form of partible inheritance necessarily operative in Muslim or 
Sikh areas or other areas where these types of laws do not exist 
or have been considerably modified. Furthermore, this type of 
explanation does not take note of the fact that often (as in the 
Egyptian case) the family farm continues to be operated as a 
single unit after inheritance [see chapter X].
Roy has persisted in his attempt to develop a land fertility- 
based explanation of the inverse relationship. In Bhalla and Roy 
[1988]25 data for 21,499 farms over all-India are used to test 
whether soil quality is a significant explanator of productivity 
differentials.26 Individual farm level data was used to regress
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output per net cultivated area on farm size, indicators of soil 
quality, a land fragmentation index, and an exogenous irrigation 
index.27 The model variants were estimated at four levels of 
aggregation: district (the lowest level), agronomic zone,
agronomic sub-zone,28 and state levels.
The results appear to show a clear pattern: the smaller the unit 
of estimation (i.e. the more valid the assumption of homogeneous 
environment), the lower the number of samples reporting a 
negative relationship for the traditional specification of the 
model. The addition of soil quality variables decreases the 
number reporting an inverse relationship for all levels of 
aggregation. The traditional model indicates a significant 
inverse relation in 16 out of 17 states (95%), in 54 of the 78 
agronomic zones (69%), in 73 of the 142 sub-zones (51%), and in 
83 of the 176 districts (47%). When soil quality variables are 
included, these percentages fall to 94, 56, 37 and 2 9
respectively [1988: 48-50].
These results are used by the authors to "lend support to those 
who use fertility based arguments" to explain the inverse 
relationship [Bhalla, 1988: 60] . However, what these results in 
fact show is that despite the existence of the 'natural', macro­
level inverse relationship (discussed in Chapter II, section 2.2 
and section 3.2 above), and despite the inclusion of soil quality 
indices in the model specification (which after all are there to 
control for soil quality differentials), there is still strong 
evidence for the existence of a significant inverse relationship
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in a high proportion of these relatively highly aggregated 
samples. And in almost one third of the district samples, we have 
a significant inverse relationship across farm size that needs 
to be explained.
The authors also attempt to use these data to claim that land 
quality is a more important determinant of the inverse 
relationship than factors associated with technology and 
technical change in agriculture. They find no systematic 
relationship between the progressivity of state-level 
agriculture, in terms of fertiliser and HYV seed use, and the 
proportion of districts in each state in which a significant 
inverse relationship occurs. Further, gross elasticities of 
output per acre with respect to farm size at the state level show 
little change between the two survey dates, even though 
technological change had been considerable [1988: 52-5].
As Roy [1981] himself has shown however, in a very much more 
robust study, aggregate data on technical change and gross 
elasticities at the state level cannot be used to say very much 
about the association between the inverse relationship and 
technical change at the district or village level. If technical 
change is unevenly distributed across a state, with the 
introduction of modern technology concentrated in particular 
areas, then such aggregated comparisons are invalid. At a more 
disaggregated level of analysis, Roy showed a highly significant 
positive correlation between the degree of technical change and 
the disappearance of the inverse relationship. The inverse
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relationship remained strong only in those areas of relatively 
backward agriculture. We will explore this finding in much 
greater detail in Chapter V.
3.4 Irrigation hypothesis
Any discussion of the land fertility-based explanation of the 
inverse relation would be incomplete without commenting on the 
perhaps curious empirical finding that small farms appear to have 
a greater percentage of acreage under irrigation [see Chapter II, 
section 2.5 and Table 12, Appendix A] . Many writers have focused 
on this fact as an explanation for the inverse relationship.
While Rao [1963: 2043] rejects the soil fertility hypothesis, he 
does recognise that a tendency exists with regard to current 
fertility which includes natural characteristics of and man-made 
improvements to land. He adduces the evidence from the FMS data 
(Bombay Report) that shows average per acre rental values and 
thus capital values per unit of land higher on the small farms. 
This reflects in part the relative availability of irrigation. 
Correction for the irrigation factor (by including the percentage 
of area irrigated as a regressor) leads to results that show 
rental values varying proportionately with farm size [Rao, 1966: 
7] .
A. P. Rao [1967: 1990] also shows that wherever there is no
significant variation in irrigation ratios across farm size,
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output per acre is constant: thus, the FMS findings may be
attributable to the irrigation factor. Other inputs are 
complementary to irrigation and this may explain why small 
farmers use higher levels of other inputs per acre.29 Roy [1979: 
68] notes that Bharadwaj finds the inverse relation statistically 
significant only for unirrigated farms and not for irrigated 
farms, and claims that this is due to the fact that water 
availability does not vary much for the latter.30
Bharadwaj [1974b: A-19] offers two possible explanations for the 
statistically significant inverse relation between irrigation 
ratio and size: 1) better irrigation leads to greater soil
fertility which over time produces greater land fragmentation; 
and 2) abundant family labour is deployed to create and maintain 
irrigation facilities. However, the first explanation along the 
lines of the macro inverse relation, would not explain why within 
a given district, small farms have a higher percentage of 
irrigated area. Secondly, if such irrigation facilities require 
capital investment, then the purported advantage of the small 
farmer will be counterbalanced. Roy [1979: 12, fn. 3] notes that 
investment in irrigation has not been a matter of individual 
farmer choice. Historically, the state (or village community or 
zamindar) has been responsible for the construction of the 
irrigation system.31
Bharadwaj also very interestingly directs attention to the 
possibilty that landlord strategies generate such a finding. 
Thus, she suggests: "The landlord may prefer parcelling out the
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irrigated land among very small tenants for two reasons: while 
the bargaining position remains strong vis a vis the petty 
tenant, the latter may also have to resort to very intensive 
cultivation in order to eke a subsistence out of the small plot 
leased to him. Thus the landlord may find it possible to maximise 
his returns (as a share of the total gross output on his entire 
land) if he leases out the land in smaller plots" [1974a: 42]. 
This approach has a great deal of plausibility, and tends to fall 
within a class-based explanation, to be closely examined in 
Chapter V.
However, an inverse relationship between farm size and percentage 
area irrigated tells us nothing about the quality of irrigation 
facilities on various farm sizes, nor its effectiveness. The 
irrigation ratio is a rather poor index which does not indicate 
the effectiveness, source, quality, controllability or quantum 
of water supply. Indeed, Bandhudas Sen states: "A large
proportion of the area officially classified as irrigated is no 
better than unirrigated land, depending on rainfall as the source 
of water" [1974: 27] . Therefore quantitative comparisons of
irrigation ratios are both imprecise and inaccurate.
Wellisz [1970: 665] states that empirical studies give a
conflicting picture of irrigation effects. Studies of individual 
projects indicate that irrigation leads to crop intensification, 
but the percentage area which is double cropped is approximately 
equal for irrigated and unirrigated land.32 The major 
contribution of irrigation appears to be in improving crop
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patterns and raising yields of individual crops (in regions where 
the level of irrigation is generally low). Bharadwaj [1974b: A- 
19] notes that while irrigation increased output per acre by 
making feasible intensive application of inputs, the latter 
tended to increase more than proportionately to output, 
especially on the small farms generating a lower productivity of 
labour. Thus higher irrigation ratios on the small farms cannot 
be regarded as a sign of economic strength or superiority.
Summary and conclusions
We have seen in this chapter that the explanations of the inverse 
relationship based on qualitative factor differences are severely 
flawed. The various approaches are both theoretically inadequate 
and their assumptions are not supported by the empirical 
evidence.
Neither the qualitative differences in land nor in management and 
labour provide an adequate explanation for the inverse 
relationship. The differences in output per acre among farms 
cannot be ascribed mainly to inter-farm differences in soil 
quality or farm management. This essentially untestable 
hypothesis rests on an uncritical acceptance of the inverse 
relationship data, relying on a residual hypothesis tested by 
weak and unreliable proxy variables without consideration of 
other factors which a more critical analysis of the data suggests 
are important.
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We have seen that any productivity advantage that might exist is 
certainly not supported by any evidence in terms of physical 
yields of individual crops or in terms of profitability. If 
indeed qualitative factor differences of this kind were involved, 
then one would expect to see discontinuities in the data at 
certain farm sizes and not a monotonically declining distribution 
of the observations. That we do not observe such discontinuities 
further undermines the technique-based approach.
The alternative hypothesis concerning differentials in land or 
soil quality between farm sizes rests on conceptual confusion 
over the meaning of fertility and on the distinction that must 
be made between the macro and micro levels of aggregation. The 
attempt to use land values or land revenue as proxies for soil 
quality have proven quite misleading. At best, indirect and 
imprecise data has been used to support a priori reasoning which 
neglects factors which would tend to undermine the hypothesis.
Notes to Chapter III
1. In fact, the empirical evidence from both the FMS data and the 
Land Holdings Inquiry conducted by the NSS 16th round 1960-61, 
would suggest that such diseconomies are negligible. Indeed, 
Hanumantha Rao himself claims that Indian farming exhibits 
constant returns to scale rather than diminishing returns - scant 
support for any residual hypothesis pertaining to management 
diseconomies. See C.H.H. Rao, Size of Holdings and Productivity: 
some empirical verifications, [unpublished and no date] cited in 
Khusro [1964: 63].
2. See also Roy [1979: 39]
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3 . If the percentage of area under current fallow increases with 
farm size then this would have some explanatory value for the FMS 
finding of declining output per acre with farm size. Note 
however, that this would be no indication of inefficient use of 
land on the part of the larger size groups, even where land was 
the limiting factor: under conditions of technologically backward 
agriculture, fallow periods are required for soil nutrient 
replenishment. Constant use of land would be quite unsustainable 
without increasing dosages of fertiliser. Given its importance, 
current fallow should perhaps be deducted from cultivable area 
for purposes of comparison. Nevertheless, there is little 
evidence to show that current fallow is a major cause of the 
inverse relationship.
4. Cited by Roy [1979: 47, fn. 2] from B.R. Kalra, Regional
variations in policy regarding size of agricultural holding, 
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 20, no. 2, Apr/Jun 
1965, (p.33).
5. A.M. Khusro, Some basic generalisations in Indian agriculture, 
unpublished, no date, cited in Sen [1964a: 325] .
6. See [Khusro, 1964]: third column of table II on pp. 65-7.
7. See Khusro [1964: 65-7, table II and 71, statement JT] . Given 
their importance, we reproduce the regression results in Table 
13, Appendix A.
8. Using data from the FMS studies, Directorate of Economics and 
Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of 
India, Studies in the Economics of Farm Management Uttar Pradesh, 
Punjab, West Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra 
Pradesh.
9. Land Revenue Commission, 1940, cited in FMS West Bengal 
Report, 1955-6, page 9.
10. Sen uses the FMS data for Bombay, 1955-56 (cost accounting 
survey), and uses both land revenues per acre and rental values 
per acre to test the fertility hypothesis.
11. Cited in Paglin [1965: 825] : J.W. Mellor, 'Increasing
Production in Indian Agriculture - A Farm Level View, AICC 
Economic Review, New Delhi, January 4, 1962, pp.47-50.
12. Roy mentions other factors as being important including 
evaporation demand, groundwater supply, irrigation, soil 
properties, crop characteristics, rainfall, and other inputs. It 
is not clear why Roy singles out topography as the prime factor. 
By topography, Roy means that land productivity, as a function 
of water availability, is inversely related to altitude. Roy 
admits that this may be an over-simplification [1979: 56],
13. Roy [1979: 59, fn.l] mentions that many studies have noticed 
heteroscedasticity and high variance within farm size groups 
which he offers as circumstantial evidence for his thesis
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concerning water availability. The presence of substantial 
heteroscedasticity and high intra-group variance when data 
relating only to irrigated land is used however, would tend to 
suggest that other random factors are at work.
14. This relates to Rudra's point that the inverse relationship 
exists only for small farm size categories. See [Rudra, 1968a].
15. See M.L. Dantwala, Agrarian structure in 12 districts, The 
Economic Weekly, special number, vol. 13, nos. 29-31, July 1961, 
p. 1159.
16. Landlords may be able to impose higher levels of rent onto 
small sharecropping or marginal peasants than onto the larger 
tenant farmers with some local political power.
17. See Wellisz S., Munk B., Mayhew T.P., and Hemmer C., Resource 
allocation in traditional agriculture: a study of Andhra Pradesh, 
Journal of Political Economy, December 1970, pp. 655-684.
18. The October moisture index measures the amount of soil 
moisture left over from the southwest monsoon and the amount 
added by the northeast monsoon in a month crucial to germination. 
See [Wellisz et al., 1970: 676, Appendix A] .
19 . One acre of potatoes gives a yield of more than twelve times 
that of pulses measured in value terms: 865 Rs. as against 68.7 
Rs .
20. Roy claims that potatoes are less labour intensive than other 
crops and that investment per acre is higher for potatoes than 
other crops which would benefit the large farms. Nevertheless, 
small farms would appear to have a higher share of area under 
potatoes [Roy, 1979: 78],
21. There are, however, important constraints. These include the 
fact that minimum plot size may be determined by peasant family 
reproduction. While a large family implies greater labour input, 
it also implies a higher minimum consumption requirement 
(although this may be mitigated if usury via consumption loans 
is important). Further, the possibility exists that below a 
certain size, the range of sizes over which the marginal product 
of labour is near or at zero may be quite extensive. See Abhijit 
Sen [1981],
22 . This situation may involve interlinkages between land, credit 
and labour markets. Such non-price links develop more easily 
under conditions where the tenant is struggling for subsistence. 
See Bharadwaj [1985: 12]: "A dominant party conjointly exploits 
the weaker parties in two or more markets by interlinking the 
terms of contracts."; and Bharadwaj [1979: 11]: "The exchanges
are set not only in terms of 'prices' but there can be non-price 
factors, explicit and/or implicit, which mainly rely on personal 
dominance and power equations."
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23. See Bharadwaj [1974b: A-15]. Very small plots compel the 
tenant to intensify input use to provide a subsistence income 
after paying rent obligations. This will be further explored in 
Chapter V.
24. Roy cites Kalra [1965] for the leasing-in data and Rao 
[1968b] for the rainfall data.
25. Both writers seem to have shifted significantly their 
position on the causes of the inverse relationship. Roy [1981] 
had made some attempt to explore a political economy approach, 
particularly in relation to technological change in the Indian 
Punjab (see Chapter V) . Bhalla [1979] , on the other hand, was an 
erstwhile supporter of a neo-classical approach based on factor 
price differentials (see Chapter IV).
26. The data was collected by the National Council for Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) Fertiliser Demand Survey for the 
agricultural years 1975-6 and 1976-7. Significantly, no data was 
collected on the use of labour input which would have allowed
direct testing of the labour intesity hypothesis.
27. The soil quality indicators comprised three indices of soil
colour, soil texture and soil depth.
28. These agronomic sub-zones are defined by soil type.
29. See Ishikawa [1967] on irrigation as a leading input. See 
also Verdoon [1956]: once land is given, there is a clustering 
of other inputs - perfect substitutability exaggerates adjustment 
possibilities, thus a complementarity approach is preferable.
30. See Roy [1979: 14, table 1.4] which summarises the FMS data 
on the percentage area irrigated by size: 12 statistically 
significant regressions out of 21.
31. Citing Bandhudas Sen [1974: 27]: "A large proportion of the 
area officially classified as irrigated is no better than 
unirrigated land, depending on rainfall as the source of water."
32. Citing Panne [1966].
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CHAPTER IV
Factor intensity explanations: the labour-based approach 
Introduction
The extensive list of complementary relationships revealed by the 
FMS data tends to suggest that the inverse relationship is 
associated with variations in cropping intensity and the quantum 
of labour and other production inputs per acre as the major 
explanatory factor (see Chapter II, section 2.5). This has 
generated a group of explanations which we may call factor 
intensity explanations. In most regions of the FMS studies, small 
farms have some combination of higher labour intensity, higher 
cropping intensity, and cropping patterns associated with more 
labour-absorbing and/or remunerative crops. We have, then, three 
possible explanations in terms of factor intensity: 1) labour
input, 2) cropping intensity, and 3) choice of crop mix.1
We will consider which of these explanations is determinant in 
section 4.5 below. However, one influential interpretation of the 
findings is that it is labour input intensity which explains 
higher cropping intensity, and much attention, therefore, has 
been directed toward the factors which explain labour input 
intensity. The findings from the FMS studies which show that 
small farmers tend to apply a higher intensity of labour and
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other factors to production have led to a vast debate over what 
we might call labour-based explanations of the inverse 
relationship.
It is clearly the case that a very strong inverse relationship 
exists between size of holding and labour input per acre (see 
Chapter II, section 2.5, and Tables 1 and 9, Appendix A) . 
Bandhudas Sen states: "the level of labour resource used per unit 
of land by the small farms in India is high irrespective of the 
quality of soil" [1967: 71], Mellor and Moorti in their field 
study in Uttar Pradesh found that "differences in yields (per 
acre) seem to be largely due to differences in the use of the 
fixed, low opportunity-cost inputs, in particular, family 
labour."2 Saini [1969b: A-120] comments: "the higher output per
acre in smaller farms is really a function of the higher input 
of labour per acre - the other factors varying in the same 
direction as labour. It may be added that relatively higher input 
of labour on smaller farms contributes to the associated higher 
intensity of cropping and the choice of crop-mix which in turn 
raise overall productivity per acre". Here, the postulated 
direction of causality is stated with great clarity.
Given the importance attached to labour use intensity, it is the 
rural labour market that has attracted most attention. It was to 
such questions that Amartya Sen directed himself by positing the 
existence of labour market dualism as the underlying explanation 
for the inverse relationship. In section 4.1, we will outline the 
essential logic of the model developed by Sen. Then, in the
117
following section 4.2, we will confront the hypotheses associated 
with Sen's model with some empirical evidence on labour use in 
Indian agriculture. Sen's model has been very influential, and 
more explicitly neoclassical models - "pricist" variants of the 
Sen model - have been developed. These are outlined in section 
4.3. In section 4.4, we present a critique of the marginalist 
approach, within which both the Sen model and its neoclassical 
variants can be located. Finally, in section 4.5, we attempt to 
go beyond the labour-based approach in anticipation of the class- 
based explanation of the inverse relationship to be presented in 
Chapter V.
4.1 Labour intensity and labour market dualism: the Sen model
Sen, in his seminal 1962 article, states that the FMS 
observations regarding the inverse relationship are to be 
expected given what he calls the "mode of production" of Indian 
agriculture and its variation over farm size. He continues: "we 
must focus attention on the systems of production underlying 
Indian agriculture" [1962: 245] . Sen further states [1966: 443] 
that it would be dangerous to analyze the peasant economy in 
terms of ideas borrowed from capitalist economies.
The Sen model3 divides the rural economy into two parts: a
modern, capitalist large farm sector based on hired labour, with 
the goal of profit maximization; and a traditional peasant small 
farm sector based on family labour aiming to maximise gross
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output. While this approach, then, does hint at the question of 
determinacy alluded to above, Sen leaves the reasons for the 
primary motivation of output maximisation on the peasant farms 
unexplained, and concentrates on the causal factors behind higher 
labour input intensity.
On the large wage labour-based farms labour is hired in up to the 
point where the marginal product of labour is equal to the market 
wage, thus maximising profits. On the small family labour-based 
farms, "provided labour has no outside opportunity of employment 
and provided there is no significant disutility of work in the 
relevant range of effort", labour will be applied beyond the 
profit-maximising point until its marginal product is zero [Sen, 
1962: 245].
In a more sophisticated version of the model [Sen, 1966: 440] , 
the small farms maximise utility in a trade-off between increased 
income from extra output and leisure. Thus on the family labour- 
based farm, the marginal product of labour is not equalised to 
the market wage, but is determined by the subjective evaluation 
of the marginal disutility of effort. Hence the market wage is 
no guide to the opportunity cost of family labour. The peasant 
household with under-employed family labour will accept lower 
returns in self-cultivation than in the rural labour market at 
the prevailing wage. Only in the case of output maximization, 
will the marginal product of labour on family labour-based farms 
approach zero. The internal family worker wage will be the
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average product, greater than the marginal product, and setting 
a floor to the market wage.
On this basis, the market wage does not reflect the 'true' 
opportunity cost of labour in the economy. Sen claims that 
capitalist labour allocation reflects this distortion, but 
peasant labour allocation is correct in calculating from the real 
cost of labour. Alternatively, of course, the wage gap may 
reflect the genuine social cost of hired labour and so there is 
no misallocation [1966: 443].
In more formal terms, a wage gap exists where the wage rate (w) 
is greater than the real cost of labour (x) . This latter is 
represented by x = V' (1}/U' (q) where the ratio is the individual 
rate of indifferent substitution between the utility of income 
(U'(q)) and the disutility of labour effort (V'(1)). This ratio 
or real labour cost will be equated with the marginal product of 
labour for peasant farm labour equilibrium: x = V' (1)/U' (q) =
Q' (L) . With output Q = f [Q; (L)] = f (x) , and since f is a
decreasing function of x (f' (x) < 0) and w > x, then f (x) > f (w) . 
That is, capitalist wage labour-based farms will have a lower 
output per acre than peasant family labour farms. At the extreme, 
with a zero real cost of labour and a positive wage, we have f (0) 
> f (w) for output maximization [Sen, 1966: 439] . Sen [1966: 440] 
recognises that it is not necessary that real labour cost on 
peasant farms equal zero (w > x = 0), but sufficient that there 
is a wage gap (w > x).
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This family labour allocation rule is similar to that advanced 
by Chayanov in his theory of the peasant economy.4 Unlike Sen, 
however, Chayanov assumes the existence of family labour farms 
to the exclusion of wage labour-based farms. Nevertheless, they 
arrive at similar claims as to the relative superiority of the 
family labour farm. The subjective evaluation of labour is lower 
on the peasant farm than on the capitalist farm and this provides 
the former with greater resilience (via the ability of the 
peasant family to compress income).5
Thus, the inverse relation, according to Sen, is the natural 
result of an economy characterised by the existence of widespread 
surplus labour and family-based non-wage cultivation. The crucial 
factor is not size as such, but the system of farming (a large 
cooperative, for example, operating on the basis of family or 
non-wage labour may have higher yields than small capitalist 
farms [1962: 24 6]).
Modifying Rudra [1973b: 990] we can break down Sen's chain of 
reasoning into the following hypotheses:
1) labour input per acre increases as farm size becomes smaller
2) all other factors are applied with equal intensity per acre 
over all farm sizes
3) the higher the labour intensity, the higher the yield per acre
4) the higher the proportion of family to hired labour, the 
higher the labour intensity
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5) the higher the proportion of family labour to hired labour, 
the higher the productivity of land
6) large farms have a higher proportion of hired labour to family 
labour
As we have seen in Chapter II, section 2,5, propositions 1, 3, 
and 6 can be accepted on the basis of the data, thereby 
supporting Sen's case. The Sen argument is centred, however, on 
propositions 4 and 5. Any break in the chain would render the 
hypothesis invalid. These hypotheses will be confronted with the 
evidence on labour use in Indian agriculture in the next section.
4.2 The Sen model and labour use in Indian agriculture
A number of writers have criticised the Sen approach as being 
analytically deficient given that even small farms do not rely 
on family labour exclusively, and a large number of small farms 
are engaged in off-farm income generating activities. It is 
pointed out by these authors that the Sen model requires the non­
existence of off-farm employment opportunities and the absence 
of labour-hiring on the small farms [Khusro, 1964; Bhagwati & 
Chakravarty, 1969; Rudra & Biswas, 1973; Taslim 1989].
Mazumdar [1963: 1259] argues that Sen's explanation breaks down 
given the fact that the FMS data shows that even small farms 
sometimes employ permanent labour or a semi-attached labourer, 
perhaps to allow greater labour flexibility in peak seasons. As
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long as any hired labour is used, the marginal supply price of 
labour to the farm will be given by the ruling wage rate, and 
consequently, input of labour would be carried to the same point 
on farms of various sizes, so long as the production function is 
the same. Mazumdar offers an alternative explanation in terms of 
the supply price of a composite unit of labour over peak and 
slack seasons.
Sen [1964b: 325] , in defence of his position, points out that the 
FMS data on labour hiring are size-class averages. More complete 
individual holding data would be necessary to substantiate 
Mazumdar's criticism. He adds that there is no need to assume 
homogeneous labour units in seasonal agriculture, and admits that 
even small peasants hire in labour at peak seasons when the wage 
gap may disappear. It is only necessary to make the assumption, 
however, that labour in different seasons is mutually 
reinforcing. The marginal product of both types of labour is 
diminishing and an increase in slack season labour will increase 
the marginal product of peak season labour and increase its use. 
Thus a lower value or real cost of slack season labour will mean 
more peak season labour applied per acre on peasant farms. This 
will guarantee that output per acre is higher on the latter 
[1966: 440] .
Thus, claims Sen, Mazumdar's alternative approach [1963]6 is, in 
fact, simply a variant of the cheap labour argument. Mazumdar's 
argument is an extension of the cheap labour argument rather than 
a new kind of explanation: since there is complementarity between
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labour applied in both busy and slack seasons, the lower 
opportunity cost in the slack season makes the cost of a 
composite unit of labour less than the average wage. Mazumdar 
merely describes a special case of Sen's argument with one unit 
of labour from the busy season and another from the slack season.
Saini [1969b: A120-21] finds that on average, the marginal value 
product of labour tends to be higher than the wage rate and 
farmers adjust labour productivity to labour cost. This means 
that the wage rate is a relevant economic factor and family 
labour can be imputed at the market wage rate. Saini runs 
regressions for different size-groups of farms (less than 7.5 
acres, 7.5-10 acres, and greater than 10 acres) and tests the 
equality of the regression coefficients: none were statistically 
different from each other. The marginal value products of labour, 
computed at the geometrical mean level of inputs are positive and 
higher than the wage rate. This would appear to confirm that the 
market wage is relevant even for family labour. Thus, the losses 
incurred by small farmers are due not to imputation of a wage to 
family labour as Sen claims.7
However, Rudra and Sen [1980: 393] note that Saini's results, 
obtained by fitting a Cobb-Douglas production function, and 
estimating the elasticity with respect to labour, and then 
calculating the MPL at the geometric mean value of labour use, 
are of dubious validity as the calculated MPL is not 
significantly different from a wide range of values. The fact 
that the APL increases over farm size suggests that no
124
equalization is taking place. The production function estimation 
is based on the assumption of different factor ratios, while the 
calculated MPL is obtained on the basis of a fixed factor ratio 
(at geometric mean level). Using observed factor ratios would 
give widely varying values for the MPL [see Rudra 1969 and 
1973a] .
Nevertheless, sensitive to the criticism that family labour farms 
and wage labour farms are not hermetically compartmentalized, and 
therefore that the wage rate may indeed be a decision variable 
for both sets of farms, Sen does attempt to look for other 
explanations of the wage gap. He suggests that the wage gap may 
be to some extent explained by the efficiency wage hypothesis:8 
the higher efficiency of wage labour and thus labour measured in 
efficiency units may mean that labour is not any more expensive 
for capitalist farms than it is for peasant farms [1966: 443]. 
On the demand side, either the efficiency wage hypothesis to 
ensure high labour productivity on the large farms or the 
monopsonistic position of large farm employers explains the offer 
of high market wages.9 The fact that large farms have a marginal 
product of labour greater than the wage rate suggests that large 
farms are unable or unwilling to employ labour up to the profit- 
maximising position. This implies monopsonistic labour market 
behaviour and/or the presence of supervision problems [Sen, 1981: 
210], Large farmers' oligopsonistic position in local labour 
markets and their demand for labour will affect the wage rate. 
Sen also mentions the possibilities of an institutionally 
determined minimum wage rate, or compensation for the loss of
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average product by out-migrating workers,10 as potential 
explanatory factors in some cases.
The wage gap will be increased if family members on small farms 
discount market wages by the risk attached to job search. In the 
extreme case the marginal product of labour will equal zero, but 
in the more general case, the opportunity cost of labour will be 
the wage rate weighted by the probability (p) of finding a job 
with (p) less than unity. As long as the probability of finding 
a job is less than unity, it is to be expected that there will 
be lower output per acre on wage-based farms where the marginal 
product of labour and wage rate are equated. On the family farm, 
labour will be applied until the marginal product of labour is 
equated with the wage rate discounted by the probability of off- 
farm employment (MPL = w.p) [.Sen, 1964a: 323-5] .11
Of course, the fact that small farms hire in labour does not 
imply that they should follow the MPL = w rule. Time constraints 
may necessitate the hire of labour for urgent tasks to avoid 
harvest failure, which is quite consistent with under-employment 
throughout the rest of the year. Further, certain operations 
require specialized skills requiring hired labour which cannot 
therefore be seen as a substitutive category. The hire of certain 
equipment for example may require hired labour.
The wage rate will not represent the marginal social opportunity 
cost of labour in the context of employment barriers [Sen, 1962: 
24 6]. Indivisibilities in labour demand during the peak season,
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when agricultural operations are under a time constraint and 
there are risks and costs to the large labour-hiring farm in 
delay, may constitute an important labour market barrier. A 
partially unemployed farmer/labourer having to cope with 
coordination between off- and on-farm work and domestic chores 
will be at a disadvantage against the fully unemployed landless 
worker. The free time at the disposal of the farmer may be less 
than the minimum required by an employer [Bardhan, 1973: 
1380] .12 The FMS data provides no information on free or unpaid 
labour services linked to rental or credit contracts. Such 
services may be extracted in the peak season, thus "no simple 
'opportunity cost' concepts can be applied" [Bharadwaj, 1974b: 
A-17] .13
Furthermore, there may be sociological factors behind labour 
market imperfections: barriers to employment of women and
children on account of status, or reluctance to work outside the 
farm [Bardhan, 1973: 1380] .14 Family labour and off-farm labour 
are not always coterminous. Social convention and traditional 
behaviour may determine the allocation of tasks, dependent on 
class, caste and gender status.
Neither hypothesis then (that family and hired labour are 
exclusively separate categories so that family labour becomes a 
datum to the cultivating household, or that they are perfect 
substitutes so that the wage rate measures opportunity cost) is 
justified. The wage rate is only one determinant of labour use
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and possibly not the most important factor [Bharadwaj, 1974b: A- 
18] .
A second major criticism directed at the Sen model is an 
extension of the above argument. Clearly, farms are neither 
exclusively family labour-based nor wage labour-based, but this 
can be taken further: examination of the FMS data shows that the 
proportion of exclusively family labour farms is negligible among 
the large farms (it is not even very high among the small farms) 
so that the labour allocation pattern posited by Sen on such 
farms cannot be used as a firm basis for an explanation of the 
inverse relation over the entire range of farm size 
[Chattopadhyay & Rudra, 1976: A-112] .15
Rao [1966: 10-11] comments: "the labour-based explanation, in the 
sense of its application beyond the profitable range...is not 
relevant for farms operated partly or wholly with hired permanent 
labour." The Sen model may hold true for the range of farm size 
where the necessity of hiring labour in the slack season does not 
arise, but Khusro [1964: 63], in the Indian context, has shown 
that family labour is fully employed on the 7.5-10 acre size 
class, and hired labour is necessary beyond 10 acres. Once 15 
acres is reached, the fixed quantity of family labour wears thin 
(per acre use of family labour is negligible both on 15 acre and 
50 acre farms, with both depending on hired labour). So the use 
of family labour cannot be used as an explanation of higher 
productivity on 15 acre as against 50 acre farms.
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Hossain [1977] restricts the opportunity cost explanation of the 
inverse relation to the range of small farms, but this does not 
explain the fact that the inverse relation is just as strong 
among the large farms relying on hired labour as between the 
small farms and large farms [Taslim, 1989: 56-7] .15 Nor does
such an approach explain the lower labour use per acre on hired 
labour farms or the absence of any relation between labour use 
and the proportion of family labour as shown by Rudra [1973b: 
989-91] . Even on farms greater than 10 acres where casual or 
permanent hired labour is used, input and output per acre 
declines generating an inverse relation [Rao, 1966: 9-10] .
Rudra presents scatter graphs of size-class averages for 149 
sample farms in Hooghly district, West Bengal 197 0-1. The 
proportion of family labour to total labour input drops from 60% 
to 10% as farm size increases from less than 1,25 acres to 10 
acres, while labour intensity falls from 900 man-hours to 600 as 
size increases. Output per acre increases with labour intensity 
up to a ceiling of Rs 2,500 {about 1,400 man-hours). However, 
labour input per farm, labour input per acre and output per acre 
show no systematic or meaningful pattern against the proportion 
of family labour to total labour. Statistical tests of labour 
input per acre against the proportion of family labour show that 
labour input per acre is not higher for family labour-based farms 
and there is no significant variation in labour input per acre 
across type of farm. Indeed, labour input per farm and output per 
acre are both less for the pure family based farm than pure hired 
labour farms. Thus there is no systematic dependence of labour
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input per acre or output per acre on labour composition, and 
therefore average output per labourer does not vary across labour 
composition [Rudra, 1973b: 992] .
Taslim [1989: 58-62] in his study of Bangladesh17 also finds
empirical support for Rudra's results. A number of the 
propositions of the labour-based approach (specifically evidence 
for the links between labour intensity, yields and farm size) are 
supported, but the link between abundant supply of family labour 
and higher labour intensity at the heart of the family labour- 
based explanation is not supported. Evidence for the inverse 
relationship itself was inconclusive (statistically significant 
only at the aggregate level) , but even if shown to exist, the 
evidence against the core hypothesis of the Sen approach shows 
that the opportunity cost of family labour explanation cannot be 
valid.
4.3 More explicitly neoclassical models: 'pricist' variants
More explicitly neoclassical models exist which posit different 
sets of factor prices facing small and large farms as an 
explanation for the inverse relationship [Srinivasan, 1972; 
Bardhan, 1974; Griffin, 1974; Bhalla, 1979; Berry and Cline, 
1979] . Here, the question is one of optimal use of factor inputs 
in the context of relative scarcity.
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These authors present the following hypothesis as the main 
explanation for the inverse relationship: factor prices differ 
between the large farms and the small farms, such that the 
effective prices of land and capital are low for the large farms 
and the effective price of labour is low for the small farms. The 
presence of relatively abundant family labour on small farms and 
the relatively low implicit price of land for the large farmers 
dictate choices of technique with different factor intensities. 
Thus small farms have high labour/land ratios, whereas large 
farms use labour and land less intensively. Small farms with a 
lower opportunity cost of labour, can exploit more marginal land, 
cultivate a larger proportion of their land, and achieve higher 
yields.
Berry and Cline take a rather eclectic position on the causes of 
these factor price differentials between large and small farms. 
The authors mention Sen's labour market dualism framework where 
the supply price of family labour is the average product of 
labour and not the marginal product. The MPL on the small farms 
will be lower than on the large farms. The main qualification to 
this is where the opportunity cost of labour is high (due to the 
availability of off-farm employment). However, the market wage 
may be discounted for labour market risk and search costs, or the 
family may try to hire out labour, but family preferences or 
unwillingness to share output with the hired-out worker will keep 
the MPL less than the wage [1979: 5].
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In these factor market imperfection theories,18 then, large 
farms go for production techniques with high land/labour and 
capital/labour ratios because factor market prices diverge from 
social opportunity cost, and this produces an inverse relation.
The empirical studies presented show markedly lower labour/land 
ratios on the large farms and this is taken to mean that capital 
and land market imperfections complement the effects of labour 
market dualism or are not strong enough to counteract them. The 
effective land price may be higher for the small farms because 
1) small plots have higher unit costs (a greater potential market 
and inconvenience for landowners); and 2) land purchase needs 
credit, and large farms have better ratings and so cheaper credit 
(thus the real price of land will be lower) . Land price 
differentials reinforce labour cost differentials and lead to 
higher labour/land ratios and output/acre on the small farms. 
The holding of land for asset price speculation or for reasons 
of social prestige and/or political power is also adduced as a 
possible explanation for lower productive activity on the large 
farms [Berry & Cline, 1979: 10-12]. Imperfections in capital
markets reinforce low labour use on the large farms: a low
effective price of capital leads to substitution of machines for 
labour.
However, the principal thesis of differential factor prices 
between large and small farms, and its explanation in terms of 
the Sen framework, is highly problematic. If indeed factor price 
differentials were the main explanatory mechanism at work, then
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we would expect to find higher capital intensities on the large 
farms manifested in technological innovation, both biochemical 
and mechanical. However, as we will see in Chapter V below, in 
this context the inverse relationship breaks down. Indeed, this 
hypothesis would appear to be more appropriate as an explanation 
for the non-existence of an inverse relationship rather than its 
cause. Further, the supposed ability of the small farmer to 
exploit more marginal land (because of a lower opportunity cost 
of labour) is hardly conducive to higher crop yields.
Lau and Yotopoulos [1971: 105-6] reject the hypothesis of equal 
efficiency between large (over 10 acres) and small farms, and 
find that small farms are more profitable i.e. more efficient. 
The relative economic superiority of small farmers is claimed to 
be due to technical efficiency since both groups are price 
efficient. This may imply that the supervisory role of the owner- 
manager of a farm is crucial for attaining efficiency [1971: 
107], Abhijit Sen [1981: 202] suggests that the inverse
relationship "cannot be understood in terms of scale advantages 
among isolated farms or simply in terms of the poverty and 
unemployment facing poor peasants. . . [it] also reflect [s] problems 
of labour use on large farms and the relative inability to 
resolve this through land and credit markets". Ghose [1979: 41] 
states that labour supervision costs rise with size, and 
therefore the effective unit cost of labour rises.
This brings us to the new neoclassical transactions cost approach 
to explaining the inverse relation, an approach we have already
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seen in relation to some of the explanations of the inverse 
relationship based on qualitative labour and management 
differences. The central argument here though is that because 
small family farmers avoid most transaction costs in labour 
markets (search, screening, supervision), it pays them to use 
more of their relatively cheaper labour per hectare, and thus to 
achieve higher yields per acre.
Lipton [1993a: 1524] mentions the "well-established economic
advantage of the family farm - that family members, with few 
costs of supervision or job search, will saturate their land with 
this labour, thus producing higher levels of output per hectare, 
and usually per unit of capital and other inputs, than large- 
scale farmers." Large farmers face problems of screening job 
applicants, searching for new workers, and providing incentives 
and supervision: the "avoidance of costs of search, screening and 
supervision in labour markets are the main explanation suggested 
for the alleged inverse relationship, and hence the case for 
redistributing large holdings to create small family farms" 
[1993b: 642].
Taslim [1989: 66] suggests that supervision problems are the
principal explanatory factor behind the inverse relation on the 
large labour-hiring farms. The ability of large farms to employ 
wage labour will be constrained by the availability of family 
labour, essential for supervision. Statistical exercises show 
that family labour and hired labour are substitutes on the small
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farms, but complementary on the large farms where family labour 
fulfils a supervisory role.19 He tests the hypothesis that 
the greater the ratio of hired labour to family labour (a proxy 
for the degree of supervision problems), the lower the 
productivity. This was corroborated for farms employing over 7 0 
man-days of hired labour per family worker.
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, such supervision 
costs would seem to be greatly exaggerated. Farmers can reduce 
supervision problems to a certain extent by employing a higher 
ratio of attached or permanent workers who can undertake some 
supervisory responsibilities. The use of attached labour in a 
supervisory role, or even better, the use of family labour, in 
setting work tasks and ensuring execution is sufficient to ensure 
that the requisite labour effort has been expended on the part 
of the workforce. The threat of losing access to wage labour 
opportunities will provide the incentive for the worker to supply 
the quantity and quality of labour effort demanded. The often 
highly personalised relationship between employer and labourer, 
sometimes involving access to credit and land, help to provide 
"nearby, informed, rapid and flexible" supervision of labour [see 
Bhaduri 1973]. Taslim [1989: 68] notes that the attached labour 
solution is only partial up to a certain level. Beyond that, an 
alternative strategy involving the introduction of labour-saving 
technology which increases both land and labour productivity 
might be more common.
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Furthermore, the link between the ratio of hired labour to family 
labour and output per acre, and hence the link between 
supervision problems and productivity depends on the robustness 
of the proxy variable used in the correlation. Indeed, as Taslim 
himself recognises [1989:68] , the ratio of hired labour to family 
labour may not be an index of supervision problems, but instead 
reflect the ability of the farmer to hire wage labour. Employment 
of wage labour requires a fund of working capital. A low hired 
labour to family labour ratio may simply reflect the lack of 
access to such a fund. If such capital constrained farms are 
characterised by lower productivity, then the above correlation 
is spurious. This, of course, points in the direction of a very 
different type of explanation for the inverse relationship which 
will be discussed in the next chapter.
4.4 A critique of the marginalist approach
One common element between the Sen model and these more 
explicitly pricist variants is that they share the same 
marginalist conceptions and categories. The critical problems 
arise from the production function methodology employed. Much of 
the FMS analysis is set out in terms of problems of resource 
utilization in analogy with producers in competitive firms: 
production function analysis and optimality of labour use. They 
share a set of similar assumptions involved in the purported 
behavioural calculus at the centre of the models. The only 
difference between Sen's model and the factor market imperfection
136
theories mentioned, above is that the latter consider all relative 
factor prices whereas Sen considers only one price: the cost of 
labour, which varies according to the system of production. Note 
that the pricist variants do not recognise different farming 
systems in agriculture: "We believe the agricultural systems in 
most parts of the third world are essentially capitalist" 
[Griffin, 1974: S3].
An important point of criticism of both the Sen model and the 
neoclassical variants concerns the simplifying assumption of a 
single crop and a single production cycle. This misses entirely 
the crucial significance of cropping intensity and cropping 
pattern. Roy [1979: 38-9] notes Sen's emphasis on "for any one 
crop", and points out that Griffin [1974: 41] talks only of the 
relation between the output of a single crop per acre, in 
particular rice yields, and farm size, and deals with individual 
production cycles. Griffin claims that the subdivision of 
holdings would increase both employment and rice output. Thus, 
we see that both models were geared to explaining a non-existent 
relationship: while the inverse relationship can be observed in 
value terms, no such relationship exists with respect to the 
physical yields of individual crops. Of course, the models can 
be respecified to look at total value of crop output and labour 
input intensity, with a strong relationship between cropping 
intensity and labour application.
Production function studies, however, suffer from the problem 
that they are estimated with flow measures which obscures the
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role of indivisibilities in agricultural production [Sen, 1981: 
204] .The whole exercise of comparing the marginal product and 
wage rates is meaningless for agricultural production. 
Agricultural production is very different from industrial 
production. It is sequential in nature, subdivided both 
temporally and operationally. The production cycle in agriculture 
is prolonged and varies greatly between crops. No straightforward 
marginal productivity rules can be applied here as the 
productivity of family labour inputs prior to harvest time will 
depend on the timely application of the necessary amount of 
labour during the harvesting period. Labour demand at the 
harvesting stage is largely determined by elements of previous 
stages.20 Labour at earlier stages thus has to be seen in the 
nature of fixed costs. Labour demand at harvest is a derived 
demand dependent on conditions earlier in the production 
cycle.21 Under such conditions, the meaning of the marginal 
product of labour in agriculture becomes extremely hazy almost 
to the point of becoming operationally useless [Roy, 1979: 20-3].
A second common element is that both approaches assume the same 
production function for all farm sizes and systems of production. 
Both peasant and capitalist farms are assumed to be operating on 
the same production function, an assumption not identified by Sen 
in his 1962 or 1964 papers, but eventually admitted in his 1966 
article. Sen focuses on two different systems of production: 
small peasant farms and large capitalist farms. It is not obvious 
therefore why these two systems are located on the same 
production function (the same marginal product of labour curve).
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Roy notes: "the model is comparing farming methods which have
fundamental differences in their organization of production and 
qualitative differences in their division of labour" [1979: 19] . 
A theoretical justification for assuming the same marginal 
product curve for family labour-based and wage labour-based farms 
is not provided by Sen. If either class of farms use more capital 
or other inputs or enjoy some other advantage then that marginal 
product curve would be higher.
A similar problem undermines the more explicitly neoclassical 
variants of the production function approach. While labour 
homogeneity is assumed, this is not sufficient: the use of a
single MPL curve requires concomitant assumptions regarding the 
organization of production, homogeneity of all factors of 
production and equal factor intensities. Such models must also 
assume that different farms apply identical capital inputs per 
acre (both in quantity and type of capital) and that land is 
homogeneous regarding soil quality and irrigation. The isoquant 
diagram of Griffin includes land and labour holding capital 
constant, but if capital intensity varies across farm size then 
the isoquant will shift unequally.22 Bagchi [1962] has shown 
that variation in the intensity of capital utilization may make 
it difficult to analyze such relationships in neoclassical 
terms .23
Indeed, Sen himself was later to admit: "it is illegitimate to 
eulogize peasant farming on the basis of an analysis in which 
every type of farm has access to the same production function and
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to the same factors of production" [1966: 444] . A peasant farmer 
may be constricted to a less efficient set of production 
conditions including lack of access to economies of scale, lack 
of technical knowledge or access to particular factors, or risk 
aversion to using new inputs.
The use of a single production function to compare two very 
different systems of farming, points to the identification 
problem at the heart of the Sen model and its disciples. This 
concerns the assumption that large farms are capitalist farms, 
and small farms are peasant family labour-based farms. This 
conceptual sleight of hand obscures the real relations at work 
which produce the inverse relation. This crucial point will be 
further discussed in Chapter V where we turn to a class-based 
approach to analysing the inverse relation. We must go deeper
than the size of holding categories to the underlying social
relations of production, in the dynamic context of agrarian 
transition.
4.5 Beyond the labour-based model: towards a political economy 
approach
We pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, that three 
possible explanations in terms of factor intensity have been
posited: 1) labour input, 2) cropping intensity, and 3) choice
of crop mix. A crucial point in the debate over the causal 
factors behind the inverse relationship, but one that is more
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often ignored or obscured, is which of these explanations is 
determinant? These findings are clearly inter-related, but what 
is the direction of causality? No simple econometric analysis can 
tell us the answer.
There are two possible interpretations however. The first, 
labour-based approach, we have surveyed critically in this 
chapter. The second is that it is higher cropping intensity and 
a cropping pattern associated with either higher labour 
absorption or remuneration (and hence the higher income derived 
from production) which implies greater factor use intensity, in 
particular labour intensity. Bharadwaj [1974b: A-16] , indeed, 
suggests that value productivity differentials between farms boil 
down to the differential cropping intensity components of crop 
patterns.24 Here, the primary motivation is output maximisation, 
with cropping intensity appearing as the proximate cause of the 
inverse relation. Higher cropping intensities imply a higher 
intensity in the application of other factors of production, 
particularly labour.
Bharadwaj [1974b: A-16] notes from the FMS evidence that while 
there is a strong inverse relationship between labour input and 
size, this is not manifested in terms of individual crops. An 
explanation in terms of efficient factor substitution (with land 
fixed and the same production function with small farms operating 
with higher labour/land ratios and with higher productivity per 
acre but lower labour productivity) is undermined by the fact 
that there is no such relationship between labour productivity
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and size to be found in the FMS data. She concludes: "Thus the
higher use of labour on small farms cannot be explained in terms 
of land-labour substitution along a production-possibility 
frontier" [1974b: A-16].
A further set of problems arise from the proposed behavioural 
calculus of the farmer internal to the farm and to the 
methodology of comparison of the wage rate and marginal 
productivity. It is inappropriate to postulate effective leisure 
preference among poor peasants who are very close to subsistence; 
the effective limits are more likely to be biological [Sen, 1981: 
207] . As we saw in section 4.2, family labour allocation is 
determined by objective factors like involuntary unemployment and 
intensity of poverty. Poverty and unemployment, rather than 
leisure preference, are the main reasons why small farmers 
intensify family labour use [S'en, 1981: 209] .
Chattopadhyay and Rudra [1976: A-114], although taking a rather 
eclectic view of the inverse relationship,25 make the following 
powerful and incisive statement which takes us beyond the 
confines of the marginalist approach: "Among the forces that
drive a small farmer to more intensive effort the most important 
one, of course, is his need for survival. There is a certain 
basic minimum of consumption that a poor peasant family has to 
have without which it will be simply wiped out. It is only 
understandable that such a poor peasant family, depending on a 
small piece of land, submerged in a vast population of surplus 
labour in the countryside, and thus not having any alternative
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sources of employment and income, would try to produce the 
maximum output on his piece of land. He would not only ignore any 
marginal productivity calculations insofar as family labour is 
concerned, he would employ hired labour whenever necessary to 
supplement family labour, and in doing that would pay no heed to 
marginal productivities. He would also try to apply non-labour 
and non-monetized inputs with maximum intensity, once again by 
using labour without any calculations. He would try to improve 
the quality of land by small-scale irrigation and other such 
means as can be procured with the help of labour. He will tend 
to leave fallow as little land as possible, and try to cultivate 
as many crops as possible and choose such crops which after 
meeting his minimum consumption needs would meet his minimum cash 
needs." Further, under sharecropping, the "tendency to intensify 
his effort would be all the more so because of the fact that he 
has now to meet his minimum needs with only a share of the 
results of his effort". Aspects of this we will wish to pursue 
in Chapter V.
Summary and conclusions
Clearly, the empirical evidence provides support for an 
explanation of the inverse relationship based on factor 
intensities, and in particular, a labour-based explanation. The 
clustering of empirical relationships around cropping intensities 
and labour input intensities (the latter subsuming capital and
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irrigation factors) in association with the inverse relation 
finding certainly justifies the focus on patterns of labour use.
However, the models presented above which attempt to explain how 
the inverse relationship is generated via labour utilisation are 
theoretically flawed, while crucial elements in their underlying 
assumptions are also subject to empirical refutation. The 
critical problems arise from the production function methodology 
employed.
The principal factor intensity-based explanation of the inverse 
relationship is the labour utilisation model developed by Sen. 
This essentially static framework has proven to be seriously 
defective. As Abhijit Sen [1981: 210] points out: there is "an 
unexplained inconsistency between the a priori evidence that it 
is labour use which causes the inverse relation and the negative 
results from direct tests of labour-based hypotheses." We have 
seen that Sen's opportunity cost model cannot be used to explain 
the existence of the inverse relationship among predominantly 
wage labour-based farms nor where most farms employ hired labour. 
Indeed, Rudra and Mukhopadhyay [1976: 34] show that labour-hiring 
is a generalised phenomenon on the small farms.
Conceptually, the cheap labour theories (both those of Sen and 
the more neoclassical variants) depend on a spurious calculus 
involving the marginal product of labour and the wage rate. As 
we have seen, the former is an operationally useless concept in 
agricultural production, while the latter is only one and
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probably not the most important variable taken into account in 
determining labour use. The situation encompasses a more complex 
set of market and non-market relations than the suggested 
behavioural assumptions incorporated in the models allow. This 
more complex enovironment will be explored in the next chapter 
where we turn to a class-based explanation of the inverse 
relationship in the dynamic context.
Notes to Chapter IV
1. There is empirical support from the FMS data for a possible 
capital-based explanation of the inverse relation given that 
small farms appear to have more capital inputs per acre. This too 
may be related to a labour-based approach. Sen [1964a: 326]
provides an explanation of this surprising finding within a 
labour-based approach: in as much as a substantial part of
capital investment on small farms takes the form of direct labour 
input in capital projects, rather than deriving from off-farm 
purchases, the cheap cost of labour is reflected in cheaper 
capital. This further implies an economy in working capital in 
"peasant agriculture" as such agriculture is not based on wage 
advances (see Sen [1964] ) .The lower labour cost will also 
increase the use of complementary factors of production. There 
is a sense in which smaller farmers can invest more cheaply by 
utilising family labour: an argument which clearly can be
subsumed under the labour-based approach. There may, of course, 
be no special advantage to peasant farms if capitalist farms have 
access to cheaper purchased capital inputs. This we will pursue 
later.
2. See J.W. Mellor, 'Increasing Production in Indian Agriculture 
- A Farm Level View', AICC Economic Review, New Delhi, January 
4, 1962, pp. 47-50. Cited in Paglin [1965: 825] .
3. A.K. Sen [1962] in a model remarkably similar to that 
developed by the Russian economist A.V. Chayanov [1966] : as 
pointed out by T.J. Byres in Output per acre and size of holding: 
the logic of peasant agriculture under semi-feudalism, 
unpublished manuscript, 1977, and in Patnaik [1979: 417, note 4] .
4. Indeed, Roy [1979: 15-6, fn.l] traces these cheap labour 
theories to Chayanov, but notes that the constraints on family 
labour farms hiring labour past the point of intersection of 
income and drudgery curves is not explained.
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5. Sen notes that Georgescu-Roegen has traced this line of 
thought to the historical "Agrarian Doctrine" and related it to 
the logic of feudal agriculture [Sen, 1964b: 439].
6. And Agarwala [1964a] . Agarwala takes the case of a "fixed 
distribution of labour over the agricultural year" which is 
"rigidly determined by technological consideration" and it is 
total labour over the year that is varied. If there is use of 
hired labour in some seasons, but not in others, "the marginal 
cost curve of labour facing the family farm is lower than that 
facing the capitalistic farm".
7. Saini suggests that these losses are due to indivisibilities 
associated with bullock labour [1969b: A-121]. Saini uses 
disaggregated FMS data for Uttar Pradesh (Meerut and 
Muzaffarnagar districts) and Punjab (Amritsar and Ferozepur 
districts) for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57. This paper is a 
shorter version of Saini [1969a]. The regression model estimated 
is specified as follows:
log Q = log C + bl.log A + b2.log L + b3.log B + b4.log F +
+ b5.log I
where Q is gross value of output in Rupees, A is land in acres, 
L is human labour in adult man-days, B is bullock labour in pair- 
days, F is expenditure on fertiliser and farm manures in Rupees, 
and I is expenditure on irrigation in Rupees. The sum of the 
regression coefficients indicate constant returns to scale. All 
land coefficients are significantly below unity which shows an 
inverse relation.
8. See H. Leibenstein, The theory of underemployment in backward 
economies, Journal of Political Economy, vol. LXV, April 1957, 
and also D. Mazumdar, The Marginal productivity theory of wages 
and disguised unemployment, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 
XXVI, June 1959.
9. See Bliss and Stern [1978] for an example of this model of 
rural wage determination.
10. See W .A . Lewis, Economic development with unlimited supplies 
of labour, The Manchester School, May 1954.
11. Roy [1979: 18], commenting on Sen's defence of the model, 
notes that the assumption of independence between p and w is 
questionable. It is just as likely that there is a functional 
relationship between the two variables.
12. The FMS data reveals the following employment patterns: 
the smallest farms rely heavily on off-farm work, with severe 
underemployment on the farm. On medium-size farms, total 
employment increases, both on and off farm, but the opportunities 
of off-farm work are inhibited by peak season work on-farm. The 
large farms are characterised by high employment on-farm 
[Bharadwaj, 1974b: A16-7] . Bharadwaj [1974b: A-17] notes however 
that on and off-farm employment are not independent categories.
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The availability of off-farm work affects the rhythm and 
intensity of on-farm work through choice of crop pattern, which 
commits family labour over crop cycles and this may limit off- 
farm employment opportunities. This is crucial when farms have 
a single earner (the FMS West Bengal Report, pp. 54-7, shows that 
over a third of the farms have a single earner). Thus on and off 
farm work are not additive or simple alternatives [Bharadwaj, 
1974b: A-l 7] .
13. See also Chattopadhyay and Rudra [1976: 112-3] .
14. See P. Visaria, The farmers' preference for work on family 
farms, in Report of the Committee of Experts on Unemployment 
Estimates, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 
197 0. The data cover nine villages in Ratnagiri district, 
Maharashtra state, and 14 villages in Kutch district, Gujarat, 
in 1966. Some 54% and 80% respectively, of male farmers, and 66% 
and 84% respectively, of female farmers expressed unwillingness 
to work off-farm. Cited in Bardhan [1973: 1380].
15. Rao [1966: 4-5] points out from his pro-small farmer 
viewpoint that since not only labour, but also capital and 
irrigation vary less than proportionately with size, the net MPL 
curve cannot be the same for different farm sizes. Higher 
capital input per acre (labour-absorbing investment) and the 
greater managerial efficiency of the small farm imply a net MPL 
curve higher for small farms than large farms. However, large 
farm access to capital could push their MPL curve outwards.
16. See section 4.3 below for Taslim's explanation of this 
empirical finding.
17. The survey data were collected by the Department of 
Economics, University of Dhaka, in 1982. The data cover two 
villages from each of Mymensingh, Comilla, and Rajashahi 
districts. Fifty households were selected from the village 
populations conditional on their involvement in the land-lease 
market (3 00 households in toto comprising pure landlords, 
cultivating landlords, owner tenants and pure tenants.
18. Even in the absence of market imperfections, Srinivasan has 
shown that labour intensification on the small farms is an 
efficient outcome. This explanation runs in terms of farmer 
behaviour in the face of production uncertainty: the choice of 
labour allocation between self-cultivation at an uncertain return 
and employment at a given wage. In order to maximise the expected 
utility of income, the farmer should devote a larger amount of 
labour per acre to self-cultivation as the size of farm 
decreases .
This holds under Arrow-type risk-aversion postulates: absolute 
risk-aversion decreases and relative risk-aversion does not 
decrease as wealth increases. However, the plausibility of non­
decreasing relative risk aversion is not self-evident, and the 
assumption of a given wage rate independent of the influence of 
production uncertainty is unsatisfactory.
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19. See Taslim [1989; 64] . The correlation between family labour 
and hired labour was negative on the small farms, but positive 
on the large farms (large farms are defined as those greater than
6.5 acres in Mymensingh, 3.5 acres in Comilla, and 10 acres in 
Rajashahi; the small farms are less than 5, 3.5 and 7.5 acres 
respectively. Further, the correlation between family labour per 
acre and total labour input per acre is negative on the small 
farms and positive on the large farms (but not statistically 
significant).
20. See Roy [1979: 21]: at the final harvesting stage, the
constraint on labour-hiring is not the MPL = wage criterion, but 
whether these fixed costs can be covered. This means that not 
only will labour continue to be hired when the MPL is less than 
the wage rate, but also even when the wage rate is greater than 
the APL. The only limit to labour-hiring occurs when the gross 
revenue from a day's harvest is less than the cost of a day's 
harvesting.
21. See Roy [1979: 22]. The physical yield of a crop is already 
determined (plants per acre times yield per plant), and therefore 
the number of labour-hours required to harvest the crop is also 
predetermined (for any given technology). Whereas with Sen, 
higher labour input causes higher yield, there is in fact a 
reversal of causation: higher yields produce a greater demand for 
labour.
22. Indeed, the FMS data also shows higher capital intensity on 
small farms contrary to Griffin who claims that the shadow price 
of capital is lower for the large farms than the small farms.
23. Cited in Sen [1964b: 441-2].
24. See Bharadwaj [1974b: A-16]. Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bombay, 
West Bengal and Madras show an inverse relation between cropping 
intensity and farm size, although it is not significant in all 
cases.
25. Rudra mentions the wide range of different explanations of 
the inverse relationship found in the literature, and he 
recognises the validity of all of them in different combinations 
in different regions of India.
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CHAPTER V
A class-based approach and the breakdown of the inverse 
relationship in the dynamic context 
Introduction
Despite the criticisms of the methodology and assumptions 
employed in Sen's labour utilisation model and the neoclassical 
"pricist" variants, the former does have the great merit of 
attempting to locate an explanation of the inverse relationship 
in terms of the different conditions of production facing farm 
households. These he explores within the logic of what he calls 
the "mode of production of Indian agriculture" and its 
correlation with farm size [1962: 245]. However, Sen's notion of 
mode of production is conceptually nebulous and constrained by 
its choice theoretic framework based on relative resource 
endowments.1 There is clearly a need to go beyond farm size as 
the relevant stratifying variable to examine the underlying 
relations and forces of production.
In this chapter, we propose an alternative class-based approach 
to understanding the inverse relationship.2 This class-based 
approach proceeds from the proposition that the peasant farm is 
embedded in the socio-economic context of an emerging capitalist 
agriculture in which however, non-capitalist forms of surplus
149
appropriation are still prevalent. Such a transitional state has 
been described by Bhaduri [1973] and Bharadwaj [1974b] as one of 
semi-feudalism, a situation in which the relations of production 
have more in common with feudalism than capitalism. Bharadwaj 
writes: "where capitalist farming is emerging out of a semi-
feudal agriculture, the coexistence of both the modes shapes the 
labour market...while the characteristics of the labour market 
itself influences the form and process of transition" [1974b: A- 
11] .
Agriculture remains backward inasmuch as "the process of 
commercialisation has not culminated necessarily or rapidly in 
the pervasive dominance of capitalist relations [Bharadwaj, 1985: 
9] . The process of commercialisation has intensified peasant 
differentiation but has not generated a qualitatively changed 
peasantry: it has not resulted in a fully-formed capitalist
agriculture in which rich peasants are transformed into 
capitalist farmers and poor peasants into wage labourers. Neither 
commercialisation nor the development of wage labour, however, 
are sufficient conditions for the development of capitalist 
agriculture.
This directly addresses Sen's and other writers' erroneous 
identification, on the basis of the labour-hiring criterion 
alone, of the large farms in their samples with capitalist farms. 
That identification needs an altogether more complex 
specification. Section 5.1 provides a digression on the criteria
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for capitalist transition in agriculture as a first step towards 
fulfilling that requirement.
A second critique of Sen involves the partial and misleading 
focus on the internal farm household calculus. Sen's focus on the 
output maximising criterion of a family labour-based farm within 
an endogenous choice theoretic framework obscures the severe 
exploitation in the relations of production within which poor 
peasants are entwined. Section 5.2 situates the inverse 
relationship within the context of the relations of production 
which characterise backward agriculture.
Finally, section 5.3 focuses on Sen's {and others') extrapolation 
of an essentially static result to a dynamic context in which 
both the relations and forces of production are changing. The 
inverse relationship appears to arise in a situation where all 
cultivators are employing the same technology, but if large 
farmers have access to a superior technology then the Sen logic 
breaks down, and with it the inverse relationship itself.
5.1 A digression on the criteria for capitalist transition in 
agriculture
A number of criteria have been presented as being crucial in 
determining whether capitalist relations have fully emerged and 
become dominant in agriculture. The various criteria identified 
in this section can be distilled from the exhaustive discussion
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which constitutes the Indian mode of production debate. This is 
the most important debate on this subject to have taken place in 
a poor country. It would be inappropriate to reference that 
debate fully here, but the major contributions are 
comprehensively and very usefully summarised in Thorner [1982] .3 
It is also worthy of note that the mode of production literature 
is referred to remarkably little in the inverse relationship 
literature, and vice versa.
The first issue is the move from petty or simple commodity 
production to generalised commodity production. Generalised 
commodity production is often seen as the encapsulating criterion 
by which one judges whether capitalism has swept all before it. 
Commodity production becomes the general form of production, with 
all of the key economic relationships in society mediated by the 
market and reduced to the exchange of equivalents. Generalised 
commodity production entails the following:
Firstly, the products of labour become fully commoditised: i.e. 
produced for market exchange. Commodity markets are fully formed, 
with full price responsiveness. True commercial surpluses become 
the norm, rather than distress surpluses. Participants have 
direct access to markets with the grip of merchant capital broken 
and subservient to productive capital. Monetization of 
transactions has become dominant, with a high degree of market 
participation and orientation. We move from the logic of the C-M- 
C circuit to M-C-M+ circuit as analysed by Marx.
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Secondly, the means of production become commoditised. Seed, 
fertilizers, irrigation water, and other machinery and equipment 
are purchased from the market rather than produced on-farm using 
family labour. We shall see that these aspects of commoditization 
are crucially dependent on the process of differentiation of the 
peasantry, a differentiation, not only quantitative, but also 
qualitative and cumulative.
Thirdly, land, the principal means of production in agriculture 
itself becomes a commodity, with the development of alienable and 
transferable property rights through land and rental markets.
Finally, labour power itself becomes a commodity. In the circuit 
M-C-M+, the secret of surplus value is discovered: the owners of 
capital (M) find a commodity which has the property of creating 
new value - labour power.
Indeed, the commoditization of labour can be seen as an important 
criterion in its own right. This entails a move from a focus on 
concrete useful labour (productive labour of a particular type) 
to a focus on general abstract labour power as the source of 
value. This in turn entails a shift from servile or unfree labour 
to labour that is free in Marx's famous double sense: free of the 
means of production, and free to sell their labour power. Labour 
loses control over the production process. We have a shift from 
petty commodity production (where the direct producers possess 
the means of production) to commodity production where they do 
not.
153
In its turn, this relationship indicates a crucial change in the 
manner of appropriating surplus labour. Now it is a question of 
appropriating surplus labour via the wage relation - the hallmark 
of capitalism. Further, this entails a shift from appropriation 
of absolute surplus value (lengthening the work day or squeezing 
necessary labour via extra-economic coercion) to appropriation 
of relative surplus value via the wage relation and the 
continuous revolution in technology, increasing labour 
productivity.
The appearance and dominance of capitalist relations of 
production has as its corollary the disintegration of pre­
capitalist relations. We have for example a shift away from pre­
capitalist customary ground rent to capitalist ground rent. Rent 
is no longer the major mechanism of surplus appropriation. 
Capitalist profit is now the major form, with rent now simply 
a surplus over capitalist profit.
With this, we find a shift away from payment in kind, and 
certainly away from payment via labour rent, to fixed money 
rents, freely negotiated. This further implies the elimination 
of usurers and merchant capital as dominant elements in the 
countryside. Formal money and credit markets become the norm 
along with formal commodity markets. The extraction of surplus 
via usury and unequal exchange exercise a powerful constraint 
upon development of the forces of production. The grip of 
moneylenders and merchant's capital must be broken, must become 
subservient to productive activity, otherwise they may prevent
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its emergence. Marx saw these as antediluvian forms of capital 
that must be eliminated.
Similarly, sharecropping as a dominant tenurial form must be 
eliminated. Its existence implies labour immobility, possibly 
debt bondage, and pre-capitalist rent as the dominant mode of 
surplus appropriation. A transitional form might be cost share 
leasing, but secure capitalist tenancy or production using wage 
labour should become the norm.
A further crucial criterion of capitalist development concerns 
surplus utilization and capital accumulation. Capital 
accumulation must become the dominant tendency: the surplus value 
appropriated must be re-invested in the production process, and 
not disappear into pre-capitalist channels of consumption and/or 
unproductive investment: e.g. moneylending or trading capital. 
Accumulation is the essential motor of capitalist development, 
entailing capital intensification and the continuous development 
of the forces of production.
Finally, at the level of the social formation, we have the need 
for simultaneous capitalist industrialisation. Otherwise labour 
and capital become trapped in agriculture, exercising a powerful 
depressing influence on productivity and encouraging pre­
capitalist forms of surplus extraction in the countryside. Usury 
and merchant capital thrive on the existence of surplus labour. 
There is also the importance of industrially-produced inputs in
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developing labour productivity and the forces of production in 
agriculture.
Note that in any attempt to identify whether or not agrarian 
transition has taken place, whether or not capitalism is in some 
sense dominant, we must stress the elementary logical point that 
while a particular criterion may be necessary to the existence 
of capitalism, it may not be sufficient. The existence of wage 
labour is a necessary, but by no means a sufficient condition for 
capitalist development. Wage labour may well be found in pre­
capitalist circumstances: in, for example, ancient Rome, Moghul 
India, Ottoman Turkey etc. The other criteria may not be met. 
Lenin suggested that when analysing the agrarian situation, it 
is not useful to employ too stereotyped an understanding of the 
theoretical proposition that capitalism requires the free 
landless worker. Neither does the appearance of wage labour prove 
the existence of capitalism - it depends on the context within 
which wage labour operates. Landless labour may not really be 
free, but may be bound in a situation of extra-economic coercion 
which has more in common with feudalism than capitalism.
Nevertheless, the appearance of free wage labour does provide 
some indication of the extent to which pre-capitalist relations 
of production have been dissolved with the separation of the 
direct producers from their means of production.
Similarly, production for the market is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition. Petty commodity producers may after all
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produce for the market, and there may be significant levels of 
market participation by peasants, without capitalism being 
dominant. Generalised commodity production may simply be grafted 
on to the pre-existing agrarian relations without altering those 
relations. However, the argument does exist that generalised 
commodity production entails capitalist relations of production. 
It is possible that the continuity of pre-capitalist relations 
of exploitation in a transitional period conceal changes in the 
effective relations of production.
Further, one might conceive of both wage labour and market 
orientation present, but still no dominance of the capitalist 
mode of production if say capital intensification is absent: if 
surplus value, instead of being re-invested in productive 
activity, is syphoned off into pre-capitalist channels.
While it may appear that commercialization is proceeding apace, 
it may well be in reality that what is happening is the further 
penetration of merchant capital. This may occur with stagnant 
production, and no capital deepening in agriculture. Although 
usurer's capital and petty trade are quite effective in 
separating the direct producers from their ownership of the means 
of production, impoverishing feudal landlords, and providing a 
stock of capital that can be used for later capitalization of 
production relations, the existence of capital in the sphere of 
circulation cannot be used to establish the existence of 
capitalism.
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Thus, the transition from rich peasant to capitalist farmer 
cannot simply be assumed (as it is generally in many studies of 
the inverse relationship) - it requires demonstration. While the 
use of wage labour and market participation may be an important 
indication of the process of agrarian transition, the evidence 
contained in Bhaduri, Bharadwaj, Patnaik and others, as to the 
lack of capital intensification on the large farms, and to the 
continued existence of unfree relations between labour hirers and 
workers would suggest that Sen's (and others') elision of rich 
peasant/capitalist farmer is invalid.
5.2 The inverse relationship in the context of backward 
agriculture
It is within the context of a backward agriculture that we must 
seek the factors that give rise to and sustain the inverse 
relationship. Within a semi-feudal agriculture, the normal 
competitive assumptions are fundamentally violated. It is 
therefore highly misleading to hypothesise that individual 
producers confront technical and market data in an impersonal 
environment and all are equally free to take decisions in all 
markets. Much of the discussion in this section leans heavily on 
the inter-linked rural markets or mode of exploitation 
literature.4
In backward agriculture, dominant classes (landlords, 
moneylenders, traders, or combinations of these functions) ensure
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that subordinate classes (poor peasants and landless labourers) 
can only gain access to markets on a highly personalised basis. 
This asymmetric economic and social power of the dominant classes 
over the subordinate classes allows the former to insist that the 
latter accept manifestly unfavourable terms in one market as a 
condition of access to another - unfavourable in the sense that 
those terms are clearly inferior to freely negotiable terms in 
free markets. Here, the dominant class can take advantage of the 
economic compulsions to participate in markets (forced commerce) 
which the subordinate classes are subject to: in order to ensure 
survival, reproduction or the need to achieve a particular cash 
income target to repay debt or taxes.
The extent and type of market participation by different groups 
of peasant and the character of markets themselves will be 
significantly determined by local patterns of power while markets 
reinforce those patterns. The initial resource position defines 
bargaining position while relative bargaining power determines 
access to resources and thus current production activity and 
asset-income position. Market and social power are vested in the 
dominant rural classes. Poor peasant involvement in one market 
may restrict choice in production decisions in other markets.
Bharadwaj portrays a hierarchical structure of exchange relations 
reflected in market interlinkages. First, the rich peasants and 
landlords: "In any market - we consider here output, land, labour 
and credit markets as the prominent ones - there are dominant 
parties mostly belonging to the substantial surplus households
159
[those of landlords and rich peasants] who set the pattern as 
well as the terms and conditions of exchange" [1985: 12]. These 
operators are powerful enough to exploit markets from a vantage 
point and shape market relations via interlocking forces 
exploitation in conjoint markets: land, credit, labour, input and 
product markets.
Next the middle peasants: "...the medium operators [middle
peasants and some richer peasants] are basically price takers and 
'quantity adjusters' in the sense that they have a safe enough 
margin of surplus to play the market game to maximise profits. . . " 
[1985: 12] . These intermediate operators are more self-reliant, 
but not necessarily in a position to exploit market relations. 
One might expect to observe defensive market avoidance on the 
part of the smaller farmers and market participation by the 
larger [Bharadwaj, 1974b: A-12].
Finally, we have the landless labourers and poor peasants: 
"...the "chronically deficit" and "subsistence" households 
[landless labourers and poor peasants] are involved in exchange 
compulsively. The very small cultivators and the landless, not 
possessing adequate resources for a reliable livelihood, have to 
enter the labour or credit market to incur consumption loans or 
obtain advances for circulating capital. Under the pressure of 
immanent cash needs they have to sell outputs, sometimes under 
prior commitments, even when they have to repurchase them under 
more adverse terms for their own subsistence" [Bharadwaj, 1985: 
12-13] .
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This compulsive market involvement will be reflected in cropping 
patterns, resource utilisation and a higher degree of 
monetisation of transactions under distress conditions. Bharadwaj 
[1974b: A-21] notes that in the West Bengal FMS studies, the 
farms producing only cash crops were all in the small size 
groups.
Markets are interlocked through price and non-price links. Such 
interlocking increases the exploitative power of dominant classes 
in that they can disperse exploitation over different markets and 
time periods - thereby circumventing traditional limitations. 
Exploitation is secured by denying participants in interlinked 
markets access to any of the individual markets: "the weaker
party in exchange loses the option to exercise choice in other 
markets due to its commitment in one. For example, the tenant who 
has committed himself into a land-labour tie (that is, to render 
free or underpaid labour services on the landlord's land as part 
of the lease contract) cannot avail himself of opportunities to 
hire himself out at a higher wage, even when such opportunities 
present themselves. The producer of a commercial crop who borrows 
on the commitment of selling his output to the merchant/creditor 
cannot gain from the higher return otherwise possible as he loses 
the option of selling it in the market. Often, unlike pure 
usurious capital, the merchant/creditor intervenes directly in 
the production organisation of the debtor, dictating the 
decisions regarding the crops to be produced" [Bharadwaj, 1985: 
13] .
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This closing of options cements exploitation since it "weakens 
the possibility of the indebted party recovering from a 
dependency situation, especially when there are no alternative 
means of livelihood" [Bharadwaj, 1985: 13].
Interlinkage further maximises exploitation over time, by the 
range and depth of control it makes possible: "The power of the 
dominant party to exploit in interlinked markets is much more 
than in markets taken separately. There are conventional limits 
to exploitation in any one single market. For example, the crop 
share is conventionally laid down. The division of produce 
becomes a matter of convention. . .There are also limits to 
exploitation set by the sheer minimum survival needs of the 
exploited party. With interlinked markets exploitation can be 
spread over markets (such as intervening in an output market on 
the basis of a credit tie) and even across generations, when the 
labour of future generations is committed by the debtor or 
tenant. Moreover, with options receding for the weaker party, the 
situation develops as one of dominant control over the entire 
livelihood of the weaker party. In proportion as the dominant 
party stretches the domain of exploitation, the weaker party's 
possibilities of redress diminish" [Bharadwaj, 1985: 13] .
Hossain [1977: 286-7] also finds evidence for this position in 
rural Bangladesh. Here, the inverse relationship arises due to 
the existence of a "pre-capitalist organisation of production, 
where the market has a limited role and cultivators have 
differential access to various resources". The pre-capitalist
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mode of production dominates the Bangladeshi social formation: 
private property in land exists but the forces of production are 
backward (capital plays only a limited role); markets in 
commodities and means of production are not significantly 
developed; and barely capitalistic large farms cultivate only a 
part of their land with hired and family labour and rent out the
rest in small plots under sharecropping.
Thus, here we have a very powerful mechanism rooted in the social 
relations of production of an essentially pre-capitalist mode of 
production that ensures poor peasants maximise output. The poor 
peasant maximises output because his/her survival as a peasant
depends upon it. It would appear therefore that the factors
driving a poor peasant to intensify labour effort are more 
important than the factors permitting him to do so. The inverse 
relationship cannot be understood in terms of scale advantages 
among isolated farms or simply in terms of the poverty and 
unemployment facing poor peasants. The inverse relationship 
arises because of factors which are related to farm size, but not 
because of some independent size effect per se. It is thus 
misguided to treat the inverse relationship as a sign of relative 
efficiency rather than of distress. Chattopadhyay and Rudra 
[1976: A-115] conclude: "if the inverse relationship be made the 
basis of a policy for preserving small farmers as they are, the 
result would be the destitution and expropriation of poor 
peasants...". At the other end of the class spectrum, rich 
peasants, who have not yet been transformed into capitalist
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farmers, use the same technology, but with much lower labour 
intensity, and thus achieve lower yields.
5.3 The static nature of the Sen approach and the breakdown of 
the inverse relationship in the dynamic context
We turn now to the third set of considerations that need to be
taken into account: the essentially static nature of the Sen
approach. The extension of a static result which emerges in a 
given set of unchanging circumstances to a dynamic context in 
which the essential circumstances are changing markedly is 
invalid. The most significant change is likely to be with respect 
to technology. Chattopadhyay and Rudra [1976: A-115] note: "It
is ironical that a static comparative situation between small 
farms and big farms, allegedly prevailing in the fifties in 
certain parts of the country - and even that, not at all 
established beyond doubt - has been the basis of plenty of 
friends of the rural poor opting for an agrarian policy that is 
ultimately destined to cause immiserisation of the rural poor. 
For even if the static comparison is valid in a certain stage of 
development of agriculture with low technological inputs, it 
cannot remain so during a period when there is a mounting drive 
by richer farmers to go in for more and more technological 
agriculture in search of higher profits."5
In those areas where we find an inverse relationship, it is the
case that all farm sizes have access to a more or less similar
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technology. Large and small farms use the same set of production 
inputs, and the small farms achieve higher output per acre via 
far higher cropping intensities which in turn imply higher 
application of labour effort per acre. With the introduction of 
a new technology which favours large farms due to its associated 
economies of scale, then the so-called advantage which the small 
farms have with respect to labour input intensity, may be matched 
or more than matched by the new advantages which large farms have 
with respect to technology. In this situation, we might expect 
the inverse relationship to break down and eventually disappear, 
and with it part of the case for redistributive land reform.
In terms of the class-based approach, which is essentially a 
dynamic theory, what is happening here is that with the 
development of the forces of production in the form of Green 
Revolution technology, it is the rich peasants who are better 
placed to reap the benefits. When the new technology is removed 
from the laboratory test beds and research stations, and inserted 
into the wider context of agrarian relations, factors operate to 
benefit disproportionately the large farmers. Institutional 
services (extension, credit, input/output prices, information, 
marketing, and political power) exhibit a strong bias in favour 
of the large farmer - both cross-sectionally and sequentially, 
with the large farmers being early adopters and therefore early 
gainers in terms of high output prices, low subsidised input 
prices [see Byres, 1972].
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It is the rich peasants who have the resources, which the poor 
peasants do not have, to gain access to the whole package of new 
inputs (HYV seeds, chemical fertilizers, plant protection 
materials). It is the rich peasants who are able to monopolise 
the available credit necessary to purchase the Green Revolution 
package. The rich peasants dominate the institutions which supply 
and distribute the new inputs. While these biochemical inputs may 
be scale neutral6, their adoption steps up pressures for 
mechanization which does have associated scale economies. Abhijit 
Sen [1981: 212-3] notes that with high labour supervision costs 
on the large farms, this sets a limit to increasing output per 
acre unless labour-augmenting technology is adopted. 
Mechanization can thus be seen as a response to problems of 
labour supervision on the large farms.7 This leads to the 
breakdown of the inverse relation with large capitalist farmers 
achieving higher yields. Much of this is supported by evidence 
from the Punjab [see Chadha, 1978; Roy, 1981; Patnaik, 1972] .
In terms of the other sets of explanations we have looked at, 
those based on qualitative factor differences and those based on 
factor scarcities/imperfect markets, being essentially static 
arguments, have not adequately addressed this question: either 
the evidence on the breakdown of the inverse relation is denied 
or ignored and the relationship holds in all places at all times, 
or it is explained in terms of a U-shaped relation with small 
farms specialising in labour-intensive production and large farms 
in capital-intensive production, both sets of farms utilising
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resources efficiently and achieving high yields. Why such 
specialization occurs is only incompletely examined however.
Some neoclassical writers do seem to be aware of the impact of 
technological change on the inverse relationship however, but 
have few suggestions as to the mechanism operating.8 Mellor 
[1967] writes: "the two prime inputs of traditional agriculture 
are land and labour. Capital is not only much less important in 
quantity, but also is largely a direct embodiment of labour in 
land improvements, water systems, and simple tools. The level of 
agricultural production in traditional agriculture is, therefore, 
limited by the amount and quality of land and by the amount of 
labour provided by the farmer, directly for production, or 
indirectly through the formation of capital goods". Ghose adds: 
"The specific conditions for this superiority [the inverse 
relationship] appear to be primitive technology and insufficient 
development of markets...It seems fairly clear that technological 
progress involving the introduction of chemical fertilizers, 
labour-saving machinery (e.g. tractors) and modern irrigation 
equipment (e.g. tubewells) is likely to erode the basis of 
superiority of small-scale production" [1979: 42].9 Sidhu
concludes: "Thus a major source of greater technical efficiency 
of smaller farms during the mid-1950s seems to be less important 
during the late 1960s" [1974: 749-50].
The empirical evidence does indeed support the proposition that 
following the introduction of the Green Revolution technology, 
the inverse relationship has disappeared, markedly so in those
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areas where the new technology has penetrated most deeply. Rani 
[1971: A-89] writes: "Whatever the situation may have been in the 
early sixties when the FMS were conducted, the whole controversy 
loses much of its importance in view of the developments which 
are taking place in Indian agriculture because, even if the small 
farmer has certain advantages over small farmers in labour- 
intensive techniques, these are likely to be wiped out as 
capital-intensive techniques gain popularity among farmers."10
Kahlon and Kapur [1968: 79-80], in an early study11, concluded 
that it was "apparent that the adoption of yield increasing 
technology on the large farms in recent years had reversed the 
trend in yield per acre on large farms". The trend reversed with 
technological breakthroughs on the large farms through adoption 
of improved strains such as hybrid maize, hybrid bajra and 
Mexican wheat, and intensive use of improved methods and 
practices. Kahlon and Kapur suggest that it was the higher 
application of chemical fertilizers that resulted in higher 
yields on the large farms. While the small farms used higher 
levels of farmyard manure than the large farms for desi maize, 
desi cotton and sugarcane, the large farmers used higher doses 
of calcium ammonium nitrate and superphosphate fertilizers than 
the small farmers, particularly for hybrid maize and wheat sown 
after the kharif crops and for irrigated groundnuts.12 The seed 
rate per acre was higher on the large farms for almost all crops, 
especially American cotton and wheat. Rapid technological change 
and intensive use of non-traditional inputs on the large farms
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also resulted in higher per acre yields in the Hissar 
district.13
Saini [1971: A-82] however produces some contrary evidence:
"Under the impact of the 'green revolution' , one would expect the 
inverse relationship to undergo a change and to cease to be true 
at least in the areas which have experienced the 'green 
revolution'. The data relating to Punjab (Ferozepur) and Uttar 
Pradesh (Muzaffarnagar), however, do not provide any evidence of 
such a change. It is perhaps too early to expect a change in the 
first two or three years of the setting in of the 'green 
revolution'." A later study by Bhattacharya and Saini [1972: A~ 
71] shows that for Muzaf f arnagar in all years there was a 
significant inverse relationship, but the evidence was not clear 
for the Ferozepur district. While they claim that the green 
revolution had not affected the inverse relation in either 
region, regressions using gross cropped areas show a shift from 
negative to positive correlation over time in Muzaffarnagar and 
from zero to positive in Ferozepur.
In an attempt to study the inverse relationship in an area where 
the new technology had been widely adopted, Singh and Patel found 
no variation in yield per acre over farm size and no sign of an 
inverse relationship: the regression coefficients were all
greater than unity, but not statistically significant. They write 
[1973: 47] : "it may be concluded that in the context of new
technology there is no indication of decrease in output per 
hectare with an increase in farm size and, therefore, the
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hypothesis of inverse relationship is rejected in the area under 
study. "14
In a major study of the Punjab, Chadha15 finds that the inverse 
relationship ceased to hold in the post-green revolution areas 
as the resource structure between small and large farms changed. 
He divides the post Green Revolution Punjab into three agro- 
economic regions (on the basis of soil conditions, cropping 
patterns and irrigation systems) with three distinct 
technological levels: 1) the sub-montane region growing wheat, 
rice, and maize under rainfed irrigation; 2) a central zone 
growing maize with tubewell irrigation; and 3) the south-western 
cotton belt with canal irrigation. The central region was ahead 
of the other two in terms of irrigation, cropping intensity, HYV 
use and tractors.
With the introduction of the new technology, high labour/land 
ratios become less important. The new factors are land saving and 
capital-absorbing and largely purchased, not produced on-farm so 
that the on-farm labour content of capital is no longer 
important. Indeed, the capital/labour ratio becomes as important 
as the labour/land ratio in traditional agriculture. Investment 
in machinery was higher in region 2 and on the large farms (the 
latter invest three times as much per acre as the small 
farms) .16
There was a clear relation between levels of irrigation and 
investment in new technology. Region 2 has a well-developed
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rental market for tubewell water and machinery. Region 2 was the 
most modern and region 1 the least modernised in terms of per 
acre investment in modern machinery.
While small farms show higher per acre investment on traditional 
items such as hoes, they lose this advantage when improved 
techniques are taken into account, with large farms showing much 
higher investment in modern machines such as tractors.17 In 
region 2, the small farmers have over 70% of their investment in 
traditional implements, but large farms have almost completely 
moved to improved items. On the large farms, the increase in 
capital inputs outstripped increases in labour input, while the 
smaller farms experienced a less than proportionate increase in 
capital input to labour input [Chadha, 1978: A-93, table P] . 
While the small farms could compete with the large farms in terms 
of HYV seeds and fertilizers, given cooperative services and 
government aid, they could not compete in terms of machinery 
[1978: A-95]. Chadha notes [1978: A-87] that while the
biochemical innovations are labour-absorbing, land-saving and 
scale-neutral, the mechanical innovations are labour displacing 
and biased to scale. Furthermore, both types of innovation call 
for substantial capital investment.
Region 2 had the highest capital/labour ratios, generating 
increased output per acre. While the inverse relation still held 
in region 1, it had broken down in region 2, with region 3 
intermediate.
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Moving beyond farm size as the stratifying category, Rao and 
Brahme [1973]18 divided farms into peasant farms and wage labour 
based farms with the former defined as those where family male 
labour input was greater than 50% of total male labour input. 
They conclude: "the inverse relationship [was] noticeable in the
peasant sector, while it [was] not apparent in the capitalist 
sector" [1973: 15] . On average, the wage labour-based sector
registered higher labour input than the family labour-based 
sector [1973: 22],
Roy also examines evidence from the Punjab to show a significant 
transition from traditional to modern capitalist agriculture.19 
As in Chadha, Roy divides Punjab into three heterogenous zones: 
the relatively backward eastern Punjab, the more recently 
advanced central districts, and the advanced western Punjab 
[1979: 139]. He notes that the latter region benefited from the 
existence of British-built canals, it being historically a cotton 
area with significant market oriented production, and so was most 
suited to the introduction of the new technology. The central 
zone also saw recent tubewell expansion in the period 1965-75, 
thus permitting rapid progress with the green revolution 
technology. Contrariwise, the eastern submontane region lagged 
behind in new technology.20
The district regressions show a still significant inverse 
relationship in the eastern zone, insignificant for the central 
zone (Bhatinda, Jullunder, Kapurthala, Gurdaspur), and in the 
western Punjab a statistically significant positive relation
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between output per acre and net cropped area (see Table 16, 
Appendix A) . Using gross cropped area in the regressions revealed 
that several western and central districts exhibited a positive 
relation (see Table 17, Appendix A) . Roy awards these results 
some importance, as normally the relationship between output per 
acre and gross cropped area is neither significantly positive or 
negative. Since the relationship has turned significantly 
positive, he suggests that large farmers have attained important 
scale advantages.
The fact that the inverse relationship disappears despite the 
still significant inverse relationship between cropping intensity 
and farm size confirms the importance of crop pattern and the 
physical yields of individual crops.21 The regression 
coefficients for HYV wheat reveal a positive tendency across farm 
size in three western districts (Ferozepur, Amritsar and 
Kapurthala) and a significantly positive relation for HYV rice 
in Amritsar and Kapurthala (see Tables 19-20, Appendix A).
Roy computes two indices of progressivity (see Tables 21-22, 
Appendix A) :22
1) the percentage area irrigated in the 1960s indicates those 
areas most suited to the introduction of the green revolution 
technology. Superimposing this pattern on the district maps shows 
an approximate similarity: the western region with a relatively 
high percentage area irrigated in the 19 60s was the most 
technologically advanced prior to the green revolution and
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farmers there were the earliest adopters of the new technology, 
while the relatively backward eastern belt of districts were 
poorly irrigated, permitting only limited adoption of the new 
technology. Roy notes that irrigation differentials between sizes 
were no longer important in the post green revolution period.
2) the percentage of cultivated area under HYVs and American 
cotton as a proxy for commercialisation (the new seeds and 
fertilizers have to be purchased in the market rather than be 
supplied from on-farm production) . Again, we find a broad 
correlation between the spatial pattern of this index and the 
inverse relationship results. The greater the degree of 
commercialisation of agriculture, the greater the tendency for 
the inverse relationship to disappear.
Amritsar and Ferozepur are the most advanced districts of the 
Punjab in terms of the extent of their adoption of the new 
technology, and were the most advanced prior to the green 
revolution. By 1974-5, the Amritsar district had 85.6% of net 
cropped area cultivated under HYV seeds [1979: 149] . The district 
experienced a very high growth rate of agricultural output of 
8.11% between 1962 and 1973 and a rapid increase in the stock of 
technology [1979: 148, table 5.8] . The area under tenancy
declined and agricultural labourers as a percentage of the male 
labour force more than doubled from 9.23% in 1961 to 20.12% in 
1971 [1979: 148, table 5.7] . Ferozepur has a higher than average 
size of holding (6.32 ha as against 5.0 ha for the state as a
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whole) and high irrigation ratios. This district specialized in 
cotton (producing 53.01% of Punjabi cotton in 1967-8) and wheat.
The relationship between farm size and land productivity as 
indicated by the regression coefficients shows an interesting 
progression: from a statistically significant -0.17 in 1956-7 
to a statistically insignificant -0.03 in 1968-9, and finally to 
a significant positive coefficient of 2.7415 in 1975-6 [1979:
151, table 5.9] . Also noteworthy as an indication of changing 
relations of production in the district is the rapid decline in 
share tenancy from 33% of the area in 1954-5 to 6.64% in 1969-70 
[1979: 152, table 5.10] . The data also reveals a rapid change in 
the stock of technology towards chemical fertilisers, tractors, 
diesel pumps and electric pumps for tubewells [1979: 153, table 
5.11] .
The hypothesis supported by Roy is that during the early period 
of transition, the institutional bias in favour of large farmers 
ensures that they are the first adopters. Scale advantages become 
more important in the post adoption period, with large farmers 
maintaining high investment and growth rates. Thus, rather than 
the small farmers being able to catch up, the initial advantages 
captured by the large farmers are further strengthened over time 
due to intrinsic scale advantages.
Further support for this thesis comes from Pakistan. Khan 
[1979]23 examines 732 irrigated farms in the Indus basin in 
1974. He finds the large farms (those over 2 5 acres) have land
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productivity some 9% higher than the small farms (below 25 
acres). The land coefficient (which represents the sum of factor 
elasticities) is 1.0974 which shows increasing returns to scale. 
Purchased input use (hired labour, machines and chemical 
fertiliser) increases with size [1979: 72] . With the introduction 
of the new technology, capital inputs were subsidized and 
directed towards the larger farmers. Large farms use more 
chemical fertilisers per acre and a similar bias exists in 
relation to tubewell technology: the large farmers had more
access to credit for investment. All loans from the Agricultural 
Development Bank of Pakistan went to farms over 2 5 acres, the 
ADBP being the main source of finance for tractors and tubewells 
[1979: 76].
Hoque and Mahmood [1981] dispute some of Khan's findings, using 
a database for 19 districts in West Punjab provided by the 
Agricultural Census and Rural Credit Survey of 1972. However, 
note that Hoque and Mahmood use highly aggregated data, grouped 
in five size classes over districts [1981: 156] . They produce a 
U-shaped relation with small farms and large farms having higher 
productivity levels than medium farms, but no significant 
difference between small farms and large farms [1981: 161] .
Rather than undermining Khan's findings, however, these results 
tend to confirm them by suggesting an intermediate stage in the 
introduction of the new technology prior to full-scale 
mechanization.
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Summary and conclusions
We have seen in this chapter, that the fundamental determinants 
of factor-use intensities are the nexus of property rights and 
tenurial conditions that shape market characteristics, resource 
endowments, and the nature and extent of market participation by 
different size-holdings. Specific resource constraints affect the 
bargaining position of farmers in the markets for land, labour, 
and other inputs. Current and past levels of market participation 
and the nature of that participation strongly influence 
production decisions, which in turn affect future resource 
endowments.
The class-based approach identifies farm size with class 
position. Within the process of peasant differentiation, poor 
peasants end up with smaller and smaller below-subsistence plots 
of land, and are forced to intensify land-use and labour input 
in order to achieve subsistence levels of income. This stratum 
of poor peasants may also be characterised by compulsive market 
involvement or 'forced commerce'. Exploitative relations of 
production and exchange, with landlords, merchants and 
moneylenders extracting surplus via high rents, usury and price 
wedges, either singly or conjointly, compel poor peasants to 
achieve higher than average yields, market a high proportion of 
high-value cash crops, and sell labour off-farm in order to pay 
off cash and debt obligations as well as reach subsistence 
income.
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At the other end of the class spectrum, rich peasants accumulate 
land and do not operate under such subsistence constraints. 
Through tenurial relationships and moneylending, rich peasants 
are a part of the exploiting class. They operate on the basis of 
hired wage labour and market a truly commercial surplus (as 
opposed to a distress surplus). A middle peasant range is more 
self-sufficient in terms of labour and consumption/production. 
This implies lower market participation and they are under no 
compulsion to intensify labour input.
In those areas where we find an inverse relationship, it is the 
case that all farm sizes have access to a more or less similar 
technology. Large and small farms use the same set of production 
inputs, and the small farms achieve higher output per acre via 
far higher cropping intensity and application of labour effort 
per acre. With the introduction of a new technology which favours 
large farms due to its associated economies of scale, then the 
so-called advantage which the small farms have with respect to 
labour input intensity, may be matched or more than matched by 
the new advantages which large farms have with respect to 
technology. In this situation, we might expect the inverse 
relationship to break down and eventually disappear, and with it 
part of the case for redistributive land reform.
In terms of the class-based approach, which is essentially a 
dynamic theory, what is happening here is that with the 
development of the forces of production in the form of Green 
Revolution technology, it is the rich peasants who are better
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placed to reap the benefits. They have the resources to gain 
access to the whole package of new inputs (HYV seeds, chemical 
fertilizers, plant protection materials) . It is the rich peasants 
who are able to monopolise the available credit necessary to 
purchase the Green Revolution package. The rich peasants dominate 
the institutions which supply and distribute the new inputs. 
While these biochemical inputs may be scale neutral, their 
adoption steps up pressures for mechanization which does have 
associated scale economies. This leads to the breakdown of the 
inverse relationship with rich peasants/capitalist farmers 
achieving higher yields.
In the next chapter, we will examine what some writers regard as 
the definitive study of the inverse relationship, in both 
theoretic and empirical terms, in the light of the framework 
developed in this chapter. These first six chapters then, set the 
context for the core part of this thesis: the inverse
relationship in Egyptian agriculture.
Notes to Chapter V
1. Bharadwaj writes in this context: "Even when the researcher 
recognises the inadequacy or irrelevance of some specific 
assumptions like profit maximization or mobility of resources 
guided by freely fluctuating prices, he is prone to tinkering 
with only those specific parts of the competitive model, keeping 
undisturbed the rest of the framework" [1974b: A-ll] .
2. T.J. Byres was the first writer to develop a consistent and 
rigorous class-based approach to the question of the inverse 
relationship in an unpublished paper presented at the IDS Rupag 
Seminar Programme in November 1977, and in a modified version at
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the Institute of Development Studies, The Hague, in April 197 9. 
See also Bharadwaj [1974a] and [1974b], and Patnaik [1979] and 
[1987] for complementary inputs to this approach.
3. Besides Thorner [1982], a useful summary and critique of the 
earlier part of the debate may be seen in McEachern [1976] . An 
excellent selection of the relevant contributions may be seen in 
Patnaik [1990] . Patnaik has been one of the most significant 
contributors to the Indian debate. Most of her important 
contributions are listed and discussed in Thorner's [1982] . Among 
Patnaik's writings published after Thorner wrote her survey, see 
Patnaik [1983] and [1986].
A major contributor to and critic of the debate on the transition 
to capitalist agriculture and the agrarian question is the 
founding editor of the Journal of Peasant Studies, T.J. Byres. 
See Byres [1972], [1974], [1977], [1981], [1982], [1986], [1986], 
[1990], and [1991].
On the semi-feudalism argument, see Bhaduri [1977] and [1983].
4. Within this literature, both political and neoclassical 
traditions are represented. For the political economy approach 
to inter-linked modes of exploitation, which focuses on surplus 
extraction by dominant classes, see Bharadwaj [1974], [1979] and 
[1985]. Other important contributors include Bhaduri [1973] and 
Srivastava [1989]. The latter includes a useful brief survey of 
the literature on interlinkage.
For the neoclassical approach, which focuses on contractual 
market relationships and market imperfections, see Srinivasan 
[1979], Bardhan [1980], Basu [1983], and Braverman & Srinivasan 
[1984] .
5. Rao [1968: 93] writes: "Even though the application of labour 
may be higher among smaller farms, they may lag behind the larger 
ones in regard to the application of technologically new inputs 
such as fertilizers, improved seeds and insecticides etc. owing 
to their low investible surplus".
6. On the question of scale versus resource neutrality and the 
pressures for mechanization see Byres [1972] and [1981].
7. Sen [1981: 327] also mentions that sharecropping can be seen 
as an institutional response by rich farmers to capture some of 
the "cheapness" of poor peasant family labour and save on 
supervision costs.
8. Sidhu [1974: 749-50] mentions the possibility that large farms 
assimilated the new Mexican wheat strains more rapidly than the 
small farms due to a "comparative advantage in research 
information".
9. Bardhan points to his Ferozepur results. Over the period 1955- 
69, the inverse relationship becomes positive. He also points out 
that the results obtained by Lau and Yotopoulos [1971] pertain
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to traditional Indian agriculture in the mid-1950s. With the 
introduction of green revolution technology, land productivity 
no longer depends on labour input intensity alone, but on the 
availability of fertilizers, irrigation etc. [1973: 1373].
10. Rani uses disaggregated FMS data for five IADP districts over 
three years 1962-65. Altogether 1,431 observations. His Chart A 
[1971: A-86] shows 14 out of 15 negative coefficients indicating 
an inverse relationship, but only 9 significant at the 10% level, 
7 at 5% and 1 at the 1% level: "Hence one can even conclude that 
yield per acre remains constant over different size groups of 
farms" [1971: A-86],
11. The study relates to the Upper Dhaia region of IADP district 
Ludhiana, the Dehlon Development Block for the year 1965-6. Small 
farms are classed as those below 10 acres and large farms those 
above 22 acres.
12. In a similarly early study, Sinha and Singh [1966: 19-20] 
find that per acre maize yields actually increased with size: 
small farms produced 10.75 maunds per acre, medium-sized farms 
produced 11.88 maunds, and the large farms 13.40 maunds. They 
also found that for groundnuts, the small farmers achieved yields 
a quarter less than the large farmers. This was also true for 
gram.
13. C.R. Kaushik, Farm adjustments on the introduction of new 
irrigation facilities in canal irrigated area of Hissar district, 
unpublished MSc thesis, 1966. Cited in Kahlon and Kapur [1968: 
80] .
14. A study of 120 farms in 4 villages in Meerut district, Uttar 
Pradesh, chosen on the basis of area under Mexican wheat 
varieties in 1969-70. Land was standardised for soil quality 
using land revenue.
15. Chadha uses Punjabi data from three sources:
1)FMS 1956-7 (2 districts: Amritsar and Ferozepur - 200 farms).
2)FMS 1969-70 (61 villages over the state (21 patwar circles)- 
detailed information on 351 farms on the cost-accounting basis 
collected by the State Statistical Organization).
3) Agricultural Census data from 1970-71 .
Small farms were defined as those from 2.5 to 10 acres, medium 
farms from 10 to 25 acres, and large farms above 25 acres. The 
1969-7 0 data does not include the very small farms (less than 2.5 
acres).
16. Compare table 4 [1978: A-90], for 1969-70, with table 5 
[1978: A-91] for the mid-50s.
17. See table 6 [1978: A-91] and table 7 [1978: A-92]
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18. The data used is from Amarvati and Akola districts 1956-7 and 
Ahmednagar district 1967-8.
19. Roy uses disaggregated data from the National Council of 
Applied Economic Research, Fertilizer Demand Study, Interim 
Report, Volume 1 - General, (mimeo) NCAER New Delhi, February 
1978. The results are analyzed in his PhD thesis [1979] and in 
[1981] . Roy disaggregates household data by district in the years 
1975-6 and 1976-7 (i.e. in the post green revolution period). 
The total sample size was 22, 791 across India, with 869 in Punjab 
(the non-response rate of 5.5% produced a final sample size of 
821 for Punjab). The data included area irrigated and detailed 
information for each crop (for an array of 66 crops), whether 
they were HYV or traditional varieties, cultivated on irrigated 
or unirrigated land, and yields. The household level data avoided 
the biases associated with the use of size class averages as in 
the FMS studies.
Roy uses a linear regression model for "simplicity" (he also 
tried out Rudra's rank correlation tests in the sample cases and 
found the "qualitative nature of the relation no different". The 
specification for all regressions was y = a + bx where y = output 
per net cropped area, output per gross cropped area, percentage 
area irrigated, cropping intensity, and yield per acre of 
individual crops [1979: 131-34].
20. See tables 5.1-5.7 [1979: 156-162] . See also the maps in
diagrams 5.1-5.8 [1979: 141-8] or alternatively [1989].
21. Further, the coefficients on b are both smaller and 
statistically weaker in the advanced regions than in the more 
traditional areas (only Amritsar and Gurdaspur show no 
significant relation). See Table 18, Appendix A.
22. These tables summarise the main findings of Roy noted in the 
text.
23. Khan fits a Cobb-Douglas production function, running log-log 
regressions of output on gross cropped area, chemical fertiliser 
use, the ratio of family top hired labour and expenditure on 
animals and machinery.
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CHAPTER VI
A critical view of Berry and Cline on the inverse relationship 
Introduction
The literature on the inverse relationship between farm size and 
land productivity is a vast body of empirical and theoretical 
work scattered throughout many journals and studies over a long 
period of time. So far, we have concentrated on the Indian 
literature, data and debate. But, although nowhere else has there 
been a debate on the Indian scale or of the Indian quality, the 
inverse relationship has been identified in a large number of 
other countries. In the present chapter we shall focus upon an 
influential attempt "to consider the issues of agrarian structure 
and productivity at the theoretical level and to bring together 
recent empirical evidence on these issues from a wide range of 
countries" [Berry and Cline, 1979: x].
That attempt is the study by Albert Berry and William Cline 
entitled Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing 
Countries, published for the ILO in 1979. This collaboration grew 
out of earlier work by the authors on Colombia and Brazil.1 It 
seems to be regarded by many writers as being the definitive 
study of the inverse relationship [see Dasgupta, 1993: 525 and 
Ellis, 1988: 197] .
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We devote a chapter to this study for three reasons. The first 
is because it allows a more general treatment of the inverse 
relationship result than we have attempted so far. Secondly, it 
displays serious methodological shortcomings which need to be 
addressed. And finally, such a chapter constitutes a useful 
bridge into the second part of the thesis, which relates to a 
country other than India: Egypt.
The main focus of the study is "on differences in the 
productivity of existing farms by size" [3]2 and the factors 
which explain these differences. Based on a wide range of 
empirical evidence, the authors conclude that an inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity is generally 
found in developing countries: "In short, it is clearly the
normal relationship1 [203] . The specific questions addressed
include the impact of factor market imperfections on resource 
utilization, the potential of redistributive land reform to 
increase output and employment, the effects of the Green 
Revolution technology on the inverse relationship, and aspects 
relating to land tenure.
Various hypotheses explaining the inverse relationship are 
examined in the second chapter [5-3 0] , and two types of empirical 
evidence are presented in chapters three and four. Chapter three 
[31-43] examines cross-country data on the farm size-productivity 
relation, while chapter four [44-127] and Appendix A [141-193] 
consider the evidence from various individual country case 
studies. Finally, chapter five [128-140] synthesizes the policy
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implications derived by the authors from both sets of empirical 
evidence.
We examine the latter first, in section 6.1, taking the empirical 
evidence at face value and abstracting from the theoretical 
analysis. In section 6.2, we turn to a critical account of the 
authors' theoretical framework. We have already covered these 
various issues in Chapters I and III, and so we deal with them 
quite briefly. In the final section 6.3, we examine in great 
detail the empirical evidence produced by the authors, both the 
cross-country data and each country study individually. We shall 
seek to show that this empirical evidence is seriously flawed and 
cannot be used to test the relevant hypotheses generated by the 
authors.
6.1 Policy implications
Berry and Cline argue that the finding of systematically higher 
land productivity and comparable levels of total factor 
productivity on small farms as opposed to large farms suggests 
"that the expansion of the small-farm subsector of agriculture 
may be a more effective way of increasing both employment and 
output than pro-large-farm strategies and thus warrants serious 
consideration in almost all developing countries" [4]. Analysis 
of social efficiency requires consideration of total factor 
productivity. This will fall with size where labour is abundant 
and where land and capital are relatively scarce, although the
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inverse relationship between total factor productivity and farm 
size will be weaker than that relating to land productivity 
alone. Nevertheless, in LDCs, small farms are likely to have 
higher total factor productivity, and so are the optimal size for 
output maximization, as well as for labour absorption and income 
distribution [16] .
Given that small farms generate higher land productivity and 
total social factor productivity (the authors do admit an 
extremely important caveat to this statement: "except in the very 
smallest farms in some countries" [128]), the authors propose the 
redistribution of land to the small farmers who apply labour more 
intensively, and the improvement of small farm access to credit 
and new technology. Both strategies will improve equity and 
increase output levels [128] .
With such land redistribution, the authors claim that: "The
optimal post-reform farm size, in the absence of technical 
returns to scale, will be merely the total agricultural area 
divided by the total number of families in the agricultural 
labour force (after adjusting for land quality). That is, since 
total factor productivity falls as farm size rises in the 
relevant range, the most productive agrarian structure will be 
that composed of the smallest farms possible, consistent with 
full allocation of the available land and labour force, i.e., 
total area divided by the total number of farm families" [18]. 
They add in a footnote: "An equal distribution of available land 
among the entire rural labour force on a family farm basis will
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generally result in parcels significantly larger than the 
smallest prereform farms" [226, note 23] . Berry and Cline then 
reason: "If the equal distribution of all available land among
all families implies a labour/land ratio equal to that of the 
same sized farms in the existing agrarian structure, the land 
productivity of these latter farms can provide a rough prediction 
of average land productivity after redistribution..." [18].
Estimates of output gains after land redistribution follow a two- 
step procedure: first, the average farm size is computed by
dividing the available land by the number of families in the
rural labour force;3 secondly, a statistical estimate of output 
per acre for that farm size is applied to the former result. 
Chapter five presents [132-3, table 5-1] estimates of the 
potential gains from such equalizing land redistribution.
Potential output increases range from 10% for Pakistan to 79.5% 
for north-eastern Brazil, including 19% for India, 23% for the 
Philippines, 25% for Brazil as a whole, and 28% for Colombia and 
the Muda river area of Malaysia {see Table 23, Appendix A).4
The only caveats to this procedure given any prominence are those 
arising from price changes following shifts in output mix, and 
changes in labour input intensities [18-19]. However, the set of 
assumptions required for this astonishingly simplistic
calculation to hold are both numerous and highly unlikely to 
occur in reality.
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The first and most obvious problem with this procedure is that 
the estimates are not constrained by product mix or land quality. 
In other words, the total land available which is defined as all 
land currently being used for agricultural purposes including 
pasture and woodland, can be converted to arable cultivation. 
Indeed, even marginal and waste land or land unsuitable for 
arable purposes can be so converted. Clearly, such a computation 
is inadmissible; the latter category of land would have to be 
excluded from the calculation, and the remainder would have to 
be disaggregated by type or use, between arable and pasture for 
example. Very different figures are likely to result. Indeed, 
where such product disaggregation has been carried out, as in 
Cline 1970 for Brazil, the potential output gains from land 
redistribution have been disappointing. In seven out of twelve 
regional crop sectors, production changes were either negative 
or insignificant {see Table 24, Appendix A).
An equalizing distribution might well lead to a modal farm size 
significantly greater than the smallest currently existing farm 
size. An important consideration here is the question of minimum 
feasible size of farm discussed in the introductory chapter 
above. None of the foregoing calculations takes into account the 
possibility of there being a minimum efficient scale or of there 
being a floor determined by subsistence income. Floors might also 
be established with regard to employment (the size of farm that 
would provide full-time employment for the average number of 
family workers) or with regard to the full employment of farm 
draught animals.
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Estimates of output gains after redistribution of land assume 
that the required inputs exist and that no losses occur due to 
the process of redistribution. Such estimates do not take into 
account the extra investment costs of providing irrigation to 
unirrigated land, or of providing extra inputs (seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides etc.). The process of land redistribution 
itself may involve extra costs in terms of cadastral survey, 
boundary marking and the provision of access to plots.
The estimates further assume that the current input-output 
characteristics on existing farms of the "optimal" size would 
also characterise farms of that size after land reform. This 
question is not only related to the availability and distribution 
of production inputs, but also to the whole area of motivation 
governing labour effort. If incomes were to rise on the small 
farms, this may relax the subsistence income or debt obligations 
constraint and allow small farmers to relax labour effort with 
a lower application of labour per acre, and hence lower output 
per acre.5 In such circumstances, while on-farm family 
consumption might increase, the supply of marketed surplus may 
well fall with serious consequences for economic activity outside 
agriculture.
One area dismissed rather cursorily by Berry and Cline is the 
question of the possible dynamic losses of redistributive land 
reform affecting negatively the rate of saving and capital 
accumulation, and the adoption of new technology. The authors 
doubt the existence of any possible dynamic losses arising from
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land distribution because 1) there appears to be no evidence for 
higher agricultural growth rates in countries with higher than 
average farm size, and 2) there is evidence in Green Revolution 
areas that small farmers adopt the new technology rapidly [134- 
5] .
The first point is quite irrelevant. Average farm size provides 
no indication of the distribution of farm size or the weight of 
large farms in that distribution. What needs to be compared is 
the relative output growth rates of a group of large capitalist 
farms with a group of small peasant farms in one country. Berry 
and Cline cite evidence of simulation experiments with rural 
savings data for Brazil and India by Cline and Bhalla6 which 
indicate that income redistribution would have only a limited 
impact on rural savings rates and total savings [28] . However, 
as Sen [1964a] and Bharadwaj [1974a] have shown, the vast bulk 
of small farms in India are highly indebted deficit farms. It is 
therefore most likely that any post-reform average or marginal 
rate of rural saving would be very low. Indeed, as we shall see 
below, Bhalla disposes of this annoying problem of deficit farms 
by excluding them from his analysis (this reduces his NCAER 
sample by over 50%).
The second assertion is also highly dubious. The authors assert 
that small farmers adopt the Green Revolution technology very 
soon after the large farmers, thus reestablishing an inverse 
relationship in the form of an S-curve [28] . They claim that the 
association of mechanization with the adoption of new technology
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is erroneous, simply just another manifestation of factor market 
imperfections, and that the existence of the latter imply the 
need to channel new inputs towards the small farms [27-8]. 
However, as was shown in Chapter V above, the empirical evidence 
does not substantiate this assertion. Patnaik [1987: 120-5] has 
demonstrated that although some farms in all size groups have 
adopted the new technology, those small farms are in fact, in 
terms of scale and hired labour use, rich farms. It is the rich 
farms who both adopt the new technology thus reaping the initial 
benefits and who maintain that advantage. The evidence in Chapter 
V above shows clearly that the inverse relation has broken down 
in those Green Revolution areas as large farmers adopt both the 
new technology and mechanize. Indeed, Berry and Cline do admit 
that large farms are able to capture economies of scale with the 
introduction of mechanized technology [138] .
6.2 Theoretical framework
These quite erroneous assertions regarding policy prescription 
are of course founded on a particular conception of the factors 
which give rise to an inverse relationship in the first place. 
Berry and Cline begin by asserting that the empirical studies 
generally show constant returns to scale in developing country 
agriculture, and that there would therefore be no losses of 
production efficiency via land redistribution. They continue: "if 
returns to scale for inputs actually used are constant, then the
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crucial determinant of the size-productivity relationship is the 
behavioural pattern of resource utilization by farm size" [6-7] .
The authors [13-4] are aware of the need to distinguish the 
inverse relationship in terms of falling physical yields of 
individual crops with farm size, a decreasing land use intensity 
or cropping intensity with farm size, and a product-mix shift to 
lower value crops as farm size increases. They mention the 
possibility that large farms might have higher output per acre 
but utilise a smaller proportion of their land area. Indeed, they 
cite evidence for higher output per acre on the large farms in 
Colombia with lower land use intensity. Similar evidence exists 
for north-eastern Brazil,7 in 1930s China and 1960s Philippines, 
while Pakistan also shows higher yields for some crops (see 
below).
The authors present the following hypothesis as the main 
explanation for the inverse relationship: factor prices differ 
between the large farms and the small farms, such that the 
effective prices of land and capital are low for the large farms 
and the effective price of labour is low for the small farms. 
Thus small farms have high labour/land ratios whereas large farms 
use labour and land less intensively. Small farms with a lower 
opportunity cost of labour, can exploit more marginal land, 
cultivate a larger proportion of their land, and achieve higher 
yields [9-10] .
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Berry and Cline take a rather eclectic position on the causes of 
these factor price differentials between large and small farms. 
The authors mention Sen's labour market dualism framework where 
the supply price of family labour is the average product of 
labour and not the marginal product. The MPL on the small farms 
will be lower than on the large farms. The main qualification to 
this is where the opportunity cost of labour is high (due to the 
availability of off-farm employment). However, the market wage 
may be discounted for risk and search costs, or the family may 
try to hire out labour, but family preferences or unwillingness 
to share output with the hired-out worker will keep the MPL less 
than the wage [8],
The effective land price may be higher for the small farms 
because 1) small plots have higher unit costs (a greater 
potential market and inconvenience for landowners); and 2) land 
purchase needs credit and large farms have better ratings and so 
cheaper credit (and so the real price of land will be lower) . 
Land price differentials reinforce labour cost differentials and 
lead to higher labour/land ratios and output/acre on the small 
farms. Imperfections in capital markets reinforce low labour use 
on the large farms: a low effective price of capital leads to 
substitution of machines for labour. The authors take a net 
substitutionist view of mechanization [11] : the main influence 
of mechanization is on substituting for labour rather than 
raising yields [see Binswanger, 1984] . The empirical studies in 
the book show markedly lower labour/land ratios on the large 
farms and this is taken to mean that capital and land market
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imperfections complement the effects of labour market dualism or 
are not strong enough to counteract them. The holding of land for 
asset price speculation or for reasons of social prestige and/or 
political power is also adduced as a possible explanation for 
lower productive activity on the large farms [10-12] .
Let us examine these theoretical explanations for the inverse 
relationship presented by the authors point by point. The fact 
that the empirical studies in the text generally show constant 
returns to scale in developing country agriculture does not mean 
that potential economies of scale are non-existent. In the 
context of backward agriculture in which the forces of production 
are not advanced and in which large and small farms are using 
essentially the same techniques of production, constant or even 
decreasing returns are possible. However, if the potential for 
technical scale economies does exist, then land redistribution 
would not be an optimal strategy.
We have seen quite clearly in Chapters II and IV above that a 
major factor behind the inverse relationship relates to cropping 
intensity and possibly cropping pattern. The distinction made 
above between these factors and the physical yields of individual 
crops and the proportion of farm area actually cultivated is an 
important one, but these latter factors do not constitute strong 
evidence for redistributive land reform. Firstly, there is little 
evidence for falling yields of individual crops across farm size; 
indeed, much evidence points the other way. Secondly, lower land 
use in terms of area cultivated, particularly if there are higher
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physical yields of individual crops on the large farms, as 
implied above, is not an argument for land redistribution to the 
small farms. In this case, the appropriate policy for output 
maximization would appear to be to induce large farms to increase 
their production activity (assuming of course that the unused 
portion of their land is actually cultivable).
The principal thesis of differential factor prices between large 
and small farms, and its explanation in terms of the Sen
framework, has also been shown to be problematic. If indeed 
factor price differentials were the main explanatory mechanism 
at work, then we would expect to find higher capital intensities 
on the large farms in terms of technological innovation, both 
biochemical and mechanical. However, as we have seen in Chapter 
V above, in this context the inverse relationship breaks down. 
Indeed, this hypothesis would appear to be more appropriate as 
an explanation for the non-existence of an inverse relationship 
rather than its cause. Further, the supposed ability of the small 
farmer to exploit more marginal land (because of a lower
opportunity cost of labour) is hardly conducive to higher crop 
yields.
The Sen framework is itself heavily flawed, as we have seen in 
Chapter IV above. The use of a single production function to 
compare two very different systems of farming, points to the 
identification problem at the heart of the Sen model. This
concerns the assumption that large farms are capitalist farms, 
and small farms are peasant family labour-based farms. This
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conceptual sleight of hand obscures the real relations at work 
which produce the inverse relationship. Sen focuses on two 
different systems of production: small peasant farms and large 
capitalist farms. It is not obvious therefore why these two 
systems are located on the same production function {the same 
marginal product of labour curve). The model is comparing farming 
methods which have fundamental differences in their organization 
of production and qualitative differences in their division of 
labour [Roy, 1979: 19] .
The assumption of labour homogeneity is not sufficient: the use 
of a single MPL curve requires concomitant assumptions regarding 
the organization of production, homogeneity of all factors of 
production and equal factor intensities. It must also be assumed 
that different farms apply identical capital inputs per acre 
(both in quantity and type of capital) and that land is 
homogeneous regarding soil quality and irrigation. A peasant 
farmer may be constricted to a less efficient set of production 
conditions including lack of access to economies of scale, lack 
of technical knowledge or access to particular factors, or risk 
aversion to using new inputs. Note too, that the alternative use 
of non-homothetic production functions can result in differential 
factor prices even with perfect factor markets.
A further set of problems arise from the proposed behavioural 
calculus of the farmer internal to the farm, and to the 
methodology of comparison of the wage rate and marginal 
productivity. It is inappropriate to postulate effective leisure
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preference among poor peasants who are very close to subsistence; 
the effective limits are more likely to be biological [Sen, 1981: 
207] . Family labour allocation is determined by objective factors 
like involuntary unemployment and intensity of poverty which 
provides a reason for a wage-gap. Poverty and unemployment, 
rather than leisure preference, are the main reasons why small 
farmers intensify family labour use [Sen, 1981: 209].
Furthermore, the whole exercise of comparing the marginal product 
and wage rates is meaningless for agricultural production. The 
production cycle in agriculture is prolonged and varies greatly 
between crops. No straightforward marginal productivity rules can 
be applied here as the productivity of family labour inputs prior 
to harvest time will depend on the timely application of the 
necessary amount of labour during the harvesting period.8 Labour 
demand at the harvesting stage is largely determined by elements 
of previous stages. Labour at earlier stages thus has to be seen 
in the nature of fixed costs. Labour demand at harvest is a 
derived demand dependent on conditions earlier in the production 
cycle.9 Under such conditions, the meaning of the marginal 
product of labour in agriculture becomes extremely hazy almost 
to the point of becoming operationally useless [.Hoy, 1979: 20-3] .
Finally, the assertions concerning the reinforcing effects of 
land and capital market imperfections cannot go unchallenged. 
Firstly, it is not necessarily the case that small plots of land 
have higher unit costs because of greater demand and 
inconvenience to landlords. The supply side may encourage small
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plot size as well, particularly in the context of highly 
fragmented agricultural land. Secondly, on the question of 
mechanisation, there is a great deal of evidence that associated 
with mechanisation is the potential for increasing land use 
intensity, both in terms of cropping intensity and the 
utilisation of the cultivable area, thus increasing output per 
acre on the farms employing such technology [see Byres, 1981].
6.3 Empirical evidence
We have seen then that neither the policy conclusions reached by 
the authors nor their theoretical support are valid. Let us now 
turn to the empirical evidence presented by Berry and Cline. The 
authors present two types of empirical evidence: cross-country 
analysis and a number of individual country case studies. In 
chapter three, Berry and Cline present evidence from cross­
country analysis based on 1960 FAO data for 30 LDCs . This shows:
1) the large farm sector (defined as those farms operating the 
top 40% of cultivated area) use land less intensively than the 
small farm sector (farms operating the bottom 2 0% of area). The 
data are reproduced in Table 25, Appendix A.
2) the ratio of large farm land use to that on small farms 
declines as per capita land endowment increases (see Table 25, 
Appendix A) .10
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3) large farms make relatively poorer use of their land where 
land distribution is more unequal [36].
4) those countries with larger average farm size do not have 
faster growth of agricultural output (see Table 26, Appendix A) .
5) agricultural growth rates are uncorrelated with concentration 
in land distribution (see Table 26, Appendix A).
6) output per acre and employment per acre are higher in 
countries with a smaller average farm size and more equal land 
distribution (see Table 27, Appendix A).
However, no theoretical or policy conclusions of relevance to the 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity can be 
drawn from these cross-country comparisons at such a high level 
of aggregation. Relation 6 above is clearly indicative of the 
macro-level inverse relationship: countries with highly fertile 
land have higher population density and smaller average farm size 
as well as higher yields. This is confirmed by the higher 
employment per acre ratios derived from FAO figures on 
agricultural population densities (in Table 26) , and by relation 
2 above.
Relations 1-3 are quite meaningless as it is unclear what is 
being compared. The top 40% of farm area will include many medium 
sized farms as well as large capitalist and peasant farms. Large 
areas of farms designated as large may simply be uncultivable
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land. Land quality clearly needs to be considered here so that 
like is being compared with like. The authors themselves make the 
point that "Few studies have attempted to disaggregate in such 
a way as to allow for land quality differences, so the data do 
not permit strong conclusions at this point" [225, note 21]. In 
the Latin American context, as farm size increases, land is 
predominantly livestock pasture, but the authors fail to state 
whether such land is cultivable as arable land [14] .
Let us turn now to the individual country case studies presented 
by the authors which may be able to provide a greater degree of 
disaggregation and therefore meaningfulness. The first case study 
presented is based on Cline's [1970] work which covers 8,000 
farms in seven agricultural states in north-east Brazil.11
Brazil
Cline's earlier work found [44-5]: 1) constant returns to scale 
across farm size, 2) an inverse relation between land use and 
farm size, and 3) an inverse relationship between labour
intensity and farm size. He then compares these findings with the 
data from a later 1973 study. The latter reveals a clear inverse
relationship in all product sectors, with the significant
exception of the rich cocoa plantation area (Bahia) which shows 
a positive relation (see Table 28, Appendix A) . Regression
exercises reveal a significant inverse relation even when 
accounting for land quality (land price is used as a proxy) and
200
where zonal dummies are included (see Table 29, Appendix A) . Note 
however, that the coefficients on the zonal dummies are not 
reported, and therefore there is no indication of their 
significance.
Note too, that the findings in Table 2 8 are derived from grouped 
average data by size class with no indication of group variances. 
The data cover very large areas, sometimes whole states and may 
thus merely indicate the macro-level inverse relationship. The 
regressions in Table 2 9 were performed on the pooled grouped data 
with zonal dummies. At this high level of aggregation therefore, 
one would expect to find such an inverse relationship.
With regard to returns to scale, a study by Scandizzo and Barbosa 
[1977] find that for north-east Brazil, the cotton and cocoa 
product sectors are characterised by increasing returns to scale 
(there is also some indication of this for the rice and sugarcane 
sectors).
Cline then analyses farm-level, product-specific data (again 
using pooled data for the whole of north-east Brazil (see Table 
30, Appendix A) . All six product sectors show an inverse 
relationship, but the coefficient for the cocoa sector is not 
statistically significant.12 Note that again the zonal dummy 
coefficients are left unreported. Note too that the method of 
categorisation of farms is conducive to a great deal of 
distortion: a farm observation is located in the livestock sector 
if 50% of total output is derived from livestock activities.
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There are major problems too concerning the data used. The 
productivity measure uses value added which as we have seen 
possibly includes a bias against the large farms which have 
higher capital-output ratios. Regressions of value added per unit 
land value against land value (again using pooled farm level data 
and no regional dummies) also show an inverse relationship for 
all product sectors (see Table 31, Appendix A) . However, if 
output and land value (as a proxy for soil quality) are 
correlated then the regression results will be biased. The value 
of land may simply reflect output expectations.
The only comparison between the 19 62 data and that for 1973 is 
for Pernambuco sugar and Ceara livestock, but as we have seen 
above, neither the sugar nor the livestock sectors are typical 
sectors from which to draw conclusions regarding an inverse 
relationship. Thus, there is no really strong support for a 
generalised inverse relationship on the basis of this data, and 
certainly none for the hypothesis of factor market imperfections 
as the main explanatory factor. Exercises testing total social 
factor productivity using shadow prices for labour (zero, half 
minimum wage and minimum wage) actually show fairly inconclusive 
and disappointing results from the authors' viewpoint (see Table 
32, Appendix A).
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Colombia
The second case study presented is based on work by Berry [1973] 
using the 1960 Colombian agricultural census and 1966 yield data. 
Large farms have lower labour input intensity, a lower share of 
land cropped and lower cropping intensity. Large farm {more than 
500 hectares) yields in value-added terms are only 15% those on 
the small farms (2-5 hectares), or after normalisation for land 
value, 45% as high (see Table 33, Appendix A) .13 The main factor 
appears to be land-use intensity: land-use on the smallest farms 
is 87%, compared with only 6% on the large farms (see Table 34, 
Appendix A).
Berry writes [60] that the inverse relationship thus arises from 
greater land use on the small farms: "The obvious hypotheses are 
those discussed in Chapter 2 . The land, labour, and capital 
markets all are imperfect, with the ultimate result that the 
opportunity costs of land and capital are higher on small farms, 
while that of labour is lower. . .Most of the differences in factor 
proportions are probably explained by factor price 
differentials" .
However, whether an inverse relationship exists or not depends 
on whether fallow land is included in the calculations: with 
fallow, large farm yields fall by 15%; with fallow land excluded, 
large farm yields rise by 60% because yields for many crops 
increase with farm size. An index of value per hectare cropped
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shows large farm yields some 60 per cent higher than the small 
farms (see Table 34, column 1). Small farm neglect of fallow may 
not be socially optimal in the dynamic sense, leading to 
environmental degradation through land overuse; fallow may in the 
long run be optimal and therefore socially more efficient. 
Berry's table 4-11 [ 6*3 ] reports a higher proportion of small
farms using more fertiliser, but the data says nothing about 
rates of application nor differing needs for fertiliser for 
different agricultural activities. Note that all the figures 
reported assume a fixed crop pattern across all size groups, 
whereas large farms are biased towards extensive cattle ranches.
Berry notes that although there is an inverse relation on the 
basis of the 1960 data, this pattern has been modified since, 
although he is not clear as to direction or magnitude [58]. He 
writes that over the 19 60s, an expansion in new technology, 
including greater use of machinery on large farms, has taken 
place with overall real value added per hectare increasing at 
2.4% per annum [64]. Indeed, the 1970 agricultural census shows 
large farms (more than 50 ha) increasing land use intensity and 
small farms (less than 5 ha) decreasing land use intensity, along 
with a shift to crop cultivation on the part of large farms (see 
Table 35, Appendix A).
Berry cites the later evidence of a study of 3,000 farms14 which 
appears to show an even stronger inverse relationship than before 
(yields per hectare drop tenfold between 5-10 ha and 50-100 ha 
farms) [67, table 4-15] . However, this data is an
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unrepresentative sample: the small farms were selected from an 
elite with access to credit, while the large farms were selected 
from colonization areas with untypically low productivity. Thus 
Berry is forced to admit that "the [INCORA] sample cannot be of 
much assistance in an attempt to judge whether size/productivity 
differentials changed significantly during the 1960s" [68] .
Indeed, the same data disaggregated for crop farms alone and for 
livestock farms alone, shows no clear trend in land productivity 
over farm size (over the range from 5-100 hectares) . Further, 
many high income farms are small farms and many low income farms 
are large farms (see Table 36, Appendix A).
Philippines
The third case study is on Philippine agriculture, based on the 
Census of the Philippines, Agriculture, 1960. The authors present 
aggregate grouped estimates showing an inverse relationship: 
large farm (above 50 hectares) crop yields are some 32-45% below 
those on small farms (1-3 ha), and livestock output per hectare 
on the large farms only 22-3 9% that on the small farms (see Table 
37, Appendix A). These results however, are subject to many of 
the deficiencies remarked on above. Many of the productivity 
estimates are based on crop areas rather than output figures, and 
the livestock figures are based on stock not current output. The 
regression results are based on grouped value added data and are 
thus not good confirmation of an inverse relationship at the 
micro level [72]. Again, a comparability problem exists in that
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large farms have a higher proportion of idle, pasture and
forested land than the small farms.15
The authors also cite a 1966 study by Ruttan [1966] for Bulacan 
province in which farms are classed by size, tenurial form (share 
tenants/owners) and land quality (irrigated/non-irrigated; and 
upland/lowland). Ruttan concludes that yields per hectare bear 
no systematic relation to size, although they tend to be lower 
on the large farms above 10 hectares. Note that labour input 
intensities are estimated on the basis of the distribution of 
farm population by farm size, thus picking up the macro-level 
inverse relationship. This is also indicated by the 1960 data 
which shows the average value per hectare of farm land higher for
provinces with lower average farm size [74] .
A 1955 University of Philippines survey showed that the value per 
hectare of tenanted land was higher than owner cultivated 
land.16 This may reflect the disproportionate share of share 
tenants in rich rice areas, again indicating the macro-level 
inverse relationship [77] . Ruttan also found higher yields on 
sharecropped rice farms, but there are serious problems with the 
data used in testing the productivity hypotheses: regions with 
good soil/climate and locational characteristics were atypical 
in farm size and tenure structure [76] .
Ruttan [1964: 104-5], in a penetrating insight, writes: "In
situations characterized by static technology, static standards 
and levels of living, and low literacy and income levels, both
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total agricultural output and total marketable surplus can be 
maximized by a tenure system which forces the cultivator to 
produce beyond the level which satisfies his family consumption 
requirement. In this situation, share tenancy does not limit 
output but rather forces agricultural output above the level that 
would be achieved under a system of owner-partnership." It is 
unfortunate that this line of reasoning is not pursued.
West Pakistan
The fourth case study is on 19 60s West Pakistan as analyzed by 
Berry.17 He presents evidence showing a strong inverse 
relationship with respect to land productivity and labour input 
intensity. However, the first estimate is based on the assumption 
of constant crop yields across farm size, and the second estimate 
on "scanty evidence" of yield differentials, showing that large 
farm (50-150 acres) yields are only 45% of those on the small 
farms (1-2.5 acres) (see Table 38, Appendix A). Further evidence 
distinguishes between irrigated and barani regions, finding a 
significant inverse relation in both areas (see Table 39, 
Appendix A) ,18 However, this finding is based on a very small 
sample of only 53 farms with none less than 7.5 acres. When 
region and tenurial status are taken into account, the relation 
is less significant.
The Pakistani evidence cited by Berry again reveals all the 
problems associated with highly aggregated and grouped data, in
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particular the confusion with the macro-level inverse 
relationship. Berry admits: "much of the negative relationship
observed in [the Agricultural Census and FAFBS data] is due to 
large farms being found predominantly in low productivity zones, 
where the low productivity is mainly the result of lack of water" 
[56] . And again: "much of this inverse relationship must be
attributed to a poorer soil-water combination on the larger 
farms" [80]. Large farms have poorer fodder land, while small 
farmers have access to common grazing land [232, note 40].
The census data further shows that the physical yields of 
sugarcane and wheat are higher on the large farms, and thus the 
composition of output was a highly significant factor, with those 
farms above 50 acres specializing in low value products [86]. 
Such differences in crop composition by size results from 
aggregation over regions with different crop patterns. Regional 
dummies will compensate for this bias only to some extent - the 
macro-level inverse relationship will still be present at this 
aggregate level. With such aggregative data, the authors' 
explanations based on imperfect factor markets cannot be tested.
While the 1960 census data also shows an inverse relationship 
between size and fertiliser application (both organic manure and 
chemical), there has been a massive increase in its use over the 
decade and especially by the large farms. This would appear to 
be a significant factor in the breakdown of the inverse 
relationship as revealed by the 1972 census (see Table 40, 
Appendix A). However, Berry claims this may be only a temporary
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phenomenon. He cites Azam [1973] who states that water and credit 
are the major constraints to small farm adoption of new 
technology, but not enough to have reversed the inverse 
relationship [95-6] .19
However a later study by Khan [1975] , based on a 1972-3 survey 
of five districts in Punjab and four in Sind confirms the 
weakening of the inverse relationship, and indicates a growing 
gap between large and small farms in the use of modern inputs. 
In most regions characterised as Green Revolution areas, Khan 
finds a positive relation between the value of output of 5 major 
crops (wheat, rice, maize, cotton, and sugarcane constituting 7 9% 
of the sown area in Punjab and 77% in Sind) per cropped acre and 
size.20 Of the 9 regions, 6 are characterised as being 
progressive, and there, large farm (above 50 acres) yields are 
18% higher than those of the small farms (below 12.5acres) (see 
Table 41, Appendix A).
A comparison of the agricultural censuses of 1960 and 1972 shows 
increasing cropping intensity on all sizes, but with the greatest 
increase on the large farms over 150 acres, where land use 
intensity more than doubled (see Table 42, Appendix A) . The 
censuses also show increased renting in of land by the large 
farms (their share of this category of land increased from 22.5% 
to 33.6% while the overall share of rented land showed a moderate 
decline) [105]. Khan also finds higher application per cropped 
area of fertiliser on the large farms and a significant large 
farm lead in the adoption of new varieties [101]. This process
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appears to be similar to that found in the Indian context, with 
an irreversible breakdown of the inverse relationship in Green 
Revolution areas.
Malaysia
The fifth case study is based on a survey of 7 62 double-cropping 
rice farms in the Muda River area of Malaysia in 1972-3. The 
authors use aggregate grouped data, but the area is characterised 
as a rice mono-cropping region, with well-functioning markets 
[116] . The evidence seems to present a strong inverse 
relationship in terms of value added per relong,21 value added 
per unit land value, and value of farm output per relong. Value 
added falls by two-thirds between the large farms over 10.5 
relong and the small farms below 1.5 relong. The inverse relation 
is still present but weaker if the smallest size-class is 
excluded, with small farms below 5 relong having average land 
productivity 32% higher than large farms over 5 relong (see Table 
43, Appendix A).
Small farm (1.5-3.5 relong) total factor productivity is 50% 
higher than on the large farms (above 10.5 relong), but this is 
based on imputed labour costs for family labour and estimated 
average rates of return on land and capital [121] . Berry and 
Cline find labour productivity (based on an index of labour 
shadow prices) approximately constant across farm size, but this 
conflicts with their finding that labour input per acre declines
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with farm size. Barnum and Squire find labour productivity some 
10% higher on farms above 5 relong [234, notes 65 and 66] .22
Barnum and Squire [1976], working on the same survey area, but 
with a smaller sample of 386 farms find only a statistically 
insignificant difference in rice output per relong between small 
farms (less than 5 relong) and large farms (above 5 relong). This 
conflicting result possibly arises from the inclusion in the 
Berry and Cline data of non-padi crops, their use of farm area 
at the beginning of the agricultural year and not the average 
over the year (this produces overestimation of small farm land 
productivity by 8.5%) . Barnum and Squire also exclude some farms 
with acid soils [233-4, note 64].
Berry and Cline make almost casual reference to the fact that 
yields vary little beyond the 1.5 relong size class [121]. They 
also note that when farms are classed by economic scale in terms 
of value of land rather than by size, the inverse relationship 
is much weaker (with large farms only 10% below average land 
productivity) and when farm output per relong is regressed on the 
value of land plus capital, there is no clear inverse 
relationship evidenced [123-4] ,23 While fertiliser and pesticide 
use per relong are constant across farm size classes, machinery 
running costs are 65% higher on the large farms [121], indicating 
significant differences in the organisation of farm production 
between different size classes.
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India
The major case study in Berry and Cline is given some prominence 
in an appendix of its own [141-193, Appendix A]. This is a study 
of farm size, productivity, and technical change in Indian 
agriculture by Surjit S. Bhalla using data from a National 
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) panel survey for 
three years: 1968-9, 1969-70, and 1970-1. The sample includes
4,118 farms from all over India of which 1,772 are used by 
Bhalla. Bhalla's principal aim is to show that the inverse 
relationship is still strongly evidenced in India despite the 
Green Revolution. He refers to the expectations that the Green 
Revolution will have weakened somewhat the 1 traditional 
'advantage'" of the small farmer because of better education, 
easier access to inputs and less risk aversion on the part of the 
large farmer [236, note 1] . This barely skims the surface of the 
large farm advantage in relation to modern inputs.
The main results and conclusions presented by Bhalla can be 
presented in summary form [111-116]:
1) the inverse relationship between farm size and output per acre 
is confirmed empirically with a highly significant negative 
coefficient on the log of farm size (see Table 44, equation (i), 
Appendix A).
2) the inverse relationship holds even when land quality (proxied 
by average village land prices) and the irrigation factor are
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accounted for (see Table 44, equations (iii) and (iv), Appendix 
A) .
3) Bhalla confirms the inverse relationship at the aggregate 
level for individual crops, but note that the regressions assume 
no relation between farm size and crop mix - further, maize, 
jowar and sugarcane crop coefficients are not statistically 
significant (see Table 45, Appendix A).
4) total social factor productivity (computed by using shadow 
wage rates) declines with farm size (see Table 46, Appendix A).
5) for the range of large farms above 3 0 acres, the inverse 
relationship is not statistically significant "suggesting that 
in India the dominant influence on the overall size-productivity 
relationship is labour-market dualism" [114].
6) land rental prices and interest rates on borrowed capital are 
higher for the small farms which leads to differing factor 
intensity patterns.24
7) labour input intensity declines and capital/labour ratios 
increase with farm size. Cropping intensity declines with size 
(see Table 47, Appendix A).
8) the inverse relationship persists in the third year although 
somewhat attenuated (compare equations (i) and (ii) in Table 44, 
Appendix A). In other words, the Green Revolution has weakened
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the size/productivity pattern, but not reversed it. The data show 
that the proportion of cultivated area under HYVs is relatively 
constant across farm size which would apparently indicate that 
the small farms are not lagging in the adoption of new technology 
(see Table 48, Appendix A).
Bhalla makes the astonishing claim that "A unique feature of this 
study is that it analyzes data for all of India" [142]. Bhalla 
proudly announces that the regression exercises include "farms 
from all of India, with differing quality of land and growing 
different crops" [146]. He complains that previous studies are 
too disaggregated at the village or district level and too many 
have been carried out in Green Revolution areas. The "dispersion 
in time, space, and methodology of these studies makes them 
unreliable for extrapolation to conditions prevailing in 
agriculture in general... Thus, since local factors can be 
expected to average out, the general pattern can be observed by 
analysis of the NCAER data" [141-2] . Bhalla does not seem to 
realise that this is precisely the problem with highly aggregated 
data. It is precisely the problems associated with aggregation 
and averaging at the general level that need to be avoided. The 
tables present highly grouped data: only four size-classes (0-5, 
5-15, 15-25, and above 25 acres), with small farms defined as 
those below 15 acres [143] . These are very wide size classes 
indeed, but nothing is said about category content or in-group 
variance.
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Besides this major defect of the Bhalla study, there are a number 
of other deficiencies in the way the data has been handled. All 
farm households that invested in land in any of the three years 
were excluded in the final analysis. This presents the danger of 
excluding those progressive farmers accumulating land for 
expanding production. Further, farms with a gross cultivated area 
of less than 0.05 acre were omitted. This cut-off point is 
significantly above the NCAER definition of 0.01 acre for a small 
plot. The inclusion of these farms might have reduced small farm 
average productivity, especially in Green Revolution areas. Any 
farm which had land leased out in the third year was omitted. 
Again, these may have been largely composed of low productivity 
small farms. Finally, an upper bound of Rs 3,000 was placed on 
income per acre (which may exclude some rich capitalist farms 
with high yields) and a lower bound of zero Rupees eliminated 
dissavers from the analysis (as Sen has shown, the marginal and 
poor peasant households with very low yields) . All these measures 
cut the sample from 4,118 to 1,772 [188-9, Annex A.l].
Bhalla posits that differential yields per acre between farm size 
classes are due to either a) differing technical/economic 
efficiency, or b) different factor prices facing small farmers 
and large farmers. Since both small farmers and large farmers are 
asserted to be equally rational, Bhalla reasons that (b) must be 
the main explanatory factor behind the inverse relationship 
[156] . Note however, that Bhalla (and others) assume homogeneous 
production functions, but if non-homothetic functions are used,
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differences in factor ratios will result even with perfect factor 
markets.
Bhalla continues: land markets will be rendered imperfect by 1) 
institutional factors such as tenancy regulations, 2) credit 
financed land purchase, and 3) lower transaction costs for large 
plots of land [157]. The observed relation between rental/acre 
and farm size, it is claimed, provides partial support for the 
contention that large farmers face lower land prices, but note 
that rental price may reflect tenancy arrangements - this effect 
needs to be removed before testing. However, the NCAER data does 
not provide tenancy information. Nevertheless, this does not stop 
Bhalla from trying [175]: tests of tenancy effects on
productivity show no relation, supposedly reinforcing Cheung's 
conclusions concerning share tenancy, but note that Bhalla has 
defined tenancy in terms of area leased in, thus creating 
conceptual confusion between the different motivation and results 
on large and small farms.
Although the finding that labour input intensity declines with 
increasing farm size appears fairly robust, it does not 
constitute firm evidence for the thesis that the inverse 
relationship is caused by differential factor prices, in 
particular, labour market dualism. Bhalla's own data shows that 
52% of small farm income is derived from off-farm employment, and 
some 83% of small farms use some hired labour [165, table A9]. 
The various a priori arguments associated with the labour market 
dualism thesis are however untestable, as the NCAER data that
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Bhalla is using provides neither information on the ratio of 
hired to family labour inputs nor disaggregated data on wage 
rates. Again, this deficiency does not prevent the author from 
proceeding to test this thesis. However, the way in which Bhalla 
has manufactured the data on farm labour input, detailed in Annex 
A2 [189-93] , would tend to cast doubt on the validity of Bhalla's 
interpretation of the results obtained from the production 
function analysis.
Total farm labour input L* is computed as the sum of hired labour 
Ll and family labour L2. LI is computed as H/w where H is total 
paid out wage costs and w is an average wage estimate. Bhalla 
uses average district-level wage data (and sometimes even average 
state-level wage data) .25 Note here that if wage rates in 
sparsely populated areas are higher than in densely populated 
areas, and the former areas have larger average farm size, then 
this will introduce a downward bias into large farm hired labour 
estimates.
L2 is defined as the sum of farm earner labour input Ml and 
family worker labour input M2. Ml is computed as (M-e/w)E where 
M is full employment (300 days), e is off-farm earnings, w is the 
wage rate, and E is the number of earners. Now, imputation of a 
constant number of work days for all farms (300) overestimates 
small farm on-farm employment, so Bhalla uses Punjabi data26 to 
correct for this: Ml = (288.3 + 0.596 (farm size) - e/w)E, as 
total employment is held to increase with farm size. Note that 
this procedure will underestimate on-farm labour input by members
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who earn higher than average wages, and if there is a relation 
between large farms and higher off-farm wages then this adds a 
further downward bias to large farm labour input intensity. 
Further, it is questionable to assume that the Punjabi figures 
are representative of other parts of India. The Punjab is a major 
Green Revolution area with possibly much higher levels of on-farm 
employment (due to HYV cultivation) thus biasing upwards the 
small farm employment level to 288 days for all India.
M2 is computed as (FW x cultivated area x 10 days per acre) where 
FW is the number of family workers. The 10 days per acre is 
derived from the full employment level of 3 00 days divided by the 
average size of large farm (30.6 acres), assuming that family 
workers work at the same rate regardless of farm size. Although 
Bhalla claims that: "This construction of M2 automatically
imputes less total work to family workers on small farms than on 
large farms" [193], it may nevertheless overestimate small farm 
levels of family worker employment by assuming that full 
employment levels of labour input intensity on the large farms 
are applicable to small farms. There may be some indication of 
this in Bhalla's omission of 63 small farms from the analysis 
whose L2 estimate came to an average of 555 days. The fact that 
Bhalla's average L* of 82 days per acre falls well within the 
range of other estimates in the literature [170] is irrelevant, 
as one is not interested so much in the average level of labour 
intensity, but in its trend over farm size. Given the synthetic 
nature of the labour input data, the results of the production 
function analysis have to be treated very tentatively.
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Clearly, the NCAER data is a very weak basis for proving that 
higher labour input intensity on the small farms as compared to 
the large farms is the main explanatory factor behind the inverse 
relationship. Even though labour input intensity may be a crucial 
factor behind the inverse relationship at the micro level, such 
a relationship between labour intensity and size at the 
aggregative macro level may hold for spurious reasons. It 
certainly does not establish the validity of the Bhalla thesis 
that the inverse relationship is caused by factor price 
differentials, and in particular, labour market dualism.
Bhalla presents evidence to show that interest rates on borrowed 
capital decline with farm size (see Table 49a and b, Appendix A) . 
While the commercial banks did lend to the non-HYV sector, mostly 
to the large farms, institutional lending sources are biased 
toward HYV growers. Small farmers pay higher interest rates than 
the large farmers, and HYV cultivation "improves access to credit 
and diminishes the cost of credit", and there is less variation 
in the cost of credit for HYV growers [161].
The "imperfect market" framework however, is hardly adequate for 
explaining the deep structural problems associated with rural 
credit markets in developing countries [see Bhaduri, 1973]. 
Nevertheless, the observation that large and small farmers face 
different costs of borrowing capital is not an imperfect market 
phenomenon which can be used to explain the existence of an 
inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity. 
Rather, as we have seen in chapter four above, it is one of the
important factors behind the breakdown of the inverse 
relationship. Relatively cheaper capital directed to those 
progressive farms who are adopting the new technology, both 
biochemical and mechanical, permits increased cropping intensity 
and land productivity on the large farms.
Bhalla concludes: "The data used were for the 1970-71
agricultural year - a year some six years after the introduction 
of the high-yielding varieties. The Green revolution has, 
therefore, not qualitatively affected the inverse relationship1 
[172] . However the validity of this conclusion is clearly suspect 
at this aggregate all-India level. Bhalla finds that the inverse 
relationship still holds for the Green Revolution states for 
Tamil Nadu rice and Punjab/Haryana wheat on the basis of the 
NCAER aggregate data [176] . Of course, the more carefully 
disaggregated and detailed studies by Chadha [1978] and Roy 
[1981] have superseded Bhalla's findings, but even the latter 
reveals a significant weakening of the inverse relationship over 
time with the coefficient on the area variable declining by some 
34% over the three years 1968-71 (see Table 50, Appendix A). 
Indeed, Bhalla's data shows that while small farm earnings 
increased by only 9% over the period, large farm earnings 
increased by 42%, significantly reducing the gap in productivity. 
This is clearly related to the finding that large farms increased 
their area under HYV cultivation by 63%, significantly more than 
the increase of 13% on the small farms (see Table 48, Appendix
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Summary and conclusions
The authors provide some further tentative evidence from a number 
of other case studies [194-203, Appendix B] , but these are 
subject to many of the criticisms noted above, in particular, 
their highly aggregated nature.27 The aggregate nature of most 
of the empirical evidence leads to an inevitable confusion 
between the macro and micro level inverse relationships which are 
of entirely different import. This applies particularly to the 
cross-country data, but also to most of the individual country 
case studies. Certainly, such data is an inadequate basis for 
testing the hypotheses concerning market imperfections.
The theoretical framework chosen by the authors, that of 
differential factor prices and imperfect markets, is both 
logically flawed and not supported by the evidence. Further, 
where it does have some validity, however inadequate, it actually 
undermines its own purpose. The so-called market imperfections 
adduced, would seem more appropriate to explaining why the 
inverse relationship might be expected to disappear in the long- 
run rather than explaining the existence of an inverse 
relationship. Indeed, some of the more careful analysis, such as 
that for Pakistan, does indicate some of these problems quite 
clearly, and also points to the breakdown of the inverse 
relationship in the dynamic context.
The authors' policy conclusion of an equalising distribution of 
land towards the small farm sector, is both crude and simplistic,
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and requires a number of unrealistic assumptions to hold. They 
are further rendered baseless by inadequate theoretical and 
empirical support. The authors would have benefited from greater 
familiarity with the Indian debate.
We now turn to the central part of the thesis: that relating to 
contemporary Egypt. This will allow us to examine the issues 
already addressed in a situation which, so far, has received 
scant attention.
Notes to Chapter VI
1. See Berry [1973] and Cline [1970].
2. All subsequent page references in this chapter refer to Berry 
& Cline [1979], unless otherwise indicated.
3 . In determining the number of family parcels it is assumed that 
each family has 2.5 workers [1979: 130]. Land available is
defined as total farm area in the 1960 FAO World Census of 
Agriculture.
4. Berry and Cline emphasise the importance of the empirical 
support for their hypotheses. Given the centrality of the data 
to their arguments, therefore, we reproduce a substantial part 
of the data sets presented by the authors, in order to show 
clearly the principal weaknesses of both their argumentation and 
its alleged empirical support.
5. See Dharm Narain [1961] in the context of the effects of 
rising farmgate prices on peasant supply response, where peasants 
market a "distress surplus", rather than a true commercial 
surplus. Poor peasants market a relatively high proportion of 
their output in order to pay off various cash obligations (debt, 
rent, taxes). This leaves them with insufficient foodgrain for 
the rest of the agricultural cycle, and they are thus forced into 
market purchases later.
6. See Cline [1973] and Bhalla [1975] using NCAER data.
7. See Sund [1965]
222
8. See Roy [1979: 21] : at the final harvesting stage, the
constraint on labour-hiring is NOT the MPL = w criterion, but 
whether these fixed costs can be covered. This means that not 
only will labour continue to be hired when the MPL is less than 
the wage rate, but also even when the wage rate is greater than 
the APL. The only limit to labour-hiring occurs when the gross 
revenue from a day's harvest is less than the cost of a day's 
harvesting.
9. See Roy [1979: 22]. The physical yield of a crop is already 
determined (plants per acre times yield per plant), and therefore 
the number of labour-hours required to harvest the crop is also 
predetermined (for any given technology). Whereas with Sen, 
higher labour input causes higher yield, there is in fact a 
reversal of causation: higher yields produce a greater demand for 
labour.
10. The authors qualify this by stating that the data measure 
omits multicropping (important in Asia) and extensive grazing 
(important in Latin America) and so the decline will be much less 
than indicated.
11. Cline's data comprises a 19 62-3 sample survey for seven 
Brazilian states conducted by the Getulio Vargas Foundation, and 
a second survey by GVF on sugar farms. There is also a 1973 
survey by the IBRD and SUDENE (Superintendencia para o 
Desenvolvimento do Nordeste) of 8,000 farms in north-east Brazil.
12. Berry and Cline claim all 6 are significant [1979: 50].
13. The effective hectares used in the calculations are defined 
as hectares divided by the ratio of land price on farms in-group 
relative to overall average land price (i.e. highly aggregated 
and grouped data).
14. A study carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Colonizacion 
y Reforma Agraria (INCORA) of 3,000 farms, analyzed by USAID 
1969.
15. As might be expected, the physical yields of individual crops 
either show no relation across farm size or insignificant 
differences [73, table 4-20]. Sugarcane and corn yields are 
higher on the large farms. Small farm rice yields (less than 0.2 
ha) are not robust due to large rounding errors [230, note 18] .
16. Citing Estanislao [1965: 120] in turn citing Horst et al. 
[1957] .
17. Berry analyzes the 1959-60 Census of Agriculture in 'Some 
evidence on the economic potential of small farms in Pakistan', 
mimeo, 1976.
18. Source: Punjab Farm Accounts and Family Budget Surveys 
(FAFBS) 1966-67 and 1968-69.
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19. According to Berry and Cline, the inverse relationship will 
be re-established once small farmers adopt the new technology, 
when technological improvement slows down, and as inputs become 
more evenly distributed. However, they admit that the 
indivisibilities associated with tubewells and mechanized 
cultivation may prevent this. Tractors make marginal and 
previously uncultivated land cultivable and machines allow a move 
away from labour intensive techniques of production [105].
20. Note however that Khan uses gross cropped area in his 
computations, and thus introduces a bias against finding an 
inverse relationship.
21. one relong = 0.7 acre.
22. The authors are somewhat confused on the topic of labour 
input intensity. They write: "the ratio of labour inputs/area in 
padi does not vary dramatically by size, being only 2 0 to 25 
percent lower in the largest-farm category than in the smallest- 
farm categories" [121].
23. Land value increases with size, while there appears to be an 
inverse relationship between capital and size in the range up to 
20 relong [117-8, table 4-48] .
24. Regressing rental per acre (R) on farm area (A), price of 
unirrigated land (P), and percentage of area irrigated (I), 
Bhalla finds the following results:
R = 203 - 4.9 A + 0.027 P + 0.46 I 
(5.2) (1.9) (1.98) (0.76)
R2=0 .19
(source: Bhalla in Berry and Cline, 1979: 113, table 4-45,
equation (i)).
The cost of borrowed capital across farm size shows the following 
trend:
farm size rate
< 5 acres 17.3
5-15 13.8
15-25 12.2
>25 11.8
(source: Bhalla in Berry and Cline, 1979: 115, table 4-46) . See 
also Table 49 in Appendix A.
25. From unpublished data for 1969-70 (Mark Rosenstein at Yale). 
Note that the Bhalla study is for 1970-71 so he uses the growth 
rate for wages in Jose [1974].
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26, D.P. Chaudhri, Factors affecting productivity on different 
size class of farm holdings in India, unpublished manuscript, 
1974.
27. B1: Taiwanese evidence shows a strong inverse relationship 
with small farm productivity below 0.5 ha., twice that of the 
large farms above 2 ha [Source: Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction in China, Taiwan Agricultural Statistics, 1901- 
1965, Economic Digest Series no. 8, Taipei, Taiwan, 1966 pp. 219- 
29] . However, this is based on highly aggregated and grouped data 
using farm income per hectare, where farm income equals farm 
receipts minus farm expenses. It is not clear whether family 
labour costs have been imputed.
B2: Bachman and Christensen [1967: 247] report data from the
Japan Farm Household Survey in 1960 showing that while individual 
crop yields are somewhat higher on the larger farms, the 
multiple-cropping ratio is larger for small farms, indicating 
that cropped land is used more intensively on the smaller units. 
Total receipts per unit of cultivated area are slightly less on 
farms with more than 2 cho (about 5 acres) than on smaller farms. 
Small farms use much more labour per acre than do larger farms. 
However, there is some evidence that with economic development 
and the greater use of capital the larger farms are becoming more 
intensive. Ogura [1973] shows that while rice yields are higher 
on the larger farms, the reverse was true during the 1930s, 
apparently reflecting the influence on yields of fertilisers, 
pesticides, and other purchased inputs that are used in somewhat 
larger amounts on the larger farms. Kaneda [1967] notes that by 
the 1950s, value added per tan (1 tan = 0,1 ha or 0.245 acre) 
does not vary across farm size.
B3: Mexican data provides evidence for a strong inverse
relationship [Eckstein et al., 1978: 9, Appendix C], but this is 
based on very broad size categories (undefined by Berry and 
Cline) at the aggregate level. Note too that comparison of 1960 
with 1940 data shows a considerable weakening of the 
relationship, as well as important differences in output 
composition between large farms, small farms and ejidos. Output 
per peso of capital plus land was higher on the large farms in 
1960 due to the shift from livestock to crops and strong 
government support with credit and infrastructural investment.
B4: Kenyan large farms in Trans-Nzoia District 1970-1 have a
lower share of area under crops and lower output and employment 
per acre [source: Ministry of Finance and Planning, Statistics 
Division, An Economic Survey of African-owned farms in Trans- 
Nzoia 1970-1, Farm Economic Survey Report no. 28, 1972] . Note
however that this is compared to farms less than 2 50 acres, which 
implies rather large size classes. There are also some exceptions 
between 1,0 00 and 1,250 acres. The Report notes that a number of 
large farmers lack adequate capital, thus suggesting the 
existence of an identification problem in the data.
B5: The Kenyan settlement schemes 1967-8 show gross output
(shillings) per acre falling from 635 on farms below 10 acres to
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111 on farms above 7 0 acres [source: Ministry of Finance and 
Planning Statistics Division, An Economic Appraisal of the 
Settlement Schemes 1964/5-1967/8, Farm Economic Survey Report 
no.27, 1971] .
B6: Malawi data shows increasing gross and net output per acre 
in densely-populated Malawi [source: National Statistical Office, 
Malawi Government, National Sample Survey of Agriculture, 1968-9, 
Zomba province, 1970, p.42]. Berry and Cline resort to deducting 
home consumption from output to get value added estimates (the 
consumption rates are arbitrary with large farm rates being three 
times small farm rates) , and then conclude that "total output per 
acre is a decreasing function of size of holding" [202].
Other countries which show an inverse relationship include: 
Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala [source; Comite Interamericano 
de Desarrollo Agricola, Monografias Sobre Algunos Aspectos de la 
Tenencia de la Tierra y el Desarrollo Rural en America Latina, 
Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, Washington, 1970, p.34]-r 
pre-revolutionary China [source; John Lossing Buck, Land 
Utilization in China (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp 1968) 
and Buck, Chinese Farm Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1930)] . Note that in fact, Buck dismisses the presence of 
an inverse relationship in Chinese agriculture as a statistical 
artefact; and Korea [source; Bank of Korea, Research Department, 
Economic Statistics Year Book, 1960, p.278] all at the aggregate 
level.
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CHAPTER VIX
The evidence for an inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity in Egypt: a shadow debate 
Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the nature and range of evidence for 
an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in the 
Egyptian countryside. In contrast with the extensive Indian 
literature on the inverse relationship is the rather meagre 
resonance that the debate has had in Egypt: only half a dozen 
serious references have surfaced so far (besides a few en passant 
assertions). This relative paucity, however, has not prevented 
calls by several writers for redistributive land reform in the 
Egyptian countryside. The Egyptian evidence ranges from simple 
assertion, by invoking the authority of Berry and Cline [1979], 
to full-scale field studies. One of these latter we shall subject 
to detailed scrutiny in Chapter IX.
The studies examined in this chapter present apparently strong, 
but contradictory evidence on the relationship between farm size 
and productivity, with some contributors supporting the existence 
of an inverse relationship while others vehemently deny its 
existence. However, all the writers below reveal crucial 
conceptual and methodological flaws in their analyses. It is
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important to consider these in some detail since they are flaws 
which recur wherever the inverse relationship has been examined 
and discussed. We draw heavily on the critical analysis of the
debate surrounding the inverse relationship which we have
discussed thoroughly in the previous six chapters.
Section 7.1 introduces the main participants in the Egyptian 
debate on the inverse relationship who suggest that such a 
relationship exists, and that its existence constitutes a strong 
case for redistributive land reform in Egypt. All these authors 
operate at a very high level of aggregation.
In section 7.2, that aggregation problem is addressed in a study 
by Crouch et al. [1983]. They provide rather more inconclusive
evidence on the inverse relationship, but while they clearly 
point out the existence of a macro-level inverse relationship, 
and its origins in regional land heterogeneity, they fail to 
proceed beyond that and recognise the distinction that needs to 
be made between the aggregate level of analysis, and the subject 
of this thesis, the micro-level inverse relationship.
Finally, in section 7.3, we examine the data and methodology of 
those researchers who deny the existence of any inverse 
relationship in the Egyptian context. The writers who fall into 
this category tend to commit an extrapolative bias, in
contradistinction to the writers in the first two sections who
suffer from an aggregation bias.
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7.1 Some evidence for an inverse relationship in Egypt: Shepley, 
Radwan, Wilson and Mabro
The assertions include Richards [1982: 177] who, referring to the 
work of Berry and Cline,1 mentions "the very large amount of 
evidence which shows that small farms are more intensively 
cultivated and have higher yields per unit area than large farms 
in the Third World."
Adams [1986: 81] likewise refers to Berry and Cline: "Experience 
in [developing] countries demonstrates that not only are small 
farmers capable of adopting new technological inputs, but that 
land productivity, labour productivity, and output per hectare 
are all higher on small farms than on large."2 He agrees with 
Griffin that small land reform peasants use intensive family 
labour inputs to produce more output per unit of land [1986: 
118], and concludes: "Thus, if the goal is to raise land and
labour productivity in peasant agriculture, it would seem 
necessary for the state to concentrate on the needs and 
requirements of small farm agriculture."
Paradoxically, while Adams appears to agree with the theoretical 
and empirical evidence that land redistribution may result in 
reduced marketed surplus as peasants consume more of their output 
on-farm [1986: 126-7] , he does not see that the inverse
relationship would be similarly affected. If the compulsions 
which give rise to poor peasants marketing a high proportion of 
their output are relaxed, on-farm family consumption is likely
229
to increase. Similarly, one would expect to see a relaxation in 
the intensity of labour effort.
More substantial references include Shepley et al. [1985] whose
production function analysis of 252 farms in four governorates3 
reveals that 1 tillers of smaller plots are economically more 
efficient [in terms of higher returns] than their counterparts 
on larger farms" [1985: 29] in rice, cotton [1985: 79], and maize 
[1985: 91] production. Small farms are defined as those below 
three feddans, and large farms as those above three feddans - 
rather large size classes. Their explanation for this finding is 
that: "Small farmers are able to coax out high productivities
from their land resources because of the concentration of other 
production inputs on small plots" [1985: 79]. As we have seen
with regard to the Indian evidence [Bharadwaj, 1974a], if this 
is true, it probably reflects the indivisibilities associated 
with animal power or equipment on small farms rather than 
superior efficiency.
Note too that Shepley et al. are looking at single crop figures 
(both physical yields and values) for which no inverse 
relationship might be expected. They show small farm rice yields 
some 11% higher than large farm yields, with small farms using 
more labour and machinery per feddan (see Table 51, Appendix A). 
This is expected, according to the authors as small farmers have 
a lower risk tolerance than large farmers, and therefore must 
"operate more efficiently than larger producers who are able to 
spread their risks over a broader resource base" [1985: 29] . They
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also make the interesting observation that the large farmers are 
operating under a capital constraint, with insufficient machinery 
and working capital. Furthermore, these large farmers appear to 
be absentee landlords. The authors, however, do not pursue these 
interesting points any further. For Shepley et al. , the small 
farm productivity advantage warrants "an increase in credit 
facilities and input supply by some 99%" [1985: 31] .
The wheat producers in the survey, however, show higher yields 
per feddan on the large farms, by some 10% (see Table 52, 
Appendix A). This is explained by large farm access to parallel 
markets for fertiliser. Small farms with a mean area of 0.5
feddan under cotton show a high intensity of cultivation, with
higher yields and labour input (see Table 53, Appendix A). Thus, 
"small farm resource-use efficiency would warrant larger plots" 
[1985: 83]. Interestingly, data presented by the authors [1985: 
73] shows significantly higher labour input intensity on the
farms in the above three feddan classes.
A major reference that forms the basis for the next chapter, is 
that of Samir Radwan in his 1986 book Agrarian Change in Egypt.4 
At the end of a section on production conditions, he writes: "we 
note that the relationship of farm productivity to farm size 
follows the inverse relationship that has been frequently 
observed" [1986: 78] .
He produces regression equations (i) to (iii), reproduced in 
Table 68, Appendix A, which show for the aggregate level, that
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net farm output and cropping intensity are negatively related to 
farm size, as is the input of family labour per unit of land 
[1986: 79] .5 The inverse relationship holds with a negative
regression coefficient significant at the 1% level and where y 
is net farm output per qirat6 and x is size of holding.
Radwan goes on to state: "Thus, in rural Egypt, as is often the 
case elsewhere in Third World agriculture, resources are used 
more intensively on small family farms. Therefore, the scope 
exists, in the sphere of farm production, to raise total output 
and reduce income inequality through further land redistribution" 
[1986: 79] . We will examine Radwan's data, methodology and
conclusions below in greater detail in Chapter IX. Let us note 
here however that Radwan employs net farm output (defined as 
total value of farm output minus input costs, excluding labour 
costs) in his yield calculations. This methodology introduces a 
number of distortions and a bias in favour of finding an inverse 
relationship. Large farms use substantially higher levels of both 
purchased and own-supplied inputs (seeds, fertilizers, fodder 
etc.). We need therefore to use the total value of crop output 
in the yield calculations.7
The next reference is that of Rodney Wilson in a 1972 study for 
the Egyptian National Institute of Planning:8 "As it is the 
smallest holdings which are usually the most intensively 
cultivated, it seems not unreasonable to believe on a priori 
grounds that labour requirements per hectare are highest on these 
smaller holdings also. The absence of data relating agricultural
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production to farm size in Egypt is an obstacle here. 
Nevertheless thee are strong reasons for believing that the 
tendency for output per hectare to increase, with decreasing 
holding size, which is observed in other developing countries 
with similar factor endowments, is also found in Egypt" [1972: 
2 ] .
His table 4 {column U') [1972: 8] shows an inverse relationship
between labour utilization per hectare and holding size with man- 
hours per year declining from 14,348 on farms with less than 0.8 
hectares to 2,658 on farms over 4 hectares.9 Wilson's table 5 
[1972: 9], reproduced in Table 54, Appendix A, also shows that 
the tendency for labour utilization per hectare of cultivated 
area to decline as holding size increases occurs in Egypt 
irrespective of the cropping system: "At least 3 times more
labour is utilized per hectare on small holdings under 0.8 
hectares, compared with he larger farms surveyed of over 4.0 
hectares in size."
A possible explanation for this inverse relationship is that: 
"Egyptian land-holders do not aim at maximising their farm 
incomes per hectare, but are satisfied with incomes which cover 
their families' subsistence, plus some modest household items. 
In order to attain this target however, those owning very small 
farms must utilize their land very intensively, which implies 
high labour inputs per hectare. Those with larger farms in 
contrast can easily achieve higher income levels, even if they 
utilize their land much less intensively. Thus income per hectare
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on the farms below 0.8 hectares surveyed was almost three times 
that found on farms averaging over 4.0 hectares. On the larger 
farms, in consequence, the family labour participation may be 
lower, and few labourers engaged at peak seasons relative to the 
size of these farms. The general lack of price incentives in 
Egyptian agriculture probably discourages the larger farmers from 
acting in a more ambitious manner" [1972: 14], Wilson continues: 
"Absentee ownership of the larger farms may provide an additional 
explanation of this lower land utilization, and consequent 
smaller labour absorption relative to farm size....Land acquired 
for these motives [prestige, inheritance provision], or for 
speculative purposes, is seldom developed adequately" [1972: 14] .
Furthermore, Wilson points out in his table 7 [1972: 16] that
labour utilization per hectare is higher on leased or shared 
farms than on those which are more than two-thirds owned.10 He 
writes: "leased holdings are farmed more intensively than owner 
occupied farms. Lessees need to cultivate their land intensively 
in order to pay their rents.... Landowners, in contrast, may be 
less aware of the opportunity costs involved in not fully 
utilizing their land" [1972: 3],
Wilson adduces the following implications for agrarian policy in 
Egypt: "The confirmation of the first hypothesis that labour
absorption per hectare decreases as farms become larger has 
important consequences for land tenure policy. It provides an 
economic justification for Egypt's land reform legislation, which 
has placed successively lower ceilings on land ownership. A
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strong case can be argued for tightening the enforcement of the 
existing legislation, and perhaps applying the 2 0 hectare ceiling 
to total family landholding, rather than individual ownership as 
at present. Pursuance of such a policy would, in the author's 
view, lead to a more intensive land utilization, and hence 
increase rural employment opportunities" [1972: 183.
Elsewhere he writes: "The situation [inegalitarian distribution 
of ownership] could undoubtedly be improved if the 19 69 land 
reform proposals for lowering the ceiling on individual 
landownership to 2 0 hectares were implemented. To date many 
landowners have avoided having their land expropriated. One means 
of evasion was by registering land in the names of different 
members of their usually large families, while still retaining 
control themselves in practice" [1972: 6] . Thus: "It would
therefore appear that land reform [is] socially necessary in the 
interests of production intensification and employment creation" 
[1972: 19].
This echoes an earlier reference by Robert Mabro in which he 
refers to inverse relations between labour intensity and farm 
size and land productivity and farm size in a study of rural 
employment problems in Egypt.11 Mabro writes: "We have shown
that total labour inputs per acre (and ceteris paribus yields) 
are a function of 'n', the land-to-man ratio. If this ratio 
increases as the size of holdings decreases, an inverse 
relationship between labour intensity and size would obtain. Such
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a relationship is well established empirically and has been 
discussed at length in the literature" [1971: 412].
Mabro's explanation for this inverse relationship in Egypt 
follows the Sen thesis. He writes [1971: 404] : "It may be
convenient to distinguish two types of farms according to the 
mode of operation, 'capitalist' (sometimes referred to as 
'large') farms which rely on hired workers and 'family' (or 
'small') farms mainly operated by the members of the household." 
The 'capitalist' or wage-labour farms tend to operate according 
to the postulate of profit-maximization. In the family sector 
individuals aim at maximizing their utility when they trade 
leisure for income (say corn) through their work [1971: 4 05].12
He continues [1971: 408-9] : "The less well-endowed worker applies 
more labour inputs per acre than his more fortunate neighbour. 
Other things being equal, yields will vary inversely with 'n'... 
If average incomes are low, peasants may have to apply labour 
inputs up to the point where the marginal product is not 
significantly different from zero in order to secure his 
subsistence. "13
While noting that his analysis is limited by its exclusion of 
capital from consideration and that this factor might turn out 
to be important, especially on the very large farms [1971: 414- 
5] , he concludes that: "Changes in the structure of land holdings 
and land ownership may result in a better use of resources. For 
incomes, yields, and employment are a function of the size of
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farms. On large estates. . .yields are usually low. . .On very small 
farms yields sometimes are significantly higher but the peasant's 
average income is low and family labour underemployed...The 
likely effects of a successful land reform are increased yields 
(and therefore total production), higher rural incomes, and a 
fuller utilization of family labour" [1971: 415-16].
7.2 Aggregation and land heterogeneity: Crouch et al.
One major problem with the above writers is that they operate at 
an excessively high level of aggregation which obscures a great 
deal. Regressing yields on farm size across all rural Egypt 
eliminates any possibility of regional diversity. Such an 
exercise not only assumes a homogeneous agriculture throughout 
rural Egypt, but also confuses two levels of analysis. An 
important distinction must be made between the 'macro' level 
size-productivity relationship based on heterogeneous land 
quality and the 'micro' level relationship [see discussion in 
Chapters II and III].
Taking rural Egypt as a whole, land is regionally heterogeneous. 
In some areas, higher soil fertility or land productivity permits 
a greater population carrying capacity and hence greater 
population settlement density. This gives rise to a tendency for 
smaller farm size in those areas, in a situation of limited land. 
So, at the aggregate level, we have an inverse relation between 
soil fertility (and hence farm productivity) and farm size, with
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the direction of causality running from the former to the latter. 
At the 'micro' level, which may be at the governorate or even 
village level, it is postulated that the direction of causality 
is reversed. Farm productivity is seen as being in some way 
dependent on farm size [see discussion in Chapter II] . It is this 
causal relation that is at the heart of the debate over the 
inverse relationship.
This problem is recognised, but misunderstood in Crouch et al. 
[1983] . Using data from the 197 6 Egyptian FMS (187 farms from 11 
villages in the eastern Delta region which covers three 
governorates: Sharqiya, Daqhaliya and Dumyat), the latter present 
tables of yields of individual crops in kg per feddan and of per 
feddan income net of per feddan cash costs for individual crops 
by farm size which shows "no clear evidence of any relation 
between farm size and yield" [1983: 20-1] (see Tables 55 and 56, 
Appendix A).
However, they also perform linear regressions of 1) physical 
yield per feddan on farm size and a dummy variable representing 
Sharqiya governorate; 2) individual crop values per feddan on 
farm size and the Sharqiya dummy variable; and 3) gross revenue 
per feddan on farm size and the Sharqiya dummy (see Table 57, 
Appendix A) . They conclude that crop yields are not constant 
across farm size (a weak inverse relation is indicated in many 
cases) and that regionality, even within the supposedly 
homogenous eastern Delta region affects yields. They note that 
when all crops are taken together, the factor whose influence on
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revenue per feddan emerges most strongly is the Sharqiya dummy 
variable: "The results on the dummy coefficients give strong
support to the idea that inter-regional differences in 
productivity are more important than social class-based 
differences" [1983: 22-3].14
In order to bring out these regionality effects more clearly, 
Crouch et al. carry out regressions of physical yields, values 
of individual crops and gross revenue per feddan on farm size and 
five zonal dummies [1983: 24-6] (see Table 58, Appendix A):
whereas when only the Sharqiya dummy was used, the size 
coefficient was significant for all crops except the aggregate 
case, with the inclusion of the zonal dummies, the size 
coefficient is statistically significant in only two cases (and 
marginal in a third) while the dummy coefficients are almost all 
statistically significant.
Crouch et al. conclude [1983: 26-7] : "Clearly, regionality is of 
much more importance than size in explaining yield variations 
across farms...Many [studies of agrarian structure in different 
countries] come to the conclusion that large farm size negatively 
affects yield, but our results naturally lead to questioning 
these studies." They continue [1983: 27]: "The significance of
these regional differences in yields suggest that perhaps the 
weak relation between size and yield has a causal direction 
opposite to that normally assumed in studies of agrarian 
structure. Perhaps in areas where yields are lower, lands are of 
lesser quality; therefore, farms must be bigger in order to
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support the same level of monetary output. At the same time, land 
would be cheaper, so larger farms would be possible. Naturally 
then, one would expect to see a negative association between farm 
size and yield, which becomes weaker once one controls for 
regionality." Here Crouch et al. discover the importance of the 
distinction that needs to be made between the macro and micro 
level analyses. But they fail to proceed beyond that recognition 
to examine the relationship between farm size and productivty at 
the micro level.
A number of other interesting econometric exercises are carried 
out [1983: 28-30] (see Table 59, Appendix A) . Yields were
regressed on a number of factors: farm size, nitrogen fertilizer 
per feddan, nitrogen fertilizer per feddan squared, labour per 
feddan, dummies for sharecropping, cash rent and land reform 
lands, and the share of hired labour in total labour as an index 
of capitalist social relations. However, these equations explain 
less yield variation than the equations with the zonal dummies:
1) the effect of farm size has almost completely dropped out
2) nitrogen fertilizer was only marginally important in the maize 
and rice equations
3) labour intensity was only important in the aggregate output 
case
4) cash rentals appeared to be weakly associated with all crop 
yields (either because farmers are stimulated to attempt higher 
yields in order to pay cash rents or because cash rents are more
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common in higher yield zones for unspecified agro-ecologic 
reasons)15
5) there was a negative relation between yields and the index of 
capitalist relations (this though they regard as being a 
statistical artefact generated because capitalist relations are 
positively associated with farm size which is negatively 
correlated with yields) .16
Crouch et al. conclude [1983: 32] : "If one accounts for regional 
differences, the influence of farm size on yields becomes fairly 
small, though still noticeable in some crops. And when one 
accounts for the influence of physical... and social... factors, 
then farm size is swamped. However, this last result is 
reasonable given that the per feddan intensity of input use on 
the larger farms is somewhat less than on the smaller ones. In 
a nutshell, the hypothesis that farm size affects yields 
negatively cannot be totally rejected, but we have discovered 
that the relationship is quite weak statistically and perhaps 
unimportant economically."17
7.3 The inverse relationship denied in Egypt: Platt and
Commander
Finally, a number of references deny the existence of an inverse 
relationship in Egyptian agriculture. Platt [1970: 16] asserts: 
"Figures are not available to show differences in efficiency of 
production between large and small farms, and between the various
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forms of tenure at operating level, but a production advantage 
doubtless went with the larger farms because of their owners' 
better access to fertilizer supplies, improved seeds, etc., and 
the production credit needed to utilize them."
A more substantive contribution to this side of the debate 
however is Simon Commander's study of three Delta villages in 
Egypt in which he concludes: "no consistent trend in terms of 
productivity was found to exist across farm size class... There 
was little evidence that any inverse relation between farm size 
and productivity existed" [1987: 227].
He presents a table (see Table 60, Appendix A) showing crop 
yields per feddan by farm size which exhibit no one uniform trend 
for crop production, and a series of regressions for physical 
yields of individual crops, which all show no significant 
relation between yield and size. While wheat yields tend to 
indicate an inverse relation, this does not hold for cotton and 
rice yields. For maize, the smallest and largest farm size yields 
are comparable with medium farm size yields lower [1987: 175] . 
Regressing physical yield per feddan for individual crops on 
operated area yielded the expected positive association between 
operated area and land productivity from the cotton and rice 
equations, but for the other crops no coherent pattern emerged 
that was statistically significant. However, when the total value 
of crop production per feddan was regressed on the operated area 
(or gross cropped area) in linear form, a coefficient of LE 4.46 
per qirat, or LE 107.04 per feddan, was yielded with a constant
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term of 1,796 and a mean value of LE 2,002 per feddan [1987: 176- 
8 ] ,18
The reasons adduced by Commander for this apparent lack of any 
inverse relationship include the thorough implementation of land 
reform in the 1950s and 1960s, generally high irrigation ratios, 
the availability of state subsidised fertilisers and cooperative 
distribution of other agricultural inputs, and the low variance 
in production conditions. These all generate a relative 
homogeneity in cropping patterns and low variance of land 
productivity across farm size [1987: 175],
None of the familiar factors associated with the inverse 
relationship appear to be present. There was apparently little 
variation in cropping intensity across farm size [1987: 178] : 
"With cropping intensities varying to a very small extent across 
farm size this latter factor has limited implications for intra­
farm size productivity variation. What proved more significant 
were differences in cropping pattern. Although virtually all 
farms had sown the standard crops, the rotational combination was 
an important factor determining the overall value of crop output 
when measured over the full agricultural year."19
He notes that the positive association between output per feddan 
and farm size in the case of cotton and rice is interesting, if 
only because both crops are the most labour intensive of the core 
crops sown in the sample catchment area [1987: 178], There was 
relatively limited variance in labour inputs committed to crop
243
production across farm size however: “small farms did not, when 
estimating labour use over a two-season period, have higher 
labour commitments to arable farming, even though, as expected, 
the hired component of that labour time was lower than for the 
larger farms" [1987: 179] .20
Commander concludes [1987: 180-1] : "The relative homogeneity of 
both material inputs21 and labour in crop production across farm 
size clearly shows that no inverse relation between productivity 
and labour use and farm size is observable in Egypt." He adds 
[1987: 178-9] : "With relatively homogeneous production functions, 
the idea that small farms devote labour time to crop production 
without regard for conventional marginal product-wage valuation 
does not hold. In any event, it is clear that land productivity 
exhibits no real bias towards the small farms whose labour 
endowments and scarcity of land assets might, in other 
circumstances, have been conducive to higher levels of average 
land productivity."
There are a number of problems with Commander's analysis. 
Firstly, Commander's regression equation uses gross cropped area 
(net sown area adjusted for the multi-cropped area) in the yield 
calculations. This introduces the opposite bias from those 
writers above, against finding an inverse relationship. If 
smaller farms have higher cropping intensities than larger farms 
(as we shall see they do) then small farm yields will 
automatically be adjusted downward by using gross cropped area
244
instead of net sown area or farm size [see discussion in Chapter
II] ,22
Secondly, Commander produces evidence for the physical yields of 
individual crops and adduces this as evidence against the 
presence of an inverse relationship. As we have observed, 
however, the inverse relationship pertains to total crop value. 
Here again if small farms have higher cropping intensities than 
large farms or if the cropping pattern on small farms is 
different from that on large farms, then even with no relation 
between the yields of individual crops and farm size, there can 
nevertheless be an inverse relationship when we look at yields 
in total crop value terms [see discussion in Chapter II].
Finally, while Radwan, Mabro and Wilson operate at too high a 
level of aggregation, Commander commits the opposite fallacy of 
extrapolating his sample results to all Egypt. Again, any 
possibility of significant regional diversity is a priori 
excluded. We may note here that Commander chooses to work in 
three Delta governorates (Gharbiya, Sharqiya and Daqhaliya) which 
all manifest high levels of utilization of modern agricultural 
technology with some of the highest ratios of tractors, pumps, 
modern ploughs, pesticide sprayers and threshing machines to land 
in all of rural Egypt - a fact which, as we have seen, is 
precisely of extreme importance in the breakdown of the inverse 
relation (see Table 61, Appendix A).
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Indeed, Richards [1989: 58] responds to Commander's results
showing the non-existence of the inverse relationship by- 
suggesting that these findings could "be the result of larger 
farmers using greater capital inputs per unit land to off-set 
smaller farmers' higher inputs of labour per unit land." However, 
Commander [1987: 178] claims that: "such yield differences
[showing higher land productivity on the large farms] cannot be 
explained by differences in the availability and utilisation of 
machinery" because labour intensive tasks such as cotton picking 
and rice transplanting were not mechanised. Nevertheless, his 
data [1987: 292, table 8C] do show that the mean value of
material inputs per feddan increase by farm size for all crops 
(see Table 62, Appendix A).
With regard to mechanised inputs, Commander's data [1987: 295, 
table 9A] show a wide diffusion of machinery in the three 
governorates, but while governorate mechanisation indices show 
that Gharbiya and Daqhaliya are more mechanised than Sharqiya, 
the Commander's own data shows that at the village level, 
Sharqiya is far more mechanised than the other two [1987: 256-7] . 
Indeed, the Sharqiya village had a machine density four times 
higher than the governorate average. The machine stock in the 
Gharbiya village was more restricted and the Daqhaliya village 
"was under-mechanised when compared with the other two sampled 
areas and the governorate as a whole."23
Indeed, perhaps Commander's results have also suffered from too 
high a level of aggregation. Using his data, we computed output
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per acre and average farm size for each village. This reveals 
that whereas an inverse relation appears to hold for the Gharbiya 
and Daqhaliya villages, it does not exist or has broken down in 
the Sharqiya village.24 This would seem to tie in with the 
evidence on machine use, supporting the hypothesis that advanced 
levels of technology are associated with the disappearance of the 
inverse relationship.
Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have critically surveyed the contributions 
to the inverse relationship debate made in the Egyptian context. 
As we have seen, this literature is rather meagre in comparison 
to the Indian debate. Certainly, there is no very profound 
discussion of why such a relationship should arise. A number of 
propositions echo the Indian debater, ranging from Wilson's 
satisficing behaviour on the large farms to Mabro's use of the 
Sen framework.
We have seen too, that the Egyptian debate exhibits many of the 
errors and misconceptions we have examined in the previous six 
chapters. On the one hand, those who have found an inverse 
relationship tend to be operating at an excessively high level 
of aggregation which reflects the inverse relationship at the 
macro-level, as remarked upon by Crouch et al. This, however, 
cannot be used as a rationale for redistributive land reform as 
most of these authors suggest.
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On the other hand, those writers who deny the existence of the 
inverse relationship in Egyptian agriculture commit the error of 
extrapolating their small sample results to the Egyptian 
countryside in general. We have seen, however, that even their 
use of the micro-level data raises a number of methodological and 
conceptual problems.
Nevertheless, these inconclusive and partial results do suggest 
that the inverse relationship may be an important phenomenon in 
rural Egypt, although not in the way conceived of by the authors 
looked at in this chapter. In Chapter IX, we will subject the 
data used by Radwan and Lee to greater scrutiny at a more 
disaggregated level, and in Chapter X, we examine village level 
data collected by the author from Egypt in 1990. But before 
turning to the data analysis, we will, in the next chapter, 
consider the central features of the political economy of 
agrarian transition in Egypt, features which are of central 
relevance to our analysis of the fieldwork data in chapters IX 
and X .
Notes to Chapter VII
1. See Chapter VI for a critical review of Berry and Cline.
2. Adams also refers the reader to Dorner [1972] . Note that Adams 
is rather confused over the inverse relationship here. Land 
productivity and output per acre are essentially the same, while 
the empirical evidence widely shows labour productivity declining 
with increasing holding size.
3. Buheira, Gharbiya, Qalubiya and Sharqiya in 1981-2.
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4. This study was the result of a 1, 000 household survey of rural 
Egypt undertaken in 197 6-77 by the ILO/World Employment 
Programme.
5. log Y = 4.016 - 0.5154 log X
( .0354)
r2 = 0.3637 
n = 415
where Y is days worked on the family farm divided by the size of 
holding and X is size of landholding.
6. 1 qirat = 1/24 feddan = 175.03m2
1 feddan = 1.038 acres = 4,200.83m2
Throughout the text, yield refers to output per feddan.
7 . Radwan provides no justification for using this measure of net 
farm output in his farm productivity computations, but it 
certainly makes dramatic changes to the results. Such input costs 
account for 65-66% of crop output on the large farms and only 40% 
on the small farms. Of course, this does not imply that the small 
farms are characterised by higher land productivity. What matters 
here is not the ratio of these input costs to output, but the 
composition of these inputs.
In contrast to the small farms, where large farm inputs are land 
and labour augmenting (and small farm inputs are dominated by 
fodder), farm productivity will be higher on the large farms. 
Radwan also includes animal produce in total output. This biases 
small farm yields upward by some 2 0% as compared to 2-10% on the 
larger farms. However, large animal/land ratios and animal 
product/total output ratios on the small farms are not an 
indication of higher productivity, but rather merely the small 
size of these farms. The use of Radwan's method on the Qena data 
below biases large farm yields downward by some 3 5% in comparison 
with the small farms.
Such an approach also faces significant problems relating to the 
imputation of cost to inputs supplied on-farm. For Radwan's 
methodology, see pages 17-27 of Radwan [1986] .
8. ILO/INPC Labour Record Survey, Research Report on Employment 
Problems in Rural Areas, 6 governorates, 1964-65.
9. size H U'
< 0.8 ha 14348 man-hours per yr
Wilson also produces the following regression equation [1972: 9] : 
log U' = 1.6174 - 0.6771 H
0 .8-2 6719
4322
2658
2-4 
over 4
with a correlation coefficient RUH = -1,00
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10. land tenure U'(labour/ha)
2/3 owned 
2/3 rented 
2/3 shared
5354
6408
6103
Wilson explains: "farmers on leased holdings need to utilize
their land intensively, not only to provide for their family 
needs, but also to pay the rents" [1972: 16] . However, note that 
these tenure categories include a wide range of farm sizes [1972:
11. Robert Mabro, Employment and wages in dual agriculture, 
Oxford Economic Papers, vol.21, no.3, 1971, This article was
based on data collected in Rural Employment Problems in the UAR, 
ILO, 1969, and the UAR/INP/ILO, Research Report on Employment 
Problems in Rural Areas (in 10 volumes), Cairo, 1965-68. This is 
the same data used by Wilson. Mabro writes: "Labour inputs per
unit of land (and sometimes yields) tend to increase as the size 
of holdings decrease" [1971: 402]. Mabro also refers the reader 
to Mazumdar [1965] and Paglin [1965] on the Indian Farm 
Management Studies.
12. This explicit use of the Sen model by Mabro (and the implicit 
use by other authors) has been questioned by some writers. Harik 
[1979: 77] , using 1961 census data, estimates the density of 
workers per feddan on small farms to be only 4.5 times higher 
than on the large estates with the greatest density on those 
farms less than 2 feddans. These estimates are much lower than 
those given by Mohieddin [1977] who estimates a factor of 11. 
Harik concludes [1979: 80] that as labour intensity is not marked 
by extremes, the gap is not wide enough to justify a dual sector 
model of agriculture with underemployment at the bottom and 
labour saving at the top.
Further, Mabro's data [1971: 413, table II] on the use of hired 
labour on small farms in Egypt shows that all farm size 
categories employ wage labour: including 24% of farms below two 
feddans:
size % using wage labour
0.5-2 24 mainly temp
source: ILO/UAR Report C p. 41
This evidence would tend to confirm that even in 1961 there 
existed a highly developed labour market in the rural areas, 
reflecting a considerable degree of inter-farm labour mobility. 
Therefore we are not speaking of highly immobile family labour 
here.
15] .
2-5 
5-10 
> 10
36
53
85
13. Mabro notes here that: "There is no choice between goods and 
leisure at a level of income near subsistence" [1971: 409, fn. 
1 ] •
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14. The authors do note however that "smaller farms grow somewhat 
more high value crops (but not much)" [1983: 23] .
15. Their own data is however unclear on this. There appears to 
be no clear association between areas of high land productivity 
and areas where cash cropping is predominant [Crouch et al., 
1983: 30-1].
16. Although farm size and the hired labour index are positively 
correlated, Crouch et al. are aware of the elision made by Sen 
and Mabro: "while it may be true that capitalist farms are in 
general larger than peasant farms, it should not be assumed that 
'large' and 'capitalist' are equivalent" [1983: 16].
In an attempt to go beyond farm size, Crouch et al. perform an 
interesting exercise by clustering farms into socio-economic 
groups: [7] small peasants with little marketed surplus and using 
little hired labour, [3] small farms using more hired labour and 
marketing a higher proportion of total output, [5] small 
capitalist farmers with 8-12 feddans using mostly hired labour, 
[2] large capitalist farmers, and [6] land rented out by large 
landlords under sharecropping. This shows that for wheat, group 
7 has higher yields than groups 5, 3 and 6; for cotton, groups 
3, 5 and 7 have higher yields than group 2. They conclude: 
"Thus, we confirm earlier results about the importance of size 
and capitalist relations when regionality is not taken into 
account" [1983: 31].
17. Regressions of factor input intensity on size and on size 
with zonal dummies show that:
1) "farm size certainly does influence factor use intensities. 
There is no doubt that larger farms use less of every input per 
feddan, except for chemical nitrogen fertiliser, and manure. In 
all crops larger farms use less human and animal labour per 
feddan, and in cotton, rice, and wheat they also use less 
mechanical power. This holds in spite of the fact that we have 
controlled for regional variability and the impact of possible 
bad measurement on in the small farms by providing dummy 
variables. Of course, these results simply confirm our previous 
result that there is a definite but weak tendency for bigger 
farms to have smaller yields."; and
2) "there are clear regional differences in intensity of factor 
use. In fact, in almost all cases, regionality seems to be just 
as important a variable as farm size in explaining variability 
in per feddan input use. However, it is not altogether clear that 
the zones using less inputs are the same as those achieving less 
yields" [Crouch et al., 1983: 37-8].
18. Commander [1987: 173-9 and 178, fn.3] . His regressions of
crop value per feddan on operated area show:
linear: y = 1795.749 + 4.464 x r2 = 0.31
(60.821) (0.888)*
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log-linear: y = 2.979 + 0.198 x r2 = 0.24
(0.042) (0.027)*
* = significant at the 1% level
where y is total value of crop production and x is gross cropped 
area, which shows a significant positive relation at the 1% 
confidence level.
Commander exhibits some confusion over his regression results. 
He writes [1987: 178] : "The positive sign for the constant [sic] 
indicated that the crop value per operated area tended to decline 
[sic] with area operated. This was confirmed when the regression 
was run in log-linear form where the coefficient was 
significantly below one." The fact that the coefficient on the 
independent variable is positive would suggest that output per 
acre increases with farms size. The coefficient in the log-linear 
case simply shows that yields increase, but less than 
proportionately with size.
These regression results are confirmed by table 8D [1987: 292, 
Appendix]:
average crop value per feddan per annum, 1984
farm size mean(LE) index
0-1 1665 100
1-3 2176 131
3-5 2203 132
5-10 2634 158
> 10 2499 150
He adds [1987: 178]: "crop values per feddan do indeed rise for 
farms of up to ten feddans but fall off for the larger units. 
Nevertheless, the value differential between the smallest farms 
and those with the highest per unit values - the 5-10 feddan 
holdings - exceeded 50%. This may be partly due to soil quality 
differences. In particular, it is likely to reflect the level of 
investment in drainage on farm, as well as the relative 
accessibility of irrigation."
19. Commander also mentions land quality as an important factor. 
While there was no attempt to grade land quality, land values 
showed a positive relation with farm size [1987: 177, table 8.3] . 
Large farm land values were a third higher than those of small 
farms. Fallow was non-existent and the reference period covered 
a two crop cycle.
20. However, Commander's data [1987: 65, table 4.4] shows that 
his Sharqiya village does exhibit higher labour intensity on the 
smaller farms even though the aggregate results reveal little 
variation:
average labour inputs per feddan in crop production for 1983-4 
(standardized man-hours)
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size Sharqiya Gharbiya Daqhaliya all all (man
0-1 2214 961 1378 1384 261
1-3 1745 1073 1668 1566 295
3-5 1395 988 1808 1557 294
5-10 1039 1112 1815 1434 270
> 10 1302 2027 1544 291
Wheat yields (y) regressed on the ratio of hired to total labour 
time in crop production (x) actually revealed a negative 
association:
y = 10.051 - 3.280 x r2 = 0.21 
( .3566) ( .5737)* F = 32.7
n = 126
^significant at the 1% level
Commander suggests that for this crop, family labour may put in 
greater effort or sustain a higher quality of work, but the 
result did not hold for other crops [1987: 179 and in.4]. Why 
this should be the case for wheat and not for other crops is not 
revealed.
He adds that although small farms have higher available labour 
per feddan, and there was a clear positive association between 
farm size and labour productivity (with rice, for example, labour 
productivity was 45% higher on the large farms) , the availability 
of off-farm work opportunities implied no compulsion to 
intensify labour effort on the small farms [1987: 181].
21. The regression of crop values (y) on material inputs which 
included seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides (x) showed a positive 
association:
y = 1526.763 + 1.845 r2
(77.397) (0.252)* F
n
* - significant at the 1% level
Even at the level of individual crops, there was a positive 
relation between crop value and material inputs [1987: 180 and 
fn. 5] .
22. Commander provides no explicit justification for using gross 
cropped area in his yield calculations. However, he does claim 
[1987: 178] that he finds little variation in cropping intensity 
across farm size. He does not provide any figures to substantiate 
this claim.
23. In 1984, the Sharqiya village had 36 tractors and 15 
threshers, as well as 6 large sprayers, 31 small sprayers and 10 
trucks. The nearby Mechanization Centre had an additional 16 
tractors available. The Gharbiya village had only 5 tractors and 
3 threshers, and no cooperative or machine centre. The Daqhaliya 
village had 18 tractors and 7 pumps (below the norm) and no 
cooperative or machine centre [Commander, 1987: 257].
= 0.24 
= 53.4 
= 171
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24. The data was derived from Commander [1987: 53, table 3.3] 
which provides average class farm size and [1987: 293, table 8F] .
Table 3.3 (excerpt) Distribution of landholdings, 1984 sample 
villages
Sharqiya Daqhaliya Gharbiya
farm size units area units area units area
0-1 721 405.22 592 264.19 158 79.09
1-3 487 891.05 288 457.09 59 88.19
3-5 43 143.19 28 99.19 4 13 .17
5-10 34 236.09 11 65.18 3 21.04
> 10 12 174.11 2 24 .22 - -
source: Village agricultural cooperatives 
table 8F average value of crop output (per farm)
village 0-1 1-3
farm size (feddans)
Sharqiya 7 57.6 
Daqhaliya 49 6.8 
Gharbiya 457.6
1658 .4 
1204.5 
1144.7
3-5
2752.9
2295.7
2441.8
5-10
6505 .5 
4571.6 
3514.0
1984
> 10
19941.5 
8729 . 0
source; ODI/Zagazig survey, 1984
Combining the data in the two tables and computing average output 
per feddan for each size class in the three villages gives
(rounded to the nearest whole number):
village 0-1 1-3 3-5 5-10 > 10
Sharqiya 1348 906 827 937 1374
Daqhaliya 1113 759 648 772 721
Gharbiya 914 766 742 501 -
Notice the strong inverse relationship in Daqhaliya and Gharbiya. 
But in the Sharqiya village, the large farms have higher 
productivity than the smaller size classes.
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CHAPTER VIII
The political economy of the contemporary Egyptian countryside 
Introduction
In this chapter, we shall consider some of the central features 
of the political economy of the Egyptian countryside, which have 
been identified by other researchers (most notably Mahmoud Abdel- 
Fadil)1 and which are central to our own analysis. In other 
words, we shall here survey the evidence with respect to the 
mechanisms and institutions which have been central to the 
emergence of rich peasant dominance in contemporary Egypt. This 
is an important prelude to the treatment of the ILO data and the 
author's study villages in the following chapters. As we shall 
see, the influences identified in this chapter were crucial in 
the study villages, both with respect to the causal factors 
behind the inverse relationship and its disappearance.
In section 8.1, we examine how the Egyptian agrarian reform, 
begun in 1952, and subsequent legislation, enhanced and 
consolidated the position of the rich peasantry, particularly 
those owning over ten feddans of land. The following two sections 
explore the institutional structure of rural Egypt, and how the 
agrarian elite were able to exercise their power through the
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cooperative system (section 8.2) and rural credit system (section 
8.3) .
Section 8.4 examines the implications of rich peasant domination 
of these institutions for the diffusion of modern technology 
which, as we have seen, is a crucial element in the breakdown of 
the inverse relationship. Finally, section 8.5 shows how that 
rural dominance has been extended to the national policy-making 
level and the implications this has had for agrarian transition 
in Egypt.
8.1 Agrarian reform and the consolidation of the rich peasantry
Prior to 1952, some 2,000 landlords (the pashas),2 representing
0.01% of all landholders, owned 20% of the land, and some 6% of 
landholders owned 65% of the land [Ikram, 1980: 213] . The
agrarian reform of 1952 led to the redistribution of land held 
by individual landlords over 2 00 feddans, and in 1961, the 
permissible ceiling fell to 100 feddans. Later, in 1969, ceilings 
were reduced to 50 feddans.
Land was redistributed in plots of 2-5 feddans (depending on soil 
quality and family size). Rents were to be controlled at seven 
times the basic land tax, but this condition often seems to have 
been evaded in practice however [Ikram, 1980: 212]. There were 
a variety of ways of evading the land reform regulations: land 
retained for self-cultivation, false registrations, and open
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flouting of the ceilings legislation. Although the pashas were 
weakened, they were not eliminated as a class in the Egyptian 
social formation, and many have since made a comeback under the 
Infitah regime.3 In the non-land reform areas, landlords could 
easily evade the laws or could shift to direct exploitation using 
wage labour.
Thus, initially the reform was limited in its impact. A generous 
ownership ceiling was set originally, thus confining the number 
of affected landowners to only 1,768 out of a total of more than 
2,800,000, or about 6/100 of one percent [Platt, 1970: 63] . Only 
12.5% of the cultivated area was directly affected with 341,982 
families receiving land, and this was restricted to ex-tenants 
with the landless receiving nothing [see Abdel-Fad.il, 1975 and 
Richards, 1982] .
Except on expropriated land, tenure structure remained
essentially unchanged: landlords retained most of their lands up 
to the legal maximum {and beyond) and even 18 years after land 
reform it was still the case that land was cultivated
predominantly by sharecroppers and tenants [Platt, 1970: 44].
While initially large landlords observed rent ceilings as they 
felt vulnerable to exposure, the smaller landlords "used their 
local prestige to force higher rents, being supported, in cases 
of complaint, by the local courts set up to settle rent disputes" 
[Platt, 1970: 45]. Saab [1967: 145] mentions the considerable 
rental rate abuse that followed the 1956 law allowing landlords
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to withdraw half their formerly rented lands from tenancy. A 
common practice was to sign leases calling for the legal rent, 
but compel the tenant to sign separate bills of exchange for 
extra amounts, Adams [1986: 90] provides an example of land
reform law circumvention from el-Diblah: "The concept of renting 
land with a [written] contract died here 30 years ago, right 
after 1952. The only land that is rented out now is rented out 
on an oral basis, for a crop or two at a time." Many poor 
peasants fear the rich peasant: "many... still 'forfeit' their
legal rights out of fear, ignorance and an abiding reluctance to 
antagonize 'those who matter' in the village" [1986: 92] . Hopkins 
[1987: 185] notes that "free market" rents are usually on a
seasonal basis and several times higher than legal rents.
The land reform process, including distress sales to the rich 
peasantry, reduced the large landholdings from 1,177,000 feddans 
to 354,000 feddans to only 6%, or 30% of the original level. Some 
659,000 feddans were distributed to farmers with less than 5 
feddans [Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 11, table 1.6] (see Tables 63 and 64, 
Appendix A) . But the main beneficiaries of the land reform 
process were the stratum of rich peasants who acquired land via 
crash or distress sales. Land was sold directly by landlords in 
larger sizes to rich peasants [Platt, 1970: 45] . Some 164,000 
feddans were transferred via distress sales to those with between 
2 0 and 50 feddans (Abdel-Fadil' s "rich peasants") . The 5-2 0 
feddan category of middle peasants remained more or less the 
same.
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Abdel-Fadil stresses that even by 1970, land ownership remained 
highly skewed and the main trend was the "steady improvement in 
the relative position (increase in numbers and acreage) of the 
medium-sized properties, and in particular owners of 2 0 to 50 
feddans" [1975: 23] representing some 5% of landholders with 3 0% 
of the total cultivated area. This compares to 1% of landholders 
and 11% of the land in 1952. Thus, the consolidation of the rich 
peasants' position in the countryside was perhaps the most 
important aspect of the reform. Their purchases of land in 
distress sales by larger landlords, the elimination of the 
pashas, and the absence of mobilization of the poor and landless 
peasants made them the dominant force in the countryside 
[Richards, 1982: 179] .
Nasser bolstered the legitimacy of his regime by avoiding the 
expropriation of rich and middle peasant holdings. By not seizing 
the medium-sized properties, the reforms avoided alienating the 
much needed "passive support" of the rich peasantry. Even when 
ceilings were lowered and all peasants compelled to join 
cooperatives, the rich peasants continued to control their 
villages, just as they had always done, as mediators between the 
peasantry and the government [Richards, 1982: 177] .
Over the first decade of land reform then, land and income was 
redistributed away from the large landlords, and moved towards 
the rich and middle peasantry operating 5-50 feddans. Abdel-Fadil 
estimates that the share of agricultural income of peasants 
owning more than 5 feddans rose from 25% in 1950 to 32% in 1961
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[1975: 60]. The structure of initial asset endowments markedly 
skewed income distribution.
It is interesting to note that in Egypt widespread inequalities 
of land holdings tend to persist after tenancy arrangements are 
made notwithstanding the fact that some 47 per cent of the 
cultivated area is leased in various ways [Mabro, 1971: 405].
The ILO survey income data [Radwan, 1986: 33] appear to show that 
the size of the rental market in land is relatively small: only 
18% of landowning households rented out land and such households 
comprised only 6% of the sample. This was explained by the low 
levels of rent (LE 1.56 per qirat or 2.7% of the average value 
of land) brought about by rent controls reducing the 
attractiveness of renting out land.
However, tenancy data from the same survey [1986: 66-8] shows
that the land rental market is far more significant than the 
income data would suggest: 47% of total land area operated in the 
sample was rented and almost 20% of total land owned was let. 
Some 72% of all households owning land rented some land, with 
almost half the tenancies supplied by absentee landlords living 
outside the village (57% of rented land was from this source).
Of the tenancies supplied by resident landlords, 45% are under 
one feddan, whereas only 24% of absentee landlord tenancies are 
under one feddan. The dominant type of tenancy is cash rental 
(92% of tenancies and 89% of rented land) while sharecropping (on
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a 50-50 basis) accounted for only 7% of tenancies. The average 
area rented did not vary between cash and share tenancies. 
However, the cost of renting under a sharecropping arrangement 
is on average 80% higher than for cash rents [1986: 69] . The
strong bargaining position of the landlords results in exorbitant 
rental values and insecurity of tenants.
Most (94.5%) registered farms are below 5 feddans in size but 
only 83.4% of operated holdings. Nevertheless, it is the case 
that the overwhelming proportion of the 2 million Egyptian 
farmers work units less than 3 feddans. The average plot size is 
generally small and has been falling over time. At present, there 
is not more than 0.3 feddans of land for every rural resident and 
no more than 0,15 for every Egyptian: at this rate, a rural
family of 6 persons would only have 1.8 feddans to support it 
which is less than the amount of land considered necessary to 
keep a family at subsistence level [Harik, 1979: 128], Mare'i 
[1954: 145-6] suggests that 5 feddans are considered adequate for 
a peasant household since it would produce LE 128 in the average 
year (enough to support an average family of 8) . A figure of 
three feddans is however supported by more recent data.4
In fact, the degree of land concentration is probably understated 
in the official records. Rich farmer circumvention of agrarian 
reform laws continues today. Adams [1986: 89] gives the example 
of one rich farmer who owns 2 00 feddans but is registered at the 
cooperative as having only 30 feddans. Commander [1987: 55]
mentions one farm of 400-475 feddans comprising 22-26% of total
261
land in the village: thus, despite the legal ceiling of 50
feddans, registration of land in the names of family members can 
circumvent these restrictions - the farm functions as a 
consolidated entity. Indeed, it is often the case that several 
families (say, several married brothers) operate several plots 
together as one business, in spite of having the plots registered 
as different farms in the official records [Crouch et al., 1983: 
61] .5
8.2 The agrarian elite and the cooperative system
The 7 0 thousand farmers with more than 10 feddans form an 
agrarian elite with an important role in national and local 
politics, and are relatively autonomous from direct government 
action in the countryside. They are descended from around 3 00 
prominent clans that have dominated Egyptian politics over this 
century and controlled all major political offices outside the 
major cities: 71% of seats on provincial councils and 55% of 
district offices. They supply the vast majority of 'umdas 
(village headmen). When the cooperative system was set up, they 
were able to circumvent the laws on cooperative board membership 
by planting poorer members of their clans on the boards 
[Sadowski, 1991: 77-8],
The idea of cooperatives was not new to Egypt in 1952: as early 
as 1908 Lutfi, a private philanthropist, had introduced rural 
credit; then in 1923 national legislation set up agricultural
2 6 2
cooperatives. However, throughout the 1930s, these cooperatives 
were no more than credit facilities catering to the needs of the 
wealthy classes [Rochin and Grossman, 1985: 16] . By 1952, there 
were around 1,700 cooperatives with half a million members. The 
large landlords dominated at both local and national level, and 
thus the impact on small farmers was relatively insignificant. 
Credit, for example, was only extended to those with over 25 
feddans of land [Mayfield, 1974: 23-4] "who borrowed most of the 
funds for their own use or for sub-lending to their tenants at 
exorbitant rates" [Platt, 1970: 40].
After 1952, all land reform recipients had to join the 
cooperative system. At first, the cooperative system was confined 
to land reform areas; then later (after Law 317 of 1956) extended 
to non-land reform areas by 1963. The cooperatives specified the 
crop rotation to be followed locally and took control of crop 
marketing and highly subsidised input supplies. They also 
attempted to consolidate blocks of cultivated land. The 
Department of Cooperatives came under the umbrella of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. At the national level there were four 
main groupings: 1) the General Agricultural Cooperative Society 
(grouping multi-purpose cooperatives) ; 2) the General Society for 
Agrarian Reform; 3) the General Society for Land Reclamation; and 
4) the Cooperative Society (for special crops), all grouped under 
the Central Agricultural Cooperative Union (CACU). There are then 
strata at muhafidhah (governorate) and markaz (district) levels, 
and finally at the bottom, village cooperatives with a minimum 
membership of 20, run by an elected board of 5 to 11 persons and
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managed by a mushrif (supervisor) appointed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture who is assisted by an accountant from the Village 
Bank. By the 1980s, there were over 5,000 agricultural 
cooperatives covering approximately 3 million farm families 
[Rochin and Grossman, 1985: 10].
There is every reason to believe that such a system has favoured 
the rich peasants: this emerging class of relatively well-to-do 
peasants replaced the pre-revolutionary wealthy landlord class. 
Due to an inadequate supply of personnel necessary to supervise 
the cooperative system,, the government relied heavily on this 
new elite who in turn, in many cases, exploited the cooperative 
system to their personal benefit. These land reform beneficiaries 
quickly gained control of the boards of directors of the 
cooperatives [Rochin and Grossman, 1985: 25] .6
The pre-reform institutional lines and rankings still persisted, 
with the Land Reform agent at the top of the order in lieu of the 
landlord, the landless labourer still at the bottom, and the 
steps between dependent on relative prosperity. Richards [1982: 
182] writes: "it is clear that the rich peasants dominated the
cooperatives, especially those set up in non-land reform areas 
after 1963 . The government simply did not have the cadre to carry 
out such a massive extension without relying extensively on the 
local power structure." This is supported by Baker: "The attitude 
of these more prosperous peasants toward the cooperative movement 
has been not so much one of opposition but one of subverting the
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service offered by the cooperative to their own exclusive use" 
[1978: 205] .
However, even in the land reform areas, the rich peasants exerted 
considerable influence. The mushrif or cooperative supervisor was 
often the same person as the former landlord's agent. Concerned 
more with debt collection, he had a short term view that did not 
encompass modernization programmes [Platt, 1970: 55-6]. Further, 
the managerial personnel, usually from the stratum of rich 
peasants, continued to act as representatives of the government, 
just as they had done for the absentee landlords. Even when 
qualified government personnel appeared in the land reform areas, 
these men were themselves often of rural middle-class origins; 
their origins, training, and inclinations (as well as their low 
pay and lack of incentives) often led them to rely on the more 
successful local farmers for guidance [Richards, 1982: 181].
There is little doubt that rich peasants controlled the board of 
cooperatives. Before 1969, 80% of board members were supposed to 
be small farmers with less than 5 feddans, but the latter were 
easily manipulated by the rich peasants, being "highly vulnerable 
to rich farmer pressure and bribery" [Adams, 1986: 69]. Small
farmers depend on rich peasants for land, labour, input 
purchases, crop sales, cash loans, and intercession with 
government authorities. Adams [1986: 136-44] suggests that the 
success of all four survival strategies for the poor peasant 
household (agricultural wage labour, animal raising or 
intensification of cropping, having a large family or labour
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migration) is linked to rich peasant patronage. These "ties of 
dependence mean that the bulk of poor peasants... have been 
'captured' - not by the state - but by rich peasants (that is, 
farmers having access to over ten feddans of land)" [1986: 80].
In 19 69, the ceiling for cooperative board membership was raised 
to 15 feddans and illiterates were excluded: this guaranteed rich 
peasant dominance.
Adams [1986: 105] writes that the leaders of four large extended 
families dominate economic, social and political life in his 
survey village of El-Diblah: "In El-Diblah the small peasants
elected to cooperative boards generally own such minuscule plots 
of land that they are either economically dependent (in the form 
of wage labour and loans) or materially vulnerable (in the form 
of bribes) to rich peasants." [1986: 84] One fellah told him: 
"There is only one ragul in this village: the umda. Everyone else 
looks to him for work, loans, and brokerage services with the 
government" [1986: 129] .7
Rich peasants were able to use their direct or indirect control 
of cooperative boards to help themselves to cooperative supplies 
and monopolize tractors and other mechanized inputs [Adams, 1986: 
85-6]. Richards [1982: 182-3] states that the cooperative
allocation "mechanism excluded the poor as systematically as a 
price system in an environment of unequal resource endowments 
would have done." The rich peasants were first in line for inputs 
while the poor peasants were locked into a consolidated crop 
rotation directed by the cooperative: this increased need for
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credit which the rich peasants supplied. Adams [1986: 62] records 
one peasant: "It is a well known fact here that only the umda and 
certain rich farmers can use the cooperative tractor. No one else 
here has the connections within the cooperative to reserve the 
tractor. And few of us have the money needed to buy cigarettes 
and tea for the driver and his helper."
Only those owning five work animals could participate in animal 
insurance schemes and therefore qualify for 150 kg of forage at 
subsidised prices, and only those with 15 feddans could acquire 
selected seeds [Richards, 1982: 183]. Poor peasants with less
than 5 feddans were prohibited from planting highly profitable 
fruit trees, while rich peasants with over 10 feddans could avoid 
planting regulations on price-controlled crops by obtaining 
permission to opt out of the official crop rotation in cotton 
regions, shifting into more profitable crops such as fruit and 
vegetables [Adams, 1986: 69] .
An extensive black market emerged on which small farmers sold 
their quotas of fertilizer to rich peasants [Richards, 1982:
182] . Some 10-20% of the total value of fertilizer distributed 
via cooperatives wound up being sold on black markets at mark-ups 
of 150% in Lower Egypt and 3 00% in Upper Egypt [Sadowski, 1991: 
75] . Mayfield [1974: 130] provides an example from Gharbiya where 
a peasant obtains two bags of fertiliser from the cooperative for 
each feddan owned; half gets sold on the black market to a larger 
owner in order to make quick cash; but after harvest, the yields
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are too low and the farmer finds that he cannot cover his 
production costs.
8.3 Rich peasants and cooperative credit
Similar diversions affected the subsidized credit programmes as 
well: most peasants did not gain access to medium and long term 
loans as the cooperatives employed the same kind of criteria as 
used formerly by the Agricultural Credit Bank. The critical 
investment loans for livestock and machinery remained predicated 
on property with machinery loans requiring a minimum of ten 
feddans [Sadowski, 1991: 75-6], producing what Adams calls a
"large farmer bias in the provision of credit" [1986: 57] .
In 1957, the Agricultural Credit Bank was required to deal only 
with cooperatives and not directly with individual farmers, and 
the credit system was used to expand the cooperative system in 
the 1960s. The Egyptian experience with cooperative credit has 
a longer history however. According to Saab: "During the first
two decades of the twentieth century, ample long-term credit had 
been made available for agriculture through the Agricultural 
Credit Bank, but most of it had been appropriated by the large 
landowning class who either diverted the funds borrowed to 
consumption purposes or utilized them for the purchase or 
enlargement of agricultural estates..." [1967: 7].
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The Agricultural Credit Bank failed to carry out its mandate, as 
few loans were granted to small farmers. Meanwhile large 
landowners established a powerful economic and social base, upon 
which the smaller landholders and landless masses became 
dependent. Unable to gain credit from the banks, small farmers 
were forced to turn to village moneylenders - often the same 
large landholders - who charged high interest rates. Thus a 
relatively few large landowners were able to dominate credit 
facilities by borrowing more in total than many small farmers, 
at considerably lower interest rates, and move to a position of 
economic control. With the economic crisis of 1907, however, 
loans to small farmers all but ceased" [Rochin and Grossman, 
1985: 14] . The Agricultural Reserve Fund advanced loans to small 
farmers in 192 9, but these were limited to export crop producers 
[Ministry of Agriculture, 1989: 35].
Rural credit has unduly benefited the large farmers. By advancing 
loans to all farmers on the basis of the size of their cultivated 
crop, the Egyptian government has actually engaged in the unequal 
subsidization of large farmers [Adams, 1986: 59-60]. Large
farmers with more than 25 feddans who represent about one percent 
of all Egyptian farmers received 19% of all rural credit in 1963- 
4 and 7% in 1972-3.8 Small peasants, who represent the majority 
of debtors (83-85%) and the most needy, get half the credit 
advanced by the cooperative system, while the medium and large 
landowners get the other half. When the government tried to check 
this trend by imposing a rate of interest of 4 per cent on loans 
advanced to holders of ten feddans and more, many large
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landowners reacted by dividing their holdings into plots of less 
than ten feddans to benefit from the exemption from interest 
[Radwan, 1977: 69] . As of 1978, 2.6 million peasants owning less 
than 5 feddans were receiving LE 71 million in government loans, 
or 56% of total available credits. But 195,000 farmers with over 
5 feddans collected LE 55 million or 44% of the total [Sadowski, 
1991: 76].
The loans from the village banks are given at high rates of 
interest (relative to small farmers' ability to repay) and with 
strict rules regarding loan security. Consequently, only a small 
proportion of poor peasants have been able to benefit from these 
loans [Harik, 1979: 137] . Nadim's study of village banks found 
that "the small farmer, who really needs the support of the Bank, 
usually cannot meet the requirements for a loan". While bank 
managers claimed that the Bank did not favour the large farmers, 
they admitted that the reliable farmers are the rich ones. In 
general, small farmers rented land and did not therefore qualify 
for loan eligibility [1979: 33] .
Only 3% of the sample took medium term loans from the bank. The 
percentage of those who received loans increases with holding 
size, but stops beyond a certain point as very large farmers did 
not borrow from the bank. Small owners and renters obtain loans 
from relatives, while larger owners borrow from the bank [Nadim, 
1979: 41]. The farmers who sought loans unsuccessfully believed 
they were turned down because their holdings were too small 
[Nadim, 1979: 18], In Qalubiya, one fellah remarked: "if a
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hiyazah is small, the farmer is not entitled to credit" [Nadim, 
1979: 3 0] . In both villages, the bank required that the borrower 
own 10 feddans in order to qualify for a loan to buy a tractor 
or plough, 5 feddans for an irrigation pump, and 1 feddan for a 
6 month loan to buy cows [Nadim, 1979: 22] .
Complaints about the bank included abuses by employees, the 
bribes required of farmers, delays in granting loans, the 
favouring of friends and acquaintances, and the neglect of small 
farmers [Nadim, 1979: 24]. Nadim [1979: 32] mentions one case 
where a bank employee forged a farmer's signature and took 
rations of seed and fertilizer and sold it on black market.
Only in 1980, did the Principal Bank for Development and 
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) begin to recognise that its main 
orientation in agricultural development gave more weight to the 
large farmers. They also noted that during the period 1968-77, 
loans were directed almost completely to short term loans, and 
that debts borne by farmers were accumulating rapidly [Ministry 
of Agriculture, 1989: 12-3] .9 Only one percent of total credit 
volume is for medium term loans (for orchards and purchase of 
cattle and machinery) [Dethier, 1981: 44] . This recognition led 
to the establishment of the Small Farmer Project, but only in 
trial form in only 21 villages in 3 governorates.
As in the past therefore, poorer peasants continued to secure 
loans from the wealthier farmers. Dethier [1981: 44] notes that 
"the existence of usury and of private moneylenders has not been
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eradicated from the countryside." Indeed, Adams [1986: 57-8]
suggests that the state supply of rural credit has "actually 
strengthened the importance of local moneylenders." He explains: 
"In the absence of any government credit for the main food crops 
grown in the area (maize, wheat), small peasants must still 
frequently turn to village moneylenders. For example, a small 
farmer wishing to plant wheat in November may well have to
mortgage off part of his future crop at high rates of interest
(exceeding 110 percent per annum) in order to obtain the 
requisite working capital." This would suggest that "usury has 
not been eliminated... in rural Egypt. The state has only 
partially, and not completely, assumed the functions of local 
moneylenders" [1986: 57].
It is difficult in the small farm context to separate production 
from consumption credit: the economic situation of many small
fellahin is so precarious that when a harvest falls short of 
family subsistence needs, they are forced to seek consumption 
loans to survive. Since the latter are not available from the
cooperatives, and since credit from relatives and friends is
generally very short term, peasants are forced to resort to more 
onerous informal credit sources such as moneylenders.
Nadim [1979: 19] mentions the presence of usurers in his Qalubiya 
village where interest rates reached 50%. Currently there are few 
such persons, but more people in Minya borrowed from other 
farmers at high rates of interest and "judging from the high 
interest rates reported, usury is still present". He states
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[1979: 20] that private lenders of interest-bearing loans are 
regarded as "thieves and embezzlers, and thus have very poor 
reputations in the village,” Some 36% of the Minya sample of 
peasants pay interest rates above 25%, some reaching as high as 
75%.
Marketing is also available as a means of surplus extraction with 
prices set by centralizing merchants who can store crops until 
prices are right, whereas small peasants want to sell for cash 
immediately after harvest [Hopkins, 1987: 186] . In pre-land
reform Egypt, the first obligation of the tenant in disposing of 
his crop was to pay the rent (often 75% of net income [Platt, 
1970: 15] } . If there were subsistence or other debts to merchants 
or moneylenders, these must be paid. If the lender was also a 
grain or cotton dealer -a usual combination - he commonly 
required payment in kind, setting the price well below free 
market value. The tight grip of the local merchants is indicated 
by the fact that 23 years after the cooperative law was passed 
there were only 5 marketing cooperativess in existence [Platt, 
1970: 22], Nadim's study [1979: 19] mentions three cases of
peasants taking advances from merchants to whom they sell 
produce. Another common borrowing practice is to mortgage a piece 
of land until its produce is sold.
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8.4 Implications with respect to the diffusion of modern 
technology of rich peasant bias in credit
This rich peasant bias in access to cooperative and village bank 
credit resources has had important implications for the pattern 
of diffusion of modern technology in Egyptian agriculture. On the 
basis of extra-economic considerations large farms are able to 
obtain inputs before other farm households, the timely supply of 
such inputs constituting a major bottleneck and a condition of 
high productivity. This is central to one of the arguments of 
this thesis, already identified and pursued further in the 
following chapters.10
Ownership of tractors, and other modern farm equipment such as 
irrigation technology, is strongly correlated with farm size. 
Commander's 1984 survey shows 60% of the tractors and a third of
irrigation pumps owned by farms over 5 feddans [1987: 240] .11
Hopkins [1982: 168] points out that these machine owners are the 
large farmers over 5 feddans who are also most likely to have 
bought or sold land in the last 5 years.12 In his later study of
the village of Musha, he discovered that the seven largest
farmers who farm 2 0% of the village land own 27% of the tractors 
and share ownership of 46% of the irrigation pumps. One of these 
families with about 300 feddans owned three tractors, nine others 
owned two each and six out of those nine are from families owning 
50 feddans or more [1987: 106] .13
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In the 197 6 ILO study, only 16% of sample households owned any 
machines. Tractors are too expensive and indivisible an 
investment for small farmers. The strict policy of PBDAC lending 
helps to restrict the diffusion of mechanized equipment to small 
farmers. Tractor loans require collateral of five feddans and a 
25% down payment [Commander, 1987: 246] and water pumps require 
a collateral of three feddans [Greenberg, 1985: 10] . Besides
interest payments on the loan, the cost of borrowing is augmented 
by bank commission surcharges. Indeed, only 40-45% of tractor 
purchases were financed by PBDAC loans or dealership agreements, 
with over half being financed by private saving or borrowing 
[Commander, 1987: 24 6] . Hopkins14 found that 65% of the farmers 
in his study felt that they would not qualify for a loan to 
purchase agricultural machinery, while half the respondents felt 
the government was doing nothing to help them in mechanization 
[1982: 115-6 ] .15
Use of tractors via the rental market was more widespread (63% 
of respondents had an entry for operating costs of machinery). 
While the proportion of farms using machines increases with size, 
even tiny farms less than a quarter of a feddan use some 
machinery and 60% of farms less than 1 feddan use machinery 
[Radwan, 1986: 78].16
Most farmers have to rent tractors and pumps from private owners 
rather than the cooperative [Hopkins, 1982: 93] . The 1976-7 FMS 
showed 86% of tractor horsepower provided by cooperatives, but 
current evidence suggests over 90% of mechanical power is owned
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and provided by the private sector.17 Private farmers have been 
in the lead in mechanization with most tractors owned by rich 
peasants [Richards, 1982: 218] . Hopkins [1987: 185] notes that 
machine rental has become increasingly important as a mode of 
surplus extraction: those who own machinery rent to others on a 
piecemeal basis in return for cash or crop share.18 The 
profitability of such operations is enhanced by subsidized fuel, 
oil and machine purchase. Further, rental prices are set fairly 
high through tacit collusion between machine owners. Cooperative 
tractors, when they are available, are rented for 15 piastres per 
qirat: "far cheaper than renting a tractor from another farmer
(25 piasters per qirat)" [Nadim, 1979: 23].
In the 1980s, the emphasis has been on machine accumulation 
rather than land accumulation: "Thus the relationship of the
larger farmers to the smaller farmers around them was mediated 
through their control of the access to machinery more than 
through control of the access to land" [Adams, 1986: 189] . Thus, 
questions of cost, payment schedules and tips become important 
[Hopkins, 1982: 93]. Hopkins [1982: 242] found machine owners 
were reticent to talk about their relations with machine renters. 
The relationship between machine owner and farmer is critical for 
the organization of production [1982: 93] . Mechanization has
increased the division of labour with the pattern being set by 
the rich peasants and capitalist farmers [Hopkins, 1987: 25] . In 
the past, reciprocal labour exchange between small peasant farms 
solved labour availability problems at peak periods, but 
mechanization and monetization have produced a pattern of hired
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labour with a high correlation between degree of mechanization 
and hired labour use [Hopkins, 1982: 236-7] . As tractor density 
increases, it is possible that owners attempt to tie farmers to 
them [1982: 242] .
Hopkins notes that the machine owners are strongly differentiated 
from most farmers by virtue of the size of their own farming 
operation. While most of the machine owners have farms of five 
feddans or more, they represent a very small percentage of the 
farmers in general. This evidence thus supports the contention 
that the present pattern of agricultural mechanization in Egypt 
tends to reinforce or even accentuate the distinction between 
large and small farmers . It gives an additional advantage to the 
large farmers, and creates a very different pattern of social 
relationships between the machine owners and the others: "It is 
probable that mechanization is also to the advantage of the small 
farmer, . .but the point here is that relatively speaking it is 
more to the advantage of the machine owner" [Hopkins, 1982: 238] . 
The mechanization process reinforces the power and position of 
large farmers and the choice of technology reflects the perceived 
interests of large farmers.
This process has been of immense importance in accelerating 
peasant differentiation in rural Egypt, and as we shall see in 
the following chapters, has had important implications for the 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity.
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8.5 The dominance of the rich peasantry and the political sphere
This dominance of the rich peasantry extends to the political 
sphere at both local and national levels. In the smaller 
villages, with less than 10,000 people, the social structure is 
more likely to be shaped or influenced by a limited number of 
families. These family relationships are extremely crucial in 
local institutions [Mayfield, 1974: 115]. The village council
chairman's authority and influence rest on his association with 
the leading families and informal village leaders [Mayfield, 
1974: 92].
Mayfield [1974: 111] found that many village councils do not
function as intended because the traditional families still 
dominate: “The popular powers in the villages have no strength
within the ASU (Arab Socialist Union) because the umdah and the 
shaykhs in the village dominate the village and the agricultural 
labourers... They did not organise themselves together into an 
Agricultural Workers' Union because of the umdah and the large 
families and thus they continue to accept ten piastres a 
day. . .The umdah is the real head of the village's administrative 
machinery,..His family controls over 800 feddans either by owning 
or leasing, and the members of the village council are all from 
his family..."
Adams [1986: 152] describes how rich peasants distribute vote 
money among their client 'umdas who control the small peasant 
vote for National Assembly elections. At the national level rich
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peasant power is clearly visible. Agrarian policy itself was 
heavily influenced by the rich peasantry. Sayyid Mar'ei (a former 
large landlord) consolidated and enlarged various supervisory 
agencies into his own personal fiefdom: the Higher Committee of 
Agrarian Reform. This latter took control of the Agricultural 
Credit and Cooperative Bank in November 1955. In 1957, he became 
Minister of Agriculture and in 1960, the entire cooperative 
system was transferred to the Ministry [Sadowski, 1991: 60] .
Sadat himself was from a rich peasant background in Minufiya. His 
policies consolidated rich peasant power in the rural 
administration: minimum property requirements were decreed for 
village mayoral elections, and the number of poor peasants 
serving on cooperative boards declined throughout the 1970s. Ever 
since 1952, rich peasants had been assured of at least half the 
seats in the National Assembly, simply by defining peasants as 
those with less than 25 feddans. In 1974, this was further 
diluted by raising the ceiling on this definition to those 
cultivating up to 50 feddans. Indeed, members of the agrarian 
elite were soon to form one of the largest and most important 
blocs in Parliament [Sadowski, 1991: 81] ,19
In the 197 0s, the main spokesman for the rich peasantry was Ahmed 
Yunis, head of the CACU. He had established a vast patronage 
network which was able to influence the top political elite and 
a third of the parliamentary deputies. This developed into a 
power struggle between Sadat's Misr party and the CACU, the 
latter attempting to secure greater cooperative independence
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while the government tried to expand its control. Sadat disbanded 
the CACU in 197 6 under Law 824 and transferred its functions to 
PBDAC based in Cairo and its network of village banks. In fact 
however, the village banks catered even more narrowly to the rich 
peasants because of property qualifications [Sadowski, 1991: 82] , 
and the latter were able to dominate the shift of PBDAC towards 
medium and long term loans [Sadowski, 1991: 202] . By 1980, CACU 
had been reactivated with the mushrifs elected locally.20
These developments and the power of the rich peasantry in the 
Egyptian countryside have, however, been uneven. This 
heterogeneity has had profound implications for agrarian 
transition in Eypt. Hopkins [1987: 4] delineates two paths of 
agrarian transition in Egypt: a capitalist path {using hired wage 
labour and machinery) and a path dominated by petty commodity 
production with small farmers producing for the market and 
agriculture becoming increasingly marginalised. The paths are 
manifested in variant forms of village development. He provides 
[1987: 55] a typology of villages reflecting these different
paths of agrarian transition in Egypt: 1) land reform or
resettlement villages which have moved in the direction of 
intensification of petty commodity production; and 2) villages 
in which capitalist agriculture and the emergence of capitalist 
relations of production around wage labour have appeared.21
The land reform villages are dominated by family farms of 3-5 
feddans dependent on the use of intensive family labour. The 
intent here is to maintain the "traditional" family farm as the
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unit of production and link it to the market through cooperatives 
[Hopkins, 1981: 56-7], These small farms are not fully
commercialised and operate with different decision variables from 
the large farms: small farms allocate land first to food and
fodder crops, secondly to cooperative quotas and areas (in order 
to get input supplies), and only market if there is a surplus 
[Ikram, 1980: 197] . Hopkins states however, that "up to a point, 
larger farmers are not qualitatively different from smaller 
farmers, just quantitatively" [1981: 48].
These villages, characterised by small scattered land possessions 
prohibit the application of modern technology and lead to the 
fragile formation of capitalism. Fragmentation weakens their 
ability to adopt new agricultural methods, representing the 
intensification of capital utilization [Ministry of Agriculture, 
1989: 79].
In the land reform village of Zeer, in Adams' study, where a more 
thorough-going land reform took place, less social 
differentiation and elite land accumulation occurred. Indeed, in 
the 30 years since land reform, out of 1,500 beneficiaries in 
Zeer, only 11 bought mechanised farm inputs, only 22 bought 
private land, and four of those had owned private land prior to 
land reform but had concealed it [1986: 106] . Thus, land reform 
had actually had the effect of slowing down capital accumulation: 
it "actually accelerated the rate at which farm units are unable 
to save and invest" [1986: 128].
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In contradistinction, "direct government influence was certainly 
much stronger in the land reform areas than elsewhere... In the 
other villages the cooperatives were easily dominated by the rich 
peasants and the village headmen" [Richards, 1982: 179] . Villages 
in which large farmers have been able to accumulate land and 
other means of production such as machinery have exhibited a 
different outcome with increased social differentiation and the 
potential disappearance of the small farmer rather than his 
survival.
The capitalist villages appear to have relatively greater 
concentration of land, larger area and population, and higher 
levels of mechanization. Such villages also benefited from 
development efforts in the form of loans for machinery and other 
modern inputs. The mode of production changes because capital has 
penetrated the village and changes the system of production 
instead of being merely externally imposed via market relations 
[Hopkins, 1987: 5-6] . The family farm gives way to larger
enterprises organized by the family, but based on wage labour and 
the intensive use of machine inputs [Hopkins et al, 1981: 59]. 
As we shall see in the following chapters, these distinctions and 
classifications are echoed throughout the survey data, and 
provide the political economy foundation for understanding the 
dynamics behind the inverse relationship and its breakdown.
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Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have established the political economy 
parameters of the framework within which to analyse the inverse 
relationship at the micro level in the Egyptian countryside. We 
have seen that despite significant land reform measures, 
important elements of semi-feudal agriculture remain strong: 
sharecropping tenancy, personalised oral contracts, and debt. 
Access to land and resources lies through the patronage of the 
rich peasants and those landlords who managed to evade land 
reform legislation. This is the environment, the matrix of 
exploitative relationships, in which the inverse relationship 
flourishes.
Our hypothesis is however, that in the early stages of 
transition, institutional biases act strongly in favour of the 
larger farmers - often the legacy of previously existing systems 
continuing to operate where political power and status determine 
access to the resources which make up the package of 
technological change in agriculture.
Several studies, as we have seen in this chapter, show that the 
main beneficiaries of the land reform legislation, and 
subsequently, the cooperative and rural credit system in Egypt 
were the rich farmers. The control of the latter by the rich 
peasantry, those owning over five or ten feddans of land, ensured 
their dominance with respect to the diffusion of the new 
technology. While at an earlier stage, intrinsic advantages of
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scale are not unimportant, these become increasingly significant 
over time, enabling the large farmers to maintain relatively high 
investment and growth rates. In this two stage process, the first 
impact of agrarian transition is the weakening and disappearance 
of the inverse relationship. Later, when scale advantages operate 
for a substantial length of time the relation turns significantly 
positive.
In the next chapter, we subject the data used by Radwan and Lee 
in their 1986 study to much closer examination, in order to 
discover the nature and extent of the inverse relationship in the 
Egyptian countryside, and its relationship to technological 
change. This will provide a stronger empirical support for our 
hypotheses. Then, in the following chapter, we can explore, at 
the more disaggregated level of individual villages, just why 
such an inverse relationship exists, where it exists, and how it 
is changing.
Notes to Chapter VIII
1. See Abdel-Fadil's 1975 work, Development, Income Distribution 
and Social Change in Rural Egypt 1952-1970, which establishes the 
central thesis of this chapter: the dominance of the rich
peasantry in rural Egypt. While we can agree with Abdel-Fadil in 
his masterful analysis of the increasing domination of the 
Egyptian countryside by a rich peasantry, we must, however, 
following Byres [1977: 268] , question his assumption that the 
rich peasantry are necessarily capitalist farmers. As we have 
seen in Chapter V, this assumption has been the source of 
somewhat premature judgements concerning the development of 
capitalist agriculture and the resolution of the agrarian 
question in particular countries. There are indeed hints in
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Abdel-Fadil [1975: 46-48] that significant elements of semi-
feudal structures remain prominent in Egyptian agriculture.
2. These actors were large absentee landlords.
3. Infitah (=opening) is the process of market liberalization 
initiated by Sadat in 1974. A more apposite name might be 
Inghirab (=turning West).
4. This figure was provided by interviewees in the author's 
survey villages. See Chapter X.
5. Ansari mentions one notable who owned 477 feddans and who kept 
his holding intact by parcelling out titles among 5 grandsons and 
8 female relatives [1986: 131] . The operation of several 
officially registered landholdings as one unit can also be seen 
in the ten feddan farm in the author's 19 9 0 survey of Shubak al- 
Sharqi in Giza. See Chapter X.
6. The literature on rich peasant domination of cooperatives 
includes Kamal, 1968; Dumont, 1968; USDA, 1977; and Baker, 1978.
7. The word ragul is used in the sense of “big man".
8. See [Adams, 1986: 60, table 3.3].
9. See Ministry of Agriculture [1989: 56-8] . The duration of 
short term loans does not exceed 14 months and repayment is 
linked to crop maturity and marketing dates. The duration of 
medium term loans is never less than 14 months and not more than 
5 years. The long term loan period is 5-15 years and is lent for 
land reclamation or building which requires real estate pledges.
By 1985-86, loans in kind still constituted more than 50% of 
total short term loans: 54.1% in 1985-6 [1989: 62, table 5], and 
PBDAC medium and long term loans accounted for 50% of advances 
[1989: 66, table 7] . The majority of investment loans go for
animals, followed by agricultural equipment [1989: 69, table 9] . 
The development of loans for agricultural machinery shows 
increasing values over the period 1975-88 [1989: 76, table 11].
10. Abdel-Fadil [1975: 31-34] stresses mechanization in the
process of peasant differentiation and the development of a 
capitalist farmer stratum in a permissive sense: only the rich 
peasantry had the necessary investible surpluses to invest in 
improved machinery. Byres [19 77: 265] asks why this should
necessarily be so given the plentiful supply of underemployed and 
unemployed rural labour. The answer possibly lies in the 
accelerating process of international labour migration to Libya, 
Iraq and the Gulf states during the 1970s. This comprised both 
direct and indirect effects: rural labour moved not only to the 
labour-importing countries, but to replace urban construction 
sector workers within Egypt. This produced temporary labour 
shortages in Egyptian agriculture during this period [see 
Richards, 1989; Richards and Martin, 1983; and Birks and
Sinclair, 1980] .
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11. See Commander [1987: 244, table 9.5] which shows machine 
ownership by type and farm size in 1982 (taken from Hopkins et 
al., 1982: 169). The distribution of machine ownership shows a 
clear large farm bias.
12. See Hopkins et al. [1982: 169, table 7] : 48 out of 83
tractors and 49 out of 112 irrigation pumps are owned by farmers 
with more than five feddans of operated area.
13. Other studies tell the same story. The ERA 2000 report [1979: 
8.6] found that of the 158 farmers in the survey, only 7 owned 
tractors - all of them large; 31 owned pumps, 5 owned sprayers 
and 4 owned threshers. The majority of these are in the hands of 
the farmers who hold between 5 and 24 feddans. The larger the 
farm holdings, the greater the proportion of farmers who are 
highly mechanized.
Nadim [1979: 46] also finds machine ownership increasing with 
farm size: the single owner who had machines in all categories 
was the largest landowner in the village (with over 2 0 feddans). 
In Minya, no-one with less than 3 feddans owned an irrigation 
pump, although access was available through rental markets.
14. A survey of 1,000 farms and 170 machine owners in 10 villages 
across 4 governorates in 1981-2.
15. The ERA 2000 study supports this finding. It finds that 
farmers were unable to adopt machines because they had "no money 
for down payment" (53%) or because it was "too hard to get 
credit" (29%) [1979: 8.16].
16. The use of tractors (a) and mechanical threshers (b) has 
increased markedly over time [Commander, 1987: 255] :
(a) (b)
mid60s 6% 9%
1970 25 32
1975 66 81
[data source: El-Kholy and Abbas, 1982: 61-66].
Commander [1987: 255] also cites a nine village survey in
Qalubiya, Sharqiya and Minya which shows low levels of machine 
ownership, but a highly developed rental market [Goueli et al., 
1986: tables 5 and 8].
See also Commander [1987: 259, table 9.9] which shows the use of 
machinery by operation and farm size for 1984. For all 
operations, the percentage of farm households using machines 
increases with farm size. And Commander [1987: 265, table 9.11] 
shows increasing irrigation technology by farm size in terms of 
the percentage of farm households using pumps in 1984.
17. See Commander [1987: 255] who cites Hopkins et al. [1982: 158 
ff.] and Reiss and Lutfi [1983: 31 ff.]. Table 9E [1987: 298]
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shows a massive increase in the growth of private machine 
ownership.
18. Radwan [1986: 39-4 0] shows that farm
the rental of equipment (and livestock)
upper income classes [table 3. 7] :
LE income no/HH income/HH
0-300 0 0 0
300-600 130 6 21.66
600-1000 201 4 50 .25
1000-1400 1326 6 221.0
1400-2000 1280 4 320.0
gt 2 000 400 1 400.0
19. One of the effects of this has been that taxation of the 
agricultural sector has been a neglected issue in Egypt. In 1973, 
the Egyptian government proposed exempting small peasants with 
less than 3 feddans from a series of taxes and duties, but rich 
peasants managed to get this extended to all farmers regardless 
of size [Sadowski, 1991: 82].
Similarly with the intersectoral terms of trade. Abdel Fadil 
[1975: 100, table 5.8] has shown that these have moved in favour 
of the agricultural sector, with the prices of manufactured 
inputs being heavily subsidized and crop output prices being 
increased. Radwan [1977] has calculated two separate terms of 
trade indices for rich and poor farmers in which the former 
increased more than the latter. The income terms of trade also 
moved relatively more favourably for the rich peasantry. Abdel- 
Fadil [1975] has demonstrated that the share of agricultural 
income of farmers with over 5 feddans increased from 25% in 1950 
to 32% in 1961.
Terms of trade indices for the agricultural sector 
1960-75 (1960=100)
all farmers poor farmers rich farmers
year (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1960 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1965 85 88 79 86 88 79 92 85 86
1970 98 98 101 99 98 104 111 111 111
1975 102 97 120 102 96 124 127 122 146
(1) overall terms of trade index between agricultural output and 
all manufactured commodities.
(2) terms of trade between agricultural output and manufactured 
consumer goods.
(3) terms of trade between agricultural output and manufactured 
inputs.
20. Recent policy developments have also allowed the former 
landlords to re-enter the rural power structure. In the early 
197 0s, Sadat packed Parliament with rural notables in order to 
pass legislation restoring land titles to formerly sequestered
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owners, and in 1975 this led to Law 67 which strengthened the 
hand of large landlords by adjusting tax assessments to give 
owners the ability to raise rents. This new legislation (which 
was passed after only six hours of debate) enhanced the power of 
landowners at the expense of sharecroppers and tenants: rent
contracts could be cancelled at the behest of the landowner and 
rent disputes were to be settled at the local level [Sadowski, 
1991: 293-5].
Shortly afterwards, these land owners were pressing for more 
radical legislation, their proposals including: an increase in 
rents from seven to ten times the value of land tax, the legal 
right to unilateral rental contract termination, the eviction of 
tenants who were late rent payers, and a reversion of cash rents 
to sharecropping [Sadowski, 1991: 295] . These measure would have 
permitted evictions on 9 0% of the cultivated area by allowing
landlords to re-register plots in smaller parcels in order to
evict tenants.
In 1982, landlords and rich peasants who formed a sizeable
proportion of NDP membership (Mubarak's own party) lobbied to 
make the right of eviction and landlord resumption of land a 
centrepiece of their agrarian policy. When the New Wafdists won 
58 seats in the 1984 elections, Mubarak conceded, but the
proposals proved too radical and unpopular, and large popular 
opposition led by the Tagammu'a party prevented these proposals 
from becoming law.
Regardless, the landlords took the law into own hands: half
refused to give tenants a written contract, only oral agreements 
which could easily be revised or single season contracts which 
were exempt from the rent laws. One method of land resumption was 
to bribe the tenant to leave the land. The result was massive 
resumption of own cultivation and tenancy agreements declined. 
Ownership increased from 25% in 1952 to 58% in 1983, with rich 
peasants increasing their share of land from 13% in 1977 to 18% 
in 1982 and large landowners enlarging holdings from 2 0 to 25% 
[Rochin and Grossman, 1985: 300] .
21. Hopkins also mentions a third type of village which is 
dependent on migrant remittances or off-farm employment, and is 
mainly non-agricultural.
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CHAPTER IX
A disaggregated analysis of the ILO data: technical change and 
the inverse relationship in Egypt 
Int roduct i on
The survey carried out by Samir Radwan and Eddy Lee in February 
1977 within the framework of the ILO World Employment Programme 
provides an opportunity to test the relation between farm size 
and productivity.1 The main focus of the ILO survey was on rural 
poverty, income and asset distribution, and employment, but it 
also includes information on production conditions with most of 
the variables necessary for our own purposes.
The principal arguments are, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, that at a high level of aggregation, an inverse 
relationship between farm size and farm productivity will be 
manifested, with its origins in land heterogeneity and long-run 
processes of population settlement. However, at a more 
disaggregated level, we may find a very different type of 
relationship and one that exhibits greater pattern variability. 
In regions of relatively backward agriculture, we have 
hypothesised that an inverse relationship will be found. In more 
advanced regions, however, that relationship may weaken or even 
cease to be negative with the transformation of existing
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production conditions from backward agriculture to a system 
employing modern technology - both biochemical and mechanical.
In section 9.1, we present the methodology and characteristics 
of the ILO survey. Section 9.2 recapitulates Radwan's analysis 
and results and the problems associated with his approach. Then, 
in sections 9.3 and 9.4, we present our results from a more 
detailed and disaggregated analysis of the ILO data. Section 9.3 
presents a contextual account of technological change in Egyptian 
agriculture, showing the degree of unequal development and 
regional heterogeneity; while section 9.4 shows how the ILO data 
reflects this, and its implications for the inverse relationship 
at a more disaggregated level. This exercise represents a 
preliminary empirical analysis of agrarian technical change in 
Egypt before we come to the more in depth study of two of the 
villages in the ILO survey in the final chapter.
9.1 The ILO survey and its characteristics
The ILO data possess a number of advantages in comparison to much 
of the data used in earlier debates.
Firstly, since the data were collected at household level there 
is no need to rely on averaged data according to size-groups. Any 
level of disaggregation is possible. However, given the small 
sample size of some of the villages, it was thought that a 
governorate-wise level of disaggregation would be adequate for
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our purpose. Secondly, the period in which the data was collected 
provides a sufficient elapse of time since the major agrarian 
changes of the 1950s and 1960s - land reform and technological 
innovations. Finally, the data allow us to examine the size- 
productivity relation in conjunction with other important 
variables.
This study is based on the results of a sample survey carried out 
in 1977. A random sample of 1,000 households in 18 villages was 
drawn using the 1966 and 197 6 Population Censuses as a frame. The 
sample size was partly dictated by considerations of 
comparability with the country's Household Budget surveys, which 
usually cover the same number of households in each of their four 
rounds. The sample was selected through a multi-stage sampling 
procedure.
Firstly, the country was divided into strata according to 
muhafidha (governorate or administrative region) boundaries. 
Seven of the 25 governorates were excluded because of their 
atypical features (being exclusively urban such as Cairo and 
Alexandria, or desert such as Sinai) . From the list of the 
remaining 18 governorates a random sample of three was chosen 
from each of the two major agro-ecological zones, Upper and Lower 
Egypt. These were: Dumyat, Gharbiya, Menufiya, Giza, Beni Suef 
and Qena.
Secondly, the total number of households in the sample was 
distributed among the six governorates in proportion to their
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share of the total rural population of those governorates. The 
definition of rural used here is that of the Population Census, 
where the breakdown between rural and urban is based on 
administrative distinction: the urban population includes all
people counted in the major urban governorates, capitals of all 
other governorates and capitals of markazes (administrative 
districts).
Thirdly, a stratified sample of 18 villages was chosen in such 
a way as to allow large and small villages to be represented in 
proportion to their respective shares in the six governorates 
combined. A population of 5,000 in the 1966 Census was taken as 
the dividing line (the cut-off point of 5,000 inhabitants in 
distinguishing between large and small villages is the criterion 
used by the Egyptian Family Budget Surveys). According to this 
criterion, one third of the villages were large and two-thirds 
small in 1966. Thus, six large and twelve small villages were 
drawn at random from the six governorates according to these 
governorates' shares of large and small villages. The principle 
chosen was the following: if governorate i had x per cent of the 
total number of large villages in the six governorates then we 
select at random 1/100.x,6 large villages from that governorate. 
For small villages, the formula similarly was 1/100.x.12 where 
x was the percentage share of i in the total number of small 
villages in the six governorates. Since whole villages (and not 
fractions) were to be chosen and since the total numbers chosen 
were small, the rounding error was large. According to the above
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criteria the numbers of large and small villages selected from 
each of the six governorates were as follows.
Finally, the number of households to be drawn from each village 
was obtained by distributing the number of households to be drawn 
from each governorate among the selected villages of the 
governorate according to the relative population of these 
villages. From each selected village in the governorate ij a 
sample of r^ households was randomly drawn according to the 
following formula:
Zij =[ Pij/Ni.SUM Pi;j] Si (i = l.... 6) 
where: S ^ number of sample households in governorate i 
Pij=population of village j in governorate i 
Ni=number of sample villages in governorate i
Of the 1,000 households, 586 were to be drawn from the six large 
villages and 414 from the twelve small villages. A random sample 
corresponding to these numbers was drawn using the lists of the 
197 6 Population and Housing Census as a frame. The 19 66 
Population Census was used as a frame in drawing the governorate 
and village samples and, as the 197 6 Population and Housing 
Census became available just on the eve of the survey, it was 
used to draw the household sample. Since the household sample was 
drawn from a frame different from that of the governorate and 
village samples, a number of checks were performed to ensure 
consistency such as relative sizes of governorates, numbers of 
villages and average size of households within the villages of 
the sample. No serious inconsistencies were found. Tables 65 to 
67 provide a summary of the sample distribution.
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The sample's representativeness of Egyptian rural society can be 
seen by comparing the survey results to national data. The 
geographical spread of the 18 villages in the sample was such 
that it ranged from the tip of the Delta (Meet al-Shiukh in 
Dumyat) to the south of the Nile Valley (al-Amiria in Qena). The 
villages represented a wide variety of rural economies with those 
that are purely agricultural (Tilwana in Menufiya), those that 
can be considered extensions to urban centres (Shubak al-Sharki 
in Giza), those with traditional handicrafts (head-cover making 
in Atf Abu Gindi in Gharbiya), and those near a large industrial 
centre (Kamalia in Gharbiya). Finally, some of the main 
characteristics of the household sample, such as the age and sex 
structure, employment patterns and income per capita were not 
significantly different from the national data. In one aspect, 
the sample was different from rural Egypt: the distribution of 
landholding. A comparison of the survey results with the 197 6 
statistics on landholding shows that the sample may have failed 
to capture the upper end of the distribution. The analysis of the 
sample results should therefore be interpreted with this bias in 
mind,.
9.2 Analysis and results: (i) The Radwan regression and its
questionable nature - the need for a more disaggregated approach
Given the relatively profound technical changes experienced by 
Egyptian agriculture, the results obtained by Radwan's regression
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of net farm output on farm size might seem somewhat surprising. 
Radwan finds the following relationship to hold:
log y = 2.6517 - 0.2559 log x
(0,0363)
R2 = 0.1075 
N = 425
where y is net farm output per qirat and x is size of 
landholding.
Radwan argues that this result is consistent with the large 
amount of evidence which shows that small farms are more 
intensive cultivators and have higher yields per unit area than 
large farms in the Third World and provides scope for further 
land redistribution in order to raise total output and reduce 
income inequalities.
However, Radwan's approach is questionable with regard to two 
points: firstly his use of net farm output may seriously bias the 
results in favour of finding an inverse relationship. Using 
imputed values both on the output and input sides as well as 
excluding labour costs on the small farms, as Radwan does, can 
easily produce substantial bias against the larger farms since 
an important cost element for the smaller farms is ignored. 
However we have retained net farm output in our yield 
calculations below as well as running regressions on yields using 
total crop values; and secondly, we must relate the results of 
these regressions to other factors, such as cropping patterns, 
cropping intensities, labour input intensities, and levels of 
technological development and commercialisation. Running
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regressions for all the variables cited, we arrived at the
results for all Egypt presented in Table 68, Appendix A.
These mixed results are very similar to those observed repeatedly 
for areas of traditional agriculture. The relationship between 
farm size and output per net cropped area is significantly 
negative for the three alternative versions of the latter. 
Cropping intensity shows, as expected, a strong inverse
relationship with operated area. We get mixed results for the 
relationship between farm size and output per gross cropped area: 
using net farm output we get a strong inverse relationship; using 
Radwan's total crop value figures we get a negative relationship 
significant at the 5% level; and using the corrected figures for 
total crop value, we get a positive but insignificant
relationship. For individual crop yields we find significantly 
negative results for winter wheat, birseem, and cotton, while 
that for maize is negative only at the 10% level. For rice, 
however we find a statistically insignificant positive 
relationship.
These regression results would, if our hypothesis is correct, 
appear to suggest either that Egyptian agriculture has not yet 
undergone as thorough a transformation as is suggested in the 
literature, or that the regressions which have been carried out 
at the all Egypt level are excessively aggregated and providing 
us with misleading results. Both explanations are partially 
correct and their joint operation can be seen when we turn to the 
regression at a more suitably disaggregated level.
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9.3 Analysis and results: (ii) a digression on technological
change in Egyptian agriculture, uneven development and regional 
heterogeneity
While scientist man-years devoted to agricultural research and 
expenditure on agricultural research both doubled in the period 
1959-74 [Antle & Aitah, 1982: 57], Richards was able to write in 
1982: "The Green Revolution has had only a limited impact so far 
on Egyptian agriculture" [1982: 215-6], Similarly, Antle [1982: 
35] writes: "The preliminary evidence reported here suggests that 
there has not been the substantial technical change in Egyptian 
agriculture needed to generate long-run productivity growth."
However, it is not agricultural pricing policies that have played 
the major role in the stagnation of aggregate output, but the 
deficiency of investment in agriculture which has had a 
significantly adverse impact on the aggregate growth rate of the 
sector [Esfahani, 1988: 135-6]. The shift from public to private 
investment in Egyptian agriculture in the mid-197 0s meant that 
most of it would have to come from large farmers who were able 
to expand production through more flexible combinations of crops 
[Esfahani, 1988: 217].
In general, there have been low rates of HYV dissemination in 
Egypt, despite generous seed subsidies. Less than 1% of the total 
rice area in Egypt was planted under HYVs in the early 1980s 
[Adams, 1985: 714] . The expansion of Mexican wheat varieties was
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quite rapid in the early 197 0s: from 0.3% of the area in 1972 to 
37% in 1974, but this declined steeply to 12.9% in 1976 (this 
compares with 76% in India and 84% for Pakistan) [Ikram, 1980: 
189-90] .
Improved maize varieties have been introduced since the 1940s but 
have had only limited impact on yields. Indeed there is little 
in the way of genetically improved maize varieties actually used 
by the Egyptian farmer: about 80% of the total area under maize 
is grown in local varieties from farm-supplied seeds. One 
"hybrid" (American Early) is now probably more local than 
improved by current standards. It is also probable that many of 
the varieties identified as hybrid are in reality seed which has 
been derived from hybrids rather than true hybrids [Fitch, 1983: 
13-4; Basheer, 1981: 5].
In general, farmers do not have adequate knowledge of what seed 
is available from the cooperatives. Morsi [1982: 242, table 6-19 
and 20] reports that the proportion of small farmers with 
information on modern technology, but who were unable to adopt 
were 13-22% of his sample and the small farmers who had tried 
modern technology were only 17-2 0% of the sample. Hopkins et al. 
[1982: 113-4] report that less than 15% of respondents in their 
study had heard of the Soil Improvement Organization and a 
quarter of those did not think it did any useful work. The 
extension worker fared even worse: 87% of farmers felt that he 
had given no information to them.
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The reasons advanced for the low adoption rates for HYVs include 
the fact that these require heavier doses of other inputs such 
as fertilizer, irrigation water, and more careful handling, but 
the supply of fertilizer and seeds has been insufficient. While 
the gross returns are higher for the new varieties, the net 
returns are less than for the traditional local varieties. 
Harvest timing is more critical with greater potential losses. 
Ikram [1980: 225] states: "family settlements in the new lands
failed because the technology developed was not suitable for 
small farmers"
Production of HYVs was confined to large farms and areas
cultivated under the Land Reform administration [Morsi, 1982:
52], Fitch [1983: 64] reports that trials tend to be held on 
larger farms and therefore may not be representative of typical 
farming conditions: "The fact that trial farms tend to be larger, 
and trial farmers better educated than the average, suggest that 
they may enjoy certain advantages which others do not. In 
addition to having better access to tractors for ploughing, trial 
farmers may also have advantages in the acquiring of seed and 
fertilizer; the fact that they are more timely in their
application of nitrogen may reflect that supplies at the
cooperatives are more available to them." Similarly with
livestock feed subsidies which primarily accrue to large private 
producers and to the public sector, not to the small farmers who 
own 80-90% of the country's livestock [Richards, 1989: 4].
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Antle [1982: 71, table 2-1] shows substantial growth in the local 
production of nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers in Egypt in the 
period 1965-78. In 1982-3, nitrogen fertiliser production 
capacity was 727,000 tons per annum with actual production of 
666,000 tons produced by four local companies. Phosphate 
fertilizers are produced by three companies in Egypt with 1982-3 
production reaching 127,000 tons [Kaldas, 1984: 2-3].
With the massive increase in fertilizer subsidies over the 1970s 
[Antle, 1982: 78, table 2-8], fertilizer consumption in Egypt
grew rapidly.2 The growth of fertilizer consumption decelerated 
in the 1980s but remained at high levels: indeed Egypt uses more 
fertilizer per cultivated acre than any other country except 
Japan - so high that the ecological sustainability of such 
practices is being increasingly questioned [Richards, 1989: 12] . 
However, while Egypt has very high rates of fertilizer 
consumption, the figures on annual fertilizer consumption do not 
indicate actual patterns of fertilizer use. Adams shows that 
small peasants facing a shortage of liquid resources regularly 
sell cooperative-supplied fertilizer to rich peasants for cash 
instead of using it themselves [1986: 51-2] .
Egypt is mainly dependent on imported pesticides with domestic 
production limited to one government owned plant [Schutz, 1987: 
4] . Use is not widespread as the expense of unsubsidized 
pesticides discourages small peasants from using them. Rich 
peasants growing fruit and vegetables however, do use them 
[Adams, 1986: 225].
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Mechanization is the most obvious example of an increase in the 
level of the productive forces, together with new crops and 
techniques such as pesticides and fertilizer use. It has clear 
implications for the penetration of capitalist relations into 
rural areas in terms of the participation of the village in the 
market and in terms of the organisation of productive labour 
within the village framework. Hopkins writes: "There is certainly 
a sense in which one can say that mechanization of agriculture 
is the 'locomotive' of changes in the Egyptian countryside." 
[1981: 45]
The diffusion of farm mechanization in Egypt has followed the 
typical sequence found throughout the developing world, in which 
power intensive operations are mechanized first. Egyptian 
mechanization basically means ownership or use of an irrigation 
pump and tractor with ploughing and threshing being the 
operations most likely to be mechanized [Hopkins, 1982: 93-4].3 
Most mechanization has been tractorization, but use of grain 
threshers and irrigation pumps has become increasingly common 
[Richards, 1989: 63; Imam, 1983: 2] . Mechanization spread rapidly 
in the 1970s with the stock of tractors growing at 7.8% per year, 
then decelerating to 2.8% per year during the 1980s.4 Tractor 
production began in Egypt in 1961 in a joint venture with 
Yugoslavia (which was halted during 197 0-4) and then Romania from 
1972 and later Canada [Khalil, 1981: 12] . But the industrial
capacity for domestic manufacture of modern farming equipment 
remains limited in relation to imported units, some financed by 
aid [El Sahrigi, 1984: 12] .5
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As we saw in Chapter VII, Commander's Sharqiya village was 
characterised by an abundance of agricultural machinery and 
mechanical energy widely diffused for power-intensive activities 
[1987: 55-6]. But the diffusion of mechanization throughout Egypt 
has been very uneven. The level of mechanization varies 
considerably even from one village to the next [Hopkins et al., 
1982: 93] . While some 66% of the cultivated area is ploughed by 
tractors, mechanised seedbed preparation has reached less than 
half of the area on farms less than one feddan [Imam, 1983: 3].
The benefits of tractorization can be seen in terms of increasing 
cropping intensity and yields, providing more flexibility in the 
cropping pattern, timeliness, and cost savings. In the early 
1980s, Richards [1981: 414-5] did not see much scope for
mechanization increasing cropping intensity in Egypt, but did 
admit that: "Perhaps mechanization will increase the cropping
intensity of rich farmers. These crop less intensively than their 
smaller neighbours because of the problems of supervising and 
controlling a large hired labour force." This is precisely what 
brings about the breakdown in the inverse relationship.
Yields have also been improved by mechanization. Hopkins et al. 
[1982: 131] found in their study that the Gharbiya and Qalubiya 
villages reported higher yields than those in Buheira and Minya: 
"In general this pattern corresponds to the pattern of highly and 
poorly mechanized villages." Of course, what is important are the 
factors which led to the differences in mechanization levels in 
the first place. Indeed, they found that the variation in levels
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of mechanization between villages was much more significant than 
the variation between crops and higher mechanization associated 
with higher yields [1982: 235].
Sahrigi et al. [1984: 8, table 2] show substantial net benefits 
per feddan from mechanization in terms of animal loss recovery, 
labour cost savings and increased production. They found a wide 
range of modern farm equipment was associated with net benefits: 
mower binders [1985: 33] reduced labour costs and increased
timeliness of operation, and mechanized threshers also [1985: 
40] . Seed drills produced yield increases [1985: 49] and
increased seed loss recovery while reducing labour costs [1985: 
52] . Mechanical irrigation pumps released animal power to
increase milk and meat yields and also helped large farmers to 
avoid labour supervision problems in saqiya6 rings [1985: 59]. 
Mechanized tillage led to yield increases and savings in labour 
time in cotton cultivation [1985: 69], and Imam [1983: 15]
reports improved yields for mechanized tillage in Upper Egypt for 
maize and for cotton. Scale economies were also important 
factors, with large pumps above 7.5 hp more economical to use 
than small 5 hp pumps [El Sahrigi, 1985: 64] , while combine
harvester use produced losses on small farms, but were feasible 
on large farms over 5 feddans [1985: 28-31].
Thus, in this section, we have seen evidence of considerable 
technological change in Egyptian agriculture, but this change has 
been uneven both regionally, and in terms of control and
diffusion of benefits which have been skewed towards the large
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farmers. These benefits have been real and positive, and may have 
allowed the larger farmers to reap significant productivity 
advantages. We shall see in the next section how this is 
reflected in the data through a heterogeneous pattern with 
respect to the inverse relationship.
9.4 Analysis and results: (iii) A disaggregated analysis and
evidence of transition
It remains to choose an appropriate technique to test the 
relationship between farm size and the other dependent variables. 
For parametric tests the choice of regression specification lies 
between the conventional linear, log-linear and semi-log etc. As 
there is no a priori reason to select any particular 
specification, we employed the same technique as Radwan - the 
log-linear regression. The specification of the regression 
equations is the same in all cases: log y = log a + b log x where 
(x) is always operated area and (y) is the indicated dependent 
variable.
When running regressions at the governorate level, we first 
notice the heterogeneity of rural Egypt in terms of production 
conditions: cropping patterns, levels of commercialization and 
mechanization. The results are presented in Table 69 in Appendix 
A. The governorate-wise analysis of the relation between farm 
size and output per net cropped area reveals that Egypt is 
undergoing a process of transition. For net yields (yl), based
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on total crop values, we find that a significant inverse 
relationship exists only for two governorates: Menufiya and Giza. 
Negative but insignificant relationships exist in Beni Suef, 
Dumyat and Gharbiya, but in Qena the relationship is positive. 
Even for net yields (y4) , based on net farm output, we find that 
while the relationship is negative for all governorates, those 
for Qena and Beni Suef are statistically insignificant. Again, 
using corrected net yields (y6) , we find that the inverse 
relationship is significant only for Giza while the other 
governorates are only weakly negative and that for Qena is 
actually positive.
This pattern is more sharply brought out by regressing output per 
gross cropped area on farm size. For gross yields (y2) , based on 
total crop values, we find weak inverse relationships only for 
three governorates: Dumyat, Giza and Beni Suef, while for Qena 
governorate the relationship has become significantly positive 
at the one per cent level. Gharbiya and Menufiya show weak 
positive relationships. For gross yields (y5), based on net farm 
output, we find significant negative coefficients for Gharbiya, 
Dumyat and Menufiya, but for Beni Suef and Giza only 
statistically insignificant negative coefficients, and for Qena 
the regression coefficient is positive. Regressing corrected net 
yields (y7) on operated area we find only one significant result: 
a positive coefficient for Qena governorate. Gharbiya and 
Menufiya have statistically insignificant positive coefficients 
while the other three have weak negative ones.
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These results show a clear and important departure from the 
results obtained by Radwan and others. While it is common to find 
neither significantly positive nor negative signs in the relation 
between farm size and output per gross cropped area, the fact 
that we have obtained significant positive coefficients means 
that either due to cropping patterns or yields of individual 
crops, large farmers have achieved important advantages. Since 
the use of gross cropped area tends to eliminate differences in 
cropping intensity it would be interesting to see whether small 
farmers have retained their traditional superiority with higher 
cropping intensities than large farmers. Regressing y3 (cropping 
intensity, equal to the ratio of gross cropped area to net 
cropped area) we do find that the traditional pattern has been 
retained. Regression coefficients for all governorates are highly 
negative. For Dumyat, there was no variation across farm size 
with the cropping intensity 2 for all fifteen farms. However, the 
fact that the inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity has in many cases disappeared, despite greater 
cropping intensities on the smaller farms, tends to confirm the 
importance of cropping patterns and yields for individual crops. 
It should further be emphasised that cropping intensity remains 
an inadequate measure of land utilization. The possibility that 
large farmers choose a cropping pattern with longer average 
growth periods, and that the inverse relationship associated with 
cropping intensity neglects these differences in cropping 
patterns cannot be ruled out.
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As far as yields for individual crops are concerned, we ran 
regressions for winter wheat and clover, cotton, maize, rice and 
sugarcane separately (these crops account for over nine tenths 
of crop production in Egypt) . For wheat (y8) , we find a 
significant inverse relationship (at the 10 per cent level) only 
for Giza, while in Qena we find a significant positive 
relationship. All the remaining governorates have insignificant 
coefficients. Birseem yields (y9) exhibit a significant inverse 
relationship for Dumyat, Menufiya, and Giza (again at the ten per 
cent level) while the relationship is statistically insignificant 
for the other governorates. For cotton (ylO), there is no clear 
relationship: yields vary inversely with farm size in Beni Suef 
and in Gharbiya, but the relationship is only significant at the 
ten per cent level, while there is no variation across farm size 
in Menufiya. None of the sample farms in Dumyat, Qena or Giza 
plant cotton during the summer season. Summer maize yields (yll) 
show no significant relationship across farm size, although the 
coefficient for Qena is positive. For rice (yl2), the 
coefficients are all positive, but insignificant. In our sample, 
only Qena has land under sugarcane (a Sa'idi crop and one 
typically grown on large farms with an annual cropping cycle) and 
yields (yl3) exhibit a significant positive relationship with 
farm size.7
On the whole, the governorate regressions indicate a more 
heterogeneous pattern of the relationship between farm size and 
productivity, possibly reflecting the process of change that the 
national all-Egypt regressions do not reflect. Ranking the
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governorates from those with the strongest positive relationship 
between farm size and productivity to those with the strongest 
negative relationships we find the following order: Qena,
Menufiya, Gharbiya, Giza, Beni Suef, and Dumyat. We must now 
attempt to relate these findings to other factors in the process 
of agrarian transformation in Egypt. We have calculated several 
alternative indices of relative levels of "progressiveness" 
ranged in Table 70, Appendix A.
In these tables, Qena which as we saw exhibited positive 
regression coefficients for the relationship between farm size 
and productivity is ranked consistently highly for all four 
indices, which reflect the level of use of both Green Revolution 
inputs and total purchased inputs. The same holds true for 
Minufiya, whereas Dumyat with strong negative coefficients in the 
regressions is here ranked consistently at a low level. The other 
three governorate rankings vary according to whether we use 
indices based on total crop values or on net farm output.
For the ratios of purchased to own produced inputs we find again 
that Qena is ranked consistently highly. High fertilizer use is 
closely correlated with the cultivation of HYV crops. Fertilizer 
use is high in Beni Suef also, reflecting the traditional 
variation in the use of fertilizer for cotton (use of fertilizer 
for cotton increases from north to south with good yield 
responses due to higher temperatures and better drainage), The 
high seed ratios for Giza can be explained by its location in the 
Cairo vegetable zone in which market gardening is the predominant
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activity. We can see that for all governorates, birseem purchases 
are only a fraction of self-cultivated fodder, but again Qena 
shows the highest level of purchase of this input.
Turning to the mechanization indices, we find that the 
governorates of Dumyat and Giza are ranked bottom while Gharbiya 
is at the top. Qena and Menufiya are also ranked in the top three 
positions. In Tables 61 and 70, which present figures for 
tractors and other agricultural equipment by governorate, we can 
see that Qena and Gharbiya are ranked highest for tractors, 
ploughs and trailers while Qena has by far the highest level of 
mechanical power for irrigation. By contrast, Beni Suef fares 
consistently badly as far as this table is concerned.
Thus, the results of the regression exercises on the sample 
households reveal a more regionally differentiated pattern of the 
relationship between farm size and productivity, which when 
compared with the indices of progressivity, appear to reflect a 
more heterogeneous process of transition taking place. In those 
areas of progressive agriculture, such as Qena, with high levels 
of technology use, we find that the inverse relationship has 
turned positive while for regions where the impact of the new 
technology has been limited, such as Beni Suef and Dumyat, the 
inverse relationship remains negative and significant. The other 
governorates present an intermediate picture, with Menufiya and 
Gharbiya tending, on the whole, to show a high level of progress 
and weakly positive coefficients on the size-productivity 
relation, while Giza tends to reveal signs of backward
309
agriculture still predominating and a strong inverse 
relationship.
Summary and conclusions
Thus, on the basis of the evidence in this chapter, we might 
suggest a plausible hypothesis for the impact of agrarian 
transformation on the relation between farm size and 
productivity. We have found in the Egyptian rural sector striking 
parallels with the process of agrarian transition in India, with 
regard to the technological factors. The heterogeneous pattern 
of technological change in Egyptian agriculture is mirrored by 
the pattern of occurrence of an inverse relationship between farm 
size and productivity. Where technical change in agriculture is 
at a relatively undeveloped stage, we appear to have evidence of 
a significant inverse relationship. In those regions where 
technical change is relatively more advanced, the inverse 
relationship is absent. We can advance the hypothesis, on the 
basis of the evidence in previous chapters, that technical change 
in these latter regions has led to the breakdown of a previously 
existent inverse relationship.
The 'traverse' from Giza to Qena, representing a development of 
the forces of production both determines and is determined by the 
development of the relations of production. In particular, rich 
peasants, either as proto- or fully-developed capitalist farmers 
monopolise productive resources and dominate access to the new
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technology through their control of the cooperative and rural 
credit systems. The utilization of this new technology 
accelerates rich peasant accumulation and deepens the process of 
social differentiation. The productivity advantages thus gained 
lead to a structural reversal in the size-productivity 
relationship characteristic of a relatively backward agriculture.
However, there is little more we can say on these political 
economy aspects at such a relatively high level of aggregation 
(governorates are certainly a more reasonable level of 
aggregation than Egypt as a whole, but still exhibit significant 
heterogeneity with respect to both soil quality and technical and 
social change). In order to explore these aspects in greater 
detail, we carried out fieldwork in two of the villages contained 
in the ILO study in the summer of 1990. The results of this 
analysis are presented in the following chapter.
Notes to Chapter IX
1. I am greatly indebted to Samir Radwan, Chief, Rural Employment 
Policies Branch, Employment and Development Department, 
International Labour Office, in Geneva, for providing me with the 
original data on which his joint study with Eddy Lee on the 
anatomy of rural poverty in Egypt was based. Many thanks are also 
due to his colleagues Albert Wagner and Patrick Cornu for 
preparing the SPSS-X tape files and instructions. I appreciate 
immensely the enabling help of Ajit Ghose, formerly at the ILO 
and Ruchira Chatterji, formerly in SPS, Cambridge University.
2. See Richards [1989: 63, Appendix, tables 6A and 6B] who shows 
the intensity of chemical fertiliser use and growth rates between 
1972 and 1988: the nitrogen use index rises from 100 to 493; and 
the phosphate index rises from 100 to 384. In the 1970s, 
fertilizer prices were only between 41 and 61 percent of world 
market prices [Adams, 1986: 53] .
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3. See Richards [1989: 63, Appendix, table 15] who presents
details of the spread of mechanization by agricultural operation 
in 1982: 90% of ploughing and 62% of irrigation activities are 
mechanisd. See also ERA 2 0 00 [1979: 8.5, table 8.1] which shows 
machine use by operation.
4. See Richards [1989: 63, Appendix, table 14] who presents
figures for the growth in the Egyptian tractor park and combine 
harvesters over the period 1971-86: the tractor park increases 
from 17,556 to 44,000; and the number of combine harvesters rises 
from 1,750 to 2,250.
5. See Khalil [1981: 14, table 3] who presents figures for
domestic tractor production, reaching only 306 for the Yugoslav 
model and only 160 of the Romanian type in 1978-9. These were 
swamped by imports of 6,061 tractors in 1977 [1981: 16, table 3- 
2]. Khalil [1981: 10] gives details of aid funds for
mechanization in the early 1980s: $32 million from the IBRD, $1.7 
million from USAID and $5 million from Japanese AID.
6. This is a traditional form of waterwheel irrigation operated
by a group of farmers.
7. The regression equation for sugarcane yields (yl3) was:
log yl3 = 0.915 + 0.049 R2 = 0.029
n = 63 
t = 1.35*
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CHAPTER X
A closer look at the inverse relationship in the context of 
agrarian transition: evidence from fieldwork in rural Egypt 
Introduction
In order to test the various hypotheses associated with the 
inverse relationship in the context of agrarian transition, 
further fieldwork was required at a more disaggregated level than 
the ILO data permits . Two village surveys were carried out in the 
summer of 1990. On the basis of the results from the ILO data, 
a village was chosen from Qena governorate which was expected to 
show a positive relationship between farm size and productivity. 
A second village was chosen from Giza governorate which was 
expected to shed light on the inverse relationship.
Section 10.1 describes how the fieldwork villages were selected, 
the survey methodology employed and some of the problems 
associated with the data. Section 10.2 analyses the data for the 
Giza village, and section 10,3 shows how and why an inverse 
relationship arises in that village. The following section 10.4, 
analyses the data for the Qena village, showing how the inverse 
relationship has broken down there. Finally, in section 10.5, we 
compare the results in the two villages, within the wider context 
of the political economy of the Egyptian countryside.
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10.1 Fieldwork methodology and problems
The first task was to select the appropriate villages from the 
ILO survey for further analysis. Clearly, on the basis of the 
results in the previous chapter, Giza governorate presented the 
strongest evidence for an inverse relationship between total crop 
output per net cropped area and farm size. This governorate also 
showed a weak, but statistically insignificant negative 
relationship when crop output per gross cropped area was used in 
the yield calculations. We have also seen that Giza ranked 
consistently low in the tables for indices of "progressivity", 
particularly in terms of new technology use and mechanization.
Qena governorate, on the other hand, provided clear and strong 
indications of a positive relationship between farm size and 
productivity: a positive, but statistically insignificant
regression coefficient using net yields, and a much stronger and 
statistically significant positive coefficient when gross yields 
were used. This governorate ranked consistently high on the 
indices of "progressivity", particularly with regard to machine 
use. These two governorates then would be the starting point.
It was possible to disaggregate the ILO data one further stage, 
down to village level. At the village level though, sample size 
was too small in most cases to be a reliable indicator of the 
strength and direction of any relationship between farm size and 
productivity. Thus, attention was directed only to those village
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samples of adequate size. The two largest samples were from the 
village of Shubak al-Sharqi in Giza governorate (151 households, 
68 of them with an operated area) and the village of Higaza in 
Qena governorate (12 9 sample households, 3 8 of them with operated 
holdings). The disaggregated ILO data is presented in Table 71, 
Appendix A.
The village of Shubak al-Sharqi revealed a statistically 
significant inverse relationship when net yields were regressed 
on farm size, and a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between cropping intensity and farm size. The three 
villages in Qena governorate all show no relation between farm 
size and output per acre, although it may be significant that the 
strength of the positive relationship increases as we move from 
net yields to gross yields, despite significantly higher cropping 
intensity on the small farms. Note that the Al-Amiriya results 
differ, but the sample size is too small to really tell us very 
much. Higaza, with the largest sample size provides the most 
robust results. Therefore, the two villages Shubak al-Sharqi in 
Giza and Higaza in Qena governorate were selected for more 
detailed fieldwork, the former expected on the basis of the ILO 
results to be an inverse relationship village, and the latter one 
in which the inverse relationship had broken down.
Both villages had the additional advantage that they were more 
suitable logistically in terms of access. The fact that Shubak 
was only an hour's drive from Giza, and Higaza an hour and a half 
from Luxor greatly facilitated the fieldwork in terms of
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accommodation and transport. The Giza governorate Ministry of 
Agriculture on the Pyramids road was some 3 0 minutes taxi drive 
from Cairo. From Giza, the ministry vehicle took us down the east 
bank of the Nile past the pyramids at Saqqara on the desert 
horizon. Some 3 0 kilometres further south we turned off through 
a date palm grove at Shubak al-Gharbi to cross the cantilever 
bridge into Tabbin on the east bank. The village of Shubak al- 
Sharqi lies just to the south of Tabbin.
The journey to Higaza was rather more complicated. From the main 
bus station in Luxor (721 km south of Cairo and 14 hours by 
train), a minibus travels north for 90 minutes to the district 
centre of Qus, where the district Ministry of Agriculture and 
research station is located. From there a 25 minute ride on the 
back of a motorbike brought us to the village of Higaza, some 15 
km to the southeast.
The survey method comprised both formal questionnaire and 
informal interview, as well as limited access to the records 
compiled by the village cooperative and district Ministry of 
Agriculture. A formal structured questionnaire was necessitated 
by the impossibility of actually living in the survey villages. 
It was only possible to visit the villages on a daily basis. The 
local ministries and village cooperative officials frowned on any 
suggestion of staying in the villages for any length of time, as 
the political situation at the time of the visit to Egypt was 
somewhat dangerous, particularly in Upper Egypt.
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The surveys were conducted between June and September 19 90 with 
the help of two assistants loaned by the local ministries of 
agriculture.1 The questionnaire was conducted in Arabic, as were 
the interviews, and can be found in Appendix B.2 Each 
questionnaire interview took an average of an hour to complete. 
The informal interviews were taped and lasted from one hour to 
90 minutes. These covered a variety of qualitative indications 
of the circumstances of the village, village history, locations, 
amenities, and the dynamics of the villages.
Each questionnaire consisted of fifteen pages. There were several 
sections to the questionnaire which was based on the original ILO 
format. The first section covered basic demographic details of 
the household members: age, gender, marital status, relationship 
to head of household, principal and secondary occupations, and 
educational attainment. The second section covered household 
labour: each working member's on-farm work in each season 
(winter, summer and nili) in standardised days, permanent and or 
casual work off-farm, but within agriculture, again for each 
season, and the wage earnings for work off-farm and outside 
agriculture both inside and outside the village.
The third section covered land ownership and operated area of the 
household: land owned, land rented in, land rented out, and
estimated land value. Respondents were asked to give details of 
the terms and conditions under which land was rented in or out 
(for example, whether it was sharecropped land, the level of 
share, and whether cash or kind payments were made) . This section
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also included information on the expansion or diminution of land 
over the previous year, over a five year period and over the 
lifetime of the current head of household, either by inheritance, 
purchase, gift or mortgage.
The fourth section covered the ownership of agricultural 
machinery and equipment: whether fully owned or shared, their 
going market value (on the basis of new for old) , and recent 
additions to the machine stock, while the fifth section dealt 
with ownership of animals: whether fully owned or shared, their 
market value and recent additions or sales. The sixth section 
asked about the ownership of other assets such as vehicles, non- 
agricultural machinery, artisanal tools or non-residential 
buildings, and the income earned from their use. The seventh 
section covered the house itself: type (mud brick or red brick) 
and value, facilities such as electricity, running water, 
sanitation, and building extensions to the house in the recent 
period. The eighth section covered credit transactions: savings 
and loans, and their terms and sources.
The ninth section gathered information on the crop production of 
the household: crop grown, type, season, output, area sown,
quantity consumed on-farm, and quantity marketed with unit price. 
The tenth section covered other income from production: land
rental income, dairy and poultry produce, including on-farm 
consumption and market sales. The eleventh section covered 
production inputs: land rental cost, fodder, machine rental, fuel 
and maintenance, the quantities and prices of chemical and
318
organic fertilisers, insecticides and pesticides, seeds, and 
labour costs for hired labour for each season, with days worked 
and wages. The final section covered input purchases and credit 
from the cooperative system, as distinct from the total inputs 
in the previous section.
Problems of data collection besides the impossibility of living 
in the village to carry out participant observation, included the 
impossibility of collecting data on the labour input of female 
members of the household. Although women are to be plainly seen 
working in the fields, tending to plants or collecting animal 
fodder, almost all respondents claimed that women do not work in 
the Sa'id (Upper Egypt). For female household members to work in 
the field would have been a'eb (disgraceful). Some information 
on child labour was forthcoming, not by the respondents 
themselves, but from some large labour hirers in informal 
interviews (see below).
Another problem was the inability to get good information on 
savings and loans. No respondent would admit to having savings. 
And although information on bank or cooperative loans was readily 
forthcoming, and one or two of the larger farmers gave me details 
of their private borrowing, smaller farmers were extremely 
reluctant to give me any information on borrowing from informal 
sources. The financial status of households has therefore had to 
be deduced from the cash flow of the household and the 
sustainability of their declared incomes and expenses.
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Finally, we need to pursue the important matter of size 
classification. Indeed, the question of size as the relevant 
stratifying variable is to some extent raised by the Giza data. 
This will be discussed below in section 10.2 within the full 
analysis of that data. Here we limit the discussion to the 
question of stratification. Abdel Fadil presents the following 
stratification schema [1975: 41] :
1) landless peasants3
2) poor peasants with less than 2 feddans
3) small peasants with 2-5 feddans
4) middle peasants with 5-2 0 feddans
5) rich peasants/capitalist farmers with more than 20 feddans 
This schema he compares with that presented by Samir Amin [1964] : 
1) landless peasants
2} poor peasants with less than 1 feddan
3) middle peasants with 1-5 feddans
4) rich farmers with 5-2 0 feddans
5) rural capitalists with more than 2 0 feddans
Abdel-Fadil's classification schema can be questioned on a number 
of points. Byres [1977: 266] suggests that the cut-off point for 
the poor peasantry should be 2 feddans, as suggested by the land 
reform legislation's redistribution of land in plots of not less 
than 2 feddans. However, the distribution of plots in this manner 
was dependent on family size and soil quality. Two feddan plots
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would have been characterised by either better soil quality or 
by their distribution to farm households with less than the 
average number of persons. Most respondents in informal 
interviews with the author however were certain that three 
feddans was the minimum size of farm to sustain the average farm 
household. I have further subdivided the class of farms below 
three feddans into those below one feddan, which for all intents 
and purposes are extremely marginal farms, operated by 
practically landless labourers, and those above one feddan but 
less than three who can be classed as the poor peasantry proper. 
Interestingly, as the results show below, while we have high 
productivity on farms from 1-3 feddans, productivity actually 
falls off below one feddan. These latter farms are just too small 
and marginal to sustain high productivity farming.
Abdel-Fadil's category of small peasants is problematic. These 
he describes [1975:41-2] thus: "They usually operate on a family 
basis, and in most cases manage to raise most of their 
subsistence food requirements. In other words, they are under 
somewhat less pressure to resort to 'consumption loans', and 
hence are less indebted to money-lenders". However, as Byres 
[1977:267] points out, these are surely the middle peasants 
identified in the classification schemas of Lenin and Mao, as 
well as those of Alavi and Wolf. We have classified the farms 
between 3 and 5 feddans as middle peasants.
Finally, Abdel-Fadil's middle peasantry with 5-2 0 feddans: 
"Having somewhat larger holdings than that of the 'small
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peasantry', this group is usually more prosperous and employs 
permanent wage labourers to some extent. These peasants produce 
mainly for the market and their crop-mixes normally cover a wider 
and more profitable variety of crops (i.e. cash crops and 
vegetables). In general, their holdings are 'technically' more 
efficient in terms of the use of better irrigation facilities, 
improved seeds and more intensive use of bullock labour and farm 
equipment.
"They generally enjoy a surplus over and above their consumption 
requirements after meeting other fixed money obligations. Often 
these 'middle peasants' are also engaged in other gainful 
activities such as retail trade and money-lending. In other 
words, these farmers have a fallback source of income in case of 
low yields" [1975: 42].
As Byres states [1977: 267] : these appear to be full-blooded, 
archetypal rich peasants, the same stratum as Abdel-Fadil's rich 
peasants with identical class interests. Indeed Abdel-Fadil' s 
mispecifications, as pointed out by Byres, may be structured 
around the mis-identification of rich peasants as capitalist 
farmers. As we have seen in our discussion of the Indian mode of 
production debate, rich peasants are not the same as capitalist 
farmers, although the transformation of such a class into a 
capitalist class is a central process of a successful transition 
to agrarian capitalism. But that transformation has to be 
demonstrated and not simply asserted.
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A central hypothesis of this thesis is that within the uneven 
development of the Egyptian countryside, these rich peasants are 
in many cases not "technically more efficient" based on their use 
of modern technology. On the contrary, in those areas of 
relatively backward agriculture, rich peasants are using 
essentially the same traditional technology as the poor and 
middle peasants, thus generating the circumstances under which 
an inverse relationship arises. Only in those areas where the 
rich peasantry have transformed themselves into a class of 
capitalist farmers will they be more efficient, and produce the 
conditions for a breakdown in the inverse relationship.
10.2 An inverse relationship village in Giza
Giza is a large governorate west and south of Cairo, with an 
estimated 1990 population of 4.265 million and covering an area 
of 85,153 square kilometers. The northern part is a sprawling 
suburb of Cairo, but rural Giza stretches some 750 km down the 
Nile valley. The village chosen was Shubak al-Sharqi in al-Saff 
district, around 35 km south of Cairo (and some 12 km south of 
the Hilwan industrial complex on the east bank of the Nile. To 
the west of the village is the Nile and the main road to Giza and 
Cairo (on the west bank) . On the east is the Saff-Cairo road. Al- 
Tabbin, the nearest town, is 5 km to the north, and to the south 
is the Minya-Shubak road.
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The total village population is around 50 thousand. Shubak 
comprises 711 ha'izeen (farm holdings) . About half the population 
are landless, and the number working in farming has decreased in 
recent years. Many work in the local cement factories and 
foundries which surround the area, while others with greater 
means run private businesses. The mushrif zira'i (agricultural 
supervisor) estimates the proportion of village population who 
actually own and operate land at 15 percent, based on an average 
of 9.5 persons per holding. This of course does not include 
landless agricultural labour.
Many people work full-time in the local factories. A floor 
cleaner can earn LE 40-50 a month. The mushrif was of the opinion 
that a person without land is better off with a factory job 
because they pay regularly, but the agricultural work is 
seasonal, and there are long periods when the farm labourer does 
not work. Some villagers have gone for work abroad in the Gulf, 
most of them aged under 40.4 Those with artisanal skills, such 
as plasterers or coppersmiths, tend to commute and work in Cairo.
There is a sug (market) in the village every Thursday for 
animals, vegetables, and fruit. There are around 500 shops in 
Shubak. There are further trade relations between the local 
villages. Every group of villages in the locality has a market 
with one in al-Minya and Shurafa every Sunday. Ikhsas and Ghamaza 
villages hold a joint market south of Shubak. On the average, 
there is one suq for every two or three villages. A large number
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of people from Shubak own land in other villages. Some rent 
tractors to farmers in other villages.
The local institutional infrastructure in Shubak includes an 
i'timan (credit) cooperative or village bank. There are currently 
only two cooperative staff members, one having died recently. The 
director is located in al-Saff, the district centre, some 25 km 
further south. There is a local government unit in the village, 
headed by an engineer, and there is also a local council, elected 
to serve Shubak and Minya. The Minya unit is fairly large, but 
the zimam (cultivated area) is smaller than that of Shubak, and 
most of the land there is unsuitable for cultivation due to 
sewage outflow. There is a veterinary clinic in the cooperative 
building, but no government machine centre. There is one at Saff, 
and the engineers are located there. The irrigation system is 
supervised by the department in Hilwan.
There is a medical clinic in the village and a hospital in al- 
Saff. Education is catered for by one primary school and one 
intermediate school, and there is a religious college attached 
to al-Azhar. There is no secondary school in the village, but 
there is one in Ikhsas and in Saff. Most of the houses have 
electricity, and 60-70% have piped drinking water. The rest have 
to use the village pump.
The mushrif explained that the village population were originally 
bedouin migrating from the Hijaz in Saudi Arabia. Prior to the 
1952 revolution, the land used to belong to a small elite of
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feudal landlords in large fazab (estates). One large landlord 
used to own over 300 feddans for example. In 1952, the land was 
divided up into smaller plots and distributed to smallholders who 
bought land.
There are still important families in the village of long 
standing, such as the Dawud, Azzam, Maliji and Zeid clans. The 
Dawuds and Azzams were large landowners prior to the revolution, 
and many members of these families hold prominent positions 
locally. Of the cooperative officials in Shubak, one is from the 
Azzam family (the mushrif himself) and the other is from Cairo. 
The director of the local council is Dr. Mohsein Azzam, and 
includes members of the other families.
The village zimam (cultivated area) is just over 1,185 feddans, 
out of a total village land area of around 2,100 feddans. The 
non-cultivated area is accounted for by factory sites and the 
rest of the area is covered by the mudbrick and breeze block 
houses of the village population. A main road runs down through 
the centre of the village which for the most part is unsurfaced 
and turns into a muddy concourse in the rain.
The village exhibits the size-class land distribution shown in 
Table 72, Appendix A. This compares well with the governorate 
level distribution shown in Table 73. As can be seen from the 
table, over 92% of the farms (658 out of 711) are less than 3 
feddans. Three feddans is generally regarded as constituting the 
minimum feasible size in terms of subsistence income. Of these,
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2 63 or 40% are less than one feddan. Over 7 6% of the small farms 
are owner operated (503 farms), and 155 are rented. The former 
account for 77% of the operated area (917 feddans out of 1,185) . 
The 3-5 feddan farms or middle peasant farms account for just 
over 6% of the holdings (44 out of 711 with 3 6 or 82% of them 
owner operated) . These account for 189 feddans or 16% of the 
operated area, of which 81% is owner operated. The farms above 
5 feddans or rich peasant farms are 9 in number or 1.26% of the 
total farms. These farms account for nearly 7% of operated area. 
Note the difference between those 5-10 feddan farms and the one 
farm above 10 feddans. Of the former, half are owned and half are 
rented, with just under half the operated area rented in. The 15 
feddan farm is wholly owned.
Note that this 15 feddan farm, which belongs to the village 
shaykh, the most important village notable, is not the farm used 
in the regression equations or data survey. Unfortunately, the 
shaykh had been hospitalised for some time before the survey 
period and was unavailable for interview. A close family member 
did provide some approximate indications of farm size and output 
over the year, but was unable to provide any details of input 
costs or other expenses. These indications pointed to relatively 
high output per acre, but as the figures were only indicative, 
and not significantly robust, it was decided to exclude them from 
the survey. The ten feddan farm included in the survey is not 
officially registered as ten feddans. It belongs to an important 
family in the village consisting of two brothers and a sister. 
The land is thus registered in three parcels, but it is operated
327
as a single and contiguous production unit, with the respondent 
in overall control.
The cropping pattern in Shubak prior to the revolution was 
dominated by cotton, but 25 years ago after construction of the 
High Dam, the village moved to the current cropping pattern. The 
predominant cropping pattern in the village is three season. The 
winter season (November-February) cropped area is almost entirely 
accounted for by birseem (54%), potatoes (30%), and vegetables 
(14%) including tomatoes, eggplants and haricot beans.5 The 
summer crops (March-August) include maize (60%) and vegetables 
(26%), mostly tomatoes. The short nili season6 (September- 
October) is devoted to millet which is cut green for animal 
fodder (89%) . Only 60% of the net sown area is planted in the 
nili season, predominantly small farms producing their own 
fodder. Birseem is an important animal fodder crop. Poor farmers 
prefer to grow their own birseem as purchased fodder is very 
expensive.
One group of farmers grow potatoes both in summer and winter. The 
summer potatoes are put in the cold store and planted 4 months 
later. Summer potatoes have to be bought in from outside. If 
potatoes were not cultivated in the previous year, the farmer 
cannot get seed potatoes on credit. Those who do not grow summer 
potatoes can obtain seed potatoes only from other farmers who 
have extra bought from the cold store. They cost LE 600-700 per 
ton, while the normal price for harvested potatoes is only LE 
100-200 per ton. A small group of farmers prefer the purchase of
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improved seeds from outside which give better yields than the 
normal red potatoes. These are the yellow Diamond variety 
potatoes. Small farmers do not have enough land or enough capital 
to cultivate potatoes in this way.
With help from the officials in the village cooperative, a 
stratified sample of 69 farm households was drawn, based on the 
size distribution given in the 1981 Agricultural Census for Saff 
district in Giza governorate. This represents approximately a 10% 
sample. The district distribution was a close fit to the village 
distribution which was not available at the beginning of the 
survey. The sample was not random, in the sense that landless 
households were excluded unless they were renting in some 
operated area. The sample was limited to those heads of household 
whose principal occupation was fellah (peasant) or muzari'a 
(farmer) . Furthermore, care was taken to avoid farms with 
significantly below or above average soil fertility. We discuss 
this below when we come to the question of soil quality in the 
village.7
OLS regression of net yields on farm size, without logarithmic 
transformation, for all 69 farms in the sample shows no clear 
relation across farm size. However, following Rudra and Patnaik, 
it is important to examine the data graphically, i.e. in 
scatterplot form, in order to present the underlying pattern of 
the data visually. This indicates a kinked U-shaped average 
curve, with the small farms between one and three feddans and the 
one large ten feddan farm exhibiting high yields.
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Seven outliers were excluded from the subsequent regression 
exercises. These were identified on the scatterplot of net yields 
against farm size. Detailed examination of the residuals and 
computation of Mahalanobis and Cook statistics confirmed that 
these observations unduly distorted the underlying pattern.8 The 
outliers included the ten feddan farm (see below for a fuller 
discussion of this exceptional case), two farms which lost their 
entire tomato crop due to pollution from a nearby cement factory, 
and four highly capitalized farms growing two improved variety 
potato crops per year. Their cropping pattern was significantly 
different from the rest of the sample, with very high yields. 
Their inclusion would have unduly strengthened the inverse 
relationship. Thirty farms in the sample grew a winter potato 
crop, but only 14 grew a summer crop, 13 of which grew both a 
winter and a summer crop. Four of these used improved Diamond 
varieties rather than the normal red potatoes.
Thus, only 62 of the farms surveyed were included in the 
regression exercises. Exclusion of the ten feddan farm was based 
on the grounds that it is a single observation, it is 
significantly different in terms of soil quality, and, looking 
more closely at the data, is a very different type of farm, 
highly capitalised and commercialised. This is also true of four 
of the farms which grow two Diamond potato crops which have very 
high yields and are highly capitalised. Exclusion of these 
outliers produces a scatterplot displaying a quasi-rectangular 
hyperbolic curve, similar to an isoquant, with many of the
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observations lying in towards the origin. This suggests some form 
of target revenue curve.
We also tested for any disjunction between farm size categories 
and those relating to economic scale which according to Patnaik 
are better proxies for class location. We computed Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients (rB) between farm size and gross annual 
output, total annual income, total capital assets, machine stock 
and stock of all productive assets as various indicators of 
economic scale.9 The results obtained show that despite the 
existence of a small group of highly capitalised farms which 
would tend to support the Patnaik argument, farm size and 
economic scale are closely correlated for all definitions of 
economic scale, as far as the village samples are concerned. 
Thus, we continue to use farm size as the relevant stratifying 
variable in our analysis.
OLS regression equation R.l, Table 74, again without any 
logarithmic transformation of the data, but excluding the 
outliers identified above, shows a significant inverse relation 
between net yields (total value of crop output per net cropped 
area) as the dependent variable and farm size.10 The relation is 
significant at the 5% level of confidence. Net yields on the 5-10 
feddan farms are less than two thirds those on the smaller farms . 
This result confirms prior expectations. Regressing gross yields 
(total value of crop output per gross cropped area) on farm size, 
the relationship is insignificant as expected, suggesting higher 
cropping intensities on the smaller size farms (see equation R.2,
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Table 74. This is further supported by the regressions of 
physical yields for individual crops on farm size. Equation R.3 
for winter potatoes shows no relationship between yields 
(measured in qantars per feddan)11 and farm size for the 26 
farms which cultivate this crop. Likewise, summer maize (ardebs 
per feddan)12 and summer potatoes (qantars per feddan) show no 
relation across farm size in regression equations R.4 and R.5. 
Only nili maize (ardebs per feddan) in equation R.6 shows a 
significant inverse relationship (within the 10% level) between 
physical yield and farm size, but given the use of this crop as 
animal feed on the small farms, such productivity comparisons are 
misleading. However, cultivation of a nili crop has significant 
implications for the inverse relationship as we shall see below.
The regression of cropping intensity (the ratio of gross cropped 
area to net sown area) on farm size in equation R.7, Table 74, 
shows clearly that small farms do have significantly higher 
cropping intensities than large farms in Shubak, falling from an 
average of 2.72 on the smallest farms and 2.44 on the farms 
between 1 and 3 feddans to 1.59 on the 5-10 feddan farms (see 
Table 75, Appendix A) . There is also some evidence of greater 
land-use intensity during particular seasons (see Table 76). The 
smaller farms have a stronger tendency to triple crop and 
intercrop summer and winter vegetables. The results confirm the 
existence of a significant inverse relationship between farm size 
and productivity in terms of crop output, the proximate cause 
being significantly higher cropping intensities on the smaller 
farms.
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10.3 The roots of the inverse relationship in Shubak
But what factors explain the higher cropping intensities on the 
small farms? To begin with, we can dispense with the arguments 
relating higher cropping intensities to higher irrigation ratios 
on the smaller farms. While this factor may be important in the 
Indian context, it is irrelevant in rural Egypt. All arable land 
in Egypt has been characterised by 100% irrigation ratios since 
the shift to perennial irrigation with an extensive network of 
canals and tanks from basin irrigation after the completion of 
the High Dam at Aswan in the 1960s. Shubak al-Sharqi has 
historically had access to perennial irrigation, and there is a 
well developed hire market for irrigation pumps in both survey 
villages .13
There is no evidence to support the variant hypotheses that small 
farms have better soil quality or that small farmers possess 
inherently superior management abilities. Soil type does indeed 
differ between the different ahwad (basins),14 The best soil is 
in Hawd al-Gezira, situated west of the Nile, an area of about 
400 feddans. The land on the eastern outskirts of the village and 
near the factories is poor. Poor land is used for birseem and 
good land for potatoes. On the east bank, there are three poor 
ahwad due to their elevation, and yields are weak. Some of the 
land is near the cement factory, and the dust from the plant 
affects the vegetable crops. For two seasons, tomato yields have
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been poor. A qirat of good land can be bought for 3,500 pounds. 
Saline or weak land would only cost LE 600.
However, care was taken to exclude land which was characterised 
by very low or very high fertility from the regression equations, 
in order to isolate this effect. We wanted to compare small and 
large farmers on the same quality of land. Regression equation 
R.8, Table 74, and Table 75 show no relationship between land 
value per feddan (as a proxy for land quality) and farm size. 
Neither is there any relation between family members per feddan 
and land value per feddan as one might expect to find if Sen's 
demographic scenario were operative at the micro level. Despite 
the existence of partible inheritance, families tend to operate 
plots as a single farm, as is the case with the ten feddan farm 
in the sample. The results show that there is no clear pattern 
of land fragmentation over farm size. More significant however 
than the number of fragments per farm is the intensity of 
fragmentation or fragments per feddan. This decreases steeply as 
farm size increases which invalidates this as a causal factor 
behind the inverse relation (see Table 75) . Further, if small 
farmers did have better land quality, this would be expected to 
show up in the physical yields of individual crops. As we have 
seen, this is clearly not the case.15
The same finding undermines the hypothesis that small farmers 
possess inherently superior managerial aptitudes. If this was the 
case, we would expect to see higher physical yields of individual 
crops. Questions of scale, complexity of organisation, and
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supervision costs do not really enter the picture here given the 
relatively small range in farm sizes. There do not appear to be 
any hidden transactions costs involved in hiring or supervising 
labourers, given the control of the farmer over the labour force.
Generally the winter and summer seasons are the busiest for wage 
labour, particularly September when preparation for potato 
planting takes place. The majority of wage labourers are from the 
village. They are supervised directly by the landowners. One 
large farmer interviewed said: "Every week I hire 3 or 4 kids
(less than 12 years old). They pick the vegetables: beans,
aubergines, tomatoes. But for the main work on the land I hire 
adults. Children's wages are around 2 or 3 pounds. In the potato 
season they might get paid in kind: 10 kg of potatoes at the end 
of the day. Adults are paid 6-7 pounds a day, 5 for shorter days. 
Many people are available for work. The men who work are in need 
of money. They work in factories, but work extra time in the 
fields. I get in touch with the workers the night before. I know 
them, so I go to their homes and ask them if they can make it. 
They are not relatives or friends. Some change from year to year. 
As people get older I have their sons. If they are busy I go to 
others until I have enough."
Clearly then, we can say that the suggested qualitative 
differences in factor endowments do not appear to have much 
explanatory power with regard to the inverse relationship between 
farm-size and productivity. The small farms do not appear to 
possess land with better soil quality, nor are they blessed with
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superior management aptitude. At the other end of the scale, 
large farmers do not appear to suffer from diseconomies in terms 
of farm management or problems associated with labour recruitment 
and supervision.
The higher cropping intensities on the small farms do appear to 
be associated however with the intensive application of labour 
inputs on the smaller size-holdings.16 Regression equation R.9, 
Table 74, and the figures in Table 75 show a highly significant 
inverse relation between labour input intensity (standardised 
man-days per feddan per year) and farm size. Labour input 
intensity falls from 3 69 man-days per feddan per year on farms 
less than one feddan to 116 on the 5-10 feddan farms. These 
results would appear to present clear evidence for a labour-based 
explanation of the inverse relationship: higher labour input
intensity on the small farms leads both to higher cropping 
intensities and higher net yields.
However, while we have found strong inverse relationships between 
output per feddan, cropping intensity, labour input intensity and 
farm size, the relationship between labour input intensity and 
output per feddan is positive, but statistically insignificant. 
There is a much stronger positive relationship between cropping 
intensity and output per feddan (see regression equations 7 and 
8 in Table 76, Appendix A).
The Sen hypothesis which rests upon cheap family labour is not 
supported by the data. Small farm labour supply is 9 6% family
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labour as opposed to only 17% on the largest farm which depends 
for 83% of its labour supply on hired labour (see Table 74, 
Appendix A) . However, note the relatively narrow range of 
variation between farms of less than one feddan and 5-10 feddan 
farms with respect to labour use. Although there is a clear 
difference in terms of the nature of labour utilization between 
the small farms and large farms, as can be seen in Table 74 with 
regard to the use of family and hired labour, in fact, there is 
no relationship at all between family labour input over the year, 
the ratio of family labour to total labour, or family labour 
intensity and output per feddan (see Table 76, regression 
equations 9, 10 and 11).
If we disaggregate crop output on a seasonal basis, we find that 
for winter and summer crops, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between yields and size, nor between 
yields and labour intensity (see Table 76, regression exercises 
1 to 6) . In other words, despite the higher land use and 
application of labour by the small farmers during the winter and 
summer seasons, these farms do not achieve higher output per 
feddan. This would tend to suggest that these farmers are in fact 
rather inefficient.
The reason we have then higher output per feddan on the small 
farms is because these latter overwhelmingly utilise the land to 
squeeze in a third seasonal crop, during the nili season. It is 
cropping intensity that determines labour use and higher output 
per acre.
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It might be argued, at one remove, that the additional cropping 
season is a manifestation of the availability of cheap family 
labour on the small farms, but this would be to obscure the 
strong economic compulsions which force these poor peasants to 
intensify cropping and produce an extra nili crop in a struggle 
for income. As can be seen from Tables 77 and 78, Appendix A, the 
very marginal economic circumstances of poverty and debt compel 
poor peasants to intensify cropping intensity and therefore 
labour use. In Table 77, net income (the difference between 
income earned from all sources, including total farm output, wage 
earnings and other income, and paid-out costs) rises from an 
average of LE 1,786 on the farms below one feddan to well over 
LE 14,000 on the large farm over 10 feddans. The increase on a 
per capita basis is even steeper, rising from only 227 pounds on 
the smallest size class to over 2,000 pounds on the ten feddan 
farm. The deficit or surplus is calculated in relation to the 
World Bank poverty line for rural Egypt of 3 65 pounds. We see 
that the poor and marginal farmers operate, on average, deficit 
farms, whereas middle peasants and rich farmers enjoy a surplus. 
Farms below one feddan are too small to support a family, and 
these farms show a much higher proportion of income earned off- 
farm (43%), either in agricultural labour or in a factory job, 
as opposed to the rich peasants who earn only 4% of their income 
off-farm (see Table 78).
Turning to Table 7 9 on average levels of farm debt, the average 
size of loan borrowed on the smallest size class is around 1,000 
pounds for one year. This represents 50% of income and 75% of net
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income. Note that the ten feddan farm actually has a longer term, 
3 year loan, so that on an annualized basis, the loan represents 
only 19% of income and 37% of net income. As we can see from the 
last two columns, the smallest farm size and the largest have 
very similar levels of debt to asset ratios and debt per feddan, 
the difference being of course that the larger farmer has a 
higher and more consistent capacity to repay.
Clearly, the levels of absolute poverty and debt in which the 
poor peasants exist compel them to intensify cropping intensity 
and labour use. But there are also indications in the data of 
other forces at work. Table 80, Appendix A, presents data on 
levels of rent paid. Thirty of the 69 farms rent in land. The 
data show that small peasants on average rent in about half an 
acre or 80% of their operated area. Notice however, that rents 
per feddan are significantly higher on the smaller farms than on 
the larger. The official land rental price is around LE 180 per 
feddan which is what the rich farmer actually pays. The small 
farmers are forced into the illegal private land rental market 
at much higher levels of rent. A feddan for tomatoes, for 
example, can cost between LE 500 and LE 1,000. Animals can also 
be rented on a seasonal basis. A farmer with many animals might 
rent a piece of land to grow birseem, the rent varying with the 
price of birseem. The rental contract is an oral agreement 
between the owner and the tenant. The cooperative would not be 
informed. Again the need to pay that rent, either in cash or in 
kind as in sharecropping, forces the poor peasant to intensify 
land use and labour intensity.
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The fieldwork data is somewhat atypical in that it under­
represents sharecropping arrangements. There are only four farms 
involved out of 69 in the sample, but one respondent confirmed 
in an interview that sharecropping arrangements were a common 
feature of land rental transactions: 1 If I rent land to someone, 
I would do it under the sharecropping system. The returns are 
higher. If the tenant pays money then he might claim rights to 
the land under the land reform laws. But under sharecropping you 
can get your land back easily. I can change the sharecropper from 
year to year depending on the output per feddan. If we share 
half-half, we share half the costs and half the returns. With 
vegetables or tomatoes though, seasonal rent might be used 
because of the high returns, compared to wheat. I need to be with 
the sharecropper in everything. I can't leave him on his own. I 
supervise every stage: ploughing, fertilising, and I work with 
him to harvest the crops (to avoid cheating). The sharecropper 
will accept such deals because he doesn't own any land of his 
own. Even somebody with three feddans with many children will go 
in for sharecropping. I decide all the steps. I supervise. I 
bring the fertilisers, not him. 1
Land rents on sharecropped land do indeed offer high returns to 
the landowner. In Shubak, one middle peasant, owning 3.25 
feddans, rented out one feddan for 3 00 pounds for the year. At 
the other end of the scale, one poor peasant operating 23 qirats 
or 0.96 feddan was paying the equivalent of 495 pounds for half 
a feddan. Another, operating 0.66 feddan, and renting half of 
that on a sharecropping basis for about 140 pounds, was thus
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paying 42 0 pounds per feddan. These compare to cash rentals of 
somewhere between 180 and 300 pounds.17
Finally, we also have some evidence, presented in Table 81, 
Appendix A, of forced commerce and market domination by 
merchants. In terms of the marketed output data, we can see that 
the farms in the smallest size class are marketing a larger 
proportion of their crop output, and total output which includes 
animal products, than the next two size classes, and almost as 
much as the rich peasants above 5 feddans. Clearly the ten feddan 
farm is highly commercialized, marketing some 94% of output.
One respondent explained in an interview: "Generally the smaller 
farmers will see a trader who will take the crops from them. Many 
merchants come here every year. For transport to market, after 
harvest, the merchant will come with big sacks to collect them, 
and camels take them to the main road. Then vans take them to 
market. For farmers growing potatoes, the merchant will come and 
check the quality of the crops. Sometimes though, a farmer keeps 
crops at home, for crisis situations. In a crisis he can sell it. 
But when they sell it quickly, the price certainly drops. If I 
have 100 ardebs of wheat, and the market price is LE 80, I would 
go to the merchant who would take it for probably 7 0 pounds. A 
small farmer in crisis will even sell an animal."
There also appears to be a flourishing parallel market in 
cooperative supplied inputs such as seeds, fertilisers and fodder 
which the large farmers can take advantage of. The same
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respondent explained: "The cooperative will distribute improved 
seeds. Sometimes its obligatory to plant them, but we don't 
always do so. Small farmers in bad financial conditions, might 
sell them on the black market for need of money. If a farmer 
doesn't have enough seeds or fertiliser he would buy from the 
black market. The prices are very high. For example, a bag of 
fertiliser is 8 pounds at the cooperative, but 16 outside. Fodder 
is about 300-400 pounds, but 500-600 pounds outside."
Another explained: "There are farmers who buy from the coop and 
then sell privately. The same for insecticides. It is more 
expensive outside. Farmers if they need money can get 
insecticides from he coop and then sell them. We get forage 
through the cooperative. I might buy 30-40 bags. If someone has 
a goat I sell him 2 or 3 bags for cash. Big traders can buy in 
bulk and charge extra on the price."
Clearly then the poor peasant is suffering not only deep poverty, 
living at or below subsistence levels, but is also subject to 
heavy indebtedness. He is often further locked into exploitative 
relationships with landlords, moneylenders and merchants. Given 
then these economic compulsions, the poor farmers intensify land 
use and labour input in order to achieve a minimum subsistence 
income and to pay back cash obligations.
The fact that the inverse relationship is evident, means that the 
larger farmers have not yet achieved higher yields through the 
application of modern technology. There is no clear relationship
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between HYV seed use and farm size18 nor between the use of 
machinery (owned and hired)19 and farm size (see Table 75, 
Appendix A) . The 5-10 feddan farms have a very low percentage of 
gross cropped area under HYV, but there is no systematic 
variation across farm size overall. While the ten feddan farm 
does have significantly higher machinery inputs, again there is 
very little variation across farm size. The main implements used 
in agricultural production on all farm sizes are the fa's (hoe) 
and sharshara (sickle) . The fa's is used for a variety of 
cultivation tasks such as bunding and furrowing. They cost around 
15 pounds in the village, about the same as a sickle. Every year 
the farmer will buy new ones. The traditional plough which can 
last up to 10 years is also very common, particularly for 
potatoes. It costs LE 100-150. A local carpenter fits the 
ploughshare to the wood.
Twenty-five years ago, irrigation was carried out using the 
tunbur (Archimedean screw), but is nowadays overwhelmingly 
carried out using diesel irrigation pumps. There are 7 9 
irrigation pumps in the village (32 fixed and 43 mobile), all of 
them 7.5 hp, and all privately owned. Only ten fixed pumps 
existed prior to 1960, eight were bought between 1960 and 1965, 
twelve between 19 65 and 197 0, another fifteen between 197 0 and 
1975, and 34 since then.
There is a lifting station from the Nile and it flushes the water 
through the branch canals. The water level is kept high 
throughout the year. The fixed lifting pumps are in Hawd al-
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Gezira. The others are mobile, serving small areas. The 
landowners, both large and small, own the fixed pumps, but the 
large have more. In Gezira, the farms are better off, owning the 
machines than rather than renting them. The owners control the 
use of the pumps, and will rent them out to smaller neighbours 
with 1/4 or 1/2 feddan. The big fixed pumps that feed the canals 
control the irrigation, not the private pumps.
Locally, there are only 8 Romanian-made tractors, 2 of them 65 
hp and 5 of them between 70 an 100 hp. One was purchased prior 
to 1970, two between 1970 and 1975, and five were bought since 
1975. The mushrif zira'i explained: "Tractor rental is through
the Qabdshiya service station as the Hawd al-Gezira is nearer 
than the Saff centre. Tractors are rented by feddan: LE 30 per 
feddan from private families, but from the service station it is 
only LE 20. The tractor comes with a plough. The difference in 
price is due to the fact that, certainly for the families, they 
intend to make more money which is not the case for the 
government which intends to help the farmer."
One farmer explained that he rents a tractor once a year, from 
local people who own it. The owner supervises the tractor, and 
drives it and maintains it. He pays LE 1.5 per qirat or LE 3 6 per 
feddan for ploughing and LE 8 pounds per qirat for cutting up??? 
the earth, as it takes longer. He stated that he would not hire 
the government tractor: "It's not cheaper and it makes for better 
relations if I hire locally from individuals." He also hires once
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a week a medium size irrigation pump at LE 2-3 per hour for 6-8 
hours.
The above data suggest that all farm size classes are utilising 
essentially the same techniques of production, and thus the large 
farms in the middle and lower rich ranges have not been able to 
capture any productivity advantages from the use of new 
technology. Further, as we shall see below, and in Table 84, 
Higaza al-Qibli, where no inverse relationship is present, has 
significantly higher levels of such input use than Shubak, 
particularly as far as the top two size classes {5-10 and over 
10 feddans) are concerned.
10.4 A positive relationship village in Qena
The evidence from Higaza al-Qibli in Qena governorate presents 
a striking difference. Qena governorate, in which the second 
village survey was undertaken, lies some 7 00 km south of Cairo 
in Upper Egypt. Qena is a narrow ribbon of fertile land running 
down both sides of the Nile from Nag Hammadi in the north to Esna 
in the south, a distance of about 200 km. It supports an 
estimated 1990 population of 2.5 million and covers an area of 
1,851 square kilometers. The village chosen on the basis of the 
ILO survey was Higaza al-Qibli in Qus district, halfway between 
Qena town and Luxor. Higaza is situated about 14 km east of the 
Nile near to the desert plateau. There are nearly 14,000 
households in the village. Higaza is a narrow village which runs
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for 1.5 km along the lower edge of the plateau. It is around 40
km from Luxor and 12 km from Qus.
The total village population is approximately 60,000. Some 60% 
of the households are landless, and around 80% of the latter are 
wage labourers. The mushrif explained that most of the young 
people work outside the village. Agricultural work by itself
would not be sufficient to buy certain expensive commodities. In
the seventies, many people went to Iraq or the Gulf to work, and 
labour shortages occurred during that period. Labour hirers had 
to book labour up to one month in advance. Nowadays, however, 
landless labourers queue up for work.
The local institutional structure is dominated by the 
cooperative. It supplies both agricultural inputs and credit, and 
is responsible for the village and its surrounding area. The Qus 
district centre manages 24 cooperatives, including Higaza (there 
were 28 cooperatives 4 years ago) . Each cooperative centre is 
headed by a director, and a number of agricultural supervisors. 
Higaza has three supervisors, one supervisor for each 1,2 00 
feddans. Other smaller cooperatives would normally have one 
supervisor for each 300 feddans. There is a general veterinary 
centre and three machinery workshops for repairs. The latter are 
all privately owned. A workshop attached to the cooperative 
centre is under construction which will cover the whole area. The 
irrigation department is in Qus.
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Each village, including Higaza, has one small medical unit. There 
are some 2 0 primary schools, 2 intermediate and one secondary 
school. Drinking water is available to every house. The pipe 
system was put in by the government. Electrical power comes from 
the High Dam, and is regarded as being the most important 
development in the village. The main market is held every 
Saturday at Higaza. Traders arrive from all the surrounding 
villages with their merchandise. There are around one and a half 
thousand shops, around 600 of them licensed.
The history of Higaza goes back some 400 years when people 
arrived from Hijaz (in Arabia) where they were facing starvation. 
The tribes first arrived at Be'ess. They had problems with the
local people, and so they moved nearer to the edge of the
plateau, which was unpopulated. The Harb and Jouheinah families 
came from Arabia. The Christian families are much older. In the 
19th century, during Muhammed Ali's period, the local bedouin 
settled down.
The structure of landholdings was feudal. The whole district of
Qus was owned by only 4 families. One of them was Christian and
they owned around half of all the land. In 1952, some land was 
distributed under the reform legislation, with a ceiling of 500 
feddans, and later 100 feddans for individual landowners. The 
largest family are the Al Esheish. This family still owns around 
2,000 feddans. The 'umda (village headman) is a member of this 
family and a member of the majlis al-shaab (People's Assembly). 
There are three other important families. The large Christian
347
landlords sold their land to the Al Esheish. They bought estates 
in Cairo and moved there. The major families tie together some 
15 villages in the area, and many own land in more than one 
village.
The important actors in the village are the 'umda and the member 
of the majlis al-shaab who is the uncle of the Higaza cooperative 
supervisor. The latter is a farmer. There is one member of the 
family in the majlis al-shaab and one member in the majlis al- 
shura (local consultative council). Ten people are elected to the 
local majlis, one from each family.
Higaza comprises some 2,080 registered operational holdings, but 
these are actually owned by some 1,650 ha'izeen, The operated 
holdings have a size-class distribution of land much more skewed 
toward the larger farms than in Shubak (see Table 82, Appendix 
A) . As can be seen from the table, 84% of the farms are below 
three feddans, farming 55% of the zimam (cultivated area). Again 
as in Giza, three feddans are regarded as the minimum feasible 
size of farm. Nearly half of the holdings (43%) under one feddan 
are rented on a cash basis. The middle peasant category operates 
181 farms (9%) accounting for 18% of the cultivated area. The 
rich peasants operate 141 farms (7%) , 16 of which are above 10 
feddans, and account for 27% of the land. Note that the 
distribution of land is further skewed by the fact that the rich 
peasants actually farm a proportion of the small rented plots in 
the table. As this distribution was unavailable at the start of
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the survey, we used the statistically similar distribution of 
operated area in Qus district in order to draw our sample.
A stratified sample of 71 farms was selected (or a 4% sample of 
the 1,650 ha'izeen) on the basis of the farm land distribution 
given in the 1981 Agricultural Census for Qena governorate (see 
Table 83). This distribution is more heavily skewed towards the 
larger farmers. Three outliers were identified in the survey 
returns and 68 entered in the regression exercises. One of these 
outliers was a small farmer with 0.67 feddan whose land was right 
in amongst the residential area of the village and suffered from 
particularly low fertility. The two others (0.67 and 2.25 
feddans) had responses that were clearly well outside the range 
of possible yields, but we were unable to return to the 
respondents for correction.
The cropping pattern in Higaza is essentially two season, but 
with a very short nili season overlapping the end of summer and 
beginning of winter. Given summer temperatures of 40-50 degrees 
Celsius, the cropping pattern is dominated by sugarcane 
cultivation which is grown on 42% of gross cropped area all year 
round (in fact a 13 month crop cycle) . Wheat and birseem account 
for 84% of gross cropped area (not under sugarcane) in the winter 
season, while maize and millet or sorghum account for 87% of 
summer gross cropped area. The short nili season is again devoted 
to coarse grain cultivation and cut green for fodder.
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Sugarcane is grown on a 4-5 year cycle. There is spring sugarcane 
which takes 14 months, and summer cane that takes only twelve and 
which is in the ground from the end of March to the beginning of 
April in the following year. A summer crop is cultivated from 
March and a nili crop in October. The land does not get rested. 
With fallow, sugarcane yields can increase to around 80 tons. But 
normally yields are around 50 tons maximum. With copious use of 
fertilisers, yields can be substantially maintained at high 
levels.
Note that the returns to sugarcane are longer term, more so than 
vegetables, for example, which have quick returns. Thus small 
farmers do not grow sugarcane because they need fast returns, and 
cannot afford the high levels of fertiliser input. A specialist 
in sugarcane production at the Cairo Museum of Agriculture also 
explained that poor peasants do not prepare the sugarcane tops 
properly in terms of the required washing and coating, and thus 
suffer lower physical yields. Intercropping takes place on all 
farm sizes with spring vegetables.
Table 84 and regression equation R.10 in Table 74 show that net 
yields per feddan increase markedly with farm size. The relation 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Net yields are more 
than a third higher on the large farms than on the small. There 
has been a clear strengthening of the trend towards higher yields 
on the large farms. As we saw above, the relationship between 
farm size and yields was positive, but not statistiscally 
different from zero in the 197 6 ILO survey. In other words, there
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appeared to be no relation across farm size for the 1976 ILO 
data. That the relationship has become significantly positive 
between 197 6 and 1990, would lend to support to our thesis that 
in the dynamic context, the large farmers' access to credit and 
new technology has allowed them to capture significant economies 
of scale. We explore this further below.
Gross yields in equation R.ll, Table 74, confirm the evidence for 
a positive relation and suggest the continuing presence of higher 
cropping intensities on the smaller farms. Table 84 presents 
figures on cropping intensities and labour input intensities 
which confirms that these are indeed characteristically higher 
on the smaller farms, but note that there is a much narrower 
range of cropping intensities than in the Giza sample. That the 
large farms do have higher net yields despite the higher cropping 
intensities and labour intensities on the small farms provides 
clear evidence that the large farms have achieved important scale 
advantages of some sort.
Again, there is no variation across farm size with respect to 
value per feddan which points to relatively homogeneous land 
quality in the village (see Table 84). The majority of the soil 
in Higaza, around 3,000 to 4,000 feddans, is tina safra (sandy 
clay). The soil nearer Qus is better quality. The ahwad around 
Higaza are poor because the soil is sandy and takes a lot of 
water. The ahwad nearest to the village have the best soil. All 
the respondents were selected from ahwad within walking distance 
of the village centre, thus assuring that soil quality was fairly
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homogeneous in the sample. While fragmentation appears higher 
than in the Giza village, with generally higher numbers of plots 
per farm and higher intensities of fragmentation, this could be 
rather misleading. Plots tend to be contiguous and the cropping 
pattern has a significant influence. Whereas in Shubak, vegetable 
and cereal intercropping produces a patchwork effect of tiny 
plots, in Higaza the cropped area is dominated by vast stretches 
of land under sugarcane and coarse grains. In Qena, land is 
cultivated in a consolidated fashion.
Regression equations R.12 and R.13 in Table 74, show results for 
physical yields of individual crops, respectively wheat and 
sugarcane. Wheat yields (in ardebs) show no trend across farm 
size, but interestingly, sugarcane shows a strong positive 
relationship between yields and farm size. This is highly 
significant - unlike Giza, where all size classes have a similar 
cropping pattern, in Qena there is a noticeable skew towards 
sugarcane cultivation on the larger farms (above 2-3 feddans). 
We find the same relationship between farm size and the use of 
family or hired labour as in Shubak, but Higaza shows much higher 
levels of wage labour utilization, indicating a more dynamic 
labour market (see Table 84).
A large farmer explained the system of labour hiring: "We hire
workers through an agent. We make a deal for cutting and taking 
the crop away. The poor work as labourers. Sixty per cent of the 
villagers have no land and 80% of them work in agriculture. They 
work temporarily for me, not continuously through the year. They
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work until I tell them they are not needed any more. They get 
paid by the day. They start around 7.30 or 8.00am until 2.00pm. 
I never pay them more or less than the going rate. The workers 
are not happy with LE 5. They say LE 5 doesn't bring them 
anything. But when they work from 8.00am to 2.00pm with a half 
hour break, LE 5 is not so bad. They bring their own lunch. I 
tell them when to take a break and when to have lunch. I don't 
use migrant labour.
"If someone has many children he takes them to work with him. 
Children work on stripping the sugarcane, cutting birseem, light 
jobs. They age between 11 and 15 years. They get LE 3 for 
stripping sugarcane. Two pounds for normal days. They work the 
same hours as the adults and work alongside them. The adults cut 
the sugarcane and the kids strip it down. Loading the rail trucks 
takes two kids . The chopper takes 1 with 2 to feed it. Two people 
will be cutting and four stripping. One feddan would need 4 
trucks, with seven adults, giving in total 28 men per feddan and 
16 children."
The construction of the High Dam at Aswan had a major impact on 
agricultural production in the Qena governorate. The mushrif 
zira'i explained: "Before the High Dam, land used to be planted 
with wheat in winter after flooding. No canals existed then and 
flood irrigation used to take place from August to September. No 
reforms happened before the High Dam. But afterwards, we were 
able to cultivate the land 3 times a year. We can irrigate any 
time. Each village has a set period for irrigation."
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The main Qalbiyah canal arrives from Aswan irrigating all the 
regions. Each region is fed by secondary canal branches, 
irrigating all the villages. Each of the secondary canals has 
doors which open in turns. The water is high for 40 days in the 
year (during winter) . Higaza is fed by four canals from the Nile, 
with two filled with water every other week.
Also of importance is that while HYV use and machinery use do not 
vary significantly across farm size in the Giza village, the 
large farms in Higaza (the top two size classes 5-10 and over 10 
feddans) use significantly higher applications of HYV seeds and 
significantly higher machinery inputs than the small farms (and 
also higher levels than similar large farms in Giza, as 
comparison of the data in Tables 75 and 84 shows) . The large 
farms have between 51% and 64% of gross cropped area under HYV 
as compared to around a third for the smaller farm sizes. This 
compares with 13% and 3 9% for the top two size classes in Shubak.
The sample data indicates that whereas in Shubak the use of 
modern agricultural machinery varies little over farm size 
classes, except for the ten feddan farm, there is a clear 
positive relationship between machine use and size in Higaza, and 
overall a higher degree of machine use (see Table 84). Machine 
use is particularly heavy on the rich peasant farms above 5 
feddans. Machine use on the farms above ten feddans is nearly 
eighteen times the level on the smallest farms . And on the farms 
between 5 and 10 feddans, machine use is over 6 times that on the
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farms below one feddan. These ratios can be compared to those in 
Shubak of 2.5 and 0.9 (cf. Table 75).
Note that in Shubak the evidence would suggest that whereas the 
above ten feddan farm can be classed as a capitalist farmer 
(given the indications on labour hire, accumulation and 
investment in modern equipment, and level of commercial 
participation) the farms in the 5-10 feddan class are not 
qualitatively different from the smaller farm sizes. In fact they 
have practically the same levels of technology use as the small 
farms. They have remained rich peasants rather than developing 
into capitalist farmers. The contrast with the Higaza sample is 
clear. There, both the farms above 10 feddans and those above 5 
feddans have high technology utilisation, and in combination with 
the other indicators, would seem to have become capitalist 
farmers, earning high returns.
In fact, figures obtained from the village cooperatives show that 
Higaza does have a significantly higher level of technological 
development than Shubak in Giza. Whereas Higaza is roughly twice 
the size of Shubak, it has 65 tractors, 225 irrigation pumps and 
25 mechanical threshers as opposed to Shubak's 8 tractors, 7 9 
pumps and no threshers. Of the 225 irrigation pumps, the majority 
are mobile (213 as against 12 fixed). The twelve fixed pumps are 
all between 25 and 45 hp. Most (160) of the diesel pumps are less 
than 10 hp, while 38 are between 10 and 12 hp, and 15 are greater 
than 12 hp. Prior to 1960, only the 12 fixed pumps were in 
existence. The first eight diesel pumps appeared in the village
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in the 1965-70 period, and 80 were bought in the 1970-75 period. 
The bulk of the diesel pumps (125) have been introduced since 
1975. The majority of irrigation pumps are owned by the large 
farmers. Twelve of the more powerful pumps are owned by farmers 
with more than 15 feddans, and 213 others are owned by farmers 
with 5 to 10 feddans.
The 65 tractors in existence comprise 45 Romanian, 12 Russian and 
7 other makes. Only one is between 35 and 50 hp, 40 are between 
50 and 7 0 hp, and 24 above 7 0 hp. All appeared in the village in 
the early 1970s. The first was introduced by the cooperative. All 
the rest are privately owned. The first private tractor was 
bought by a large farmer with over 15 feddans. A farmer with 10 
feddans, who guarantees that relatives with 2 0 or 3 0 feddans 
would use it, would buy one. They cost around LE 20,000. Payment 
is made by instalment over a period of 5 years with a 2 5% rate 
of interest.
Small farmers below three feddans hire tractors locally and pay 
about LE 24 per feddan. Normally, farmers rent a tractor twice 
a year for each crop. For machine hiring, the owner decides the 
price and the farmer the use of the machine. The deal is done 
orally. Larger farmers might rent a tractor three or four times 
a year depending on the crop. The owner or his son will drive the 
tractor. Payment for hire can be made up to a year later. A small 
farmer growing sugarcane can wait until they are paid by the 
sugar factory to pay for the hire of machines.
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One farmer explained: "For ploughing, the first pass costs LE 10-
12. The second and third passes are cheaper. Altogether around 
LE 20-25 per feddan. But the traditional plough costs more - 
around LE 30 (plus a packet of cigarettes). A traditional plough 
can do 1 feddan a day, two if the animals are good. But a tractor 
can do up to 5 feddans a day. Soil preparation might take a day 
per feddan, and furrowing a day. Irrigation costs about 500 
pounds per year. For 1 feddan, hire of an irrigation pumps costs 
25 pounds, but if the land is near the canal, it can be cheaper." 
In Higaza there are also 2 5 threshers. The people who own the 
threshers are the same as own the tractors and they are used 
together. For the thresher, hiring is by the hour (LE 30). One 
ardeb of wheat might cost LE 10-12.
This superiority in new technology is also reflected at the
governorate and district levels: Qena has a 1.4:1 advantage in 
tractors (in terms of the 1982-3 stock per 1,000 feddans), a 7:1 
advantage in modern ploughs, a 3:1 lead in threshers, and a 6:1 
lead with respect to irrigation pump horsepower (see Table 61,
Appendix A). In terms of farm use,20 Table 85a shows that Qena
has a 1.6:1 advantage in tractor use, a 2.8:1 advantage in the 
use of irrigation pumps, and a 2.3:1 lead in the use of 
threshers. The differences are more striking at the district 
level. Qus district in Qena has an advantage in farm tractor use 
of almost 2:1, in threshers of almost 2:1, and a massive lead in 
irrigation pump use of over 13:1 over Saff district in Giza. In 
terms of the number of operational units the ratio between Qus 
and Saff is only 1.3:1,
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The ownership of agricultural machinery in Higaza is more heavily 
concentrated in the larger size classes above 5 feddans (see 
Table 85b) . The 1981 Agricultural Census shows that 72% of 
tractor owning or sharing farms are located in the above 5 feddan 
size classes in Qena as opposed to only 55% in Giza. With regard 
to irrigation pumps, 52% of owning or sharing farms are above 5 
feddans in Qena, and just 2 9% in Giza. And 72% of mechanical 
thresher owning or sharing farms are above 5 feddans in Qena, as 
opposed to only 42% in Giza. Clearly, the rich peasant farms in 
Qena have been able to accumulate and invest in new technology 
to a much greater extent than in Giza.
The two areas can be contrasted in terms of their level of 
commercialisation too (see Table 85). Whereas in Saff district, 
58% of the tractors and 67% of the irrigation pumps are rented 
in the private sector (the rest are hired through the cooperative 
system), the respective figures for Qus district are 98% and 92%. 
Some 97% of the threshing equipment is hired through the private 
rental market in Qus as opposed to 80% in Saff. Thus Qus has a 
significantly more developed private rental market for 
agricultural equipment than Saff district.
10,5 The emerging comparative picture and a conclusion with 
regard to the inverse relationship
These results provide us with enough evidence to form a picture 
of what is going on. In an area like Giza, with a relatively low
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development of the forces of production, and with all farm sizes 
using more or less the same techniques of production, the higher 
cropping intensities of poor peasants (less than three feddans) 
which imply higher labour use intensities and higher value 
yields, produce the inverse relationship. Rich peasants (above 
five feddans) have not yet achieved significant scale advantages, 
although they may be expected to do so in time (as can be seen 
for the ten feddan farm which is making some progress).
It might be said that the Qena village, Higaza al-Qibli, shows 
the Giza village an image of its own future. Here, the
significantly advanced level of the productive forces has allowed 
the rich peasants to reap important scale advantages which more 
than counteract the still higher labour and cropping intensities 
of the poor peasant farms. Included here in the development of 
the forces of production is the significantly different cropping 
pattern as well as use of modern inputs.
Some indication of how such rich peasants were able to do this
can be seen in terms of rich peasant domination of the
cooperative and village bank system as well as land resources. 
As we have seen above the leading members of the cooperative are 
large landowners themselves. The sample data (see Table 84) shows 
that, in Higaza, the top two size classes, representing 8% of 
farm households, own 48% of the land, control 91% of credit 
disbursements in 1989-90 and 39% of cooperative supplied inputs. 
In the Shubak sample, they represent 5% of the farms, own 33% of 
the land and dominate 56% of credit disbursements and only 14%
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of cooperative supplied inputs. The mean per capita wealth for 
large farms over ten feddans is fifteen times that of small farms 
in Shubak, but over thirty times in Higaza.
One large farmer described how large farms have easier access to 
credit facitiies: "I have a calf and a cow for milk. The calf
gets fed with birseem. A cow or gamusa costs LE 800-1,000. Not 
all farmers can own animals. Only big farmers could keep a calf. 
To purchase an animal, I borrow from the bank. Big farmers with 
a lot of land could even borrow to buy a tractor. It's easier to 
borrow money. "
While Giza may perhaps represent something of an anomaly, a semi- 
rural/semi-urban governorate producing high value fruit and 
vegetable crops for urban markets such as Cairo, Taylor [1984] 
corroborates the results of the above analysis. She writes that 
land is highly fragmented in the region. Despite investment in 
irrigation pumps and livestock, differentiation of farms along 
capitalist lines has not occurred. Indeed there has been an 
expansion of the peasant sector which she defines as that 
composed of family household production, as opposed to wage- 
labour farming. The nature of the local political economy has 
meant that accumulation of land has been prevented by rapidly 
rising land values while tenants have been able to establish 
security of tenure with low fixed annual rents. Labour migration 
too has hindered the development of a wage-labour market in the 
region.
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The almost counter-intuitive findings of the above analysis are 
also corroborated by evidence produced by Esfahani [1988: 157]. 
He notes that while one would expect mechanization to advance 
earlier and faster in areas near urban centres, the evidence 
shows that the urban and semi-urban governorates are 
characterised by a lesser degree of mechanization than all other 
regions in Egypt and that their mechanization process has started 
rather late {see Table 86, Appendix A) .21 Upper Egypt, on the 
other hand, is characterised by relatively higher degrees of 
mechanical power, more chemical fertilizer use, and less organic 
manure use than other regions. He explains that this unexpected 
pattern of mechanization is mainly due to the differences in 
regional cropping patterns and in policies toward different 
crops: "the expansion of sugar cane in Upper Egypt was strongly
supported by heavy use of fertilizer and machinery from the 
beginning, while the change in the input composition of other 
crops came more gradually. In particular, the development of 
horticulture in the UG [urban governorates] did not require much 
machinery and could more easily use manure in place of 
fertilizer",
Waterbury [1979: 132-4 and 216-8] too has noted the concentration 
of investment projects in Upper Egypt, and PBDAC figures [1989: 
71, table 10] show that the distribution of investment loans by 
governorate on a per feddan and per farm basis have favoured Qena 
more than Giza: Qena farmers received LE 13 0 per feddan and LE 
27 0 per holding whereas Giza farmers received only LE 92 per 
feddan and LE 145 per holding in 1985-6. The latter source [1989:
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8] also mentions a study by El Shohna [1970] which shows that 
Qena and Aswan governorates in Upper Egypt enjoyed a considerable 
share of subsidised cash loans throughout the 1960s due to the 
vast plantations of sugarcane. Adams [1986: 60] mentions that
sugarcane is regarded as a large farm crop and that credit 
advances favour the cultivation of sugarcane: a feddan of cotton 
gets a cash loan of only LE 17, but a feddan of sugarcane gets 
LE 45. Moreover, if the sugarcane grower plants more than 10 
feddans, cash loans rise to LE 160 per feddan from the sugar 
mills.22
A noticeable trend in the cropping pattern in Upper Egypt during 
the post revolution period was the rapid expansion of the 
sugarcane crop at the expense of other crops [Esfahani, 1988: 
137] . Sugarcane is a major industrial crop and its area expanded 
rapidly from 96,000 feddans in the early 1950s to 220,000 feddans 
in 1975 [Ikram, 1980: 192] . The area planted under sugarcane 
increased rapidly under state control by 29% in 1970-3 to 1978- 
81, due to the increased availability of summer water in Minya, 
Qena and Aswan [Radwan, 1986: 157] .
But sugarcane cultivation in Egypt has a longer history. In areas 
of Upper Egypt, the creation of perennial irrigation in the 19th 
century led to the cultivation of sugarcane on a large scale. Low 
population density and the availability of irrigation water for 
a year-round crop like sugarcane gave rise to a pattern of large 
estates (at first royal, then later private). This development 
of agrarian capitalism required more labour for the new cash
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crops, and labour was recruited from the sedenterizing Bedouin 
population in estate villages built up by the landowners for this 
purpose [Hopkins et alf 1981: 9-10].
Most sugarcane was grown under contract to local sugar mills. The 
joint effort by farmer and mill requires a high level of 
technical efficiency and support services (sugar production 
depends not on tons of cane but on sugar content) [Ikram, 1980: 
192] . In the 19th century, local (baladi) varieties were 
superseded by improved Roumi varieties and in the early years of 
the 2 0th century, the Compagnie des Sucreries introduced a new 
variety no.105 from Javanese strains [Foaden and Fletcher, 1908: 
447]. Also the diffusion process for sugar extraction in mills 
took over from the crushing process in hand mills [Foaden and 
Fletcher, 1908: 453] . Schutz [1987: 8] notes that with sugarcane, 
the sugar company cooperates with the Credit Bank for the supply 
of inputs and debt is subtracted from payment (for other crops, 
credit is via the cooperative or village bank).
The government encouraged the expansion of sugarcane cultivation 
by setting prices higher than international prices: in 1985, the 
world price was LE 14 per ton, but the procurement price was 20- 
24 per ton, and in 1988 prices were raised to LE 38-50 per ton 
[Sadowski, 1991: 179]. Returns per feddan to sugarcane are more 
than 400 times that on cotton, and because of its annual rotation 
only rich farmers can grow it [Adams, 1986: 71] . In addition,
rich farmers who plant non-traditional crops like sugarcane or 
grapes can get government subsidized inputs that small farmer
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maize and birseem crops cannot (see Table 87). Thus rich farmers 
are reaping both subsidized inputs and manage to avoid taxed 
crops [Adams, 1986: 73-4].
We are not suggesting here that the results obtained are crop 
specific.23 There is a temptation by some agronomists to 
classify villages according to their main crop (“sugarcane 
villages" or "rice villages" for example). The rational kernel 
underlying this is that each crop imposes a certain rhythm and 
discipline on agricultural production, but it is perhaps too easy 
to exaggerate the influence of a single crop on the total village 
structure. Certainly though, the major cropping pattern will 
imply variations in market involvement and in labour intensity 
[Hopkins, 1981: 43-5] . Thus a major impetus to technical and
social change in Qena was provided by the close relationship 
between sugar capital and sugarcane growers. The sugar mill not 
only locked rich peasants into commercialised agriculture, but 
furthered the process of peasant differentiation by favouring the 
large farms with loans and subsidised inputs.
The sugar factories have a great deal of control over production. 
The sugarcane factory sets up a cutting plan, giving priority to 
the areas with older plantings and ending with the new plantings. 
A farmer growing sugarcane will pay an intermediate agent LE 2 00 
to get all the machines and workers, and take the harvested crop 
to the factory. Then the farmer gets his money from the sugar 
factory. Here too then we have some indication of why Qena 
appears to be characterised by a more advanced agriculture than
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Giza, despite the latter's proximity to the Cairo fruit and 
vegetable market.
Taylor's thesis above that high land values in Giza have blocked 
the accumulation of land on the part of rich peasants/capitalist 
farmers can only be one small part of the story. Indeed, it is 
perhaps the lack of such proximity to the state centre that has 
benefited the rich peasants of Qena. Not only were they subject 
to less supervision in the land reform process, but the state had 
to depend more heavily on the rich peasant/capitalist farmer 
strata in Qena to organise and administer the cooperative system 
in that locality. All these factors may go a long way to 
explaining the relatively advanced agricultural sector in Qena 
as compared with Giza.
The paths of development of the two survey villages echo those 
described and analysed by Hopkins [1987] which we examined in 
Chapter VIII. Two paths of agrarian transition in Egypt are 
delineated: a capitalist path (using hired wage labour and
machinery) and a path dominated by petty commodity production 
with small farmers producing for the market and agriculture 
becoming increasingly marginalised. These two paths are 
manifested in variant forms of village development: 1) land
reform villages which have moved in the direction of 
intensification of petty commodity production; and 2) villages 
in which capitalist agriculture and the emergence of capitalist 
relations of production based on the use of wage labour and 
modern agricultural equipment have appeared.
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The village of Shubak al-Sharqi falls into the first category. 
Land reform in Shubak has created a situation in which less 
social differentiation and elite land accumulation has occurred. 
Thus, land reform has actually had the effect of slowing down 
capital accumulation, inhibiting saving and investment. Shubak 
has been characterised by small scattered land possessions 
prohibiting the application of modern technology and leading to 
the fragile formation of capitalism. Land fragmentation has 
weakened the ability of large farmers to adopt new agricultural 
methods, slowing down the intensification of capital utilization.
The village is dominated by middle and rich peasant farms which 
have not developed into capitalist farmers. These farms are not 
fully commercialised and operate with essentially the same 
techniques of production as the poor farmers with less than three 
feddans of land. Clearly, the evidence from Shubak shows us that 
the larger farmers are not qualitatively different from smaller 
farmers, but only quantitatively differentiated.
In contradistinction, Higaza clearly falls into the capitalist 
path category. This village has a relatively greater 
concentration of land, a larger area and population, and higher 
levels of new technology use, particularly mechanization. The 
cooperative system was dominated by the rich peasants allowing 
the large farms to accumulate land and other means of production 
such as machinery. Thus, Higaza has exhibited a different outcome 
with increased social differentiation and the potential 
disappearance of the small farmer rather than his survival.
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Higaza has also benefited from development efforts in the form 
of loans for machinery and other modern inputs because of its 
integration into an industrialised agriculture dominated by sugar 
capital. The mode of production has changed because capital has 
penetrated the village and changed the system of production 
instead of being merely externally imposed via market relations. 
The middle and rich peasant family farms have given way to 
capitalist enterprises organized by the family, but based on wage 
labour and capitalist accumulation, manifested in the intensive 
use of machine inputs.
What implications can we draw from this for the inverse 
relationship between farm size and farm productivity, and its 
suggested policy implications such as redistributive land reform? 
The Egyptian evidence supports the hypothesis that in the static 
context, the inverse relationship is not the product of superior 
efficiency on the part of small farms nor is it due to better 
quality land on the small farms, but arises from the desperate 
struggle of poor peasants for survival on below-subsistence plots 
of land in a relatively backward agriculture, and the matrix of 
exploitative relations within which they operate. Redistribution 
of land on the basis of the inverse relationship argument 
therefore, far from alleviating poverty and creating employment 
opportunities, will only deepen and perpetuate extreme levels of 
exploitation and poverty.
Furthermore, in the dynamic context of the development of both 
the relations and forces of production, in the shape of the new
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technology, the inverse relation is likely to break down and 
disappear. Rich peasants are able to capture the gains from the 
new technology, and with increased accumulation develop into 
capitalist farmers, The evidence from the village of Higaza would 
tend to support this thesis. Thus, the inverse relationship 
argument for land redistribution no longer has any rationale in 
the context of changing production conditions within Egyptian 
agriculture.
Notes to Chapter X
1. The Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture was very helpful. One 
assistant was from the Giza Ministry of Agriculture, Statistics 
Division, and the second, an extension worker from Qus district 
Ministry of Agriculture. The Village Cooperative and Bank staff 
were also of immense help. I was present at over 60% of the 
interviews in Shubak al-Sharqi and 34% of the interviews in 
Higaza al-Qibli.
2. A trial run was conducted in Shubak before the start of the 
survey proper in order to sort out bugs in the questionnaire and 
train the research assistants in obtaining robust responses. 
Numerous cross-checks were required in different parts of the 
questionnaire, particularly in the sections on production for 
both output and inputs. For the section on labour inputs, a 
negotiated response was often required, given the difficulties 
associated with the respondent's memory and the concept of 
1 standardised work days". The formal questionnaire sessions were 
conducted with the head of household, sometimes with other family 
members present. Most of the Shubak sessions took place at or 
near the village cooperative building. No cooperative staff were 
present during these sessions. The sessions in Higaza were either 
conducted in the household itself or in the field under a tree. 
Again no cooperative staff were present.
3. Given the main aim of our survey to examine the inverse 
relationship, we excluded landless labourer households from our 
survey s amp1e.
4. Return migrants use their savings to build a house or purchase 
land. The returnee has also earned the financil status to marry. 
The average bride price locally is around 4-5 thousand pounds.
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5. While vegetable cultivation is not subject to price controls 
with payments direct to the grower, it does suffer from high 
price instability and crop wastage [Harik, 1979: 193].
6. The nili season was historically the Nile flood period. Since 
the introduction of perennial irrigation, many farmers, 
particularly the small farmers, now use this period to cultivate 
extra animal fodder crops. This is of immense importance for the 
inverse relationship as can be seen below.
7. In fact three such farms crept into the sample and were 
excluded from the regression equations. See the details of these 
farms in the text.
8. Cases that have unusually large residuals or atypical values 
of the independent variable can have a substantial impact on the 
regression results and need to be identified. Studentized 
residuals allow identification of outliers. The Mahalanobis 
distance is a measure of the deviation of cases from average 
values of the independent variable. Even when a residual is not 
particularly large, certain observations can influence the 
regression parameters. Cook's D identifies an influential point 
by considering changes in residuals when the suspected case is 
omitted.
9. We computed Spearman rank correlation coefficients to compare 
ranking of farm size and a set of other variables suggested as 
being closer proxies for class location: total output, total 
income, total capital assets, machine stock and total stock of 
productive assets. This was done for both village samples.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rs) is computed in the 
following way: rs - 1 - [ 6 .Xd2] / [n (n2 - 1)], where d is the
difference between the ranks assigned to the variable 
observations being compared, and n is the number of pairs of 
observations. The values of rs range from -1 to +1. A value of +1 
indicates a perfect association between the variable rankings. 
If rs is close to zero, we would conclude that the variables are 
uncorrelated.
The following results were obtained for both sample villages:
farm size Shubak (rs) Higaza (rs)
and:
1) output 0 ,.89 0 ,.94
2) income 0 ,.77 0 . 91
3) assets 0 . 61 0 ,.84
4) machinery 0 ,.64 0 . 80
5) productive 0 . 71 0 . 68
assets
10. All the regression results mentioned in the text are 
presented in Table 74, Appendix A. Size class averages in Shubak 
al-Sharqi for all the variables used can be found in Table 75, 
Appendix A.
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Crop values are expressed in Egyptian pounds (LE) per feddan. 
During the survey period the Egyptian pound fluctuated between 
a rate of LE 4-5 to the pound Sterling.
11. 1 metric qantar = 157.5kg = 308.51b.
12. 1 ardeb (maize) = 140kg = 308.4 lb
1 ardeb (wheat) = 150kg = 33 0.4 lb.
13. Irrigation pumps are hired by the hour. The hourly rate is 
LE 1.5-2. One feddan takes 6-7 hours. The average per feddan cost 
is then LE 14. In summer, irrigation takes place every 5 to 7 
days, and in winter, every 10-12 days. Maintenance and fuel costs 
are the owner's responsibility and the owner will supervise its 
use.
14. The cultivated areas {zimam) in Egyptian villages are still 
divided by name into the traditional flood irrigation basins 
(hawd, pi. ahwad) used prior to the introduction of perennial 
irrigation.
15. Rochin and Grossman [1985: 19] mention that land was 
distributed to small farmers in plots of 2-5 feddans depending 
on family size and productivity of the land. However, given the 
relatively small impact of land redistribution in terms of the 
cultivated area actually affected (around 12.5%) this will not 
have resulted in a strong correlation between small farm size and 
higher quality soil. In fact, the largest farm in the sample with 
ten feddans has the best quality land in Shubak. The owner is 
also a university-trained agricultural engineer.
16. Labour intensity was computed by summing the total male 
labour input for each season and dividing by cultivated area. 
These figures of course understate the total labour force and 
therefore labour input intensity, possibly considerably, as they 
do not take into account female and child labour force 
participation. Richards [1989: 19] estimates, based on rural 
labour force surveys, that approximately a third of all crop 
labour is done by women. Harik [1979: 67] estimates that unpaid 
family labour (women and children) constitute a third of the 
rural labour force in size and anything from 10-50% of labour 
time by children and 33% by women. Mayfield [1974: 32] writes 
that average annual working days per man was 286 per year in 19 66 
(with 188 for women and 159 for children) . Other surveys however, 
(for example, Shepley [1985]) have found rather lower 
percentages: around 10% for female crop labour. Women in Upper 
Egypt have very low participation ratios, and Harik [1979: 83] 
mentions that female workers have a tendency to drop out of the 
ranks of field workers before they reach the age of 20.
However, for our purposes, what is important is not the exact 
number of labour-days per feddan per year, but the general trend 
of labour input intensity across farm size. Indeed it is likely 
that the under-reporting of female and child labour force 
participation would tend to bias the figures against an inverse
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relationship between labour input per feddan and farm size as the 
actual participation rates are higher on the small farms than the 
large farms. On the former, women and children may be compelled 
to work in the fields, whereas on the rich peasant farms, female 
members of the household are able to withdraw from the labour 
force.
17. The rich peasantry had originally supported the rent control 
components of the agrarian reform: after all, they rented more 
land than other any other group, usually from poor peasants with 
less than 3 feddans. Land reform changed their situation from net 
renters to owners and as land values and incomes rose during the 
197 0s because of the injection of oil remittances, rent became 
a smaller proportion of peasant income and rich peasants turned 
against rent controls which stood in the way of either raising 
rents or reclaiming plots for sale.
18. There is a generally high level of purchased seed inputs in
all size classes. Adams [1986: 51] explains that small farms do
not normally use own-produced seed anyway: it is too expensive
in opportunity cost terms because of their need to use land for
fodder crops rather than producing a seed crop.
This is also true for birseem, the main animal fodder crop. Dr. 
Ahmed Rammah, a forage agronomist at the Agricultural Research 
Centre in Giza, informed me that 1989 and 199 0 marked the 
beginning of field trials for improved varieties of birseem: Giza 
6, Giza 10, Giza 15, Sakha 3 and Sakha 4. These produce yields 
some 30% above those of baladi (traditional) varieties. But only 
the large farmers with over ten feddans are willing to grow seed 
crops. For the small farmers, a birseem seed crop would use land 
cutting into the summer cropped area. This is even the case when 
the Research Centre supplies new seeds free of charge.
19. HYV seed use was computed by taking the percentage of gross
cropped area under HYV crops. The indices of machinery use are 
the value of rented machinery (pumps, tractors and ploughs) plus 
ten percent of the value of owned machinery per feddan.
20. The latest available (1981) agricultural census does not have 
figures for current population of agricultural equipment, but 
does give figures for the number of farms using such equipment 
on owned, shared and rented bases. The ratio of farms in Qena to 
that in Giza is 1.6, suggesting the same overall level of use of 
tractors. This only points out the high level of aggregation 
inherent in a comparison of governorates.
21. This finding is based on a cross-sectional comparison of the 
revenue shares of mechanical power and of fertilizer as measures 
of the degree of mechanization.
22. Adams [1986: 60, fn. 11] mentions that the privately owned 
cane presses are all owned by rich peasants.
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23. While tomatoes are a very labour intensive crop: 192 man-days 
per year (compared to 65 for wheat and maize or 99 for birseem 
and cotton) [Ikram, 1980: 193], the general assumption that
vegetable cultivation is highly labour intensive and unmechanised 
is not borne out by reality: Hopkins [1982: 132] writes:
"vegetable farming did not appear appreciably less mechanized 
than open field farming."
APPENDIX A 
Statistical Tables
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Table 1 Selected farm indicators by farm size for 15 developing 
countries
country
Sudan
Syria
Ethiopia
Nigeria
CLS MD--LN GO--LN VA--LN KA--LN LUI OFLI
< 0.5 328.,20 203 .20 198.,90 115 .,20 1.00 0.02
0 .5-1 206.,50 85.,00 82 .,90 344.,20 1.00 0,11
1-1.5 160 .,00 94.,50 93 .,00 60 .,20 1.00 0.15
1.5-2 161.,30 146 .,80 142 .,10 219 .,10 1.00 0.19
2-2 .5 78.,90 64.,00 62 .,00 67 .30 1.00 0,18
2 .5-3 114.,70 69 .,80 67 .,60 87 . 00 0 .98 0.24
3-4 87 .,80 75 .40 73 .40 66 .,30 1.01 0.18
4-5 88.,60 70 .80 68 .60 52 .,10 0 .99 0.29
5-6 66.,60 59.,70 57 .70 64.,30 1.00 0.25
6-7 96.,90 71.,60 68..90 26 .,80 1.00 0.29
7-8 52 .,00 28..70 27 ,.50 21,.10 1.00 0.24
8-10 41.. 90 47 .,90 46..70 80 .40 1.00 0.34
10-15 60..20 35 .10 33 ,.70 36 .50 0 .99 0.36
> 15 51..80 38..20 36,,60 32 .90 1.00 0.50
< 0.5 608..90 706,.30 300 ,.10 1638 ,.70 1.02 0.49
0 .5-1 169,.30 423 .30 243 ,.00 273 ,.60 1.06 0.47
1-2 161..40 337 ,.70 180,.10 406..40 1.08 0.53
2-3 96..40 235 ,.70 125 .20 282 .60 0 .97 0.52
3-4 96,.80 187 .70 98,.50 229 ,.70 0 .73 0.66
4-5 51..50 140 ,.10 70 ,.40 204 ,.70 0 .77 0.63
5-6 70..60 107,.90 59 ,.90 128,.70 0 .71 0.72
6-8 56 ,.60 102 ,.30 53 ,.90 90 ,.10 0 .71 0.58
8-10 35..70 91.,20 48,.30 94..50 0 .70 0.61
10-15 33 ,.70 75 . 60 36,.90 99,.30 0 .76 0.67
15i-20 20 .50 76,.20 38 ,.30 73 ,.10 0 .71 0.69
20-50 15..30 43 ,.60 22 .40 42 ,.00 0.66 0.79
50-150 8 ,.20 35,.40 19,.80 26,.00 0.58 0.80
> 150 8,.20 21..80 16..80 9..10 0.09 0.95
< 1.0 339,.70 74 .60 69,.80 245 ,.30 0.52 0.00
1-1.5 246 ,.00 159,.30 144,.30 320 ,.40 0 .91 0.02
1.5-2 220 .00 36,.40 25,.10 56,.70 0 .78 0.00
2-2 .5 97 .00 57 ,.70 47 ,.30 136,.40 1.00 0.15
2 .5-3 136..70 63 ,.60 51..20 149,.60 1.24 0.05
3-3 .5 185..00 98,.10 88,.20 240,.00 1.00 0.04
3 .5-4 126..70 51,.80 42 ,.00 134 ,.80 0 .92 0.03
4-■5 62 ,.60 55,.30 46,.60 75,.90 0.87 0.11
5-■6 51..60 42 ,.20 33 ,.30 59,.40 0.80 0.01
> 6 6..11 9,.20 8.20 2.70 0 .63 0.00
< 0 .2 138 .40 753 ,.70 595,.80 814 .50 1.36 0.26
0 .5-1 167 .50 542 .20 408 .50 509 .90 1.29 0.39
1-■1.5 133 .50 479 .40 365 .60 319 .40 1.57 0.37
1.5-2 146 .70 389 .40 286 .30 509 .50 1.57 0.31
2-•2 .5 66 .90 393 .00 321 .10 341 .90 1.55 0.38
2 .5-3 56 .20 478 .00 370 .40 149 .70 1 .61 0.54
3-■3 .5 45 .70 315 .90 170 .30 165 .60 1 .35 0.64
3 .5-4 53 .80 375 .80 265 .70 177 .90 1 .66 0. 44
4-■5 41 .90 356 .10 270 .10 190 .80 1 .34 0.47
5-■7 52 .90 388 .50 254 .80 156 .60 1 .82 0.58
7-■10 44 .00 367 .20 274 .20 173 .00 1.62 0.59
1Ci-15 39 .10 338 . 50 274 .40 64 .80 2 .01 0.71
> 15 15 .80 124 . 60 77 .90 494 .20 0 .86 0.46
Note: All values are expressed in 1970 US dollars; land figures are 
expressed in hectares. CLS = farm size (intervals expressed in 
hectares) ; MD-LN = man-days per hectare; GO-LN = gross output per 
hectare; VA-LN ~ value added per hectare; KA-LN = capital stock 
(land excluded) per hectare; LUI = land use intensity; OFLI = 
percent of off-farm labour.
Source: Table 2 [Cornia, 1985: 519-23].
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country
Tanzania
Uganda
Barbados
Mexico
Peru
Thailand
CLS MD--LN GO--LN VA--LN KA--LN LUI OFLI
< 0 .2 1378,.20 649 ,.10 904 .80 2199 ,.99 1.43 0.00
0.2-0,.4 415,.60 361,.90 340 .80 1616,.90 1.29 0.00
0 .4-0 ,.6 208,.10 259,.90 250 .50 390,.90 1.03 0.05
0 .6-0 ,.8 238,.70 329,.40 299 .60 63 6 .10 1.02 0.00
0.8-1 172 ,.30 196,.70 186 .50 332 ,.90 1.03 0.01
1-1.5 123 ,.60 168,.00 157 .80 384 ,.50 0.96 0.01
1.5-2 114,.00 153 ,.60 146 .70 180 ,.70 0.97 0.04
2-2 .5 105,.30 147 ,.00 139 .80 157,.60 0.95 0.04
2 .5-3 130 ,.70 135,.00 131..80 81..40 0. 97 0 ,.05
3-•4 78,.30 122 ,.10 117 .80 75..60 0.96 0,.01
4-5 74,.20 61,.00 58,. 60 91,.30 0.85 0,.05
5-6 60,.20 59 ,.20 57 ,.80 49 .40 0.93 0,.13
6-8 53 ,.40 84,.50 82 .30 30..50 0.94 0,.04
8-10 47 ,.70 50 ,.20 49,.50 82 ,.90 0.97 0,.10
10-15 54,.10 83 ,. 90 83 ,.00 47 ,.10 0.95 0 ,.26> 15 19,.50 117 ,. 00 117 ,.00 18..10 1 .00 0,.42
< 1 255 ,.70 221,.40 194 ,.60 109 .50 0..79 0 ,. 07
1-2 192 ,. 80 212 ,.50 191..00 160,.90 0 ,.78 0,.06
2-3 115 ,.50 146,.80 129 ,.30 86,.50 0,.67 0,.03
3-4 77 ,.40 112 ,.70 98,.60 91,.20 0 ,.54 0,.01
4-5 91,.70 94,.50 83 ,.50 140..20 0 ,.51 0,.05
5-6 60,.60 73 ,.30 65..80 57,.00 0 .39 0,.01
6-8 45,.80 54,.10 48..50 23 .00 0 ,.35 0,.02
> 8 35 ,. 50 35..50 31,.80 28..10 0 ,.33 0 ,. 07
< 0 .1 1560 ,.00 2980..00 2850 ,.00 461,.70 2 ,.20 0.. 00
0 .1-0 .2 686 ,.00 2115 .,40 1777 ,.90 7376 . 90 0 .79 0 ,.10
0 .2-0 .3 1058 ,.40 7241..50 2818 .80 7335,.80 0 ,.72 0 ,.00
0 .3-0 ,4 448 ,.20 821..50 559 ,.40 9999 .99 0 .81 0 ,00
0 .4-0 ,.5 510 ,.20 234.. 00 120,.40 870 .60 0 ,.92 0,.00
0 .5-0 ,.6 270 ,.40 745,.20 440,.00 4051..10 0,.41 0,.09
0 .6-1 505,.30 1977..50 1654,.50 2565..40 0 .30 0 ,.04
1-2 238,.40 979..20 508,.70 442 .40 0..76 0 ,.05
2-3 .5 146,.70 309,.70 218..10 1162 ,.00 0 ,.40 0 .00
> 3 .5 153 ,.90 1166,,70 398 ,.80 1474 ,70 0 .44 0 ,.00
< 1 64,.80 49..60 49..30 130 .40 1,.00 0 .00
1-2 32 ,.30 265..00 211..60 107 .60 1..00 0 ,.32
2-3 62 ,.60 95.. 00 95..00 16,.30 1,.00 0 .00
3-4 78,.50 1292 , 00 582 .50 273 ,.80 1..00 0 ,.004-6 10 ,.60 288..30 268,.40 71..60 1,.00 0 .00
6-8 29 ,.10 103 ,30 96,.10 194,.80 0..98 0 ,.00
8-10 16,.10 74.,20 63 ,.50 423 .30 1..02 0 ,.0710-15 10 ,.80 59,,40 48,.90 230 .60 1..08 0 ,.06
15-20 16,.80 85,. 60 44,.70 258..70 1..27 0 ,.2320-30 8,.00 104,, 60 61,.50 286,.20 1,.49 0 .27
30-35 5 ,60 70,.30 34..60 185 . 50 1,. 17 0 ,.32> 35 2 ,.40 34 ., 50 17 ,.40 28 .50 0 .92 0 ,.35
< 1 265,.10 194,.70 151..00 240 ,.70 1,.00 0 ,.13
1-2 209 ,.20 140,.30 111..90 165,.90 1..00 0 ,.07
2-3 104,.20 126..90 89 .00 123 ,.60 0 .92 0 ,.263-4 150 ,.90 145..80 97 .30 287 ,.40 0 ,.81 0 ,.464-5 75,.60 166,.70 105 .00 53 ,.00 0 .89 0,.605-7 47 ,.00 846,,70 798,.50 117 .10 0 ,.80 0 ,.27
7-10 56,.00 237 ,.50 171,.50 430 .20 1,.00 0 ,.7510-15 59 ,.50 406,.30 293 ,10 338..10 0 .86 0 ,.9215-20 63 ,.20 150 ,.50 96,.20 63 .00 0 ,.59 0,.66> 20 36,.20 135 ,50 103 ,.20 107 ,.90 0 ,.54 0 .76
< 1 82 ,.40 152 .70 144,.50 503 ,.20 1..33 0 ,.171-2 75,.10 116..50 99,.20 33 .00 1..00 0,.232-4 87 ,.10 135 ,.10 119 ,.00 98 .10 0 ,.99 0 ,.16> 4 42 ,.70 87 ,.20 84,.60 18,.10 0..98 0 ,.49
375
country CLS MD-LN GO-LN VA-LN KA-LN LUI OFLI
Bangladesh<
Burma
India
Nepal
Korea
.1 
0 . 1-0 
0 ,2-0 
0.3-0 
0.4-0 
0.5-0 
0 .6-0 
0.7-0 
0 . 8-0 
0.9-1
1-1.5 
1.5-2
2-2.5 
>2.5
< 0.5 
0.5-1
1-1.5
1.5-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
7-10 
10-13
> 13
< 1
1-1.5
1.5-2
2-2.5
2.5-3
3-3 .5
3.5-4
4-5
5-6
6-8
8-10
< 0.2
0 . 2-0
0.4-0
0 .6-0
0 .8-1
1-1.5
1.5-2
2-2.5
2.5-3
3-3.5
> 3.5
< 2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
> 7
530.00 
343.70
480.00
275.00
382.80 440.00
426.80 1270.10
556 .50 
387.00
337.80
534.40
391.80 
530.30 
402.60 
269 .20
472.40 
348.20
1029
412
269
276
185
140
159
138
113 
190
114 
78
70
20
60
00
90
30
20
50
90
60
90
30
851.10
224.60
335.40
407.10
183.10
253.10 
276 . 90
162.40
264.00 
137 .20
177.60
936.00 
1444.10
585.00 
639.80
1064 .70
651.40 
537 .30 
456.20
369.40 
474 .70
462.70
192.00
143.70
211.70 
51.80 
37.00 
68.50
562 .50 
589 .70
426.80
365.80 
455 .70
705.80 
494 .20
454.50
504.50
408.00
797 .30
486.50
240.50 
181.70 
189 .30
151.80
166.50
234.50
202.50
186.00 
188 .70
109.50
736 .70
501.60 
658 .90 
609 .30 
702 .70
635.40
551.00
524.40
368.50
548.80
277.00
792 .50
693.10
441.40
583.60
677.10
399.50
332.40
370.00 
256 .30 
377 .20
320.50
897.10
516.00 
258 .00 
584.90 
328 .70
303.80
350.00 
221.80
234.90 
1026.90
350.60
414.10
225.10
224.10 
273 .90
446.00
392.60
344.10 
380.70
384.30
136.00 
167 .00
96.10
48.50
81.80
58.80
71.90
113.30 
87 .00 
99.20
66.90
26.90
180.00 
218.00 
277 .20
209.90
333.80 
233 .70
244.60
265.10
153.10
253.80
168.40
677 .50
492.40
365.90 
433 .80
503.00
303.40
274.00 
282 .30
191.80
331.10 
250.20
3798.40
1586.20
1254.20 
1370 .70
1326.20
685.10 
746.20
706.00
643.90 
739 .20 
574 .50
553.10
504.00 
529 .70
397 .70 
546.30 
203 .10
219.40
231.10
173.10 
192 .70
194.40 
277 .40
223.90
210.10 
208.80
967.90 
319 .80
514.90 
470 .70 
408 .70
448.90
510.00
324.90
194.40 
503 .20
361.50
1345 . 80
590.50
1279.40
278.50
468.40 
274.10 
152 .00
341.50 
88.60
284 .40 
419.80
642.20 1569.70
429.20 437.70
198.80
545.00 
279.40
245.00
507 .30 
533 .70 
248.60 
387 .80
2.00 
1.80 
1.90 
1.94 
1.43 
1.48 
1.64 
1.56 
1.78 
1.69 
1.51 
1.10 
1.61 
1.20
00
01
20
09
31
09
15
07
00
0.98
0.90
1.00
78
00
89
26
82
50
1.88
00
00
00
22.70 297.40 232.70 143.80
1.92
2 .57 
2.31
1.75 
1.69 
1.67
1.41
1.42 
1.33 
1.26 
1.59
1.75
1.00 
1.00 
0 .87 
1.00 
1.01 
1.00 
1.00
0.17 
0.26 
0 .33 
0.62 
0.29 
0.36 
0.61 
0.60 
0.66 
0.61 
0.60 
0.61 
0.85 
0.79
0 . 09 
0 .17 
0.21 
0.16 
0.28 
0.25 
0.39 
0 . 60 
0.38 
0.43 
0 .50 
0.79
0.03 
0 .10 
0 .10 
0 .17 
0.05 
0.31 
0.09 
0.54 
0.24 
0.31 
0.33
0.18 
0.39 
0.68 
0 .22 
0 .16 
0 .12 
0.16 
0.18 
0 .15 
0.29 
0 .11
0.08 
0.14 
0.15 
0.30 
0.30 
0.21 
0 .35
Note: All values are expressed in 1970 US dollars; land figures are 
expressed in hectares. CLS = farm size (intervals expressed in 
hectares) ; MD-LN = man-days per hectare; GO-LN - gross output per 
hectare; VA-LN = value added per hectare; KA-LN - capital stock 
(land excluded) per hectare; LUI = land use intensity; OFLI = 
percent of off-farm labour.
Source: Table 2 [Cornia/ 1985: 519-23].
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Table 2 The Indian FMS size class data: gross output and 
farm business income per hectare by size class
Amritsar and Ferozepur Karnal, Rohtak and Jind 
(1954-57) Tehsil (1961-62)
size output FBI output FBI
<5ha 496.69 237 .32 751.21 452 .21
5-10 459.62 205.10 585.65 316.30
10-15 ( 548.58 318.77
15-20 (427.50 200 .16 506.27 291.59
20-30 ( 462.09 291.59
30-50 (380.55 187.80 373.13 205.10
>50 353.37 185 .33 259.46 138.38
Uttar Pradesh (Meerut Maharashtra (Akolt
Sc Muzaffarnagar) 1954-57 Sc Amraoti) 1955-5r
size output FBI output FBI
<5ha 496.69 237 .22 259.07 148.86
5-10 459.62 205 .10 219.01 119 .35
10-15 427.50 200 .16 231.00 122 .05
15-20 380.55 187 .80 201.25 111.69
20-30 ( 207 .87 116.36
30-40 ( 209 .25 120.84
40-50 (353 .37 185.33 239.40 129 .88
>50 ( 226.10 116.66
Maharashtra (1955-57) Maharashtra (1955'
Ahmednagar Nasik
size output FBI output FBI
<5ha 226.35 78.33 303 .20 53 .38
5-10 231.79 100 . 08 295.54 125.04
10-15 145 .30 62 . 02 158.64 52 .63
15-20 362.51 137.64 139.62 64.74
20-25 98.35 45.72 129 .24 60 .29
25-30 128.99 62 .77 146.54 82 .04
30-50 172 .78 69 .44 171.49 56.09
>50 81.55 41.27 104.77 37 .81
West Bengal (Hooghly & Madras (Salem &
24 Paraganas) 1954-57 Coimbatore) 1954-.
size output FBI output FBI
.01-1.25 583.18 321.24 (
1.26-2 .50 598.00 316.30 (550.31 86 .74
2 .51-3.75 573 .29 227 .34 (
3.76-5.00 599.16 279 .23 (481.12 191.76
5.01-7.50 583.18 294.06 417.12 171.49
7.51-10.0 551. 05 321.24 425.52 204 .36
10.01-15 400 .32 202.63 247 . 60 88 .47
15 .01-20 ( 175 .45 60 .05
20.0-25.0(437.38 239 .70 164.82 54.86
>25.00 ( 204.11 108.97
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size
Andhra Pradesh 
(West Godavari) 
output FBI
Orissa 
(Sambalpur district) 
output FBI
.01-1.25 1280.02 558 .47 (
1.26-2.50 1126.82 415.14 (328.65 185 .33
2.51-5.00 894.53 328.65 316.30 180 .39
5.01-7.50 746 .27 237 .22 (
7.51-10 .0 842.64 192 .75 (286.65 140.85
10.01-15 939 .01 291.59 254.52 96 .37
15.01-20 1008.20 271.82 (
>20.00 921.72 383 .02 (311.36 145.79
N . Monghor C . Monghor S. Monghor
size output output output
<2 .5 474.45 494.22 439 .85
2.5-5.0 370.66 476.92 467 .04
5.0-7 . 5 441.33 442.56 (447 .27
7.5-10 486.80 360.78 (
10.0-15 363 .25 429 . 97 632.60
15.0-20 528.81 528.81 454.68
>20 , 0 407 .73 575 .76 422 .56
Bihar (Shahabad) 1960-61
size output
<2.5 508.40
2 . 5-5 . 0 495 .06
5.0-7 . 5 470 .34
7.5-10 478 . 91
10.0-15 482 .39
15.0-20 473.69
20-30 452 . 01
>3 0 471.65
Rajasthan (Pali) Kerala (Allepey &
1962-63 Quilon) 1962-63
size output FBI output FBI
<1.0 ( 590.40 96.72
1-2.5 (213 .22 142.65 890.62 225.87
2.5-5.0 255.67 188.98 689.78 148.85
5.0-7.5 350.78 162 .22 (
7.5-10 190.98 77 . 91 (807.30 223.06
10-15 216.76 103 .78 768.48 225.28
15-20 260.84 107.96 (
20-25 166.27 76.65 (741.37 235.95
>25 136.42 37.88 503.19 -90.62
Madhya Pradesh (Raipur)
1962-63
size output FBI
<1.0 500 .73 321.41
1.0-2 . 0 409.10 257.40
2.0-4.0 391.82 238.01
4.0-6.0 352 .94 212.56
>6.0 377.83 216.32
Source: Appendix III [Department of Agriculture, 1966: 105-14]
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Table 3 Yield per acre related to size: all crop production,
Indian FMS
Region Year Constant
term
a Standard
error
R2 F
Pun j ab 1954-55 2 .08 -0 . 02 0 .005 0.79 11. 691
1955-56 1.96 -0.11 0.049 0 .83 11. 041
1956-57 2 .48 -0.20 0.017 0 .96 84.18'
West Bengal
Hooghly 1954-55 2 .48 -0.13 0.050 0 .55 7.141
24 Paraganas 1954-55 2 .40 -0 .23 0.145 0.30 2 .56
Hooghly 1955-56 2 .32 -0.11 0.027 0 .72 15 .71'
24 Paraganas 1955-56 2 .31 -0 .13 0 . 057 0 .46 5.04'
Hooghly 1956-57 2 .49 -0.07 0.076 0 .12 0 .77
24 Paraganas 1956-57 2 .35 -0 .02 0 .066 0 .17 0.11
Bombay
Ahmednagar 1954-55 1.89 -0.30 0.074 0 .72 16.28'
Nasik 1954-55 2 .13 -0.41 0.110 0 .71 14.15'
Ahmednagar 1955-56 2 .02 -0 .22 0.166 0 .23 1.75
Nasik 1955-56 2 .22 -0.31 0.081 0 .50 14 . 69'
Ahmednagar 1956-57 2.28 -0.32 0.164 0 .41 4.05'
Nasik 1956-57 2.28 -0.35 0 . 089 0 .74 16.82'
Madras
1954-55 2 .27 -0.35 0 .191 0.36 3.36
1955-56 2 .42 -0.41 0.091 0 .75 20.39'
1956-57 2.68 -0 ,47 0.104 0 .75 20 .59'
U.P.
1954-55 2 .57 -0.13 0.040 0 .75 10 ,43:
1955-56 2 .51 -0.12 0 . 079 0 .43 2.26
1956-57 2 .88 -0.21 0 . 059 0.67 12 .17
M.P.
Akola 1955-56 2 .14 -0 .11 0 . 057 0.38 3 .71
Amraoti 1956-57 2 .18 -0 .08 0 .065 0 .21 1.50
Akola 1955-56 1.83 -0 .02 0 . 059 0 . 03 0 .15
Amraoti 1956-57 1.69 0 .14 0 .029 0.02 2 .10
Note: a denotes significance at 1 per cent level
b denotes significance at 5 per cent level
c denotes significance at 10 per cent level
Source: Table B.l [Bharadwaj, 1974: 92].
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Table 4 Statistics relating to the inverse relationship
state year n constant b coeff. t value R:
Andhra 1957-58 104 2 .59 0.90 2.11 0 .
Andhra 1958-59 97 2.60 0.80 3.25 0,
Andhra 1959-60 84 2.60 0.85 1.49 0.
Bihar 1958-59 98 2 .55 0.71 3 .77 0,
Madras 1954-55 198 2 .08 0.69 3 .14 0,
Madras 1955-56 181 2.22 0.63 4.24 0,
Maharashtra 1955-56 160 2.06 0.70 4.31 0 ,
Maharashtra 1956-57 160 2 .15 0.66 5.10 0,
MP 1955-56 159 1.71 1.03 0.51 0,
MP 1956-57 159 2 .12 0.86 3 .37 0,
Orissa 1957-58 98 2 .15 0.96 0.72 0,
Orissa 1958-59 100 2 .12 0.92 2.35 0 ,
Orissa 1959-60 99 2.05 0.90 2 .53 0 ,
Punj ab 1955-56 200 2.28 0.90 2,28 0,
Punj ab 1956-57 200 2 .45 0.85 3 .88 0
UP 1955-56 147 2 .55 0 .78 5.05 0
UP 1956-57 196 2 .52 0.85 3.38 0
W Bengal 1955-56 190 2 .13 1.08 0.99 0
W Bengal 1956-57 192 2,33 1.10 1.79 0
UP 1955-56 97 2 .56 0.76 4.85 0
UP 1956-57 96 2 .57 0.82 3 .44 0
UP 1966-67 150 3 .55 0 . 84 3 .69 0
Punjab 1955-56 100 2 .19 0 . 95 0 .81 0
Punj ab 1956-57 100 2 .45 0.84 2 .66 0
Punjab 1967-68 150 3 .28 0.94 0 .73 0
78
65
48
46
21
23
39
38
70
74
76
88
83
70
69
68
66
50
67
71
71
71
70
65
49
source: table 1 [Saini, 1971: A79].
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Table 5 Significance of linear and log-linear regressions of gross 
value of output per acre (V/A) on farm size (A) and of the rank 
correlation coefficient between these variates
linear regression log-linear Kendall
vill n b r t b r t tau
a) Muzaffarnagar 1955--56
1 10 -0.2 -0 . 058 -0.,164
2 10 -13 .2 -0 .,660 -2 .485
3 10 -1.1 -0..104 -0..296
4 8 2.6 0..250 0 .63 6
5 10 -5 . 9 -0 .561 -1.. 916
6 10 -3.4 -0..222 -0.,644
7 10 -25.4 -0.,667 -2 .,532
8 10 -0.8 -0 . 097 -0..276
9 9 -4 .1 -0..392 -1,.127
10 10 1.4 0 , 399 1,.230
all 97 -4.0 -0 ,.288 -2 .930
b)Fero zepur 1955-5 6
1 10 -1. 5 -0 . 252 -0 .736
2 10 -3.9 -0,.698 -2 .756
3 10 -1.5 -0,.385 -1..179
4 10 1.3 0 ,.452 1,,432
5 10 1.3 0 . 376 1.,156
6 10 1.8 0 .365 1,.110
7 10 -0.3 -0 ,.173 -0..498
8 10 0.03 0,.022 0,.061
9 10 0.06 0..029 0,.081
10 10 1.4 0 .400 1,.233
all 100 -0 . 03 0 . 010 -0 ,.098
c) Muzaffarnagar 1956--57
1 10 -1.6 -0..390 -1..198
2 10 -3.0 -0,.395 -1,.180
3 10 -6.9 -0,.529 -1,.765
4 8 1.3 0,. 145 0,.359
5 10 -3.7 -0 ,.546 -1,.842
6 10 3.8 0..234 0,.682
7 10 -19 .3 -0 .737 -3 ,.083
8 10 -12 .4 -0 .641 -2 ,.360
9 9 -0.4 -0..028 -0,.075
10 9 1.9 0.472 1,.417
all 96 -2 . 6 -0 .216 -2 .140
d) Ferozepur 1956-57
1 10 -2.7 -0 .469 -1 .503
2 10 -5.2 -0 .830 -4 .215
3 10 -2 . 6 -0 .438 -1 .379
4 10 0.9 0.317 0.945
5 10 1.4 0.363 1.101
6 10 1.7 0.509 1. 673
7 10 -0.3 -0 .180 -0 .519
8 10 0 . 06 0. 034 0. 097
9 10 -3.7 -0 . 580 -2 .016
10 10 0 . 06 0. 040 0. 113
all 100 -0 . 9 -0 .193 -1 .950
-0 .006 -0 ,.022 -0 ,.063 -0..067
-0 ,.385 -0,.899 -5..808 -0..556
-0 ,.084 -0 ,.081 -0 ,023 -0,. Ill
-0 .030 -0,.037 -0 ,.091 -0,. 077
-0 .452 -0 ,.695 -2 ,.738 -0,.467
-0,.130 -0,.251 -0,.734 -0..244
-0 ,.459 -0,.808 -3 ,.882 -0 .644
0 ,.004 0,.018 0,.051 0,.022
-0..150 -0,.424 -1,.240 -0,.444
0..113 0,.341 1,.026 0..200
-0 ,.248 -0,.456 -4,.446
-0.163 -0.289 -0.855 -0.244
-0 .468 -0.689 -2.686 -0.600
-0.143 -0 .479 -1.542 -0.333
0.269 0.622 2 .247 0.378
0 .243 0 .227 0 .659 0.511
0 .232 0.333 0.999 0.244
-0.068 0.229 -0.664 -0.244
-0.057 -0 .186 -0.535 -0.111
-0.043 -0.097 -0 .277 0.244
0.102 0 .147 0 .420 0 .156
-0.058 -0.094 -0.934
-0 ,.111 -0 ,. 414 -1,.285 -0,.289
-0,.100 -0 ,.412 -1,.279 -0..378
-0,.353 -0 ,.573 -1,,978 -0,. 511
0 .004 0 .021 0,.051 -0.. 071
-0,.465 -0 ,.704 -2 ,.801 -0 . 511
0., 017 0 . 039 0 ,.111 0..111
-0,,262 -0 .751 -3 ,.220 -0 ,.294
-0,.217 -0 ,.567 -1,.947 -0,.511
0 . 047 0 . 092 0,.246 0 ,.056
0..076 0 ,.234 0 ,.637 0.222
-0 . 165 -0,.326 -3 ,.342
-0..098 -0 . 516 -1,.704 -0,.333
-0 . 341 -0,.738 -3 ,.097 -0 ,.378
-0 ,.162 -0,.499 -1 ,.628 -0,.156
0 , 197 0 . 435 1,.367 0,.156
0,.192 0,.802 3 ,.802 0,.289
0 ,.178 0 . 443 1 . 397 0,.289
-0,.120 -0 . 208 -0 ,.601 -0,.111
-0 ,.110 -0 ,.288 -0 ,.850 -0,.244
-0 ,.276 -0 ,.739 -3 ,.102 -0 .467
-0,.008 0 . 030 0 ,.085 -0,.067
-0,.172 -0 . 275 -2 ,.835
381
e) Muzaffarnagar 1966-67
1 10 -80 .6 -0 ,.467 -1.
2 10 -267 .3 -0..528 -1.
3 10 -556 .9 -0,.543 -1.
4 10 6.3 0..054 0.
5 10 -27 .0 -0,.128 -0.
6 10 -90 .6 -0,.570 -1.
7 10 -81 .6 -0 .320 -0 .
8 10 -99 .9 -0 . 627 -2 .
9 10 12 .4 0.163 0.
10 10 -87 . 6 -0 .418 -1.
11 10 -204 .7 -0 .553 -1.
12 10 -37 .8 -0 .213 -0.
13 10 -36 .5 -0 .215 -0.
14 10 18 ,1 0.132 0.
15 10 -29 .4 -0 .237 -0.
all 150 -80 .4 -0 .245 -3 .
') Muzaf farnagar 1967--68
1 10 -22 .8 -0 . 118 -0 .
2 10 -8 .0 -0 .051 -0.
3 10 -76 .7 -0 .321 -0 .
4 10 -31 . 1 -0 .202 -0 .
5 10 -139 .7 -0 .855 -4 .
6 10 2.2 0.009 0.
7 10 -227 .3 -0 .374 -1.
8 10 -159 .8 -0 .641 -2 .
9 10 0.2 0.001 0.
10 10 -268 .2 -0 .669 -2 .
11 10 -233 .4 -0 .549 -1.
12 10 -32 .4 -0 .425 -1.
13 10 -81 .4 -0 .503 -1.
14 10 -145 .7 -0 . 603 -2 .
15 10 57 . 7 0.307 0 .
all 150 -68 .2 -0 .260 -3 .
r) Ferozepur 1967'-68
1 10 24 .4 0.180 0 .
2 10 62 .7 0.440 1.
3 10 -15 .2 -0 .171 -0.
4 10 4.0 0.061 0 .
5 10 -3 .3 -0 ,074 -0 .
6 10 29 .1 0.496 1.
7 10 -31 .3 -0 .350 -1.
8 10 -12 .2 -0 .125 -0 .
9 10 -64 .3 -0 .667 -2 .
10 10 17 .5 0.350 1.
11 10 -2 .7 -0 .060 -0.
12 10 -8 .8 -0 .167 -0.
13 10 -7 .9 -0 .351 -1.
14 10 22 .0 0.577 2 .
15 10 -24 .7 -0 .324 -0 .
all 150 -2 .3 -0 . 029 -0 .
-0 ,.215 -0 ,.636 -2 .333 -0 .733
-0,.298 -0 ,.442 - 1 ,.395 -0 ,.289
-0,.362 -0 ,.478 -1,.538 -0 .289
0,.090 0 ,.265 0..777 0,.111
-0..101 -0 ,.268 -0 . 786 -0 ,.067
-0..317 -0 ,.596 -2 .100 -0,.333
-0 .116 -0 .384 -1.. 175 -0,.422
-0..266 -0,.613 -2 ,.194 -0 ,.467
0 ,. 030 0,.182 0..525 0 ,.200
-0 ,.197 -0 ,.421 -1 .312 -0 ,.289
-0 ,.332 -0 ,.730 -3 .022 -0,. 511
0,.117 0,.134 0.383 -0,.156
-0 ,.128 -0,.279 -0 .823 -0 . 156
0,.046 0 ,. 148 0.422 -0,. 067
-0 ,.055 -0 ,.211 -0 .611 -0 . 156
-0 ,.135 -0 ,.248 -3 .111
-0.073 -0.171 -0 .491 -0.289
0.047 0 .283 0 .836 0 . 044
-0.098 -0.484 -1.562 -0.200
-0.019 -0.062 -0.177 -0.067
-0.180 -0.787 -3.613 -0.556
0 . 053 0.100 0 .286 0.156
-0.203 -0.381 -1.168 -0.333
-0 .272 -0.659 -2 .481 -0.422
-0.027 -0.117 -0 .333 -0.378
-0.402 -0.764 -3.345 -0.467
-0 .292 -0.545 -1.840 -0.422
-0.079 -0.386 -1.182 -0.333
-0.110 -0,511 -1.680 -0.378
-0 .157 -0.852 -4.595 -0.600
0 .126 0 .449 1.419 0 .378
-0 .092 -0 .245 -3.075
0 ,.019 0 . 036 0 ,.102 0,.067
0,.154 0 .262 0 ,.766 0 ,.244
-0,.097 -0 . 224 -0,.652 -0 ,.022
0,.060 0..144 0 .411 0 ,.244
-0,.032 -0..100 -0,.284 -0 ,.200
0 . 188 0..429 1 ,.343 0,.156
-0..180 -0 .393 - 1 ,.208 -0,.289
-0 . 121 -0,.242 -0 ,.705 0,. 022
-0 ,.507 -0..759 -3 ,.299 -0 ,.644
0,.142 0 . 339 1,.018 0,.200
-0..052 -0..089 -0 ,.243 -0,.022
-0 .018 -0 . 054 -0,.152 -0,.156
-0 .140 -0..536 -1,.798 -0,.467
0 ,.203 0..580 2 ,.016 0 ,. 600
-0 ,.156 -0 ,.486 -1,. 574 -0 ,.244
- 0 . 028 -0 ,.046 -0 ,.557
494
757
830
153
366
962
956
274
467
301
878
616
623
376
688
070
337
145
960
584
656
027
139
365
003
543
857
329
647
137
911
276
519
386
490
174
209
616
056
355
532
056
149
479
059
000
969
351
382
h) Muzaffarnagar 1968-69
1 10 -13 .5 -0 .150 -0.
2 10 25 .0 0 .286 0.
3 10 -33 .0 -0 ,.386 -1 .
4 10 -19 .8 -0..536 -1 .
5 10 17 .5 0,.373 1 .
6 10 -57 .1 -0 ,.537 -1.
7 10 -43 .8 -0..314 -0.
8 10 3.9 0 ,.062 0 .
9 10 -66 .4 -0 .461 -1.
10 10 -148 .1 -0 .789 -3 .
11 10 -29 .1 -0,.242 -0.
12 10 -14 .7 -0,.268 -0 .
13 10 -108 .9 -0 .442 -1.
14 10 -12 .2 -0,.126 -0 .
15 10 4.9 0 ,.056 0 .
all 150 -20 .5 -0,.145 -1.
.) Ferozepur 19'68-69
1 10 -6 . 1 -0 ,. 034 -0 .
2 10 -83 .4 -0,.535 -1.
3 10 11 .9 0,.265 0 .
4 10 -13 .4 -0..161 -0 .
5 10 -25 .0 -0,.453 -1.
6 10 22 .9 0,.273 0 .
7 10 6.3 0,.095 0 .
8 10 0.1 0 .001 0 .
9 10 -27 .9 -0,.646 -2 .
10 10 20 .6 0,. 508 1.
11 10 4.9 0 ,.094 0 .
12 10 -13 .6 -0,.162 -0 .
13 10 4.3 0 .203 0 .
14 10 5.1 0..149 0 .
15 10 -3 .5 -0..052 -0 .
all 150 -1 .4 -0,.018 -0 .
-0 .094 -0..424 -1,.325 -0 .467
0 .005 0..050 0 .143 -0,.022
-0 .021 -0..232 -0 ,.674 -0,.378
-0..053 -0,.560 -1,.910 -0..511
0..023 0 .271 0 .797 -0,.244
-0..119 -0..547 -1,.848 -0 .378
-0.. 067 -0 ,.371 -1..129 -0,.022
-0 ,.008 -0 ,.061 -0 ,. 172 -0 ,.067
-0,.140 -0 ,.528 -1,.753 -0,.378
-0,.215 -0 ,.688 -2 ,. 683 -0,.511
-0,.044 -0 ,.189 -0..545 -0,. Ill
-0,.059 -0,.352 -1,.062 -0,.289
-0,.149 -0,.455 -1,.443 -0..067
-0..002 -0,.019 -0.. 053 -0 ,.333
-0 . 009 -0 .060 -0,.170 -0 ,.022
-0,.042 -0,.168 -2 ,. 073
-0.142 -0.158 -0.454 -0.067
-0.336 -0.486 -1.575 -0 .289
0.033 0 .101 0 .287 0.111
-0.033 -0.074 -0 .211 -0.156
-0.168 -0.346 -1.043 -0 .200
0.203 0 .356 1. 080 0 .244
0.085 0.298 0 .883 0 .156
-0.072 -0.146 -0 .418 -0 . 022
-0.329 -0.680 -2.624 -0,422
0.180 0 .389 1.161 0 .156
-0.075 -0.110 -0 .314 -0.022
-0.041 -0.083 -0 .237 -0.156
0.061 0 .129 0 .368 0 .022
0.009 0 . 035 0.100 -0.289
-0.082 -0.154 -0.442 -0.289
-0.027 -0.039 -0 .471
429
844
183
797
136
802
936
176
468
636
706
788
392
360
159
788
097
791
777
462
439
804
269
003
393
670
268
463
586
427
148
221
source: table 1 [Bhattacharya and Saini, 1972: A65-66].
Table 6 Yield per acre and size of holding: individual crops,
Indian FMS
Region/crop Year Constant
term
a Standard
error
R2 F
Punjab
Wheat
irrigated 1955-56 0 .74 0.20 0.069 0 .75 11.04b
1956-57 2 ,14 0 .17 0 .028 0 .83 14.92b
Wheat-gram 
irrigated 1955-56 2.36 -0.02 0.09 0 .74 9 .34c
American
cotton 1954-55 2.06 0 .12 0.039 0.76 9 .58c
1955-56 2 . 04 0 .12 0.049 0.79 14.42b
Desi cotton 1954-55 0.43 0.28 0.068 0 .71 16 .51b
West Bengal
Aman paddy 
Hooghly 1955-56 1.20 0.12 0.037 0 . 61 9 . 66b
Aus paddy 
Hooghly 1955-56 0.64 0 .47 0.053 0.96 77 77a
Pulses: 
Hooghly 1955-56 0.38 0 .23 0.082 0 . 55 8 .14b
Mesta: 
Hooghly 1956-57 0.89 0.18 0 . 090 0 .40 3 .97°
24 Paraganas 1956-57 0.48 0.69 0 . 076 0 . 92 83 .73a
Bombay
Irrigated
wheat
Ahmednagar 1956-57 1.00 -0.28 0 .120 0.46 5 .43c
Dry Bajri 
Ahmednagar 1956-57 1.89 -0.30 0 .074 0 .72 16 . 28a
Nasik 1956-57 2 .14 -0.41 0 .109 0.69 14.15a
Dry gram 
Ahmednagar 1956-57 -0 . 01 0.33 0 .170 0.39 3 .82c
Irrigated
gram
Ahmednagar 1956-57 0 .18 0 .42 0 .173 0 .49 5 . 95c
Madras
Paddy 
season I 1956-57 1.59 -0 .17 0.04 0.70 15.3 0a
Paddy 
season II 1955-56 1.42 -0.10 0 . 05 0 .45 4, 85c
U.P.
Wheat
irrigated 1954-55 1.20 -0.07 0.03 0.36 4 . 02°
Sugarcane
ratoon 1954-55 2 .73 -0.23 0.06 0.69 13.51a
Wheat _ 
unirrigated 1954-55 0.98 -0.13 0.03 0 .75 21.2 6a
Note: a denotes significance at 1 per cent level
b denotes significance at 5 per cent level
c denotes significance at 10 per cent level
Source: table B.II [Bharadwaj, 1974a: 93].
Table 7 Intensity of cropping and size of holding,
Indian FMS
State/district Year Constant
term
a Standard
error
R2 F
Punj ab
Amritsar 1954-55 2 .22 -0 . 04 0 . 02 0,48 6.75
Ferozepur 1954-55 2 .13 -0.05 0.02 0 .34 4 .25
Amritsar 1955-56
Ferozepur 1955-56
Amritsar 1956-57 2 .34 -0 .07 0 .03 0.36 5.34
Ferozepur 1956-57 2 .82 -0 .19 0.02 0 . 94 46.65
West Bengal
Hooghly 1954-55 0.03 -0 . 03 0 , 04 0 .11 0.76
24 Paraganas 1954-55 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.30 2 . 66
Hooghly 1955-56 0.05 -0.09 0 . 02 0 .85 32 . 09
24 Paraganas 1955-56 0.05 -0 . 07 0 . 02 0 . 64 10.82
Hooghly 1956-57 0.09 -0.51 0.04 0.26 2.11
24 Paraganas 1956-57 0 . 04 -0.09 0.03 0 .55 8.05
Bombay
Ahmednagar 1954-55 0 .08 -0.04 0 .01 0 .49 6.50
Nasik 1954-55 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.38 8.35
Ahmednagar 1955-56 0 .03 -0.001 0.01 0.02 0,02
Nasik 1955-56 0.19 -0.10 0 . 02 0.70 14 .54
Ahmednagar 1956-57 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.30 2 . 62
Nasik 1956-57 0.19 -0.14 0 . 02 0 .83 30.33
Madras 1954-55 2 . 07 -0 .13 0.05 0 .37 6.18
1955-56 0,19 -0.20 0 . 03 0 . 90 51.27
1956-57 0.20 -0.16 0.05 0.66 11.60
U. P. 1954-55 0 .23 -0.11 0 .02 0 .86 38.29
1955-56 0 .18 -0.05 0 .01 0.71 15 .29
1956-57 0 .21 -0 . 07 0 .01 0 .86 42 .84
M.P. Double cropping was negligible in M.P.
Note: a denotes significance at 1 per cent level
b denotes significance at 5 per cent level
c denotes significance at 10 per cent level
Source: table B.IV [Bharadwaj, 1974a:95].
Table 8 Fragments per acre and size of holding, Indian FMS
State/district Year Constant
term
a Standard
error
R2 F
Punj ab
1954-57 0.50 -0.76 0 .045 0.98 282 .87a
West Bengal
Hooghly 
24 Paraganas
1954-57
1954-57
0.64 
0 .65
-0.23 
-0 .50
0.040 
0 .079
0.85 
0 .86
33.04a 
38.72*
U. P. 1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
0.34 
0 .41 
0.37
-0 .37 
-0 .40 
-0.30
0.074 
0.065 
0 . 041
0.79
0.85
0.90
25,19*
37.88*
51.90*
Bombay 1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
0.30
0.17
0.29
-0 . 64 
-0.60 
-0.62
0 .102 
0 .065 
0.088
0 . 88 
0.94 
0 .94
39.42* 
92.96* 
49.59*
M.P. 1955-56
1956-57
-0.10 
-0 .13
-0.49 
-0 .48
-0.31
0.015
0.96
0.98
244.66* 
977,92*
Note: * denotes significance at 1 per cent level 
Source: table B.V [Bharadwaj, 1974a: 96].
Table 9 Labour days per acre related to the size of holding:
all crop production, Indian FMS
State/district Year Constant
term
a Standard
error
R2 F
Punj ab 1954-55 1.45 -0.10 0 .02 0.86 19 .40
1955-56 1.47 -0 .10 0 .02 0 .92 46.16
1956-57 1.47 -0 .15 0 .02 0.92 47 .32
West Bengal
Hooghly 1954-55 2 .16 -0.11 0 . 07 0.31 2 .75
24 Paraganas 1954-55 1.37 -0.20 0.09 0 .44 4 .59c
Hooghly 1955-56 1.81 -1.13 0 . 04 0 . 61 9 . 62b
24 Paraganas 1955-56 1.77 -0.27 0 . 05 0.81 2 6 . lla
Hooghly 1956-57 1.85 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.29
24 Paraganas 1956-57 1.67 -0 . 08 0.05 0.31 2 .72
Bombay
Ahmednagar 1955-56 1.79 -0.36 0.09 0 .72 16.59a
Nasik 1955-56 1.85 -0.36 0.07 0 . 69 2 9.92a
Ahmednagar 1956-57 1.82 -0.43 0 . 07 0.83 29 .78a
Nasik 1956-57 1.89 -0.45 0.04 0.96 101.62a
Madras 1954-55 1.95 -0 .40 0 .125 0 . 64 10 .36b
1955-56 2 . 07 -0 .52 0 .10 0.81 27.12a
U. P. 1954-55 2.16 -0.49 0.05 0.94 99.62a
1955-56 1.88 -0.18 0.04 0 .77 2 0.93a
1956-57 1.78 -0.01 0 . 07 0.002 0.02
M.P.
Akola 1955-56 1.60 -0 .22 0.05 0.79 23 .74a
Amraoti 1955-56 1.51 -0 .11 0.09 0.19 1.46
Akola 1956-57 1.15 0 .03 0 .07 0.02 0.16
Amraoti 1956-57 1.12 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.15
Note: a denotes significance at 1 per cent level
b denotes significance at 5 per cent level
c denotes significance at 10 per cent level
Source: table C.II [Bharadwaj, 1974a: 99].
Table 10 Bullock labour days per acre in relation to 
the size of holding, Indian FMS
State/district Year Constant
term
a Standard
error
R2 F
Punj ab 1954-55 1.44 -0.16 0.02 0 .88 50 .51a
1955-56 1.50 -0,12 0.04 0.76 9 .86c
1956-57 1,29 -0,20 0.03 0 .77 10 . 09b
West Bengal
Hooghly 1954-55 1.27 -0.03 0 . 04 0.08 0.50
24 Paraganas 1954-55 1.37 -0 .20 0 . 09 0 .44 4.59°
Hooghly 1955-56 1.20 -0.03 0.03 0.09 0 .75
24 Paraganas 1955-56 1.23 -0.12 0 . 04 0.56 7 . 87b
Hooghly 1956-57 1.28 -0 . 01 0 . 08 0 .00 0.03
24 Paraganas 1956-57 1.22 -0.03 0.06 0.04 0.29
Bombay
Ahmednagar 1955-56 2 .10 -0.75 0 .33 0.90 22 .31a
Nasik 1955-56 1.78 -0.35 0 .11 0 . 64 33 .77a
Ahmednagar 1956-57 1.68 -0 .32 0.08 0.79 5 .17c
Nasik 1956-57 1.89 -0 .41 0 . 07 0.85 10.49b
Madras 1954-55 1.89 -0.47 0.09 0.81 25 . 88a
1955-56 2 .14 -0.67 0.09 0.90 51.69a
U. P. 1955-56 0.33 -0.13 0.14 0.22 0 .88
1956-57 1.62 -0.12 0 .03 0 .86 19.24b
M.P .
Akola 1956-57 1.20 -0.04 0.04 0 .13 0.89
Amraoti 1956-57 1,06 -0 . 01 0.08 0.00 0.02
Note: a denotes significance at 1 per cent level
b denotes significance at 5 per cent level
c denotes significance at 10 per cent level
Source: Table F,1 [Bharadwajf 1974a: 109].
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Table 11 Total inputs per acre related to the size of holding:
all crop production, Indian FMS
state/district year constant
term
a standard
error
R2 F
Punj ab 1954-55 2 .53 -0.35 0.24 0.40 2.03
1955-56 2 .43 -0.18 0.03 0 . 85 31,37b
1956-57 2 .57 -0.20 0.04 0 . 92 3 6.47a
West Bengal
Hooghly 1954-55 2 .49 -0.15 0.05 0.61 9 .47b
24 Paraganas 1954-55 2.38 -0 .32 0.04 0.90 56 . 99a
Hooghly 1955-56 2 .26 -0 .17 0.05 0.64 10 .31b
24 Paraganas 1955-56 2 .27 -0 .18 0.05 0.60 9 .54b
Hooghly 1956-57 2 .49 -0 .11 0 .05 0 ,45 4 . 98c
24 Paraganas 1956-57 2 .22 -0.01 0 .04 0.02 0 .11
Bombay
Ahmednagar 1955-56 2.25 -0.36 0 .14 0.52 6.46b
Nasik 1955-56 2.25 -0.36 0.09 0 .72 15,69a
Ahmednagar 1956-57 2 .34 -0.48 0.13 0.66 11. 66b
Nasik 1956-57 2 .49 -0.52 0.07 0.90 59.85a
Madras 1954-55 2 .42 -0 .41 0.12 0.66 11.48b
1955-56 2 .52 -0.50 0.04 0.96 134.81a
1956-57 2 .62 -0 .49 0.06 0.90 61.29a
U. P. 1954-55 2 . 74 -0 .41 0 . 04 0 . 98 102.61a
1955-56 -1. 24 1.21 0.25 0 .88 23.62a
1956-57 1.04 -0 . 05 0.02 0.72 7 . 93b
M.P. 1955-56 2 .01 -0.07 0.02 0 .59 8 . 66b
1956-57 1.90 -0.08 0.03 0 .58 8 . 08b
Note: a denotes significance at 1 per cent level
b denotes significance at 5 per cent level
° denotes significance at 10 per cent level
Source: Table F.IV [Bharadwaj, 1974a: 112],
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Table 12 Percentage area irrigated related to size of holding,
Indian FMS
state/district year constant
term
b standard
error
R2 F
Punj ab
Amritsar 1954-55 1.99 -0.05 0 .04 0.28 1.21
Ferozepur 1954-55 2 .02 -0 .11 0.08 0 .40 2.06
Amritsar 1955-56 2 . 01 -0.02 0 . 02 0.86 20.621
Ferozepur 1955-56 1.85 -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.08
Amritsar 1956-57 1.93 -0.02 0.02 0.10 0.35
Ferozepur 1956-57 1.96 -0.08 0.07 0.13 0.44
West Bengal
Hooghly 1954-55 -1. 01 -0.09 0 .93 0.00 0 .00
24 Paraganas 1954-55 1.67 -0 .67 0.12 0 .83 32 .45-
Hooghly 1955-56 1.08 -0 .34 0.20 0 .34 2.99
24 Paraganas 1955-56 -0.68 -0 .40 1.04 0.02 0.15
Hooghly 1956-57 1.57 -0 .85 0.16 0 .81 27 .83
24 Paraganas 1956-57 0 . 04 -0 .01 0.26 0 .00 0.00
Bombay
Ahmednagar 1955-56 2 . 03 -0 . 60 0 .14 0 .74 17 .35
Nasik 1955-56 1.31 -0 .43 0 .21 0 .41 4.2 6
Ahmednagar 1956-57 1.77 -0 .42 0.13 0 . 62 9 .72
Nasik 1956-57 1.75 -0 .57 0.10 0 .83 27 .54
U. P. 1954-55 1.91 -0.08 0.03 0.62 9 .52
1955-56 1.95 -0.09 0.04 0.50 6.26
1956-57 1.98 -0.06 0.01 0.81 25.77
Madras 1955-56 1.65 -0 .32 0.09 0 .68 13 .55
1956-57 1.87 -0.54 0.12 0 .75 19 .51
Note: a denotes significance at 1 per cent level
h denotes significance at 1 per cent level
c denotes significance at 1 per cent level
Source: Table G.I [Bharadwaj, 1974a: 114].
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Table 13 Equations for least square regression lines fitted 
to behaviour of returns per corrected acre by size of farm 
(corrected acreage)
gross output per corrected acre and 
farm size
state
Andhra
Bombay
MP
Madras 
Punj ab 
UP
W Bengal
constant 
237 .34 
39.62 
69 . 08 
103.25 
44 .48 
227 .77 
184.41
b coeff 
0.610 
0.080 
0.040 
-0.860 
0.850 
-0.520 
-0.570
se 
1.7492 
0.2012 
0.0975 
0.1949 
0.5240 
1.4678 
0.9780
net farm business income per 
corrected acre and farm size
state constant b coeff. se
Andhra 76.34 0.537 0.5290
Bombay 16.80 0 .049 0 .1425
MP 37 . 08 0.002 0.0583
Madras 54.77 -0.386 0 .2276
Punj ab 173 .70 0 .479 0.2914
UP 88 .73 0.269 1.0382
W Bengal 95.30 -0.175 0.5577
net profit per corrected acre and 
farm size
state constant b coeff. se
Andhra -32.09 1.469 0,2855
Bombay -4.18 0.173 0.0894
MP 11.05 0.085 0.0479
Madras 2 .46 0 .190 0.3023
Punj ab -15.88 0 .344 0 .1000
UP -7.93 3 .220 0 .6340
W Bengal 22 . 84 0.401 0.6500
source: statement II [Khusro, 1964: 71].
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Table 14a Topography and major crops of two districts 
in West Bengal
region
land i 
high
[% total area) 
medium low
crops
paddy
(% sown 
jute
area)
potato
Hooghly 
24 Paraganas
34.76
25.16
26.59 38.65 
20.86 53.98
65 .82 
80 .47
15 .27 
4 .34
5.58 
0 .52
Note: The districts chosen are Hooghly and 24 Paraganas - 
both essentially wet areas. However, in a comparison between 
the two, since 24 Paraganas is on the whole in a lower lying 
area than Hooghly it is generally "wetter" then Hooghly.
source: table 2.5 [Roy 1979: 71]
Table 14b Topographical characteristics and cropping pattern 
for some selected villages in West Bengal
village high medium 
(acres)
low paddy jute pulses 
(acres)
potato
Baliadarga 50..34 14.,09 37 .91 3,39
Bolsiddhi 43 ,.46 217 ,.28 173 .,83 366,.44
Bongaon 834 .00 442 .00 164..43 1100 ,.00 25 .00 350. o o c20.001
Khau 3092 ,60 2767 ,.07
Krishnagar 157,.01 80 ,.00 20 . 00
Satbaria 1044 ,.02 600 ,.00
U .Akhrabaua 284,.07 224,.07
Srinagar 1301,.03 144,.60 1140,.09 130 .04 56 .82 28 .701
(41,.00)u
Note: u = unirrigateed i = irrigated
Source: table 2.6 [Roy, 1979: 73]
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Table 15 The effect of cropping pattern changes with size group 
of holding on output per acre (West Bengal)
crop 1 j 2S 4 c 6 1J 8
aman paddy 68 .09 141. 56
aus paddy 1.,50 2 .62 0.01
jute 18 .,74 36. 30 218.,77 100.,00 205 .,13 100 .00 to
mesta 2 .,35 5.53 1.25
pulses 6.,01 4..13
potatoes 3 .,31 28..63
aman paddy 67 .,18 -0 .,91 139..67
aus paddy 3 ., 98 2 .,48 6.95 1.25
jute 14.,13 -4.,61 27 .37 213 .,82 97.,74 205.,53 100..19 to
mesta 4 .,36 2 .,01 10 .27 2.50
pulses 7 !.53 1..52 5.,17
potatoes 2 .,82 -0 .49 24.,39
aman paddy 73 .,76 5.,67 153 .,35
aus paddy 1.,74 0..24 3,,04 2.50
jute 13 .,25 -5.,49 25.,67 209..40 95.,71 206.,76 100..79 to
mesta 2 .95 0..60 6.,95 3.75
pulses 6., 77 0 .76 4., 65
potatoes 1..82 -1,.49 15 .,74
aman paddy 71.,64 3 .55 148.,94
aus paddy 3 ,05 1,.55 5 .,23 3.75
j ute 13 .40 -5 ,.34 25,.96 209 ,.10 95..57 205 ,38 100 .12 to
mesta 2 ,38 0 ,.03 5.,60 5.00
pulses 7 .42 1..41 5..10
potatoes 2 ,.10 -1,.21 18..17
aman paddy 66..11 -1..98 137 .44
aus paddy 5..45 3 ,.95 9..52 5,00
jute 12 .80 -5,.94 24,.79 204 .13 93,.31 205,.26 100..06 to
mesta 4,. 57 2 ,.22 10,.76 7.50
pulses 9 .32 3 ,.31 6..40
potatoes 1..76 -1..55 15,.22
aman paddy 77 .52 9 ,.43 161..16
aus paddy 3 .89 2 .39 6,.79 7.50
jute 9 .89 -8 ,.85 19,.16 207 ,.66 94..92 205,.52 100..19 to
mesta 1..82 -0..53 4,.29 10 .00
pulses 5..42 -0 .59 3 ,.72
potatoes 1.45 -1 .86 12 ,.54
aman paddy 64 .74 -3 .35 134,.59
aus paddy 2.21 0.71 3,.86 10 .00
jute 13 .41 -5 .33 25,.98 192 .18 87 ,.84 206 .73 100 ,.78 to
mesta 5.92 3. 57 13,.98 15 .00
pulses 13 .17 7.16 9,.05
potatoes 0.55 -2 .76 4,.76
aman paddy 68 .22 0.13 141,.93
aus paddy 1.75 0.25 3 ,.06 15 .00
jute 10 .54 -8 .20 20,.42 193 .35 88 .37 208 . 93 100 ,.34 and
mesta 1.38 -0 . 97 3 ,.25 above
pulses 16 .56 10 .55 11 .38
potatoes 1.55 -1 .76 13 ,.41
Note: 1) percentage area under crop 2) percentage change from first 
size group 3) value per acre attributable to each crop 4) total 
value of all crops (per acre) Rs. 5) total value all crops index
6) total value all crops exc. potatoes and pulses (Rs.) 7) total 
value all crop exc, potatoes and pulses (index) 8) size class 
Source: table 2.8 [Roy, 1979: 76]
Table 16 Output per net cropped acre and farm size, Punjab
No. Districts
1
a.
[t value)
b F- 
(t value)
-value n R2
1. Patiala 1648.85 
(10 .7)
-32 .418** 
(2 .3368)
5.46 75 0.07
2 , Ferozepur 956.551
(16.44)
2 ,7415 
(1.0513)
1.105 127 0.009
3 . Sangrur 1361.06
(15.78)
-22 .8683*** 
(2 .752)
7.572 72 0.1
4 . Bhatinda 1249.81 
(11.98)
-6.9583
(1.1417)
1.303 101 0.013
5 . Jullunder 1695.15
(10.66)
-3.1751 
(0.2031)
0 . 041 42 0.001
6. Hoshiarpur 1555.67
(34.39)
-11.3808*
(1.6828)
2 . 831 119 0 . 02
7 . Kapurthala 1605.6 
(15.68)
-7.9832 
(0.6303)
0.395 20 0.02
8. Rupnagar 870.16
(14.92)
-13 .8832** 
(2 .241)
5,02 58 0.08
9 . Ludhiana 1797.53 
(17,25)
-36 .717*** 
(3.482)
12.121 75 0.14
10. Gurdaspur 1734.53 
(20.12)
-15.921
(1.483)
2 .199 61 0.04
11. Amritsar 1555.99
(26.95)
12.098** 
(2.1488)
4 . 617 70 0.06
*** = significant at the 1 percent level
** = significant at the 5 percent level
* = significant at the 10 percent level
source: Table 5.1 [Roy, 1979: 156].
Table 17 Output per net cropped acre and farm size, Punjab
No. Districts a
(t value)
b
(t value)
F-value n R2
1. Patiala 823 .21 
(10.80)
-10.3104
(1.5030)
2 .259 75 0 .03
2 . Ferozepur 552.99 
(15.25)
+ 6 . 0306*** 
(3.7102)
13 .766 127 0.01
3 . Sangrur 684.05 
(15.37)
-3.7555 
(0.4897)
0 .767 72 0.01
4. Bhatinda 706.78 
(13.45)
+1.4086 
(1.2727)
0.211 101 0 .02
5. Jullunder 830.48 
(9.74)
+10.6658 
(0.5382)
1.620 42 0 .04
6 . Hoshiarpur 795.295
(34.80)
-1.8378
(0.5382)
0 .289 119 0.002
7 . Kapurthala 736.297 
(12.44)
+13.114* 
(1.793)
3 .212 20 0.15
8 . Rupnagar 512.42 
(19.35)
-4.2243
(1.5009)
2 .253 58 0 . 04
9. Ludhiana 908.309
(18,38)
-14 .8715*** 
(2 .9723)
8.834 75 0.01
10 . Gurdaspur 957.078 
(22.88)
-6.2100
(1.19168)
1.420 61 0 . 02
11. Amritsar 872 .37 
(35.57)
+ 6.5506*** 
(2 .7831)
7 .744 70 0.01
*** = significant at the 1 percent level
** = significant at the 5 percent level
* = significant at the 10 percent level
source: Table 5.2 [Roy, 1979: 157].
Table 18 Cropping intensity and farm size, Punjab
No. Districts a
(t value)
b
(t value)
F-value n R2
1. Patiala 1.997 
(30.73)
-0 .02116*** 
(3.6263)
13 .150 75 0 .15
2 . Ferozepur 1.7332
(28.06)
-0.00708** 
(2.5586)
6.545 127 0.05
3 . Sangrur 1.9799 
(36.39)
-0 . 02462*** 
(4.6837)
21.937 72 0 .24
4. Bhatinda 1.65299
(31.541)
-0 , 00907*** 
(2.9634)
8.779 101 0.08
5 . Jullunder 2.0184 
(55.011)
-0 . 02049*** 
(5.68018)
32 .263 42 0.45
6. Hoshiarpur 1.9755
(67.53)
-0.01212*** 
(2.77005)
7.667 119 0 . 06
7 . Kapurthala 2.12 65 
(29.68)
-0 . 0329*** 
(3 .71141)
13.772 20 0 .43
8. Rupnagar 1.6433
(32.154)
-0.01155 
(2.1267)
4 .522 58 0.07
9. Ludhiana 1.9574 
(57.13)
-0.01155** 
(2 .1267)
4.522 75 0.17
10 . Gurdaspur 1.7994 
(32.26)
-0.006104 
(0.8784)
0 . 771 61 0.01
11. Amritsar 1.7884 
(43.16)
-0.000101 
(0.0252)
0 .001 70 0 .00
*** = significant at the 1 percent level
** = significant at the 5 percent level
* = significant at the 10 percent level
source: table 5.3 [Roy, 1979: 158].
Table 19 Yield per acre of HYV wheat and farm size, Punjab
No . Districts a
(t value)
b
(t value)
F-value n R2
1 . Patiala 8.3968
(7.868)
-0 . 07417 
(0 .7796)
0.608 72 0.009
2 . Ferozepur 7.8759 
(7.8511)
+ 0 . 04262 
(1.021)
1.042 108 0.01
3 . Sangrur 9.8501 
(22.21)
-0.071003*
(1.6757)
2 .808 69 0 .04
4 . Bhatinda 10.309 
(11.213)
-0 .002954 
(0.0615)
0.317 77 0 .004
5. Jullunder 11.0091 
(23.51)
-0.002954
(0.0615)
0.003 42 0.0001
6 . Hoshiarpur 13.645 
(30.387)
-0 .18726*** 
(3.0167)
9 .10 54 0 .15
7 . Kapurthala 1.356 
(0.1833)
+1.8265* 
(2.0428)
4.173 19 0.2
8 . Rupnagar 10.049
(22.64)
+0.00694
(0.1591)
0 .024 49 0.0005
9 . Ludhiana 12.7106 
(15.45)
-0 .23052** 
(2 .787)
7 .769 74 0.1
10 . Gurdaspur 9 .339 
(17.88)
+0.01443 
(0.0643)
0 . 049 57 0 . 0009
*—
I Amritsar 8.4956 
(17.87)
+0.0677
(1.44723)
2.167 70 0.03
*** =significant at the 1 percent level
** -significant at the 5 percent level
* =significant at the 10 percent level
source: table 5.5 [Roy, 1979: 160].
Table 20 Yield per acre of HYV rice and farm size, Punjab
NO . Districts a
(t value)
b
(t value)
F-value n R2
1. Patiala 12 .238 
(13.58)
0.01995 0.065 35 0.002
2 . Ferozepur 13.662 
(9.377)
0.04648 
(0.6156)
0.379 44 0.009
3 . Sangrur
4. Bhatinda 15.68
(5.135)
-0.2649 
(1.792)
3 .212 11 0.26
5 . Jullunder 27.7642 
(4.4016)
-0.66396 
(1.1523)
1.323 9 0 .16
6. Hoshiarpur
7 . Kapurthala 12.0658 
(6.384)
0.52021* 
(2.12724)
4 .525 18 0 .22
8. Rupnagar
9. Ludhiana 19 .771 
(16.83)
-0.24693** 
(2.347)
5.508 33 0 .15
10 . Gurdaspur 12.8018 
(13.47)
0.07446 
(0.6435)
0.414 55 0.008
11. Amritsar 15.282 
(30.55)
0 .18316*** 
(3.865)
14 . 939 67 0 .19
*** = significant at the 1 percent level
** = significant at the 5 percent level
* = significant at the 10 percent level
source: table 5.6 [Roy, 1979: 161].
Table 21 Percentage area irrigated and farm size, Punjab
No. Districts a
(t value)
b
(t value)
F-value n R2
1. Patiala 0.9818
(31.05)
-0 .005235* 
(1.839)
3 .383 75 0.04
2 . Ferozepur 0.89757 
(33.21)
-0.00251** 
(2.0888)
4.362 125 0.03
3 . Sangrur 0.99464
(43.65)
-0.00339 
(1.5541)
2 .416 70 0.03
4. Bhatinda 0.8682 
(23.19)
-0.00202
(0.9540)
0.910 94 0.01
5 . Jullunder 0.97363 
(48.34)
0.00041 
(0.02071)
0 , 037 42 0.001
6. Hoshiarpur 1.0277
(105.75)
-0 . 0123** 
(5.2852)
2,936 19 0 .15
7 . Kapurthala 1.022 
(17.22)
-0 .00201 
(1.7137)
0 .383 50 0.008
8 . Rupnagar 0 .9078 
(27.796)
0 .00201 
(0.6188)
0.383 50 0.008
9 . Ludhiana all farms in the sample have 
100 percent irrigation
75
10 . Gurdaspur 1.0066
(176.21)
-0.00165** 
(2.3501)
5.606 59 0.09
11. Amritsar 0.9899
(93.855)
0.000083
(0.08116)
0 . 014 70 0.0002
***  ^ significant at the 1 percent level
** = significant at the 5 percent level
* = significant at the 10 percent level
source: table 5.4 [Roy, 1979: 159].
Table 22 Various indices of progress for districts of Punjab
No. Districts a b c d e
1 . Patiala 40 .7 73 .4 20.31 87 .79 7 .64
2 , Ferozepur 66.3 80 .2 23 . 50 91.17 7 .54
3 . Sangrur 51.3 71.6 20.42 86.27 6.91
4. Bhatinda 55.2 53 .6 23.07 89 .57 7 . 03
5. Jullunder 64.1 77.6 17 .81 75.76 6.88
6 . Hoshiarpur 15.1 45.7 17 .70 53 .51 7 .46
7 . Kapurthala 62 .1 71.5 15.26 73 .76 7 .15
8 . Rupnagar 17 .0 39.0 15.80 49 .11 6.11
9 . Ludhiana 59 .3 81.6 17 .84 80 .15 6.80
10 . Gurdaspur 43 .5 68.6 19.02 71.07 8.65
1 1. Amritsar 87 .2 88.9 20 .12 86 . 67 8.11
a = percentage area irrigated 1960-61
jb = percentage area under HYVs and American cotton 1974-75 
c = agricultural labour as percentage of male work force 1971 
d = percentage area of crops with HYV under HYVs 1976-77 
e = annual compound rates of growth 1962-5 to 1970-3
source: table 5.7 [Roy, 1979: 162].
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Table 23 Potential effects of land redistribution on agricultural 
production in five developing countries
Brazil NE 
1962-3
Brazil
1973
Colombia
1960
India
1970-1
Pakistan
1960
Phi1ipp 
1960
Muda
1972-3
A 11720 7815 2781 146491 8000 9617
B 249862 79840 27338 131873 19810 7772
C 25.5 24.6 2 .25 6.19 2 . 02 0.80
D $49.4 610 ps 695rs 458rs 407ps $1660M
E $27 .5 477ps 555rs 415rs 331ps $1300M
p 1.795 1.28 1.19 1.10 1.23 1.27
G 25 79.5 28 19 10 23 28
Notes:
A=agricultural labour force (1,000)
B=total farm area (1,000 ha)
C=equalizing parcel size (=B/[A/2.5])
D=output per hectare on parcel size 
E=overall average output per hecatre 
F=Ratio, D/E
G-percentage increase in output from total land redistribution 
Source: Table 5-1 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 132-33].
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Table 24 Results of "total" land reform based on family units (2.5 
adult-equivalent workers). Percentage change of production
sector UE1 CAP size product sector UE1 CAP size
product
Ceara H A 20 .9 25.,6
cotton L A 24.,0 22 .,2
H B 20 .9 26,.5
L B 24,.0 19 ,.6
Pernambuco H A 15.,2 7 .,7
cotton L A 17 .,5 1 ,.7
H B 15,.2 2 ,.3
L B 17 ,.5 -7 ,.0
E. Santo H A 32 ,.3 5.,9
coffee L A 36.,4 1 .,5
H B 32 ,.3 -5,. 2
L B 36 ,.4 -9 ,.7
S. Paulo H A 19 .3 -9 ,.2
coffee L A 2 0,.4 -10 ,.5
H B 19 ,.3 -27 ,.7
L B 20 ,.4 -28,.5
Pernambuco H A 1 1.8 63 ,.1
sugar FGV L A 13 ,.6 56 ,.1
H B 11 .8 74 .3
L B 13 .6 66 .2
S. Paulo H A 22 .2 22 ,.8
cereals L A 23 .5 2 0,.2
H B 22 .2 9.9
L B 23 .5 6 .7
R.G. rice H A 29.,0 34., 2
FGV L A 30..6 33 .,3
H B 29.,0 52 .,9
L B 30 .,6 51.,1
M.G. corn H A 2 1.,9 -3 .7
L A 23 .,2 -5..1
H B 2 1.9 1 1.5
L B 23 ,.2 7 ,.0
S. Paulo H A 47,, 6 27 ,6
cattle/gen. L A 50,.4 25 ,.3
H B 47 ,.6 30 ,.1
L B 50 ,.3 26,.8
Alagoas H A 19 ,.5 -13 ,.2
sugar L A 22 ,.5 -14,.2
H B 19,.5 -18,.1
L B 22 ,.5 -18,.9
Pernambuco H A 13 ,.6 29 ,.4
sugar IAA L A 15,.6 23 ,.8
H B 13 .6 25,.7
T i B 15 .6 20 ,.3
S. Paulo H A 27 .5 -2 .1
sugar L A 29 .0 -5..5
H B 27 .5 0 .0
T i B 29 .0 -3 .4
Notes:
UE=unemployment assumption as % of employed. High assumption is 19% 
in NE Brazil, 16% in east, 7% in south; Low assumption is 3.4% in
northeast, 2.9% in east, and 1.3% in south
CAP=assumption regarding resource distribution: A= no change 
in sectoral total capital and seeds. B= post-reform capital and 
seeds and fertiliser allowed to change such that parcels use 
inputs according to pre-reform input-size relationship.
Source: table 26 [Cline, 1970: 146-47].
Table 25 Relative land-use intensity: large farms 
compared to small farms (selected countries)
weighted average percent
cultivated area rel. size
small farms large farms int. limit
(bottom 20%) (top 40%)
A B C D E= F=
country % ceiling % floor C/A D/B
Brazil 33 .0 91 2 .0 1000 0 .06 1 0,.99
Chile 41,.4 467 6 ,0 1000 0 .14 2 .14
Colombia 48 ,8 38 4.,5 525 0 .09 13 .82
Peru 46,.4 263 5., 0 1000 0 .11 3 ,.80
Uruguay 31,.0 320 7 ,.0 1000 0 .23 3 ,.13
Venezuela 51,.8 452 10 ,.0 1000 0 .19 2 ,.21
Costa Rica 43 ,.8 42 17 ,.0 413 0 .39 9 ,.83
Nicaragua 43 ,.6 48 9 ,.8 419 0 .22 8 ,.73
Panama 67 ,.5 18 1 1,.1 120 0 .16 6 ,67
Ceylon 8 6,.9 1 .28 80,.6 9.25 0 . 93 7 ,.23
Taiwan 71,.0 0 .60 80 ,.2 1.86 1 .13 3 ,.10
India 93 ,.9 2 .12 87 ,.8 7 .95 0 . 94 3 ,.75
Japan 91..0 0 .65 75,.4 1.87 0 .83 2 ,.88
S. Korea 33 .0 0 .38 46,.3 1.21 1 .40 3 ,.18
Pakistan 87 ,.5 2 .03 67 ,. 5 8 0 .77 3 ,. 94
Philippines 96,.5 2 .78 75,.3 8.45 0 .78 3 ,.04
Thailand 90..4 2 .78 85,.6 7.2 0 .95 2 ,.59
Turkey 97 .1 4.34 76 .3 15.6 0 .79 3 .59
Kenya 49 .5 7.45 13 ,.0 1000 0 .26 134,.23
UAR Egypt 99 .8 1 .21 90 .1 5.7 0 .90 4.71
Source: table 3-1 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 33].
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Table 26 Comparison of agricultural growth rates to average 
farm size, population growth rates, land concentration, 
and land endowment (30 selected countries)
country 1 2 3 4 5
Japan 1 .,18 1 ., 6 1 ., 0 0 .,411 1 .,73
Indonesia 1 .,20 2 .,7 2 .0 0 .553 2 .,18
Taiwan 1 .,27 3 .,8 2 .,9 0 ,.401 0 .57
UAR 1 .,59 0 .,7 2 .,5 0 .598 0 .,19
Sri Lanka 1 .,61 1 .,9 2 .,4 0 ,.665 1 .00
Korea 2 .06 3 .,9 2 .7 0 .195 0 .,57
Pakistan 2 .,35 4.,7 2 .,7 0 .631 1 .,84
India 2 ,.70 1 .,9 2 .3 0 .584 0 .90
Uganda 3 .29 1 ., 0 2 .,7 0 .485 2 .,63
Philippines 3 .59 2 ., 9 3 . 0 0 ,.507 1 .,13
Thailand 3 .47 3 ,.7 3 .1 0 .455 1 .86
Senegal 3 ,.63 -2 ,.2 2 .1 0 ,.399 6 .48
Turkey 5 ,.03 3 ,.4 2 .5 0 ,.629 3 ,.18
Dominica 5,.05 3 .2 3 .0 0 ,.798 1 .85
Guatemala 8 .34 4..8 3 .1 0 ,. 828 3 ,. 40
Morocco 9,. 82 2 .4 2 . 9 0 ,.640 4,.73
Kenya 1 1,.74 2 .8 3 ,.1 0 ,.822 3 ,.40
Tunisia 15,.40 2 ,.0 3 ,.0 0 ,.645 6 ,.65
Panama 18 ,.81 5,.1 3 ,.3 0 ,.737 1 1,.97
Peru 20 ,.37 2 ,.3 3 ,.1 0 ,.935 20 ,.97
Colombia 22 .59 4,.4 3 ,.2 0 .868 1 1 ,.80
Nicaragua 37 ,.41 5 ,.5 3 ,.5 0 .801 1 1 ,.51
Costa Rica 41 .05 6 ,.3 3.3 0 .782 6 ,.32
Brazil 74 .86 3 ,.6 2 . 9 0 .831 20 ,. 95
Venezuela 81 .21 4,.4 3.5 0 . 927 32 ,.31
Paraguay 108 .53 3 .1 3 .1 0 .938 32 .03
Chile 118 .32 1 .4 2 .3 0 .933 30 .47
Mexico 123 .87 3.4 3.5 0 .747 8 .56
Uruguay 195 .26 -0 .6 1 .3 0 .820 36 .83
Argentina 371 .06 1 .0 1 .5 0 .836 75 .11
notes:
1) average farm size (ha)
2) agricultural output growth rate, 1961-71 (%)
3) population growth rate, 1960-70 (%)
4) Gini coefficient for farm land distribution
5) total land area per agricultural population, 1970 
hectares
source: table 3-3 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 38-9].
Table 27 Productivity, employment and distribution 
of land in selected countries
country year A B C D
Greece 1961 424 0 , 50 3 .18 0 . 597
Spain 1962 90 0 .,09 14.,85 0 . 832
Costa Rica 1963 83 0 ,.09 40 .70
Dominica 1971 129 0 ,.28 8 .,64
El Salvador 1961 186 0 ,.38 6 .,95
Guatemala 1964 144 0 ,.29 8 .17
Mexico 1960 22 0 ,. 04 123 .90
Nicaragua 1963 55 0 ,.09 37 .,34
Argentina 1970 18 0 ,.01 270 ,10 0 . 873
Brazil 1960 14 0 ,.05 79 .25 0 ,.845
Chile 1965 18 0 ,.03 118..50
Colombia 1960 67 0 .10 22 .60 0 . 865
Paraguay 1961 11 0 ,.02 108,.70
Peru 1961 50 0 ,.10 20 ,.37 0 ,.947
Uruguay 1966 14 0 .01 208,. 80 0 ,.833
Venezuela 1961 31 0 . 03 81,.24 0 ,.936
China 1960-1 841 2 .05 1 ,.27 0 ,.474
India 1960 172 1 .22 6 ,. 52 0 ,. 607
Indonesia 1963 323 2 .17 1 ,.05
Iran 1960 187 0 ,.32 6 ,.05 0 ,.624
Korea 1970 1085 2 ,.88 0 ,.85
Japan 1960 1720 1 .45 1 ,.18 0 ,.473
Nepal 1960-2 352 2 .54 1 ,.23
Pakistan 1960 240 0 .96 2 .35 0 . 607
Philippines 1960 250 1 .25 3 ,.59 0 ,.580
Sri Lanka 1962 376 1 .12 1 ,.61
Thailand 1963 166 1 .21 3 ,.47
Turkey 1963 155 0 .64 5 .03 0 .611
Vietnam 1960 355 2 .79 1 .33
Botswana 1969-70 168 1 .18 4 .75
Egypt 1960-61 681 1 .89 1 .59
Kenya 1969 183 1 .31 4 .20
Malagasy 1961-2 293 3.32 1 .04
Mali 1960 98 2 .06 4 .35
Morocco 1961 144 0 .49 4 .62
Senegal 1960 209 1 .20 3.62
Togo 1961-2 189 1 .05 2 . 62
Tunisia 1961-2 42 0 .12 15 .41
Uganda 1963-4 167 0.84 3.29
Zambia 1960 68 0.67
Notes:
A-farm GDP per hectare (US$)
B=employment per hectare 
C=average size of holding (ha)
D=Gini coefficient of land concentration
source: table 3-5 [Beriy and Cline, 1979: 41-42].
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Table 28 Northeast Brazil, 1973: Production per unit of 
available land resource by farm size group
size average av. size average av.
zone group size Q/ha zone group size Q/ha
1 3 ,.1 85,.92 E 1 3 .,7 353 ,.03
2 25 ,.5 30,.73 2 26,.1 63 ,.88
3 71..9 16,.19 3 72 .8 46 ,.64
4 138 ,.9 8 ,.80 4 143 ,.6 35 ,.24
5 313 ,.2 5,.00 5 283 ,.5 45 ,.81
6 1178,.0 2 ,.20 6 2303 ,.6 7 ,.76
1 3 ,.7 78,.25 F 1 5,.6 173 ,.13
2 26,.6 33 ,.14 2 27 .1 243 ,.65
3 68 ,.8 15 ,.03 3 70 ,.6 268,.71
4 138,.9 8 ,.45 4 142 ,.3 314,.40
5 317 ,.2 5,.99 5 294 ,.6 253 ,.46
6 1396,. 9 4,.40 6 620 ,. 0 227 ,.49
1 4,.9 60 ,.41 G 1 4,.0 197 ,.11
2 27 .5 35,.54 2 26,.5 54,.49
3 72 ,.4 28,.19 3 73 ,.3 51,.34
4 143 .3 18,.33 4 143 ,.4 30 .49
5 288 .1 15 ,.87 5 299 .1 28 .88
6 1059 .2 1 1,.14 6 1135 .3 10 ,.17
1 4,.8 2 1.00
2 24,.2 52 ,.16
3 71,.8 47 .06
4 138 .4 13 .91
5 282 .5 14 .17
6 1210 .6 9.80
Notes:
Zones: A-low demographic density (west of Maranhao,
Piaui, Bahia); B-middle north (east of Maranhao, north 
of Piaui) ; C-semiarid sertao (portions of Ceara, Rio 
Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Bahia); D-semihumid 
southeast (portion of Bahia); E-humid east (coastal
zone of Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas,
Sergipe, northern Bahia); F-humid southeast (cocoa zone 
of Bahia); G-Agreste (transitional zone of Rio Grande do 
Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia).
Size groups:
1 0-9.9ha 4 100-199.9
2 10-49.9 5 200-499.9
3 50-99.9 6 500 and over
source: table 4-1 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 46-7].
Table 29 Northeast Brazil: regression results,
land productivity by farm size, grouped farm data, 1973
form
dep
var
regional
inter
cept
. dummies coefficients 
slope const, a b c R2
1 Q/X no no 153,3 -44.93 0.1323
(34.8) (16.9)
2 Q/V no no 1.431 -0.263 0.5061
( .164) (.041)
3 Q/X yes no 110.7 -39.91 0.1963 0.8137
(22.7) (7.9) (.046)
4 Q/X yes yes 141.5 -56.44 0.2033 0.8856
(36.7) -16.3 (.062}
Notes:
1) dependent variables: Q/X=output per hectare; Q/V= 
output per unit land value
2) a=log of farm area (ha); b=log of land value; 
c-land price per hectare
Source: table 4-2 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 49].
Table 30 Northeast Brazil: regression results, land 
productivity by farm size, farm area basis, and by 
major product, 1973
product constant
log of 
farm 
area
land
price/
hectare
% share- 
cropped 
area R2
livestock 84.45
(2 1 .1)
-19.33
(3.7)
0.3619
(0.24)
26 .58 
(81.0)
0 .217
rice 63 .91 
(1 2.2)
— 12 .23 
(1 .01)
0.0447 
(.026)
58.97
(15.7)
0 .304
cocoa 214.1 
(50 .3)
-9.87
(9.8)
0.0853 
(.019)
-78.9 
(182 .7)
0.474
sugar 155.6
(18.9)
-2 0 .16 
(3.16)
0.0207 
(.0196)
264.1
(291.3)
0 .277
manioc,
corn,
beans
75 .5 
(4.5)
-11.91 
( .93)
0.0108 
(.0061)
31.45
(14.3)
0 .151
other 253 . 6 
(18.8)
-29.41
(3.4)
0.00395 
(.0052)
58 .86 
(36.1)
0 .114
Note: dependent variable = value-added per hectare 
(1973 $US)
source: table 4-3 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 50].
Table 31 Northeast Brazil: regression results, land 
productivity by farm size, land value basis, and by 
major product, 1973
product constant
log of 
land 
value R2
livestock 5 .755 
(.696)
-0.5593 
(.081)
0.043
rice 9.555
(1.13)
-1.0733 
(.145)
0 .118
cocoa 2 . 026 
( .413)
-0.1585 
{ .039)
0 .148
sugar 4 . 548 
( .91)
-0.4113 
{.098)
0.093
manioc,
corn,
beans
7.96 
(.705)
-0.8991 
( .092)
0.087
other 12 .996 
(1.29)
-1.4067 
(.155)
0.081
Note: dependent variable = value-added divided by 
land value (1973 $US)
source: table 4-4 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 52].
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Table 32 Total social factor productivity by farm size group. 
Northeast Brazil
size 
zone group X zone
size
group X
A 1 1.134 0 .717 0.525 E 1 1.855 1.422 1.142
2 1.177 0.814 0.622 2 1.201 0.924 0.758
3 1.173 0 .848 0.664 3 1.318 1.082 0.918
4 0.786 0.632 0.528 4 1. 065 0.909 0 .794
5 0.509 0.446 0.398 5 1.218 1.016 0.871
6 0.601 0.527 0 .469 6 0 .132 0.130 0 .129
1 1 .254 0 .806 0.594
2 1.744 1.125 0 .831
3 1 .445 0.967 0 .726
4 1 .180 0.900 0 .728
5 1.036 0 . 676 0 . 676
6 1.215 1.022 0.882
1 2 .122 1.355 0.996
2 1.412 1.234 1.097
3 0 . 997 0.944 0 .895
4 1.395 1.306 1.210
5 1.132 1.073 1.020
6 na na na
1 1.316 0 .771 0.545
2 1.532 1.036 0 .783
3 1.492 1.110 0 .884
4 0.689 0.600 0.532
5 1.290 1.044 0.876
6 0 . 977 0.861 0.769
1 2 .530 1.532 1.098
2 1 .157 0 .884 0 .715
3 1 .205 1. 007 0 .864
4 0.790 0 .681 0.599
5 0.698 0.623 0.563
6 0 .351 0 .298 0.259
1 na na na
2 0.833 0.603 0.603
3 1.145 0.981 0 .859
4 0.381 0.350 0.323
5 0 .381 0.356 0.335
6 0 .257 0.249 0.242
Notes:
Columns: X=zero labour cost; Y=at labour cost one 
half minimum wage; Z=with labour cost at minimum wage
Zones: A-low demographic density (west of Maranhao,
Piaui, Bahia); B~middle north (east of Maranhao, north 
of Piaui); C-semiarid sertao (portions of Ceara, Rio 
Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Bahia); D-semihumid 
southeast (portion of Bahia); E-humid east (coastal 
zone of Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, 
Sergipe, northern Bahia); F~humid southeast (cocoa zone 
of Bahia); G-Agreste (transitional zone of Rio Grande do 
Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia).
Size groups:
1 0-9.9ha 4 100-199.9
2 10-49.9 5 200-499.9
3 50-99.9 6 500 and over
source: table 4-7 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 56-7].
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Table 33 Land productivity and farm size in Colombia, 
1960-61 (values in thousands of 1960 pesos)
farm
size A B C D E F
0-3 606.4 1.37 0.75 1.05 0.82 0 .45
3-5 150 .2 0 . 86 0.79 1.02 0 .41 0.38
5-10 169 .2 0,73 0 .73 1.04 0.19 0 .19
10-50 201 0 .44 0.57 0 .96 0 .12 0 .16
50-500 76 0 .23 0.38 0 .88 0.036 0 . 06
over 500 6.9 0 .13 0.35 0.89 0.008 0 . 023
total 1209 .7 0 .285 0.46 0 .95 0 . 08 0.128
Note: farm size in hectares 
A=number of farms (1,000)
B=value-added per hectare
C=value-added per effective hectare (physical hectares 
divided by ratio of land price on farms in group relative 
to overall average land price)
D-value of crop output per hectare of cultivated 
land (including fallow)
E=man-years of labour per hectare 
F=man-years of labour per effective hectare
source: table 4-8 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 59J.
Table 34 Differences in yield by farm size, Colombia 1966
farm size 1 2 3 4 5 6
0-2 94.2 80.5 1.23 1.05 0 .87 0.85
2-5 96.8 81.6 1.22 1.03 0 .77 0.84
5-10 96.7 79.4 1.27 1.04 0.66 0.82
10-20 100.0 78.5 1.34 1.05 0 .56 0 .78
20-50 96.8 68.1 1.25 0 .88 0 .44 0.70
50-200 117 . 8 68.8 1.50 0 .87 0.28 0 . 58
200-500 140.3 70.7 1.79 0.90 0.18 0.50
> 500 147 .4 67 .3 1.99 0.89 0.06 0.46
notes: farm size in hectares
1) index value of product per hectare cropped
2) index value of product per hectare cropped and fallow
3) value of crop output per hectare cropped (1,000 pesos)
4) value of crop output per hectare cropped and fallow
5) cropped area as percentage of arable and pasture land
6) cropped area as percentage of cropped and fallow land
source: table 4-9 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 61],
Table 35 Colombia: land use in 1960-61 and 1970-71 (%)
farm
(ha)
size temporary crops 
in use fallow total
perm.
crops
all
crops pasture other
1960--61
all 7.14 5 .78 12 .92 5..54 12 .68 53 .43 28..11
<5 35 .91 1 0.78 4 6 .69 23 .91 59 .82 17 . 65 1 1.75
5-50 15 .96 4 ,.51 25,.45 14..91 30 ,.87 36 .13 23 ,.51
>50 3.14 4,.51 7 ,.65 2 .01 5 ,.15 60.06 30 ,.28
1970--71
all 6 .81 1 0,.32 17 ,.13 7 ,.58 14..38 56.4 18,.89
<5 29 .08 7 .99 37,.07 29..53 58,.61 24.85 9,.05
5-50 13 .45 14 .59 28 ,. 04 18..53 31,.98 39.15 14,.58
>50 4.17 9.42 13 ,.59 3 ,.92 8 ,.09 61.97 20 ,.52
source: table 4-14 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 66].
Table 36 Colombia: characteristics of 474 farm 
sub-sample of the INCORA borrowers sample, 1969
farm size A B C D
0-1 14154 10776 16599 15852
1-5 4892 7989 2429 13061
5-10 3641 5909 1021 17311
10-15 2052 4745 696 15171
15-20 2569 7458 872 18197
20-50 1442 5297 509 22835
50-100 1472 8333 961 31799
> 100 671 2043 414 14020
all farms 2652 6057 910 16266
notes: farm size in hectares
A=value of land-based production per hectare 
B=value of crop output per cultivated hectare 
C=value of livestock output per hectare of pasture 
D=income per farm (pesos)
source: table D-4 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 218].
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Table 37 Philippines: relationship of value-added per 
farm area to farm size (pesos per hectare), 1960
VA/cult . % area % area % area % area
size VA/ha ha cropped idle pasture forest
0-0.2 9559 953 56 .63 2 .19 0 1.15
0.2-0 .5 1388 478 92 .62 2.3 0 0.89
0.5-1 811 380 93 .18 3.51 0 0 .56
1-2 556 344 92 .58 4 .73 0 1.16
2-3 443 321 90 .58 6.48 0 1.63
3-4 397 321 87 .75 8.4 0.003 2 .59
4-5 359 323 83 .02 7.9 0.01 4.09
5-10 292 329 70.26 18.71 0.35 9 .22
10-15 229 338 56.19 25.2 1.39 15.68
15-2 0 249 374 57 . 8 23 .56 2 .58 14 .76
20-25 215 358 51. 97 25 . 63 3 . 87 17 .15
25-50 215 330 56.61 21.74 6.36 13 .96
50-100 196 298 58 .28 17 .67 11.38 11.23
100-200 143 207 59.57 13 .26 17 .12 7 .84
> 200 82 196 32 .4 11 .77 45.17 8.78
all 331 325 71.79 14.35 4.88 7.5
source: tables 4-18 and 4-19 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 70
Table 38 Output per acre by farm size, 
Pakistan, 1959-60
output per acre
size estimate 1 estimate 2
<1 739 .2 668.6
1-2.5 391.4 361.7
2 .5-5 277 .4 259 .2
5-7.5 248.5 236
7.5-12.5 216.3 205.9
12.5-25 179.5 158.5
25.50 136.2 148
50-150 76.9 83 .4
> 150 28.4 30.4
all 168 .1 168,1
source: table 4-26 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 81].
Table 39 Land productivity by farm size, Punjab 
1966-67/1968-69 (based on FAFBS)
size income per acre
irrigated
<12.5 467.78
12.6-25 391.51
25.1-50 258.99
> 50 134.35
barani
<12 .5 277 .75
12.6-25 172.81
25.1-50 42.69
> 50 40 .45
source: table 4-28 [Berry and Cline 1979: 82].
Table 40 West Pakistan: use of fertilisers by farm size
1960 and 1972
% farms using % cropped area % net sown
size fertiliser fertilised area fert
acres 1960 1972 1972 1960
<1 16.2 34 35 58
1-2.5 25.4 44 42 30
2.5-5 32 .1 48 42 19
5-7.5 36.6 51 42 15
7.5-12.5 41.2 55 43 13
12.5-25 44 58 43 10
25-50 41.3 53 41 8
50-150 26.6 45 41 5
> 150 13 .5 39 49 5
all 32.6 52 43 12
source: table 4-34 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 93].
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Table 41 Indices of land productivity, Punjab and Sind 
by district
Punj ab : output per cropped area, 5 major crops
size relatively backward { relatively progressive
acres 1 2 3 (4 5 6 7 8 9
<12 .5 104 .2 94.3 99.3 86.3 89.5 56 76.4 86.1 86.4
12.5-25 90.6 99.6 93 .6 92 92.9 65.3 83.4 88.1 91.5
25-50 67.5 103.8 85 .7 96.8 97 .7 89.8 94.8 91.1 91.3
> 50 50 .4 99.2 74 . 8 113 .8 104 .4 121 113.1 97.8 101.7
size
acres
Punjab: net 
relatively 
1 2
farm income 
backward (
3 (4
per cropped 
relatively 
5 6
area, 5 major 
progressive 
7 8
crop
9
<12 .5 102.6 103 102.8 94.6 87 .1 57 .5 79.7 89 89.2
12.5-25 100 111.4 105.7 98 .1 92 .6 66.9 85.9 93.8 94
25-50 70 111.4 90.7 97.7 97.5 90.7 95.3 93 .5 92 .4
> 50 39.4 92.8 66.1 106.1 104.8 119.9 110 .3 92.6 99
Sind: output per cropped area, 5 major crops 
size relatively backward relatively progressive
acres 10 11 12 13 14 15
<12 .5 
12.5-25 
25-50 
> 50
86.5
86.6 
86 . 6
110 . 9
84.6 
96 
93 .5 
106.5
79.8 96.2 
102,1 98.7 
95.2 91.3 
104 104.5
86.9
98.9 
93 .3
105
86.8
95.8
91.6
106.5
Sind:
size
acres
net farm income per cropped area, 5 major crops 
relatively backward relatively progressive 
10 11 12 13 14 15
<12.5 88.4 81.6 87.4 100 .4 92 ,4 89 .5
12.5-25 86.8 94.5 95.1 100.9 96.8 94.3
25-50 89.2 92 .4 93.1 89.8 91.8 91.1
> 50 109 .5 108.1 105.8 104.1 106 106.9
notes:
1) Jhelum 9) Punjab and
2) Rahimyav Khan 10) Jacobabad
3) average 11) Larkava
4) Gujranwala 12) Nawabshah
5) Sahiwal 13) Hyderabad
6) Lyallpur 14) average
7) average 15) Sind
8) Punjab
source: Khan [1975: 54].
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Table 42 Changes in intensity of agriculture, 1960-72 
West Pakistan
farm size net sown area/cultivable area
acres 1960 1972
<1 81 94.9
1-2.5 82 93 .5
2.5-5 83 93 .1
5-7.5 84 92.8
7.5-12.5 83 94.1
12.5-25 80 87.6
25-50 72 80.8
50-150 54 57 .8
>150 27 48.9
source: table 4-38 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 102],
Table 43 Factor productivity of Muda River farms 
by size, double-croppers, 1972-73
farm size VA per VA per unit output per 
relong relong land value relong
<1.5 843 1.18 883
1.5-2.5 454 0.665 535
2.5-3.5 485 0 . 674 570
3.5-5 392 0 .441 473
5-6.5 378 0.362 441
6 .5-8.5 378 0 .354 467
8.5-10.5 325 0.296 403
10.5-15 302 0,212 376
15-20 312 0 .247 379
20-40 287 0 .27 360
all 370 0.451 446
source: table 4-48 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 117].
Table 44 Selected empirical estimates of the relationship 
of farm size to productivity, India, 1968-9 and 197 0-1
equation year constant b
coefficients
c d R2
i 1970-1 882 -130 0.095
(41.6) (13.6)
11 1968-9 918 -168 0.12
(37.9) (15.6)
i n 1970-1 663 -108 0 . 07 0.20
(30.0) (11.9) (15.3)
IV 1970-1 496 -92 0 .046 4.6 0 .393
(2 2.0) (1 1.6) (1 1.0) (23.8)
note: t statistic in parentheses 
model: y - a + b log A + cP +dl
where y is output per acre, A is farm area, P is price of 
unirrigated land, I is percent of land irrigated
source: table 4-44 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 112].
415
Table 45 Regression results: land productivity in relation 
to farm size by individual crop, 1970-71
crop n const
coefficient 
log A
on:
P I R2
rice 761 698
(2 1.8)
-115
(8.5)
0.06
(9.8)
0.19
rice 761 596
(8 .8)
-105
(8.16)
0.046
(8.16)
2.8
(9.91)
0 .282
wheat 389 1021
(15.8)
-147
(6.28)
0 . 025 
(2 .33)
0.104
wheat 389 605 
(9.55)
-128
(6.47)
0 , 021 
(2.32)
6.06 
(12,7)
0.367
maize 220 343
(4.8)
-39 .6 
(1.77)
0 .098 
(4.3)
0 .105
maize 220 199 
(3 .33)
-17.8
(0.96)
0 . 079 
(4.2)
5.45
(10.4)
0.4
cotton 122 410
(4.33)
-83
(2.95)
0 .17 
(7.8)
0 .371
cotton 122 399
(4.24)
-76
(2 .66)
0 .13 
(4.5)
1.7
(1.64)
0.38
j owar 37 168
(1.36)
0 .78 
(0.014)
0.14 
(4.04)
0.285
jowar 37 46.2 
(0.47)
-6.62
(0.15)
0.08 
(2.71)
5.5
(5.07)
0.586
sugar 13 1630 
(2.85)
-242
(1.24)
0 . 005 
(0.05)
0.02
sugar 13 1446
(2.29)
-228
(1.14)
-0.0008
(0.008)
3.19 
(0.77)
-0.06
note: t values in parentheses
model: y = a + b log A +cP + dl
where A is output, P is price of unirrigated land 
and I is percentage area irrigated
source: table A-3 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 155].
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Table 46 Total social factor productivity: 
sensitivity analysis, India
farm size ( acres) 0-5 5-15 15-25 >25 all
I. interest rate on 
capital=10% 
labour cost at: 
a) zero 1.39 1.27 1.09 1.03 1.05
b) 0.5 wage 1.00 1.01 0.91 0.83 0.81
c) 0.75 wage 0.88 0 .92 0.84 0.76 0.72
d) full wage 0.79 0 .84 0.78 0.70 0.66
II. interest rate on 
capital=15% 
labour cost at: 
a) zero 0.93 0.84 0 .73 0 . 69 0.70
b) 0.5 wage 0 .74 0.72 0.64 0 .59 0 .58
c) 0.75 wage 0 .67 0.67 0 . 61 0 .55 0.54
d) full wage 0 .61 0.63 0 .58 0 .52 0.50
source: table A~13b [Berry and Cline, 1979: 174].
Table 47 Technical characteristics of 
sample farms: India
farm size cropping labour capital/ 
acres intensity days/acre labour
0-5 1.38 122 12.2
5-15 1,26 70 13.8
15-25 1.15 51 14.1
>25 1 47 11.7
all 1.15 82 13.1
source: tables A-l and A-12
[Berry and Cline, 1979: 149 and 171].
Table 48 
India
Average income per acre and HYV area , 1968-69 to 1970-71,
farm size HYV area 
%
acres 1968-69 
income/acre
income/
acre
1968-
HYV area income/ 
% acre 
69 1970-71
% change 
1970-71
% change 
HYV area
0-5 14.6 676 16.5 737 13 .0 9.0
5-15 12 .8 536 16.3 607 27 .3 13 .2
15-2 5 13 .1 426 18.5 482 41.2 13.1
> 25 11.1 243 18.1 346 63 .1 42 .4
all 12 .8 426 17.4 499 35.9 17.1
source: table A-16 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 179].
Table 49 Cost and source of capital by farm 
size and HYV classification
A.
farm size HYV non HYV all
acres % % %
0-5 13.9 18.6 17 .3
5-15 12 .3 14.8 13 .8
15-25 11.6 12 .7 12 .2
> 25 9.7 13.0 11. 8
12 .4 15 .8 14 .5
B.
source
HYV
%
non HYV
%
all
%
government 5 . 9 1.4 3.6
cooperative 28.6 17 .1 22 .7
comm banks 2.8 5.2 4.0
moneylender 29.3 69 .2 49.6
friends and 33.1 4.9 18.8
relatives
total 100 100 100
source: tables A-5 and A-8b
[Berry and Cline, 1979 : 160 and 164 ] .
Table 50 Farm productivity regressions for 1968-69, 
1969-70, and 1970-71, India
year constant
coefficients 
log A P
on:
I R2
1968-69 607 -139 0 .052 4.1 0 .292
{22.07) (14.1) (1 0.1) (15.3)
1969-70 558 -128 0.028 6.2 0.454
(24.9) (16.1) (6 .66) (28.5)
1970-71 496 -92 0.046 4.6 0.393
(22) (1 1.6) (11) (23.8)
note: t values in parentheses
model: y - a + b log- A +cP + dl
where A is output, P is price of unirrigated land 
and I is percentage area irrigated
source: table A-15 [Berry and Cline, 1979: 177].
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Table 51 Rice budgets and internal rates of return 
(LE 1982 per feddan), Egypt
quantity price income/cost
output unit small large small large small large
grain ton 
straw ton 
total
2 .56 
2 .63
2 .33 
2 .59
130.17 
9 .84
128.45 
9 .22
333 .25 
25.89 
359 .14
299.31 
23 .87 
323.18
inputs
labour phe1 
seeds qirat 
fert kg 
machines 
other2 
total
359.14 
2 .14 
79.63
277.86 
2.2 
72 .19
0.32 
23 .64 
0 .27
0 .32 
2 1. 08 
0.26
114.92 
50 .59 
21.5 
48 .22 
32 .63
263.93
88.92 
46.36 
18 .77 
40 .48 
35.24 
231.42
invest
land opportunity cost3 75 .71 66.65
IRR 8 .16% 11.69
1) phe = person-hour equivalents per feddan; 1 adult male hour 
= 2 child-hours or 1.5 adult female-hours
2) saqia and animal-powered irrigation, storage, haulage, 
interest and depreciation
3) with government rent fixed at arbitrarily low levels, 
opportunity cost pricing was used. This is derived from 
foregone income in maize and cotton for the 5 months that land 
is planted to rice. The opportunity cost is assumed to be the 
mean value between government rent levels and parallel market 
rents, plus foregone production of alternative crops. The 
opportunity cost for rice land is (152.20+29. 66+43.26)/3 =
LE 75.71 for small farms; for large farms (23.29+43.26)/3 =
LE 66.65.
source: Shepley [1985: 24]
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Table 52 Wheat crop budgets and internal rates of return 
(per feddan), Egypt
quantity price income/cost
output unit small large small large small large
grain ardab 9.9 10.25 10 .48 10.66 103 .75 109 .29
straw ton 4.42 3.82 34.3 45.06 151.62 172.14
total 255.37 281.43
inputs
labour phe 165.92 198.09 0.31 0 .31 51.44 61.41
seeds kg 87.2 82.54 0,11 0.12 9.59 10.23
f ert kg 80.41 64.63 0.29 0 .285 23 .32 18.42
machines LE 31.8 35.34
other1 LE 10 .41 15.80
total 126.56 141.20
investment
land opportunity cost2 103.83 109.62
IRR 6.53% 7.52%
1) saqia and animal-powered irrigation, storage, haulage, 
interest and depreciation
2) with government rent fixed at arbitrariliy low levels, 
opportunity cost pricing was used. This is derived from foregone 
income in birseem for the 6 months that land is planted to wheat. 
The opportunity cost is assumed to be the mean value between 
government rent levels and parallel market rents, plus foregone 
production of alternative crops. Thus shadow prices for small farms 
is (207.57+52. 05+51.91)/3=LE 103.87. For large farms, the shadow 
price is (229.43+47.52+51.91)/3=LE 109.62.
source: table 7.2 [Shepley, 1985: 35].
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Table 53 Cotton budgets and internal rates of return 
(LE 1982 per feddan), Egypt
quantity price income/cost
output unit small large small large small large
cotton
stalks
total
qantar 8.39 8.07 59 .75 59 .48 501.43 
22 .56 
523.99
480.01 
15.00
495.01
inputs
labour phe 
seeds kg 
fert kg 
machines LE 
micro nutrients 
pesticides 
other1 LE 
total
689 .76 
93 .17 
152 .06
643 .36 
125.82 
198.9
0.27
0.04
0.35
0 .27 
0.04 
0 .40
186 .24 
3 .72 
53 .22 
24.08 
16.40 
21.10 
24.53 
329.29
173 .71 
5.03 
79 .56 
23.50 
17.15 
12 .01 
18.09 
329.05
invest
land opportunity cost2 174 174
IRR 2 .51% -1.03%
1) haulage, interest/depreciation, sagia irrigation
2) LE 7.25 per qirat (weighted mean marginal value product 
of land in birseem and wheat) x 24 - LE 174 per feddan.
source: table 9.4 [Shepley, 1985: 76]
Table 54 Labour utilization per hectare cultivated, 
by crop pattern and holding size, Egypt
crops <0.8 0 00 1 to 2-4 >4
CWMa 6615 4246 2754 1965
WMb 8184 5298 2373
cottonc 7175 4234 2545 1837
riced 7652 3603 2105 1388
vegd 9046 4845 2437
sugard 8029 4410 5608 1960
notes:
a Cot ton-wheat-maize: 15 to 25% cotton 
b wheat-maize: over 25% wheat, less than 15% 
cotton
c rice and vegetables: over 25% 
d sugarcane: over 25%
source Wilson 1972: 9 tab 5
Table 55
crop
Yields
ltl
by farm size, Egypt, 1983
1-3 3-5 5-10 gelO all
wheat 1069 1332 1274 1115 898 1215
ssbirs 32 31 32 24 24 29
maize 2303 1568 1213 1209 1350 1439
rice 2320 2670 2623 2855 1914 2541
cotton 796 883 934 765 779 854
lsbirs 91 82 91 72 65 85
potato 0 6035 6009 0 0 6026
onion 5171 5750 7000 2000 5454 4949
tomato 0 6973 2271 2350 4118 4292
fruits 0 860 2927 970 7211 4030
source: Crouch et: al 1983 : 20
Table 56 Income
crop <1
net <
1
of cash costs
-3 3-5
per feddan,
5-10 >
Egypt
10 all
wheat -40 .74 53 .49 49.33 40 .2 39..06 46..19
ssbirs 46..52 37 .26 2 1.53 22 .06 2 1 .,35 29 .88
maize 56..66 60 .57 50. 04 49 .51 30.,55 53 ,.73
rice 97 .56 110 .11 110 .76 98.67 61 99 ,.65
cotton 120 .13 121 .44 137 .57 108.36 122 .,83 122 ,.34
lsbirs 107 .42 123 .44 164. 12 96.5 84 120 ,.53
potato 0 166 .82 137 .61 0 0 157 ,.09
onion 89 114 .54 5.82 -49.72 6 8.,36 49,.79
tomato 0 365 .27 62. 79 72 .1 244.,81 212 ,.58
fruits 0 128 45i.l 62.08 470 .,46 205,.36
source: Crouch et al. [1983: 21].
Table 57 Regression of yields on farm size and 
regional dummy, Egypt
var constant dummy t size t
cornl 1294 349 3 . 6 -15.7 -2 .45
corn2 94.6 -2.8 -0 .51 -0.9 -2 .45
cottonl 772 . 6 249 4 .56 -7.8 -2 .42
cotton2 169.2 64.8 5.03 -1.2 -1.57
ricel 2575 299 .9 1.48 -30.6 -2 .57
ric2 142 .2 32 .5 2 . 84 -2.1 -3 .12
wheat1 1394.8 -149 .6 -1.71 -13 .9 -2.66
wheat2 94.1 0 .16 0.03 -0.83 -2 .4
all 110 .9 29.8 4.33 -0.42 -1
cropl=physical yields primary only 
crop2=cash yields primary and secondary
source: Crouch et al. [1983: 22].
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Table 58 Regressions of yields on farm size and regional dummies, 
Egypt
cornl coef t corn2 coef t
int 1675 17 .3 82 14.5
z2 -491 -3.4 -5.3 -0 . 6
z3 102 0.9 19 .4 2.8
z4 -462 -3.3 4.8 0.6
z8 -277 -2 .1 22 2.8
z9 -380 -1.9 6 . 5 0.6
size -12 -2 -0.7 -1.9
r2 0.28 0 .22
cottonl coef t cotton2 coef t
int 981 15.8 217 13 .6
z2 -271 -2.7 -72.8 -2.8
z3 170 2.2 49.4 2.5
z4 149 1.7 14.8 0.6
z8 -292 -3 . 9 -63.6 -3.3
z9 -374 -4.6 -62 .3 -3
size
£,2
-3 
0 .43
-0.9 0
0.34
0
ricel coef t rice2 coef t
int 3555 14 .2 246.9 19.3
z2 -1668 -4.5 -134.1 -7
z3 -482 -1.5 -74.8 -4.5
z4 -703 -1.9 -99.3 -5.1
z8 -969 -3.2 -105.2 -6.7
z9 -1636 -4.8 -136.8 -7 . 9
size
r2
-17 
0 .22
-1.6 -1.3
0.4
-2.3
wheat1 coef t wheat2 coef t
int 1285 14 .2 91.4 15.1
z2 -452 -3.1 -27,9 -2 .8
z3 52 0.5 19 .7 2 .4
z4 477 3.4 11.7 1.3
z8 -40 -0.3 -3.8 -0.4
z9 -174 -1.4 -11.5 -1.4
size -8 -1.7 -0.4 -1.2
r2 0.29 0.25
all coef t
int 153 .6 20.1
z2 -46.8 -3.7
z3 -20.4 -2
z4 -38.4 -3
z8 -45 .7 -4.9
z9 -70 . 5 -6.8
size -0.1 -0.3
r2 0 .23
note: crop 1 = physical yields and crop 2 = value yields 
source: Crouch et al. [1983: 25-2].
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Table 59 Regressions of crop yields on selected indicators, Egypt
corn coef tvalue rice coef tvalue
int 1212 .5 5.5 int 1795.6 3.9
size 8.1 0.9 size -10.5 -0 . 6
N 2.3 2.3 N 4.3 1 .7
N2 -1.7 -1.6 N2 -3.9 -1.3
labour 3.0 0.7 labour 3.0 0 . 6
SC -19 .3 -0.1 SC 261.1 0.8
cash -206.3 -1.9 cash 465. 6 1.9
NR -236.3 -2.2 NR -0.2 0.0
HL/TL -481.4 -2.2 HL/TL -184.1 -0.4
r2 0 .23 £.2 0 .12
cotton coef tvalue wheat coef tvalue
int 606.4 5.1 int 948.2 4.4
size -9.4 -2 .1 size -7.9 -1
N 0.7 1.6 N 0.7 0.8
N2 -0.3 -0.7 N2 -0.4 -0.5
labour 0.5 1.2 labour -4.3 -1.1
SC 144.9 1.7 SC 3.2 0
cash 226.4 3.5 cash 186.8 1.9
NR -136.6 -2.1 NR 192 .2 1.9
HL/TL 171.4 1.5 HL/TL 219.6 1.2
r2 0 .22 2^ 0.16
all coef tvalue
int 119 .1 7.7
size -0.2 -0.3
N 0 -0.1
N2 -0.1 -0.2
labour 1 21
SC 3.2 0.3
cash 2 . 5 0.3
NR -2.8 -0.3
HL/TL -31.8 -1.8
r2 0.04
note: int = intercept term
size - farm size
N and N2 = nitrogen fertiliser application 
SC = sharecropping 
cash = cash rental system 
NR = land reform lands
HL/TL = proportion of hired labour to total
source: Crouch et al 1983: 28-29
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Table 60 Crop yields per feddan, 1984 by farm size, Egypt
size
feddan
wheat
ardab
cotton
qantar
rice
ardab
maize
ardab
0-1 8.97 7.83 18.86 13 .37
1-3 7 . 97 8.27 21.87 12 .83
3-5 7.95 8.90 21.07 12 .54
5-10 8.20 8.80 22 .67 12 .81
>10 6.05 9.50 28.33 13 .88
all 8.25 8.21 20 .87 12 . 99
source: Commander [1987: 174].
Table 61 Current population of tractors and agricultural equipment 
per 1000 feddans of crop area, by governorate: 1982-83, Egypt
governorate tractors ploughs sprayers threshers trailers irrig
(hp)
Alexandria 6.3 1.3 0.8 0.2 0.4 73 .6
Buheira 7 .1 5.6 0.2 1.0 1.1 133 .3
Gharbiya 9.4 11.2 4.4 2.1 6.4 114.3
Kafr al-Sheikh 5.9 6.4 3.4 1.1 1.1 115.3
Daqhaliya 8.3 10.7 4.5 1.2 4.8 191.2
Dumyat 8.3 5.5 2,9 0.4 1.9 393 .1
Sharqiya 6.8 7.0 3.2 1.2 4.8 73 .7
Ismailia 9.7 8.9 1.4 0.7 6.5 180.3
Suez 12 .7 11.8 1.5 1.5 3 .7 379.1
Bur Said
Menufiya 6.3 5.9 1.7 2.3 1.7 139.8
Qalubia 7.3 8.6 2.7 2.3 6.0 127.4
Cairo 4.4 3.9 0.4 1.4 139 .8
Giza 7.7 1.6 0.6 1.5 0.7 129.9
Beni Suef 4.5 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 104.6
Fayyum 7.0 5,0 1.1 0.1 2.3 13 .5
Minya 6.8 4.2 3.8 1.7 2.1 162.5
Assyut 7.7 10 .8 0.2 2.3 9.3 309.5
Sohag 7.7 6.8 0.9 3.1 4.1 266.6
Qena 10.6 7.6 0.4 3.1 4.3 610.0
Aswan 4.3 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 30.6
Matruh
New Valley 6.2 1.0 0.4 139 .1
N. Sinai
average 7.3 6.8 2.4 1.5 3.4 163.9
source: table 9A [Commander, 1987: 295],
Table 62 Mean value of material inputs per feddan: by 
crop, Egypt 1984
crop 0-1 1-3 3 -5 5--10 >10
wheat 16..60 18,.00 14,.90 17 ,. 60 20,. 00
sh birs 19,.20 17 ,.60 17 ,.10 16 ,.70 25 ,.00
lng birs 18..00 15,.80 18,.60 15,.30 22 ,.30
cotton 24,.00 23 ,.40 25,.10 22 ,.80 27 ,.00
rice 18,.90 21,.00 21,.00 23,.20 21,.80
maize 20,.20 23 .50 20,.30 20,.30 21,.50
source: Commander [1987: 292].
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Table 63 Developments in landownership in Egypt, 1952-65
(in thousands)
before 1952 reform after 1952 reform
size class 
(feddans)
holdings 
no. %
area 
no. %
holdings 
no. %
area 
no. %
small
< 5 2642 94.3 2122 35.4 2841 94.4 2781 46.6
medium
5-10 79 2.8 526 8.8 79 2.6 526 8.8
10-20 47 1.7 638 10 .7 47 1.6 638 10 .7
20-50 22 0.8 654 10 .9 30 1 818 13 .6
large
50-100 6 0.2 430 7.2 6 0.2 430 7.2
100-200 3 0.1 437 7.3 3 0.1 437 7.2
> 200 2 0.1 1177 19 .7 2 0.1 354 5.9
total 2801 100.0 5984 100 3008 100 5984 100
situation in 19611 situation in 19652
size class holdings 
(feddans) no. %
area 
no. %
holdings 
no. %
area 
no. %
size class
small
< 5 2919 94.1 3172 52 .1 3033 94.5 3693 57 .1
medium
5-10 80 2.6 526 8.6 78 2.4 614 9.5
10-20 65 2.1 638 10.7 613 1.9 527 8.2
20-50 26 0.8 818 13 .4 29 0 . 9 815 12 .6
large
50-100 6 0.2 430 7 6 0.2 392 6.1
100-200 5 0.5 500 8.2 4 0.1 421 6.5
> 200 - - - - - - -
total 3101 100 .0 6084 100 100 6462 6 4624 100
Notes:
1) after the promulgation of Law No. 127, June 1961.
2) excluding government properties.
3) there is some doubt as to the accuracy of this figure since 
the average size of ownership in this bracket works out at 8.6 
which is clearly inconsistent with the size class of 10 to 20 
feddans. The same situation applies to 1961.
4) the increase in the area of cultivated land between 1961 
and 1965 is mainly due to large-scale land reclamation schemes.
source: table 1.6 [Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 11].
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Table 64 Summary of changes in Egyptian landownership, 1952-65
(in thousands)
size class 
(feddans)
no. of holdings area owned
19521 1965 change 19521 1965 change (a) (b)
small
< 5
medium
2642 3033 391 2122 3693
(3353)
1571
(1231)
671 218!
5-10 79 78 -1 526 614 88 - 88
10-20 47 412 14 638 5273 -111 - -111
20-50 22 29 7 654 815 161 - 161
large
50-100 6 6 0 430 392 -38 - -38
100-200 3 4 1 437 421 -16 - -16
> 200 2 - -2 1177 - -1177 -8756 -302
total 2801 3191 390 5984 6462
(6326)
478
(342)
-2047 -
(a) = transfers of land as a result of the land reform programme
(b) = private sales and other transactions
Notes:
1) situation before the implementation of the agrarian reform law 
No. 178, 1952.
2) adjusted figure (see note to table #) .
3) these are doubtful figures. In the absence of firm evidence, 
Abdel-Fadil assumes that the decrease in this size class was 
counter-balanced by sales from public organisations to small 
farmers.
4) this represents the cumulative distribution of land reform land 
up to 1965.
5) including 110,000 feddans sold by other public organisations to 
small-holders.
6} this represents the total area requisitioned from 1952 to the end 
of 1966.
7) this represents the surplus of requisitioned area over the 
actually distributed land.
8) the number in parentheses under the official figures in the less 
than 5 feddan size class are Abdel-Fadil 's estimates of the 
effective increase in the total area of small-holdings derived by 
referring to the annual agricultural survey published by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in 1961-64. The official figures for this 
class reflect scheduled rather than effective transfers.
source; table 1.15 [Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 24].
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Table 65 Total population and households in ILO sample governorates
governorate rural share of rural number of
population population in households in
sample % the sample*
Dumyat 0.32 5.6 56
Gharbiya 1,30 22.6 226
Menufiya 1.22 21.2 213
Giza 1.00 17 .4 174
Beni Suef 0 .72 12 .5 125
Qena 1.19 20.7 206
Total 5.75 100.0 1000
*The number of households with valid answers varies since 132
questionnaires were discarded and another two were not usable for
some entries.
source: table A2.1 [Radwan, 1986: 21]
Table 6 6 Number of villages in the ILO sample by size
governorate large small total
Dumyat 0 1 1
Gharbiya 1 3 4
Menufiya 1 3 4
Giza 1 1 2
Beni Suef 1 3 4
Qena 2 1 3
Total 6 12 18
source: table A2.2 [Radwan, 1986: 22]
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Table 67 Distribution of the ILO household sample by governorate and 
village
governorate markaz population total households
and village (district) (1976) households selected
Dumyat
Meet al-Shiukh
Gharbiya
Shubra Blula 
al-Sakhawia 
Atf Abu Gindi 
Kamalia 
Al-Shaheedi
Menufiya
Tilwana
Manshat Masjid 
al-Khidr 
Kafr Mansur 
Manshat Abu 
Zikri
Giza
Shubak al- 
Sharki 
Salehia
Beni Suef
Al-Maimoun
Telt
Beni Ghoneim 
Kafr Mansur
Farskour
Kutour
I
Mahalla 
al-Kubra
Al-Bagour
I
Ashmoun
Quesna
Al-Saff
Al-Wasta
Al~Fashn
Al-Wasta
Beba
2 794
5 378
1 429
2 460 
4 644
6 121
1 112
3 285
4 047
13 176 
1 793
9 321 
5 141 
1 722 
3 062
560
1 045 
321 
386 
178
1 285
220
631
697
2 236 
386
2 080 
1 063 
375 
671
56
89
24
36
77
111
18
46
36
151
23
62
33
11
19
Qena
Tafnis
Higaza
Al-Amiria
Esna
Qus
Abu Tesht
6 921 
17 959 
5 021
1 219 
3 327 
1 124
44
129
33
source: Radwan [1986: 18, table 2.4],
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Table 68 All Egypt regression matrix
dep a b t n
y9ylO
yll
yl2
1.00 
0 .63 
0 .37 
1.15 
0.77 
0.96 
0 .59 
0 .50 
0 . 85 
1.14 
0.41 
0.67
-0.068 -3.041***
0.036 1.417
-0.104 -7.377***
-0.256 -7.062***
-0.146 -4.097***
-0.050 -2.233**
0.054 2.203***
-0.062 -2.254**
-0.118 -3.352***
-0.153 -2.235**
-0.041 -1.763*
0.019 0.727
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348
104
220
100
.0214 
. 0047 
.1140 
.1078 
.0392 
.0116 
.0113 
. 0290 
.0315 
. 0467 
. 0141 
. 0054
source: computed from ILO data
x=independent variable farm size or operated area, calculated as land 
owned + land rented in - land leased out, and measured in qirats.
yl=output per net cropped area. Net cropped area is taken as equal 
do farm size as fallow is negligible in land-scarce Egyptian 
agriculture. Output is measured in value terms and is the simple 
unweighted sum of the output values1 of individual crops.
y2=output per gross cropped area. Gross cropped area is computed by 
the simple addition of the areas planted under the crops listed 
above. Output is as above.
y3=cropping intensity as the ratio of gross cropped area to net 
cropped area.
y4=a second version of output per net cropped area computed by Radwan 
for his regression. This uses net farm output in the numerator, 
calculated as the (total value of crop sales + imputed value of own 
consumption) minus total production costs, including the value of 
own-produced inputs but excluding the imputed value or family labour.
y5=a second version of output per gross cropped area based on net 
farm output as above.
y6=a third version of output per net cropped area based on Radwan's 
calculations of total crop value. The latter for the most part agree 
with my own calculations of total crop value, but there are some 
discrepancies which may bias the results in favour of the inverse 
relation hypothesis. In some cases, the total crop values for large 
farms have been underestimated while for some small farms, total crop 
values appear to have been adjusted upwards.
y7=a third version of output per gross cropped area based on Radwan's 
calculations of total crop value.
y8=winter wheat yields in value terms. The data did include physical 
measures of output for the different crops, but were measured in
different physical units for different households. Some by weight and
others by ary measure. Producer prices do not vary significantly over 
farm size.
y9=winter birseem yields in value terms.
ylO=summer cotton yields in value terms.
yll=summer maize yields in value terms. 
yl2=summer rice yields in value terms.
1) Unit farmgate prices were recorded in the original survey. I ran 
supplementary regressions of producer prices for the major crops 
against farm size. The results revealed no significant variation in 
prices across farm size. Indeed the coefficients were weakly 
negative.
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Table 69 Regression results on XLO data disaggregated by 
governorate (i) output per net cropped area (yl) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0.88 -0 . 018 -0.589 125 .0028
Damietta 1.05 -0.047
COoT 1 1 415 . 0828
Menufia 1.06 -0,163 -2.865** * 71 .1063
Qena 0.82 0.062 1.328 78 . 0227
Beni Suef 0,99 -0.128 -1.442 74 .1067
Giza 1.20 -0.099 -2 . 933*** 74 . 1067
*** significant at the 1% level ** 5% level * 10% level
(ii) output per gross cropped area (y2) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0 .56 0.037 125288 0133
Damietta 0 .75 -0.047 -1.084 15 .0828
Menufia 0.54 0 .014 0.281 71 .0012
Qena 0 .58 0.163 3 . 087*** 78 .1114
Beni Suef 0.65 -0 .065 -0.682 62 . 0077
Giza 0.89 -0 . 040 -1.082 74 .0160
(iii) cropping intensity (y3) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0 .32 -0.055 -2.788*** 125 .0594
Damietta
Menufia 0 .52 -0.176 -4.661*** 71 .2395
Qena 0 .23 -0 .101 -3.251*** 78 .1221
Beni Suef 0.35 -0.063 -1.986** 62 .0617
Giza 0.31 -0.059 -2 .271** 74 .0668
(iv) net farm output per net cropped area (y4) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 1.04 -0 .218 -3 .706*** 122 .1027
Damietta 1.41 -0 .291 -3 . 654*** 15 .5067
Menufia 1.34 -0.340 -4.142 * * * 71 .1991
Qena 0.71 -0.042 -0.482 75 .0032
Beni Suef 0 .86 -0.170 -1.648 61 .0440
Giza 1.30 -0.204 -2.286** 71 . 0704
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(v) net farm output per gross cropped area (y5) and farm
size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0 .71 -0.163 -3.140** * 122 . 0759
Damietta 1.11 -0.291 -3.650*** 15 .5067
Menufia 0 .84 -0.174 -2.050** 70 . 0583
Qena 0 .46 0.064 0 .751 75 . 0077
Beni Suef 0 .51 -0.109 -1.048 61 .0187
Giza 0.98 -0.136 -1.525 71 .0326
(vi) output per net cropped area (y6) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0.90 -0 .034 -1.207 125 . 0117
Damietta 1.06 -0.054 -1.203 15 .1002
Menufia 0.90 -0 . 078 -1.041 71 .0155
Qena 0.81 0 . 062 1.293 78 .0215
Beni Suef 0.88 -0.068 -1.404 62 .0318
Giza 1.21 -0.106 -2.851*** 74 .1014
(vii) output per gross cropped area (y7) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0 .58 0 . 021 0 .798 125 .0052
Damietta 0.76 -0.054 -1.203 15 . 1002
Menufia 0.39 0.098 1.486 71 .0310
Qena 0.58 0.163 3 . 010*** 78 .1065
Beni Suef 0.53 0 .005 -0.099 62 .0002
Giza 0.90 -0.046 -1.170 74 .0186
(viii) winter wheat yields (y8) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0 .37 0.016 0.446 82 .0025
Damietta 0 .56 -0 .205 -1.566 13 .1824
Menufia 0.59 -0.072 -1.637 58 .0457
Qena 0 .21 0.107 1.996* 31 .1208
Beni Suef 0.34 -0.034 -0.696 29 . 0176
Giza 0.91 -0.357 -2.506* 5 .6768
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(ix) birseem yields (y9) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0.38 0.028 0.516 113 .0024
Damietta 0 .87 -0.134 -2 .179** 15 .2675
Menufia 0.76 -0.105 -2 .395** 61 .0886
Qena 0.89 -0.012 -0.193 42 .0009
Beni Suef 0 .92 -0.148 -1.547 48 .0494
Giza 1.03 -0.042 -1.794* 69 .0458
(x) cotton yields (yio) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0.98 -0 .585 -1.266 78 .0206
Damietta
Menufia -4 .86 3 .22 2 1.000
Qena
Beni Suef 1.69 -0.493 -1 .868* 24 .1369
Giza
(xi) maize yields (yii) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0 .40 -0.031 -0.775 70 . 0088
Damietta
Menufia 0.36 -0 . 004 -0.069 40 .0001
Qena 0 .24 0 . 052 0.650 18 .0257
Beni Suef 0.20 -0.002 -0.037 32 .0000
Giza 0 .48 -0.030 -0.846 60 . 0122
(xii) rice yields (yl2) and farm size
governorate a b t n R2
Gharbia 0.66 0.014 0 .584 43 .0042
Damietta 0 .71 0.060 1.075 10 .0816
Menufia 0.76 0.017 0 .407 36 .0048
Qena
Beni Suef 
Giza
0.68 0 . 074 1.001 10 .1112
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Table 70a Average levels of purchased input use by governorate
governorate Cl C2 C3 C4
Gharbiya
0.1116
0.1663 0.0880 0.2056
Damietta 0.0778 0.0935 0.0952 0.1178
Menufiya 0 .2557 0.2111 0.3081 0.2677
Qena 0.2653 0.6955 0 .2896 0.8065
Beni Suwayf 0.1465 0 .2608 0.1603 0.2916
Giza 0 .1926 0.1411 0.2128 0.1601
ALL 0.1980 0.2548 0.2291 0.3001
Cl = ratio of total outlays on fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and 
fodder total crop value 
C2 = ratio of total outlays on fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and 
fodder to net farm output 
C3 = ratio of total cost of purchased inputs to total crop value 
C4 = ratio of total cost of purchased inputs to net farm output
source: computed from ILO data
Table 70b Ratios of purchased inputs 
governorate
to own produced input s by
governorate fertilizer fodder seeds
Gharbiya 3 .7423 0.1480 2.5187
Damietta 0.8161 0 .0048 2.7900
Menufiya 1.6423 0.1563 1.1011
Qena 8.0911 0 .5318 2.5974
Beni Suwayf 4.6338 0 .0366 1.6135
Giza 3 .1957 0.1650 7.7747
ALL 3.9049 0 .1948 3.3954
source:computed from ILO data
435
Table 7 0c Average levels of mechanization by governorate
governorate Ml M2 M3 M4
Gharbiya 0 .4088 0.1872 0 . 0071 0 .0024
Damietta 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Menufiya 0.0140 0.0099 0 . 0055 0.0025
Qena 0.0744 0.0762 0.0044 0.0016
Beni Suwayf 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000
Giza 0.1010 0.0127 0 . 0026 0.0010
ALL 0.1724 0.0442 0.0043 0.0016
Ml = ratio of value of farm machinery and transport equipment to 
total crop value
M2 = ratio of value of farm machinery and transport equipment to 
net farm output
M3 = ratio of machinery fuel cost to total cost of purchased 
inputs
M4 = ratio of machinery running costs to total value of inputs
source: computed from ILO data
Table 7 0d Population of tractors and other agricultural
equipment per 1,000 feddans of cropped area by governorate 1981
82
governorate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gharbiya 9.4 11.2 4.4 2.1 6.4 114.3 hp
Damietta 8.3 5.5 2.9 0.4 1.9 393.1
Menufiya 6.3 5.9 1.7 2.3 1.7 139 .8
Qena 10 .6 7.6 0.4 3.1 4.3 610.0
Beni Suwayf 4.5 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 104.6
Giza 7.7 1.6 0.6 1.5 0.7 129 . 9
(1) tractors (4) threshers
(2 ) ploughs (5) trailers
(3) pesticide sprayers (6) mechanical power for irrigation
source: Commander [1987: 295].
Table 71 Disaggregated ILO data: by village
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a b c d e f
Gharbiya
Shubra Blula 11 89 57 -1.2 -0.24 -1.67
Atf Abu Gindi 12 22 9 -1.69 0.18 -2 .96
Kami iya 13 36 26 2 .08 1.18 0.41
Al-Shahidi 14 77 33 -0 .88 0 .72 -3 .08
Dumyat
Mit Shuyukh 21 55 15 -1.2 -1.2 0
Menufiya
Tilwana 31 110 36 -1.09 0 .19 -1.76
Manshat 
Masjid al-Khadr
32 18 11 -0.65 0 .45 -1.48
Kafr Mansur 33 46 24 -0.12 0.96 -3.2
Manshat Abu 
Zikri
34 38 1 0 0 0
Qena
Tafnis 41 44 24 0.5 1.62 -1.92
Higaza 42 129 38 0.09 1.44 -2 .16
Al-Amiriya 43 33 16 1.39 0.84 0 .73
Beni Suef
Al -Ma' mun 51 62 33 -0 .95 0 .27 -1.99
Beni Ghoneim 52 11 1 0 0 0
Telt 53 33 20 -0 .48 -0.25 -0.4
Kafr Mansur 54 19 9 -0 .18 -0.44 0.94
Giza
Shubak al-Sharqi 61 151 68 -2 .58 -1.02 i H1 DO
Salehia 62 22 6 -0.93 -0.93 0
a=village code 
b=sample size
c-sample households with operated area 
d=t value (regression with net cropped area) 
e=t value (regression with gross cropped area) 
f=t value (regression with cropping intensity).
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Table 72 Land distribution by holding size: Shubak al-Sharqi
class farms % owned % rented %
It 1 263 36.99 216 82 47 18
1-3 395 55 .55 287 73 108 27
3-5 44 6.19 36 82 8 18
5-10 8 1.12 4 50 4 50
gt 10 1 0 .14 1 100 0 0
total 711 100.00 544 167
class land % 
(feddans)
owned O,“O rented %
It 1 172.625 14.56 146.333 85 26.292 15
1-3 744.167 62 .79 551.167 74 193.000 26
3-5 188.667 15 . 92 152 .792 81 39.875 19
5-10 64 .792 5.47 32.042 49 32.750 51
gt 10 15 1.27 15 100 0 0
total 1185.251 100.00 897 .334 291.917
source:: village cooperative, mushrif zira'i ,
Table 73 Distribution of farms and land by farm size
in Giza governorate, 1981
S 1 Z G farms % area %
<1 41497 43 .46 21041 12 .55
1-3 41947 43 .93 67416 40.20
3-5 7220 7 .56 25390 15.14
5-10 3234 3.39 20829 12 .42
>10 1592 1.67 33008 19 . 68
total 95490 100 167684 100
source: table la [Ministry of Agriculture (Giza), 1985: 4]
Table 74 Regression results, 1990 fieldwork
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dependent constant coefficient r2 n t sd
R1 NY 1745.3 -95.86 0.0605 62 -1.97 0.0539
R2 GY 609.52 13 .68 0.0093 62 0 .751 0.4558
R3 PY 107 -5.8 0.01306 40 -0.71 0.4825
R4 PY 8.5 0.3 0.002 58 0 .395 0.6944
R5 PY 64 15 .7 0.045 10 0.617 0.5547
R6 PY 8.7 -0.6 0 , 071 43 -1.78 0.0831
R7 CROPINT 2 .89 -0.2199 0,2711 62 -4.724 0.0000
R8 VALACRE 13591 922 0 .0309 62 1.275 0 .2080
R9 LABINT 400 -65.78 0 .2285 62 -4.216 0.0001
RIO NY 1162.74 16.163 0.1069 68 2.812 0.0065
Rll GY 603 .15 13 .3 0 .865 68 20 . 6 0.0000
R12 PY 7.4 -0.006 0.0000 57 -0 . 021 0.9834
R13 PY 36.9 0.3 0.076 49 1.967 0.0551
*R refers to the regression equations discussed in the text
The independent variable is farm size in feddans unless 
otherwise stated.
NFQ=net farm output=total farm output-input costs 
GY=value of output per gross cropped feddan 
NY=value of output per net sown feddan 
PY=physical yield per feddan (see text for unit of 
measurement)
CROPINT-cropping intensity (gross cropped area/net sown area) 
VALACRE=land value per feddan
LABINT= standard!zed man-days per feddan per year
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Table 75 Size-class averages for Shubak al-Sharqi, Giza
farm size nca nyield gyield cropint labint valacre
<1 0.61 1522.86 556.66 2 .72 369.41 12793
1-3 1.76 1853.16 772.73 2.44 259.27 16454
3-5 3 .45 1419.25 607.84 2.36 165.03 14366
5-10 6.13 921.83 561.08 1.59 115.90 20955
>10 10.00 2566.00 938.76 2 .73 90.00 20000
@hyv fragment hhnrO pcq Pcy
<1 0.23 1.47 (2.41) 8.60 131.61 275.15
1-3 0.36 2.45 (1.39) 10 .38 351.18 460.76
3-5 0 .40 1.80 (0.52) 8.60 751.98 1033.26
5-10 0 .13 1.50 (0.24) 12 .50 481.40 824 .20
>10 0.39 6.00 (0.60) 7.00 3694.29 3848.57
pew ©market @lf am ©lhired. machine
<1 2427 0 .44 0.96 0.04 219
1-3 3515 0 .44 0 .82 0.18 214
3-5 7840 0.45 0.84 0 .16 288
5-10 11783 0 .56 0 .77 0.23 206
>10 37500 0.94 0.17 0.83 550
source: Giza survey data 1990
nca-net cropped area
nyield=value of output per net cropped feddan 
gyield-value of output per gross cropped feddan 
cropint-cropping intensity 
labint=labour intensity 
valacre=land value per feddan
@hyv=percentage gross cropped area under HYV crops
fragment^number of fragments per farm (in brackets, intensity
of fragmentation)
hhnrO=number of family members in household 
pcq=per capita output 
pcy=per capita income 
pcw=per capita wealth
@market=percent age of output marketed 
©lfam=percentage family labour 
@lhired=percent age hired labour
machine=machinery inputs (machine rentals+maintenance 
costs+10% of owned machinery)
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Table 7 6 Relationship between family labour, labour input 
intensity and cropping intensity: Shubak al-Sharqi
1) seasonal yields on seasonal cropping intensity
constant b error n t
winter 959 -23 .4 252 62 -0.093
summer 592 124.3 161 62 -0 .773
nili 84 338 54 62 6.234
2 ) seasonal yields on seasonal family labour input pei
constant b error n t
winter 962 -0.3 0 . 66 62 -0.456
summer 449 0.2 0.4 62 0.482
nili 173 1.64 0.36 62 4.616
all year 1470 0 .457 0.357 62 1.28
3) seasonal yields on seasonal labour input intensity
constant b error n t
winter 946 0.097 0.66 62 -0.148
summer 441 0.25 0.4 62 0.59
nili 165 1.64 0 .34 62 4.9
4) seasonal yields on, farm size
constant b error n t
winter 911 16 27 62 1.396
summer 447 -16 23 62 -0.689
nili 373 -46 22 62 -2.026
5) seasonal land use (cropped area/farm size) on farm
constant b error n t
winter 1.02 -0 .05 0.012 62 -4 .12
summer 1.0 6 -0.06 0.017 62 -3 .44
nili 0.8 -0.1 0.04 62 -2 .736
6) seasonal labour input intensity on farm size
constant b error n t
winter 119 -15 4.9 62 -3 ,22
summer 159 -22 .7 6.4 62 -3 .56
nili 112 -18 .5 7.2 62 -2 .56
7) annual net yields on cropping intensity
annual 2 89 511 99 62 5 .158
8) annual net yields on labour input intensity
annual 1442 0 .52 0.36 62 1.438
9) net yields on annual family labour input
annual 1561 0 .11 0.29 62 0 .37
10) net yields on percentage family labour
annual 1605 -10.6 394 62 -0 .27
11) net yields on family labour input per feddan 
annual 1470 0.45 0.36 62 1.28
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Table 77 Per capita net income and poverty levels by size class, 
Shubak al-Sharqi, 1990
CLASS AVNCA AVNETINC AVPCNETY AVPOVERT
1.00 .61 1786.52 227.15 -137.85
2.00 1.76 3018.11 321.56 -43.44
3.00 3 .45 5192.20 599 .27 234.27
4.00 6.13 5798.00 472 .78 107.78
5.00 10 . 00 14390.00 2055 .71 1690.71
AVNCA = operated area; AVNETINC = net income; AVPCNETY = per capita 
net income; AVPOVERT - divergence from poverty line of LE 3 65
Table 78 Average incomes and their sources, by size class,
Shubak al-Sharqi, 1990
CLASS AVINC AVEXINC AV@EXINC
1.00 2366.32 1234.47 ,43
2 .00 4828.73 1148.39 .22
3 .00 8886.00 2419.00 .24
4.00 10302.50 4285.00 .39
5.00 26940.00 1080 .00 .04
AVINC = average income per household; AVEXINC = average outside 
earnings; AV@EXINC = average proportion of income earned off-farm 
Note that one of the farms in t the 5-10 feddan class has a high 
salaried member who works as a civil servant.
Table 79 Average levels of debt by size class, Shubak al-Sharqi, 1990
CLASS AVLOAN AVDl AVD2 AVD3 AVD4
1.00 1177.91 .50 .75 .05 1597.67
2.00 1079.33 .23 .49 .03 643.09
3.00 3450.00 .35 1.06 . 05 1076.47
4.00 600.00 .07 .19 .01 120 . 00
5.00 16000.00 .59 1.11 .06 1600.00
AVLOAN = average loan; AVDl = debt to income; AVD2 = debt to net 
income; AVD3 = debt to assets; AVD4 = debt per feddan
Table 80 Average levels of rent by size class, Shubak al-Sharqi, 1990
CLASS AV@RENT AVRENTA AVRENT
1.00 .80 .57 258.37
2 .00 .62 1.09 231.59
3 .00 .48 1.65 206.90
4.00 .40 2.00 240.00
5.00 .40 4.00 45 .00
AV@RENT = average rented area as percentage of total; AVRENTA = 
average rented area; AVRENT = average rent per feddan
Table 81 Marketed output per size class,
Shubak al-Sharqi, 1990
CLASS AVMl AVM2
1.00 .55 .50
2.00 .47 .45
3.00 .40 .45
4.00 .59 .56
5.00 .95 . 94
AVM1 = marketed crop (
AVM2 = marketed output
Table 82 Land distribution by farm size: Higaza al-Qibli
owned rented all
class holdings area holdings area holdings area
<1 432 251.75 320 158 752 409 .75
1-3 740 1317 .34 266 429.5 1006 1746.84
3-5 142 544 39 148 181 692
5-10 120 842 5 31.375 125 873 .375
>10 12 158.5 4 42.792 16 201.292
TOTAL 1446 3113.59 634 809.667 2080 3923.257
source: mushrif zira'i, Higaza cooperative
Table 83 Distribution of farms and land by farm size 
in Qena governorate, 1981
size farms % area %
<1 55243 39.90 24500 7,58
1-3 52051 37 .59 87400 27 . 05
3-5 16506 11.92 59411 18,39
5-10 10292 7 .43 67142 20.78
>10 4369 3.16 84619 26.19
total 138461 100 323072 100
source: table la [Ministry of Agriculture (Qena), 1985:
Table 84 Size-class averages for Higaza al-Qibli, Qena
farm size nca nyield gyield cropint labint valacre
<1 0.51 1190 802 1.69 486 11176
1-3 1.85 1225 854 1.51 284 8649
3-5 3.31 1144 839 1.41 185 11329
5-10 6.69 1324 999 1.34 170 10339
>10 26.00 1617 1315 1.23 113 12115
@hyv fragment hhnrO pcq pcy
<1 0.29 1.86 (3.6) 5.79 126 177
1-3 0.38 3.96 (2 .1) 8.33 329 392
3-5 0.38 5.25 (1 .6) 7 .50 586 716
5-10 0 .51 7 .67 (1 .2) 10.67 914 994
>10 0 . 64 5 . 00 (0 .2 ) 6.50 6853 7031
pew ©market ©If am ©lhired machine
<1 2616 0 .44 0 .86 0.14 198
1-3 3918 0 .54 0.72 0.28 373
3-5 7446 0.58 0.61 0.39 276
5-10 11445 0.64 0.50 0.50 1193
>10 68512 0 .89 0.26 0 .74 3543
source: Qena survey data 1990
nca-net cropped area
nyield=value of output per net cropped feddan 
gyield=value of output per gross cropped feddan 
cropint =cropping intensity 
labint=labour intensity 
valacre=land value per feddan
@hyv=per cent age gross cropped area under HYV crops
fragment=number of fragments per farm (in brackets, intensity
of fragmentation)
hhnrO=number of family members in household 
pcq=per capita output 
pcy=per capita income 
pcw=per capita wealth
@market=percentage of output marketed 
@lfam=percentage family labour 
Qlhired-percentage hired labour
machine=machinery inputs (machine rentals+maintenance 
costs+10% of owned machinery)
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Table 85a Farm utilisation of agricultural machinery, 1981
Giza
type
owned/
shared
rented
public
rented
private total
small tractors 321 480 5671 6472
large tractors 1657 3398 63344 68399
other tractors 715 739 5384 6838
fixed pumps 3893 247 9379 13519
mobile pumps 4892 248 22514 27654
threshers 695 1357 25277 27329
Qena
type
owned/
shared
rented
public
rented
private total
small tractors 149 145 2855 3149
large tractors 2657 2758 98687 104102
other tractors 1468 1283 23606 26357
fixed pumps 4271 2390 33022 39683
mobile pumps 7835 890 64958 73683
threshers 1564 651 59663 61878
Qus district 
type
owned/
shared
rented
public
rented
private total
small tractors 16 2 444 462
large tractors 196 24 11844 12064
other tractors 34 8 330 372
fixed pumps 476 10 5185 5671
mobile pumps 689 15 7560 8264
threshers 92 11 3506 3609
Saff district 
type
owned/
shared
rented
public
rented
private total
small tractors 34 80 244 358
large tractors 101 2161 3456 5718
other tractors 40 408 160 608
fixed pumps 204 31 483 718
mobile pumps 77 34 226 337
threshers 28 416 1725 2169
source: table 4 6a [Ministry of Agriculture, Qena,
1985: 140] and [Ministry of Agriculture, Giza, 1985: 129].
Table 85b Size distribution of owned farm equipment, 
Qena and Giza
Qena
size tractors pumps threshers
n Q,O n % n %
<1 222 5 587 5 56 4
1-3 444 10 2777 23 186 12
3-5 531 12 2530 21 194 12
5-10 1167 27 3361 28 410 26
>10 1910 45 2851 24 718 46
total 4274 100 12106 100 1564 100
Giza
size tractors pumps threshers
n % n % n %
<1 162 6 740 8 59 8
1-3 569 21 3822 44 201 29
3-5 484 18 1693 19 141 20
5-10 664 25 1369 16 140 20
>10 815 30 1161 13 154 22
total 2693 100 8785 100 695 100
source: table 46a [Ministry of Agriculture, 1985: 129],
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Table 86 Input shares in total crop revenue in four regions: 1965-79
(3 year average), Egypt
year anim mech seed manu fert ins
Delta
65-67 9.99 0.37 4.66 3 .43 5.96 2 .62
68-70 7.33 3 .94 5.36 3 .59 6.82 1.67
71-73 5.02 5.32 4.56 3.25 6.12 1.80
74-76 4.08 5 . 65 4.13 3.36 4.95 1.32
77-79 3.70 5 .33 4.51 3 .00 3.89 1.25
65-70 8.73 2.16 5.01 3 .51 6.39 2 .15
71-79 4.27 5.43 4 .40 3.20 4.99 1.46
othr lab rent prof r+p 1+r+p
0 ,.87 19 ,.21 23 ,.59 29,.17 52 .76 71,.97
0 . 87 18 .34 23 ,.05 29 .02 52 .07 70 .41
0 . 84 14..72 19 ,.78 38 .60 58..38 73 .10
1 ,.34 15..50 15,.82 43 .85 59,.67 75 ,.17
1 ,.36 17 ,.36 13 ,.71 45,.88 59 ,.59 76,.95
0 ,.87 18,.78 23 ,.32 29 ,.10 52 ,.42 71,.20
1 .18 15..86 16,.44 42 .78 59,.22 75,.08
UG
65-67 5.97 0.21 3 .57 3 .86 4.97 1.34
68-70 5 .43 2 . 07 4.10 4.46 6 .24 1.27
71-73 3 .74 2 .12 3 .78 4 .11 5.32 1.04
74-76 3 .27 2 .42 4.23 3 .58 4.36 0 .83
77-79 3.26 3.28 5.97 3 .51 3 .48 1.01
65-70 5.70 1.14 3 . 84 4,16 5 . 61 1.31
71-79 3 .42 2 . 61 4.66 3 .73 4.39 0.96
0 .88 14..30 19 ,.61 45 ,.28 64,.89 79..19
1 ,.17 16,.23 20 ,.74 38 ,.29 59..03 75..26
0 ,.97 13 ,.10 16,.56 49,.27 65,.83 78,.93
0 ,.95 13 ,. 02 13 ,. 14 54 ,.20 67 .34 80 ,.36
1 . 11 15 ,. 60 13 ,.72 49 ,.04 62 ,.76 78,.36
1 ,.03 15,.27 20 .18 41,.79 61..97 77 ,.24
1 ,.01 13 ,.91 14 .47 50 .84 65,.31 79,.22
ME
65-67 4.01 1.20 3 .51 3 .65 6 .51 1.15
68-70 3 . 97 2.36 3.97 3.79 8.59 1.60
71-73 2 .67 2 .73 3 .77 3 .51 7.55 1.32
74-76 2.39 3.25 3.75 3 .43 5.62 0 . 94
77-79 3 . 07 4.81 4.39 3 .12 4.67 0.95
65-70 3 . 99 1.78 3 .74 3 .72 7 .55 1.38
71-79 2 .71 3 . 60 3 . 97 3 .35 5.95 1.07
1 ,.05 17 .16 20 ,.40 41,.35 61..75 78,.91
1 . 26 19 ,.26 23 ,.07 32 ,.13 55.,20 74,.46
1 ,.12 15 ,.40 19 ,.43 42 ,.50 61..93 77..33
1 ,.25 19..54 14,. 85 44,.98 59..83 79 .37
1 ,.41 2 1,.64 13 ,.98 41,. 95 55..93 77 ,.57
1 ,.16 18,.21 2 1 ,.74 36,.74 58,.48 76,.69
1 ,.26 18 ,.86 16,.09 43 ,.14 59 ,.23 78,.09
UE
65-67 5.59 7.13 4.82 0.81 7.97 0.77 1.27 18.09 22.85 30.70 53.55 71.64
68-70 5.33 9.96 5.92 1.70 9.41 1.44 1.41 19.79 23.53 21.50 45.03 64.82
71-73 4.06 8.53 5.38 1.42 8.28 0.92 1.32 16.45 18.50 35.13 53.63 70.08
74-76 3.56 6.79 6.00 1.48 6.45 0.74 1.45 21.81 13.86 37.86 51.72 73.53
77-79 5.07 6.51 6.19 1.07 5.57 0.59 1.75 28.01 13.45 31.80 45.25 73.26
65-70 5.46 8.55 5.37 1.26 8.69 1.11 1.34 18.94 23.19 26.10 49.29 68.23
71-79 4.23 7.28 5.86 1.32 6.77 0.75 1.51 22.09 15.27 34.93 50.20 72.29
source: table 10 [Esfahani, 1988: 154].
anim=animals 
seed=seed 
fert=fertiliser 
othr=other inputs 
rent=land rent
mech=machinery 
manu=manufactured inputs 
ins=insecticides 
lab=labour 
prof =pro fits
r+p=rent plu profits l+r+p=labour+rent+profits
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Table 87 Lending categories currently 
implemented for main field crops during 
1988, Egypt
lending category
crop sub*l non-sub
wheat 12 70
bean 15 50
lentil 15 15
onion 8
garlic 100 100
potato 300
tomato 150
cotton 75 50
rice 70 50
maize 40
sugar 650 50
soya 50
1) subsidized interest rate ranges from 3.5% to 6.5% 
source: Ministry of Agriculture, PBDAC, 1989 p.59.
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